3, c. 153, and 18 & 19 Vict. c. 81, since the words "duly registered as recorded" which occurred in 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 8, were not re-enacted when that statute was repealed by 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 3, and do not appear in 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 1. Indictment for setting Fire to a Dwelling-house, some Person being therein. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 2, ante, p. 647.) Commencement as ante, p. 651]-feloniously, unlawfully and maliciously did set fire to a certain dwelling-house ("any dwelling-house") of J. N., situate at the parish of B., in the county of M., one J. L., and M., his wife, then, to wit, at the time of the committing of the felony aforesaid, being in the said dwelling-house; against the form [as ante, p. 465]. The defendant cannot, upon this indictment, be convicted under s. 3 (ante, p. 647), because under that section an intent to injure or defraud must be alleged and proved. R. v. Paice, 1 C. & K. 73. Felony: penal servitude for life or for not less than three years, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour; and, if a male under sixteen years, with or without whipping.-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 2 (ante, p. 647); 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1, sub-ss. 1, 2 (ante, p. 235). As to requiring the offender to enter into recognizances and find sureties for keeping the peace, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 73 (ante, p. 649). This offence is not triable at quarter sessions. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1 (ante, p. 126). Evidence. Prove that the defendant wilfully set fire to the dwelling-house (see ante, p. 652); and that at the time J. L. and his wife were in the house. It is not sufficient to prove that they were in the house at the time when the defendant set fire to an adjoining building, from which the flames communicated to the house, they having then left it. R. v. Fletcher, 2 C. & K. 215: R. v. Warren, 1 Cox, 68. The offence is committed even if the prisoner was the only person in the house when he sets fire to it. R. v. Pardoe, 17 Cox, 715, Coleridge, C.J. If any one in the house is burnt by an offence within this section the incendiary is indictable for murder. R. v. Serné, 16 Cox, 311, Stephen, J. Indictment for Attempting to set Fire to a Building. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 8, ante, p. 648.) Commencement as ante, p. 651]-feloniously, unlawfully and maliciously did attempt by then, etc. (state the overt act-“by any overt act") feloniously, unlawfully and maliciously, to set fire to a certain building (describe the building as in the precedents, pp. 651, 655, and supra: any building or any matter or thing being in, against, or under any building,' under such circumstances that if the same were thereby set fire to, the offence would amount to felony ") situate at the parish of B., in the county of M., [with intent thereby then to injure (injure or defraud)]; against the form [as ante, p. 465]. See Greaves' Crim. Law Cons. Acts (2nd ed.), 213–215. Felony penal servitude for not more than fourteen and not less than three years, or imprisonment not exceeding two years with or without hard labour; and, if a male under sixteen years, with or without whipping.-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 8; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1, sub-ss. 1, 2 (ante, p. 235). As to requiring the offender to enter into recognizances and find sureties for keeping the peace, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 73 (ante, p. 649). Evidence. Prove that the defendant attempted, by the means stated in the indictment, wilfully to set fire to the house (see ante, p. 652): and that it was situated as described in the indictment. (See ante, p. 653.) And prove circumstances from which the jury may infer the intent as laid. (See ante, p. 340.) In many cases no allegation or proof of intent will be necessary (see ss. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, ante, pp. 647, 648). Wilfully throwing a light into a post-office letter-box in a house with intent to burn the letters, but not the house, is not a felony within this enactment. R. v. Batstone, 10 Cox, 20. SETTING FIRE TO COAL MINES, ETC. Statute. 24 & 25 Vict. 97 (Malicious Damage Act, 1861), s. 26.]—Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously set fire to any mine of coal, cannel coal, anthracite, or other mineral fuel shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life. . . or to be imprisoned . . . and if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping. [This section is taken from 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 9, and 9 & 10 Vict. c. 25, s. 9, with the additions italicized.] Sect. 27-Attempting to set fire to mines.]-Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any overt act attempt to set fire to any mine, under such circumstances that if the mine were thereby set fire to the offender would be guilty of felony, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding fourteen years, or to be imprisoned... and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping. [This section re-enacts 9 & 10 Vict. c. 25, s. 7, with the additions italicized.] Indictment for setting Fire to a Coal Mine. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 26.) Commencement as ante, p. 651]-feloniously, unlawfully, and maliciously did set fire to a certain mine of coal ("any mine of coal, cannel coal, anthracite, or other mineral fuel ") [of J. N.] situate at the parish of B., in the county of M.; against the form [as ante, p. 465]. Felony penal servitude for life or for not less than three years, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour; and, if a male under sixteen years, with or without whipping.