office and had reference to the entries which were suspended and the revocation of the suspension ordered February 10, 1891, by the Department. It was held in the opinion:

It is shown that from May 9, to June 1, 1891, the local officers, by ordinary mail, notified the desert entryman of the decision of February 10, 191, and on August 15, 1893, your office instructed the local officers that this notice was insufficient, inasmuch as the Rules of Practice required notice to be sent by registered mail.

To the same effect is the case of White . Dodge (21 L. D., 494). Counsel for the appellant argues that the defendant was represented before the Department by attorneys in the proceedings leading to the decision of January 12, 1891, revoking the suspension of these entries, and that they were notified thereof on February 10, 1891, and that such notice was, in law, notice to this entryman; further, that your office erred in not considering the notice given to said attorneys on said date, February 10, 1891, and also the notice given them on the following dates: August 5, 1892, November 7, 1892, December 2, 1892, and January 6, 1893, and that, therefore, the notice given on August 22, 1893, to the entryman was wholly unnecessary.

This question was considered in White . Dodge, on re-review (23 L. D., 240), and as now presented is in all essential respects similar to the case as then presented, except that in said case the notice given said attorneys on February 10, 1891, aud on September 25, 1891, was set out in full, whereas in the cause at bar such alleged notices are not set out and are referred to by date only.

In the case of White . Dodge, on re-review, supra, it was held that the notice contained in the letter of February 10, 1891, and that contained in the letter of September 25, 1891, to the attorneys representing one hundred and sixty-three desert entrymen, in Kern county, California, were not sufficient in themselves, and it was determined as matter of law that the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi potest did not apply to matters of pleading, and that the notice shown was too vague and indefinite.

This entry having been made on the 30th day of April, 1877, having been suspended on the 28th day of September, 1877, the order of suspension having been revoked and proper notice thereof having only been given on August 22, 1893, and the contest affidavit having been filed May 17, 1895, it follows that this entry has only been in existence, excluding the period of suspension, two years, one month and twentyfour days, counting to the time of the filing of the affidavit of contest.

In this case, however, it appears from what has heretofore been set out, that at the original date set for hearing, to wit, August 5, 1895, this plaintiff set forth that he had not made service and asked for order of service by publication, which order, as has been seen, was accordingly granted and hearing set for September 13, 1895. Without ascertaining when said service by publication became complete it is sufficient to say that it became so prior to such latter date, making a total of two years,

six months and twenty-one days that the entry had been in existence, exclusive of the period of suspension, as determined up to the time when proper notice of its revocation was given the entryman.

Your office was correct in dismissing the contest and that action is affirmed.

WAGON ROAD GRANT →BONA FIDE PURCHASER-CONFIRMATION.

CALIFORNIA AND OREGON LAND COMPANY.

The title of a purchaser in good faith from a wagon road company of lands previously certified thereto, is confirmed, in the absence of adverse claims, although by the true construction of the grant to said company said lands were excepted therefrom; and in such case the only remedy left to the government is by way of suit against the wagon road company to recover the value of said lands.

Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, November (W. V. D.) 19, 1897. (F. W. C.)

With your office letter of October 2, 1897, was enclosed a copy of your office decision of April 2, 1897, in which it was held that the S3 of the NE and E of the SE and lots 5 and 6 of Sec. 31, T. 18 S., R. 1 W., Roseburg land district, Oregon, were excepted from the grant made July 2, 1864, (13 Stat., 355) to aid in the construction of the Oregon Central Military Road, and in which a rule was laid upon said company and its successors, the California and Oregon Land Company, to show cause why proceedings should not be instituted to set aside the title erroneously conveyed by the certification made on December 8, 1871, on account of said grant.

The records show that the tract above described was embraced in the donation certification of Oliver L. Barrett, filed April 4, 1855, which claim remained of record until canceled by your office April 4, 1896.

To said rule the California and Oregon Land Company responded, asking the dismissal of the rule, upon the ground that the donation. notification was not sufficient to except the tract from the grant named; and, further, that said company, the California and Oregon Land Company, had been adjudged to be a bona fide purchaser from the Oregon Central Military Road Company of the land in question, in the case of the United States r. The California and Oregon Land Co. (148 U. S., 31), and that its title was therefore confirmed by the act of March 2, 1896 (29 Stat., 42).

Your office letter of May 22, 1897, refused to dismiss the rule, and as no further answer was made thereto the matter is submitted for the consideration of this Department.

In the case of the United States r. Winona and St. Peter Railroad Co., (165 U. S., 463) the court, after referring to the acts of March 3, 1887, (24 Stat., 556) and March 2, 1896, (29 Stat., 42) states that:

Our conclusion is that these acts operated to confirm the title to every purchaser from a railroad company of the lands certified or patented to or for its benefit, notwithstanding any mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of the land depart

ment, and notwithstanding the fact that the lands so certified or patented were, by the true construction of the land grants, although within the limits of the grants, excepted from their operation, provided that he purchased in good faith, paid value for the lands, and, providing, also, that the lands were public lands in the statutory sense of the term and free from individual or other claims.

Barrett's claim under the donation notification, which is held to have been sufficient to have defeated the grant, having been duly canceled and the California and Oregon Land Company having been adjudged to be a bona fide purchaser from the Oregon Central Military Road Company, it follows, under the decision above quoted, that as to the land here involved the title of the California and Oregon Land Company must be held to have been confirmed, and no action should be brought by the United States looking to the setting aside of the title conveyed under the certification before referred to. The only right remaining to the United States is the right to recover the value of the land from the Oregon Central Military Road Company. To this end, I have to direct that demand be made upon said company, if still in existence, or upon any one found who can be held liable through that company.

DITTMER . WOLFE.

