tion, not to essential definition; which would thus be reduced to the second part, viz. logical definition. In the example of the Proposition of which the parts subject, predicate, and copula, are enumerated, this enumeration is again one of properties which, in this case, are all essential; but I do not see any thing more physical in the property of being expressed by means of two terms and a copula, than-in the property of expressing an affirmation or a negation. These distinctions between Dr. Whately's several modes of definition may be thus exhibited in a tabular form: Definition of a By giving a synony- (By the exhibition of properties essential to the constitution of the idea expressed by the definiendum. mous word without any regard to any· OR OR By the exhibition of properties belonging to the essence; i. e. By the exhibition of pro- By the exhibition of properties not essential to the constitution of such idea, but which do belong to it. By comparing this table with that of Modes of Exposition given above, the reader will be enabled to judge to which author the following paragraph may be applied. "It is scarcely credible how much confusion has arisen from the ignorance of these distinctions which has prevailed among logical writers.' Elements, p. 74. 97 CHAPTER VII. METHODIZATION. (Whately's Elements, Ch. XI. Part I. § 6, Division, p. 68.) THE exposition of the general principles of Methodization, and of its application, in the instance of some of the most important subjects, form a considerable portion of Mr. Bentham's MSS. on Logic. The following short exposé of the theory is chiefly abstracted from those papers. As the object of exposition is the conveying a clear, correct, and complete conception of the idea represented by a word, so that of methodization is to enable the mind to entertain a clear, correct, and complete notion of a number of ideas, either simultaneously or in succession, in such manner as to be able with facility to retain, to compare, or to combine them with a view to the accomplishment of any particular end. Methodization may therefore be defined, the H putting a number of objects together in a particular manner, directed by design to a particular end. Methodization is either physical or logical; physical, when the objects methodized are real entities; logical, when they are ideas. But, as ideas themselves have no real existence, and therefore cannot actually be placed in any order, it is upon the signs only which represent those ideas that logical methodization can operate. These signs being words or names of the ideas, nomenclature (that is, the giving names) is, as well as exposition, an operation essentially subservient to methodization; and is accordingly treated of in detail in the MSS. before me. Much has, however, been already published on this subject, both in Mr. Bentham's Chrestomathia and in my above-mentioned "Essai sur la Nomenclature et la Classification, &c." I do not think it therefore necessary to repeat, on the present occasion, what has there been said. Methodization may be divided into two distinct operations, according to whether it has place with or without regard to succession; that is, to priority and posteriority. These two modes of methodization may be termed successive colloca |