—24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, 8. 26; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1, sub-ss. 1, 2 (ante, p. 235). As to requiring the offender to enter into recognizances and find sureties for keeping the peace, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 73 (ante, p. 650). This offence is not triable at quarter sessions. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1 (ante, p. 126). Evidence. Prove that the defendant set fire to the mine as described in the indictment. (See ante, pp. 652, 653.) As to proof of the allegation "of J. N." see R. v. Newboult, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 344 (ante, p. 654). It is equally an offence within this Act to set fire to a mine in the possession of the party himself, where it is proved to be done with intent to injure or defraud any other person; s. 59 (ante, p. 649).-See ante, p. 654. A.C.P. 42 SETTING FIRE TO OR DESTROYING SHIPS, ETC. Statutes. 12 G. 3, c. 24 (Dockyards, etc., Protection Act, 1772), s. 1. If any person or persons shall either within this realm, or in any of the islands, countries, forts, or places thereunto belonging, wilfully and maliciously set on fire or burn, or otherwise destroy, or cause to be set on fire, or burnt, or otherwise destroyed, or aid and procure, abet, or assist in the setting on fire, or burning, or otherwise destroying any of his Majesty's ships or vessels of war, whether the said ships or vessels of war be on float or building, or begun to be built, in any of his Majesty's dockyards, or building or repairing in any private yards, for the use of his Majesty, or any of his Majesty's arsenals, magazines, dockyards, rope-yards, victualling offices, or any of the buildings erected therein or belonging thereto, or any timber or materials therein placed for building or repairing, or fitting out of ships or vessels; or any part of his Majesty's military, naval, or victualling stores, or other ammunition of war, or any place or places where such military, naval, or victualling stores, or other ammunition of war is or shall be kept, or deposited; that then the person or persons guilty of any such offence being thereof convicted in due form of law shall be guilty of felony, and shall suffer death as in cases of felony. . . [For indictment, see post, p. 661.] Sect. 2.-Venue.]—See ante, p. 38. 29 & 30 Vict. c. 109 (Naval Discipline Act), s. 34.]-Every person subject to this Act who shall unlawfully set fire to any dockyard, victualling yard, or steam factory yard, arsenal, magazine, building, stores, or to any ship, vessel, hoy, barge, boat, or other craft, or furniture thereunto belonging, not being the property of an enemy, pirate, or rebel, shall suffer death or such other punishment as hereinafter mentioned. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97 (Malicious Damage Act, 1861, s. 42.]-Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously set fire to, cast away, or in any wise destroy any ship or vessel, whether the same be complete or in an unfinished state, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life... or to be imprisoned. . . and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping. [This section re-enacts 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89, ss. 4, 6. In R. v. Guy, Hants assizes, July, 1902, G. was indicted under s. 42 for unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to a yacht of which he was captain. He did so in conjunction with the owner in order as he knew to defraud underwriters. Held by Bigham, J., that though s. 43 dealt with this offence specifically, G. could be convicted under s. 42.] Sect. 43.]-Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously set fire to, or cast away, or in anywise destroy any ship or vessel, with intent thereby to prejudice any owner or part-owner of such ship or vessel, or of any goods on board the same, or any person that has underwritten or shall underwrite any policy of insurance upon such ship or vessel, or on the freight thereof, or upon any goods on board the same, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life. . or to be imprisoned . . . and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping. [This section re-enacts 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 6.] Sect. 44-Attempting to set fire to ships.]-Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously, by any overt act, attempt to set fire to, cast away, or destroy any ship or vessel, under such circumstances that if the ship or vessel were thereby set fire to, cast away, or destroyed, the offender would be guilty of felony, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding fourteen years. . . or to be imprisoned . . . and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, without or without whipping. [This section re-enacts 9 & 10 Vict. c. 25, s. 7, with the additions italicized.] Indictment for setting Fire to a Ship. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 42, supra.) Cornwall, to wit:-The jurors for our lord the King upon their oath present, that J. S., on the 1st day of June, in the year of our Lord feloniously, unlawfully and maliciously did set fire to a certain ship ("any ship or vessel, whether the same be complete or in an unfinished state") called the "Rattler," the property of J. N.; against the form [as ante, p. 465]. If the offence be committed upon the high seas, see the next precedent. Felony: penal servitude for life or for not less than three years, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, and, if a male under sixteen years, with or without whipping.