in his life, asking pardon of the gods for such an unprecedented act. The son promises to take care of the old man, and the play ends.

RACINE.

Closely modelled, in several scenes, upon "The Wasps" of Aristophanes, but of more intelligible, because of more modern interest, is "Les Plaideurs" of Racine. The absence of any translation of this exquisite comedy, either in prose or verse, so far as I can learn, is my excuse for offering translations by myself of some passages. We have, as dramatis personæ, Daudin, a judge, fond of exercising his powers; his son, Leandre, a gay youth, to whom the study of the law, for which his father designs him, is irksome; L'Intime, the judge's secretary; Petit Jean, the house porter, illiterate; and the Prompter, who helps the advocate, Petit Jean, in the trial scene; also Chicaneau, a citizen, and La Comtesse, both litigious. Leandre and Daudin make their first appearance in a dialogue, in which the old man expostulates with his son on account of his dissolute course, and reproaches him for despising the law. The hereditary pride of the old French judge is strikingly illustrated:

"Money is not earned so fast in my dominion. Each one of thy fine ribbons cost me 'n opinion. My gown makes you ashamed! And you the son of a judge!

Should'st act the gentleman? Oh, Daudin, that's all fudge!
Consider, in my wardrobe and in my sleeping-room,
The portraits of the Daudins; all these have worn the gown.
It is a good profession. Compare, too, price for price,
The New Year's gifts of a good judge, and those of a
marquis:

Remark what we shall be at th' end of next December:What 's then your gentleman? A post in th' antechamber."

The son tries to convince the father that his health demands repose and retirement, and to induce him to stay at home and temporarily give up business. The old gentleman being indisposed to accede, the son threatens restraint. The judge says that life to him, without the exercise of his official duties, is a punishment. The son tells him he can set up a domestic court. At that moment the porter opportunely rushes in, announcing that the house-dog, Citron, has carried off and devoured a capon. The judge seizes on the idea, orders the arraignment of the offender, and assigns the porter to the prosecution, and the secretary to the defense. The trial then goes on, with the aid of the Prompter, the advocates having first been crammed for their respective parts. I give below a translation in full of this admirable scene, in which the tedious prolixity and irrelevancy of the advocates and their oratorical affectations, with the ad captandum argument of presenting the prisoner's family in court, which even now-a-days is so effective when the action is against a railroad and the relatives are women in weeds, are drawn in such a masterly manner:

Daudin:

Come, who are you down there?

Commence then.

Daudin:

Prompter: Gentlemen

Petit Jean:

Oh, take a lower key,

For if you prompt so loud they never can hear me, My lord

Oh, sir,

I think I understand good breeding better'n that. Daudin: Be covered, I repeat.

Petit Jean (putting on his hat, to Prompter):
Well, Prompter, now be dumb;
That which I know the best is my exordium.
Your honors, when I consider with exactitude
The world's inconstancy, full of vicissitude;
When I behold so many races different,

So many wandering stars, not one star permanent;
When I view Cæsar and his fortune;
When I behold the sun, when I behold the moon;
When I behold the state of the Babylonians,
Transferred from Persia to the Macedonians;
When I behold the Lorraines, at first despotic,
Pass to a monarchy, and then grow democratic;
When I behold Japan-
L'Intimé :

When will he stop beholding?
Petit Jean:

Oh dear! why will he interrupt me with his scolding?
I cannot speak a word.

Leandrê:

Sychosis

Oh dear me! what's the use of beating round the bush?
They teach me to speak words in length a fathom each,
Big sounding words, that would from here to Poutoise
reach,

Now, I don't see the sense of all this hurly-burly;
In short, to find a fowl I came this morning early;

There's naught your dog won't steal, if it but take the shape on

of fowl, and now he's gone and gobbled up our capon A capon from the Maine; here's nothing to decide; The first time that I find him, I'll soundly tan his hide.

Leandrè:

A very neat conclusion, worthy your setting out!

