XVIII. UNLAWFUL DETENTION OF ILL EMPLOYEE. An employee acting as saleswoman for the defendant in its veil department became violently ill while at work. She asked for a pass to get her hat and coat, it being a rule of the defendant that hats, coats, and other street apparel should be placed in a locker on reporting for duty. Permission to get her coat, etc., was refused and she was compelled to remain in the store for over two hours on the ground that no passes could be issued, prior to closing time, before the holiday season was over. When finally allowed to go home she was suffering from chills, the weather was cold, and she was compelled to travel five miles to her residence. On arriving home her condition became worse, and despite medical aid, she died six days later. While it was alleged that deceased's death was caused solely by the act of the defendant in compelling her to remain two hours in the store, the court was of the opinion that such allegation would be difficult to prove, but that, in any event, the matter should not be determined on a demurrer. As to the liability of the defendant for restraining the deceased from going home, the court spoke as follows: KEEFE V. STRAUS, 91 Misc. 627 (Sept., 1915), in part. A more serious question arises as to whether the act of the defendants in refusing to permit the sick woman to obtain her wearing apparel from the locker so that she might go home was a wrongful act in a legal sense, and such as to create under the circumstances a cause of action. The general rule governing actions brought to recover for death caused by wrongful act is stated as follows in 13 Cyc. 318: "In most cases the question of the right to recover for the death of a person by wrongful act is merely a question of negligence, and is to be governed by the same principles and considerations of negligence where the results are less serious." The best definition of negligence is that given by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts: "The failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." Unquestionably the defendants owed a duty to observe some degree of care for their employee while she was engaged in the performance of her duties to them. What precaution did these admitted circumstances justly demand of the defendants? If the deceased had been working on a machine and had cut off her arm in the presence of the defendants, and they had stood by and allowed her to bleed to death, no one would question their liability. Here there was more than a mere omission. The deceased was shaking with a chill and vomiting when she asked the defend ants for the pass to get her apparel so that she might obtain 'immediate medical attention. Her illness and distress were obvious. Yet the defendants, it is alleged, and for the purposes of the demurrer it must be deemed to be true, however incredible, actually interfered with her leaving and obtaining medical attention, as a result of which she was detained in the store in this condition for over two hours. The suggestions in the brief for the defendants that the deceased might have gone home without her hat and coat and other wearing apparel that was kept by them under lock and key, or that she might have borrowed a coat, or might have bought a coat in the store, do not appeal to the court and will hardly be repeated to the jury. The deceased was, in effect, refused permission to leave, and the demurrer admits that by defendants' refusal to give the deceased a pass she was forced to remain. That this was not only an omission of that degree of care which circumstances justly demanded, but amounted to a positive wrongful act is, in my opinion, beyond question. A very different situation may be disclosed upon the trial, but to hold that upon these conceded facts there is no cause of action would be a reproach to justice. The motion for judgment is granted, with ten dollars costs, with leave to withdraw the demurrer and answer within ten days on payment of said costs." I. MEMBERSHIP, EXPULSION, REINSTATEMENT, ETC., IN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS. A. EXPULSION AND REINSTATEMENT 1. PROCEEDINGS TO REMOVE MEMBER DRAZEN V. CURBY, 172 App. Div. 417 (April 20, 1916), abstract. When a member of a local labor organization who has been expelled upon charges filed, has had notice of the charges and has appeared and defended the same, has appealed to the respective bodies authorized by the organization to hear such appeals, and his expulsion has been approved, the court will not interfere with the determination, where the proceedings were in all respects regular and in accordance with the constitution and rules of the organization. 2. EXPULSION WITHOUT NOTICE (1) ROBERTS V. SCHIFFERDECKER, 170 App. Div. 918 (July, 1915), abstract. A member of a labor organization may not be expelled by the organization without notice and opportunity to be heard. In a memorandum opinion, the Appellate Division, Second Department has said: "Judgment reversed, with costs, and decision and judgment in favor of plaintiff rendered, with the additional finding of fact that the committee, on February 10, 1912, immediately after its organization, without giving any notice to plaintiff and without his attendance or presence, went to Somers Hall and investigated the charge. The ground of our determination is that we conclude that the attempted expulsion of the plaintiff was invalid for the reason that it was incompetent for the grievance committee to investigate at all until after it had given the plaintiff notice and opportunity to attend before it. Our such determination, however, is without prejudice to the right of the local organization to properly try the plaintiff upon charges preferred against him." The (2) GILMORE V. PALMER, 109 Misc. 552 (December, 1919), abstract. Plaintiff was suspended from the defendant union, without notice, and without an opportunity to be heard or a trial. constitution of the union provided, in substance, that any member advocating its disruption, should stand by that act expelled, and that the General Executive Board should enforce this provision |