-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 42; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 8, sub-ss. 1, 2 (ante, p. 235). As to requiring the offender to enter into recognizances and find sureties for keeping the peace, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 73 (ante, p. 650). This offence is not triable at quarter sessions. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1 (ante, p. 126). Evidence. Prove that the defendant set fire to the ship. (See ante, 652.) Where a sailor on board a ship entered a part of the vessel where spirits were kept, for the purpose of stealing rum, and, while tapping a cask of rum, a lighted match, held by him, came in contact with the spirits which were flowing from the cask tapped by him, and a fire ensued which destroyed the vessel, it was held that a conviction for arson of the ship could not be upheld. R. v. Faulkner, Ir. Rep. 11 C. L. 8; 13 Cox, 550. It is immaterial whether the ship were complete or in an unfinished state. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 42. Where a pleasure boat, eighteen feet long, was set fire to, Patteson, J., inclined to think that it was a vessel within the meaning of 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 10 (rep.), but the prisoner was acquitted on the merits, and no decided opinion was given. R. v. Bowyer, 4 C. & P. 559, Patteson, J. Upon an indictment for firing a barge. Alderson, B., said, that if the prisoner was convicted he would take the opinion of the judges as to whether a barge was within the meaning of that statute: the prisoner was acquitted. R. v. Smith, 4 C. & P. 569. The burning of a ship, of which the defendant was a part-owner, was held within 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 10 : R. v. Wallace, C. & Mar. 200; 2 Mood. C. C. 200. (See s. 59, ante, p. 649.) Prove that it was done maliciously (see ante, p. 651), and prove the ownership of the ship as described in the indictment. Where, upon an indictment against the defendant for setting fire to a ship with intent to prejudice E. and G. his part-owners, it appeared that the defendant had declared that E. and G. were part-owners, and a bill of sale was produced, by which forty-three sixty-fourths of the vessel were transferred by the defendant, the sole owners to E. and G.; and also an entry in the books of registry, in the following form:-Custom House, Padstow, 11th August, 1829. W. P., of etc., has sold, by bill of sale, dated, etc., forty-three sixty-fourth shares, to N. G., of etc., and R. E., of etc., Signed,” etc.,and it was objected that the bill of sale was not valid, because by 6 G. 4, c. 110, s. 37 (rep.), the entry must contain not only the date of the bill of sale, but also the date of the production of it, the judge thought that the date, 11th August, in the commencement of the entry, might be considered as the date of the production of it, particularly as the entry followed the form given by the statute; and it was held that the defendant was properly convicted. R. v. Philp, 1 Mood. C. C. 263. Indeed, it would seem that acts of ownership would of themselves be sufficient to prove this allegation, subject to contradiction by the entry in the register. Registry of a British ship is now proved under 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 64 (ante, p. 351). Indictment for setting Fire to a Ship, with Intent, etc. Yorkshire, to wit:-The jurors for our lord the King, upon their oath present, that J. S., on the first day of August, in the year of our Lord on board a certain ship called the "Rattler," the property of J. N., on a certain voyage upon the high seas, then being upon the high seas, feloniously, unlawfully, and maliciously did set fire to the said ship ("any ship or vessel "), with intent thereby to prejudice the said J. N., the owner (“ owner or part-owner") of the said ship; [or, one E. F., the owner of certain goods, then laden and being on board the said ship; or, one E. F., who had before then underwritten a certain policy of assurance on the said ship (or, on the freight of the said ship; or, on certain goods then being on board the said ship), which said policy was then in full force and operation ("the owner or part-owner of such ship or vessel, or of any goods on board the same, or any person who has underwritten or shall underwrite any policy of insurance upon such ship or vessel, or on the freight thereof, or upon any goods on board the same");] against the form [as ante, p. 465). The intent may be stated in different ways in different counts. See R. v. Smith, 4 C. & P. 569: R. v. Bowyer, Id. 559. As to the venue, see ante, p. 38 et seq. Felony: 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 43. The punishments are the same as under the last precedent. This offence is not triable at quarter sessions. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1 (ante, p. 126). Evidence. If the intent be laid to prejudice the owner of the ship or goods, prove the case as directed under the last form; and in the latter case prove the shipment of the goods. In R. v. Philp, 1 Mood. C. C. 263 (supra), there was no proof of malice against the owners, and the ship was insured for more than its value; but the judge thought that the defendant must be understood to contemplate the consequence of his act; and the judges held that, as to this point, the conviction was right. See R. v. Newill, 1 Mood. C. C. 458. The destruction of a vessel by a part-owner shows an intent to prejudice the other part-owners, though he has insured the whole ship, and promised that the other part-owners shall have the |