Motion for review of departmental decision of August 19, 1897, 25 L. D., 137, denied by Secretary Bliss, November 19, 1897.

PRIVATE LAND CLAIM-SMALL HOLDING.

DONACIANO CHAVEZ.

Under section 12, act of March 3, 1891, all claims under Spanish or Mexican grants, referred to in section 6 of said act, are to be held as abandoned, if not presented before the court of private land claims within two years from the taking effect of said act; and a grant occupying such status is consequently no bar to the adjudication of a "small holding" lying within the limits of such grant. Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, November (W. V.D.) (C. W. P.)

19, 1897.

With your letter of August 11, 1896, you transmit the appeal of Donaciano Chavez from the decision of your office of April 15, 1896, suspending his "small holding" claim, No. 1759, for 3.77 acres of land in section 32, township 10 N., range 3 E., Santa Fe land district, New Mexico, until the question of title to the "Antonio Sandoval" grant is determined.

March 2, 1896, Chavez submitted proof of his possession and occupation of said land, which was rejected by the local officers for conflict with the timber culture entry, No. 141, of Richard Page. Chavez appealed. Your office found that Chavez claims title from Francisco Savedra, through Antonio Sandoval and others, and that an examina

tion of memoranda on file in your office shows that the land claimed by Mr. Chavez is within the limits of the "Antonio Sandoval,” or “Las Lagunitas" grant, and that this grant has not been surveyed, but that its locus south of the Albuquerque grant, as shown, as well as its probable location furnished by the surveyor-general of New Mexico, indicates that Sec. 32, T. 10 N., R. 3 E., is entirely within the limits of said grant; and the claim of Chavez was held suspended until the question of title to the "Antonio Sandoval" grant is determined. From this decision Chavez has appealed, and in his appeal alleges:

(1) That there is no such a recognized grant as the 'Antonio Sandoval' or 'Las Lagunitas grant.'

(2) That if any such a grant ever existed, the same has never been officially recog nized, but has been rejected by the surveyor general of the Territory of New Mexico. (3) That the Department has ruled against the existence of any such grant, and has issued patents, for lands embraced within the said alleged grant.

By the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 854), Congress established the court of private laud claims, for the final adjudication of all private land claims in the Territories of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah and the States of Nevada, Colorado and Wyoming.

The object of said act was the final adjudication of all private land claims in the States and Territories mentioned in the act, and the creation of a special tribunal was to provide for the adjudication of claims under grants made by Spain or Mexico, to land within the territory specified in said act, prior to its acquisition by the United States. Congress invested said tribunal with full authority to determine every question, subject to the right of appeal to the supreme court of the United States, respecting the validity, extent and scope of all unadjusted claims to lands included in Spanish or Mexican grants. The title, validity and boundaries of such grants or claims were to be adju dicated according to the law of nations, the stipulations of the trea'y concluded between the United States and the Republic of Mexico at the city of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, on February 2, 1848, and the treaty between the same powers on December 30, 1853, and the lands embraced within the boundaries of Mexican or Spanish grants or claims at the date said treaties were ratified were placed in a state of reservation, which has been continued in force by the act of March 3, 1891, supra, and will so remain until after the judgment of said court becomes final and in all respects complete.

But in view of the statements contained in Mr. Chavez's appeal, and of section twelve of the act of March 3, 1891, supra, which provides that all claims mentioned in section six of said act (which provides for the adjudication of claims under grants by Spain or Mexico), shall at the end of two years from the taking effect of the act, if no petition in respect to the same shall have then been filed, be deemed and taken, in all courts and elsewhere, to be abandoned, and shall be forever barred, you are directed to ascertain whether any claim has been filed in the court of private land claims under the "Antonio Sandoval" or "Las Laguni

tas" grant, and this case is returned to your office that you may pursue this course, and in case it appears that there has been no claim filed in the court of private land claims under the "Antonio Sandoval" or "Las Lagunitas" graut, you will consider the proof submitted by said Chavez on his small holding."

The tract book of your office shows that August 11, 1896, the day of the date of your letter of transmittal, the timber culture entry, No. 141, of said Page was canceled by your office, from which action Page has not appealed.

The decision of your office is modified accordingly.

STATE OF WASHINGTON v. MCBRIDE.

Motion for review of departmental decision of August 27, 1897, 25 L. D., 167, denied by Secretary Bliss, November 19, 1897.

RAILROAD GRANT--INDEMNITY SELECTIONS.

UNION OIL COMPANY.

Action suspended on that part of the departmental decision of November 5, 1897, herein, which relates to the question of the right of the Southern Pacific R. R. Co. to make indemnity selections within the forfeited primary limits of the Atlantic and Pacific grant.

Acting Secretary Davis to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (W. V. D.)

November 22, 1897.

(A. B. P.)

The Southern Pacific Railroad Company, by its attorneys, has filed in this Department an application for a suspension or modification of that part of departmental decision of November 6, 1897, in the case of the Union Oil Company, on review, 25 L. D., 351, which holds that:

The question as to the right of the Southern Pacific Company to make indemnity selections within the forfeited primary limits of the grant to the Atlantic and Pacific has been finally determined adversely to the Southern Pacific by the supreme court (168 U. S., ) and a discussion of any claimed rights under the railroad's selection of the land here in question is, therefore, unnecessary.

In the application it is set forth that counsel for the railroad company have applied to the supreme court for an order staying the issue of the mandate on the court's decision in the case referred to, with the view of obtaining a rehearing or reconsideration thereof, and that an order has been made accordingly, staying the mandate for thirty days. The application is duly supported by affidavit, and in view of the matters presented it has been determined to treat the same as a petition for re-review of said departmental decision as to the single matter complained of; and for the purpose of having the said matter further considered if deemed necessary, after final action by the supreme court