Spirit's influence; yet many eminent Arminian divines have displayed the most evangelical sentiments. See Wesley, on Original Sin, against Dr, Taylor; and Mr. Fletcher, of Madeley, on the Fall of Man.

But for the satisfaction of the English reader, who is not in possession of Wall on Infant Baptism, I shall here annex some extracts from the writings of Pelagius, as given by Archbishop Usher, some of which are to be found in Wall. It will appear from them how great a similarity there exists between the mode of reasoning adopted by our ancient Britons, and some of his countrymen of the present and the last age.

His views of free will he thus states: "There exists in us an ability or capacity planted by God as a fruitful and powerful principle, by which we may incline to either side: this, according as the will inclines, may produce fruit of various kind, and which, according to the option of him who cultivates it, may either be decked with the flowers of virtue, or be deformed with the weeds of vice." Then he subjoins, " As we have, therefore, in us the principle of free agency, to be our strong and firm guard against sin, which the Creator hath endowed every man's nature with, we are also through his inestimable goodness fortified by his continual assistance."

Although we may not be disposed to censure what is contained in the above extract, when speaking philosophically of man as a free-agent; yet, such a descant on the dignity of human nature, without the least allusion to the change and alteration made in man by the fall, with so vague a reference to the grace of God, bespeaks a mind unacquainted with the plan of our salvation by Christ.

Pelagius wrote a short commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans; from which Usher gives us seve

ral extracts. The following exposition of the latter part of the seventh chapter of that Epistle contains nothing reprehensible for what it expresses, but rather for what is omitted; and it was there he was generally faulty. "This, which you apply to the state of the apostle, all ecclesiastical persons consider him in that place as personating the condition of a sinner, and as yet living under the law, who from vicious habits had contracted a kind of necessity of sinning, so that when he felt inclined to that which was good, his bad habits precipitated him into evil. Under the form of one person he illustrates the situation of a people sinning while under the old law, whom he shews were to be delivered by Christ alone from that evil state, who first forgives the sin of the believer through baptism; and then, through the imitation of himself, he urges them on to perfect holiness, and subdues the vicious habits by the example of his virtues." There is no mention of the internal operation of grace to counteract the propensities of fallen nature; but it is suggested that the example of Christ's life set before us is sufficient to lead us on to perfect holiness. As he would have it that men were depraved owing to bad examples, rather than through any inherent degeneracy of their nature; so he seems to consider the example of Christ as the greatest assistance to holiness we derive from the gospel. In his treatise on free-will he has the following passages: "He who runs to God, and desires to be governed by him, that is, he whose will acquiesces in the will of God, and by cleaving to him continually becomes one in spirit with him, as the apostle says; this he cannot do but in the exercise of his free-will. This, whosoever improves well, he gives himself up so fully to God, and mortifies his own will so completely, that he can say with the Apostle, I live, yet not I; but Christ liveth in

me: he surrenders his heart into the hands of God, that God may incline as he thinks proper."

In explaining the apostle's words, God worketh in us to will and to do, he says, "He worketh in us to will what is good, and to work what is good; for while we are engrossed by earthly desires, and like brute animals delight only in the things which are temporal, he inflames us by representing to us the excellence of future glory, and with the promise of its rewards; while by his manifested wisdom he excites our sluggish will to the love of God, and at the same time he allures us to every thing that is good."

"Under all this," says the primate, "there lies concealed a deadly poison, which Augustine, in his first book, De Gratia Dei, hath laid open. This man, when closely pressed, we find, acknowledged the internal aids of the Holy Ghost: but we may observe in what way he did this; it is all to be applied to the great things which are represented to us in the Sacred Records; and thus all inspiration is made to consist in that revelation of Divine things which is made to us in the Scriptures.

As a further specimen of Pelagius's mode of reasoning, Augustine has given the following extract, which I take from Vossius's History of Pelagianism. He distinguishes between the power, the will, and the act:"In the first," he says, "we consider the power; secondly, the will; thirdly, the action. As to the first, the power is in nature; the will in our determination, (in arbitrio); the being actually good in the affection. The first, especially, belongs to God, who conferred it on his creature: but the other two, that is, to will and to act, are to be ascribed to man as proceeding from our own choice. There human virtue consists in willing and acting; yea, this is the praise of both man and God, for it is he who hath afforded us the capacity to will and

to act; for that very capacity he assists by the aids of his grace. But that man is capable of both willing and accomplishing that which is good, it is from God. The one (that is, the capacity,) may exist alone; but the other two (the willing and doing) can never exist distinct from the other. Therefore, I am at my liberty neither to will nor to do a good action: but I cannot be divested of the capacity; it exists in me, even in spite of my opposition to it; nor doth nature know any intermission in this respect. But a few instances may throw some light on this subject. The faculty of seeing is not ours; but whether we make a proper or improper use thereof lies with us. And in order to comprise all under one; that we are endued with a capacity to act, speak, or think aright, comes from him, who hath endued with such a faculty, and assists in the exercise of it. But when we either do, or speak, or think aright, it is our own act; because in all these respects we are capable of perverting the capacity with which we are endued: therefore, when we assert that man may live without sin, we ascribe the praise to God, who hath conferred upon us that power; for there can be no cause of ascribing any thing to man, where the Divine power alone is concerned." Here Pelagius acknowledges that it is in God we live and move; and he ascribes praise to God for enduing us with the powers which render us moral agents. But here is nothing respecting the influence of the Holy Ghost assisting us to overcome evil propensities, and shake off sin, and to forsake sinful practices. Nature appears here to be sufficient without any supernatural aid. The misfortune of this man was, that he gave himself up to subtle metaphysical reasonings, instead of receiving the word of God in its simple and obvious meaning. This was the main source of all his errors, as we should more clearly discern were we in

possession of the whole of his works. He had studied too much in the schools of philosophy, and too little in the school of Christ.

It appears that the Pelagians were fond of the Socratic mode of arguing; and delighted in puzzling their opponents by reducing them to certain dilemmas, from which they thought they could not extricate themselves. His reasonings on the possibility of living without sin are philosophically conclusive: but they are not sound theology, as they do not admit of the low condition into which man is fallen, nor the necessity of the special influence of the Holy Ghost to enable us perfectly to love God, and worthily to magnify his holy name.

"Those who deny the possibility of man's living without sin must first of all be asked, what is it which constitutes the evil of sin? Is it something which is avoidable, or unavoidable? If it cannot be shunned, then is it no longer sin; but if it be that which may be avoided, then man may live without sin."

"It may again be enquired, whether sin proceeds from choice, or necessity? If from necessity, then it is no longer sin; if it proceed from our own will and choice, it may be avoided.

"The question is then put whether sin be natural, or accidental? Whether it be an action, or a substance? Ought man then to live without sin, or ought he not? If he ought, he may. Then he asks, Is it the will of God, that man should live without sin, or that he should live in sin?"

To such queries we may answer, with Augustine, that man may live without sin, but not of his own powers, but through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ. But Pelagius would never express himself with sufficient clearness on the necessity of Divine grace; and when upon some occasions he was induced to make a few