Petit Jean:

Say, can't you soften down the shrillness of your tone?
L'Intimé (in his ordinary voice):
Oh, yes, I've many of them. (In a pompous tone:) What-
ever diffidence

May justly be aroused by said fame and eloquence,
We rest upon your truth, as Hope leans on the anchor,
And trust your sense of right to mitigate all rancor.

Before the great Daudin innocence is power;

Yes, before the Cato of Normandy, the lower,
That sun of equity whose beams have never languished;
Vict'ry delights the gods; but Cato 's for the vanquished.

Daudin:

Now truly he pleads well.

I infer that the inhabitants of Maine were notorious "experts.'

In courts of equity Your Aristotle hasn't the least authority. Come, to the point.

To the point.

L'Intime:

Pausanias, in his Corinthiacs,

Daudin:

L'Intimé :

Daudin: L'Intimé:

I'll enter your default.

Oh dear, how rash you act. Then have the facts. (Quickly.) This dog to the kitchen drawing nigh,

A capon plump and sweet within he did espy:
Now he for whom I speak with hunger there was hasting;
He against whom I speak was nicely plucked and basting;
Then he for whom I speak, seized on, took off, secreted
Him against whom I speak. The larder thus depleted,
He's taken on a writ. Counsel plead pro and con;

A day's fixed. I'm to speak, I speak, and now I've done.
Daudin:

Tut, tut, tut, tut! Learn better how to try your case.
Th' irrelevant you give at a deliberate pace,
Th' important you run over at a gallop strong.
L'Intimé:

The former, may it please you, sir, is fine.

Daudin:
It's wrong.
Were causes ever known to be in this way pleaded?
What say th' assembly?

Leandrè:

This style is now most heeded.
L'Intime (in a vehement tone):
Where were we, gentlemen? They come. And how come?
They chase my client, and they force a mansion.
What mansion? Why, the mansion of our own judge.
They force the cellar which serves us for refuge.
Of brigandage they then accuse us, and of theft,
We're then dragged headlong forth, and to our accusers
left,

To master Little John, your honor-I attest.
Who does not know the law. If any Dog (Digest

De vi, and see the paragraph Caponibus),

Is manifestly contrary to such abuse?

And when it turned out true that my poor client Citron
Had eaten all or most of the aforesaid capon,
Against this trifling deed you will not hesitate
To weigh our former actions, and let them mitigate.
When has my client ever been reprimanded?

By whom has this your house always been defended?
When have we failed to bark at robbers in our town?
Witness three low attorneys, from whom we've torn the
gown.

They show you certain fragments to accuse us by;
Receive these other fragments to help us justify.

But Adam

Petit Jean: L'Intimé:

if necessary, proceed without the delay of obtaining a warrant in such cases. The law has therefore given an officer much more authority to make such arrests than it has a private individual. An officer may arrest any person, if he has reasonable ground to suspect he has committed a felony, whether any felony has been committed or not by the party suspected or arrested, or by any person.

In 1 Lead. Cr. Cases, p. 197, note, Mr. Bennett says: "The first enunciation of this doctrine is in the Year Books, 7 Hen. IV; Hilary Term, pl. 35. Again, in Ward's Case, in 1636 (Clayton's Reports, 44), we find another recognition of the right of an officer to act upon the charge or accusation of a third person; but Samuel v. Payne (1 Doug. 359, 1780) was the first distinct adjudication upon this important question of law. Ledwith v. Catchpole (Caldecott's Cases, 291, 1783) is another important case. The main distinction between Samuel v. Payne and Ledwith v. Catchpole is, that, in the former, the party arrested was, by a third person, reported to the officer as guily of a felony, and the officer proceeded upon that charge alone, while in the latter there was no charge against the suspected person in particular, but the officer acted upon his own suspicion that he was the true offender. But it is clear that, in either case, if the officer acts bona fide, and upon reasonable grounds, he is not guilty of a trespass. See Cowles v. Dunbar, 2 Carr. & Payne, 565. Every American case on this question, which we have examined, refers to Samuel v. Payne as authority. It was decided by the celebrated Lord Mansfield. Ledwith v. Catchpole was decided by the same distinguished jurist, who, on a motion for a new trial, said: "The first question is, whether a felony has been committed or not; and then the fundamental distinction is, that if a felony has actually been committed, a private person may, as well as a peace officer, arrest; if not, the question always turns upon this: Was the arrest bona fide; was the act done fairly and in pursuit of an offender, or by design or malice and ill-will? It would be a terrible thing, if, under probable cause, an arrest could not be made. Many an innocent man has and may be taken up upon such suspicion; but the mischief and inconvenience to the public, in this point of view, is comparatively nothing. It is of great consequence to the police of the country."

It was attempted by the plaintiff, in Beckwith v. Philby (6 Barn. & Cress., 635), to make an essential distinction between the rights of an officer whether he acts upon his own suspicion or upon the charge and accusation of another. It was admitted that, in the latter case, it is his duty to make the arrest, and it is not incumbent on him to prove the actual commission of a felony, But it was claimed, that, if he assumed to act upon his own suspicion, he then placed himself in the situation of any private citizen, and could justify himself only on proof that a felony had been in fact committed. But any such distinction was entirely negatived by the court, and it was there broadly laid down, that a constable, having reasonable cause to suspect that a felony has been committed, has authority to arrest the party suspected, although it afterward appear that no felony has been committed." Mr. Bennett (1 Lead. Cr. Cases, p. 200, note) has the following: "The attempt has sometimes been

inade to engraft a limitation to the power of an officer to arrest as before stated, and to allow him to arrest only when there is reason to suspect that the party accused would otherwise escape." This position was first advanced by Sergeant Russell, in Davis v. Russell (5 Bingham, 359). It would be of serious consequence, said he, to the liberty of the subject and the peace and comfort of society, if a constable is to be empowered to arrest on his own suspicions and judgment, where he has no reason to fear an escape, and may with propriety lay the case first before a magistrate.

cess.

If such a proceeding were allowable, the most respectable individuals, even judges themselves, might, upon the unfounded assertions of any unprincipled persons, be dragged from their beds to a prison. But this limitation was not sanctioned by the court. The same effort was made in this country in Rohan v. Sawin (5 Cushing, 281), but with the like want of sucThe judge below sanctioned this doctrine, and ruled in accordance with it, but this was reversed on exceptions. "We do not find," said the court, "any authority for thus restricting a constable in the exercise of his authority to arrest for a felony without a warrant. The probability of an escape or not, if the party is not forthwith arrested, ought to have its proper effect upon the mind of the officer, in deciding whether he will arrest without a warrant; but it is not a matter upon which a jury is to pass in deciding upon the right of the officer to arrest. The question of immediate necessity for an immediate arrest, in order to prevent the escape of the party charged with felony, is one the officer must act upon under his official responsibility, and not a question to be reviewed elsewhere."

The great principle that underlies all authorities upon the foregoing questions seems to be, that although many innocent persons may be arrested from an abuse of such authority by imprudent and careless officers, when exercising their own judgment as to a proper cause to arrest without warrant, yet it does not overbalance the good which results to society by the exercise of such authority as will insure the prompt arrest of felonious offenders.

But in misdemeanors, after being committed, there is not the same motive to avoid arrest, as the punishment is much less. And, therefore, little is lost by the delay in obtaining a warrant in such cases, and the liability to arrest innocent persons on suspicion greatly diminished. Besides, it might be better that many of this class of small offenders escape, than sanction the above principle of the law of arrest in the apprehension upon suspicion for mere misdemeanors; for, at best, it is an arbitrary rule, and can only be justified by the stern necessities of society in the arrest of felons.

The following are elementary treatises and reported cases, where the foregoing questions are discussed to some extent, viz.: In England, Lawrence v. Hedger (3 Taunt. 14); Nicholson v. Hardwick (5 C. & P. 495); Hobbs v. Branscomb (3 Camp. 420; 1 East. P. C. 301; 2 Hale, P. C. 83, 84, 89; Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 242; 4 Black. Com. 290; 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 22). In America, Rohan v. Sawin (5 Cush. 281); Eanes v. The State (6 Humphreys, 53); Wakely v. Hart (6 Binney, 316); Holley