appeared from the bills of cost on file in their respective offices. The mover of the resolutions stated that it would be found that in some portions of the State the aggregate fees charged by referees would equal at least fifty per cent of the aggregate amounts recovered in actions tried before them. For reasons that we have heretofore alluded to the reference of cases has become quite the rule, and, indeed, it is very safe to say that two-thirds of all the actions tried are tried before referees. There are several advantages about this method of trying a case, provided the referee be well chosen and perform his duty diligently and faithfully. It secures the judgment of a single mind, and one accustomed to examine and weigh carefully questions of fact and questions of law; the trial takes place in the quiet of a private room and not amid the excitement and hurry of the circuit; adjournments from time to time and place to place may be had as the interests of justice may require; and the referee, unlike a jury, may frame his award in accordance with the real justice of the case without finding wholly for either party. These are some of the advantages, but the disadvantages are quite as obvious. The chief of these are the expense and the uncertainty and delay. Though the law provides for compensation at the rate of three dollars per day, yet there is almost invariably an understanding express or implied that the referee shall not be limited to this amount, and the fees usually range from ten to fifteen dollars per day. This would not be burdensome if the trial were to proceed de die in diem, but when there are, as is usually the case, several meetings where nothing is done but to adjourn, and each at the rate of a full day's work, the ultimate amount which the losing party has to pay is very large. The "law's delay," in trials before referees, is notorious. A case before a referee is proceeded with when none of the parties engaged can find any thing else to do. If the referee has any other engagement, or if the counsel on either side has any other business on hand, the case is postponed. It is to be hoped that the Legislature will not adjourn without endeavoring to lessen these evils. It will have a beneficial effect if they will provide a fair per diem compensation for the referee, with the proviso that a meeting for adjournment shall not be counted as a day's engagement. A suit is now pending in the Supreme Court of this State, which, considering the grounds on which it is based, may be considered a novelty in its way. The action was brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the people to restrain Weare C. Little and Emerson W. Keyes from publishing and selling four volumes of decisions of cases decided in the Court of Appeals-known as Keyes' Reports - not previously reported, and which the State Reporter had decided not to report. The plaintiffs allege as the main ground of the action that such publication and sale will "confuse and mislead the people as to the law," "weaken their respect for the court, and impose upon the members of the bar." We believe it is not claimed that the cases are not truthfully reported, and the volumes in every respect as well made as volumes of reports usually are. It seems to us to be a most extraordinary proposition for the people of the State to put forth, that the publication of the most deliberate decisions of the highest judicial tribunal in the State will tend to "confuse and mislead the people as to the law," "weaken their respect for the courts, and impose upon the members of the bar." In that view of the case, how arduous and responsible must be the position of Court of Appeals Reporter. He is not only the guardian who is to protect the "people" and the "bar" from being mislead, confused and imposed upon, but he is made the repository of the dignity and "respect" of the court, and is bound to protect the court from itself. Job only wished for some one to defend him from his friends, but here is an august tribunal that has to be defended from its own folly. It would be interesting to know by what process of ratiocination this important conclusion is arrived at. If it should be sustained by the court before whom this action is pending, would it not be an act of wisdom to slightly change the order of things, and have all the opinions of the court submitted to the reporter, before they are pronounced, for his approval? Thus the people would escape the danger of being misled and confused, and the bar of being imposed upon, while the court itself would be freed from the awful peril that now hangs over it of being disgraced in the eyes of people by their opinions. Seriously, it is a sad thing that the Attorney-General of the State of New York should allow himself to be prevailed upon by interested parties to institute an action based on such foolish and frivolous ground. The defendants' counsel, Daniel Ketchum, thus sensibly puts the case in his "points:" "If the publication of these decisions in a fair and truthful manner will have the effect to weaken the respect of the people for the court, then it is most respectfully submitted that the plaintiffs should change their servants instead of seeking a decision that would cast greater reproach upon themselves and their courts than any ever made in the State." BOOK NOTICES. The Bible in the Public Schools. Arguments in the Case of John D. Minor et al. v. The Board of Education of the City of Cincinnati et al. Superior Court of Cincinnati, with the Opinions and Decision of the Court. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1870. It is a well-known fact, that near the close of the year last past the board of education of the city of Cincinnati passed a resolution prohibiting religious instruction and the reading of religious books, including the Bible, in the public schools. Thereupon numerous citizens of that city instituted an action to restrain said board from putting in operation their resolution. The case was argued upon an agreed statement of fact at a general term of the Superior Court, before Judges STORER, TAFT, and HAGANS, and a decision rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, granting the injunction prayed in the petition. The arguments, of which there were three on a side, took a very wide range, and are remarkable specimens of research and erudition. The authority, authenticity, and inspiration of the Bible; the nature of religion; the effect of Christianity on civilization and human progress; the relations of Church and State and religion and government, and many other things, human and divine, were discussed in a most elaborate manner. Unhappily, the judges saw fit to pass only upon the power of the defendants to make the rule in question, and we are therefore deprived of an authoritative judicial exposition of several questions which have puzzled mankind for several centuries. These arguments, together with the opinions of the judges, are given in full in the book before us, and are well worth reading by every one interested in the topic under discussion. Reports of Cases in Law and Equity: delivered in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. By Oliver Barbour, LL. D. Vol. LIV. Albany, 1870: W. C. Little & Co. It is nearly twenty-three years since the Supreme Court of New York as at present organized began its labors. During that period there has been no reporter other than Mr. Barbour, whose cases were confined to this Court. He has issued something more than two volumes in each year, and with the commencement of 1870 completes his fifty-fourth volume. The character of these reports is best indicated by the fact that during the extended time embraced by them no competitor has appeared. Messrs. Howard and Abbott have reported only practice cases, and have not limited their selections to any particular Court. As is to be expected, they each sometimes report the same cases with Mr. Barbour, but such occurrences are comparatively rare. The principal objection raised against this series of reports is that too many cases are reported, making the volumes too numerous. If, however, we compare Mr. Barbour's work with that of previous reporters of this Court, we will find that he does not much exceed any of them in the proportionate number of cases or of volumes. Johnson's Reports, extending from 1806 to 1823, number twenty volumes, more than a volume a year, principally made up of Supreme Court decisions. Wendell's Reports, of the same character, twenty-six in number, extend from 1828 to 1841, two volumes in each year. The other reporters do not differ greatly from Wendell in the comparative number of their volumes. It is true that a small portion of these volumes are taken up with cases decided in the Court of Errors, but the absence of equity cases of which the Supreme Court had then no jurisdiction, more than compensates for the limited space devoted to the court of last resort. There are, however, many reasons why the present reports of the Supreme Court decisions should excel in bulk and number those of former times. The business of the Court in the days of the earlier reporters was trifling in comparison with its present immense magnitude. Single cases are not infrequent now in which the amount litigated is greater than the sum total involved in all the cases noticed in any volume of Johnson's Reports. Since the organization of the present Supreme Court, interests have grown up surpassing in magnitude and in novelty even the speculations of previous years. In 1846 the railway system of the country was made up of a few disconnected roads along the principal lines of travel, the coal mines were just being developed, the telegraph was an experiment, the insurance business was in its infancy, and oil and mining enterprises were unknown. The marvellous changes that the succeeding years have brought forth are familiar to us all, and with them has been built up a vast body of statute and judicial legislation. The Supreme Court has been the principal source of the latter, its decisions in most instances not being appealed from, and when appealed from being usually confirmed. When we consider all these things, and in addition that with these reports was begun the practical operation of a new and unique system of judicature, the precise limits of whose action it has taken all these years to authoritatively determine, it cannot surprise us that so many volumes have been produced; but we are rather surprised that such a selection has been made as to comprise within the limits of a little more than two volumes a year the judicial reasoning involved in the settlement of so many questions. The Supreme Court has been fortunate in securing for so long a period the voluntary labors of such a man as Mr. Barbour in the position of reporter; and now Length and verbosity have been from time immemorial charged upon the conveyancer, as well as pleaders and equity draftsmen. One of our legal antiquarians (Somner) in a kind of funeral eulogium on the Saxon simplicity, observed, that even in his time, "an acre of land could not pass without almost an acre of parchment." So, in Donne's second satire "In parchment, then, large as the fields, he draws Shakspeare makes Hamlet remark, "that the very conveyances of a man's lands would hardly lie in his coffin!" "Somner might have observed at this day," says Wynne, "that a flock of sheep is often converted into a settlement." TERMS OF SUPREME COURT FOR MARCH. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Westchester, Tappen. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Schenectady, Rosekrans. 3d Tuesday, Special Term, Jefferson, Mullin. 4th Monday, Special Term, White Plains, Tappen. 4th Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Yates, J. C. Smith. 4th Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Herkimer, Mullin. 4th Tuesday, Special Term, Erie, Talcott. Last Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Tompkins, Parker. Last Tuesday, Special Term, Albany, Miller. DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.* ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. Where a debtor settles the amount due from him to his creditor upon notes and drafts, by giving him, in full satisfaction of the claim, a draft on a third person for 50 per cent of the amount, payable in gold, which is subsequently paid, and the creditor accepts such draft and surrenders and cancels the evidences of the indebtedness, this is a good accord and satisfaction. Stagg v. Alexander. AGREEMENT. Where each of the parties to an agreement had a claim, under it, against the other, contingent or conditioned to become due, upon the formation of a corporation; held, that this meant a legal corporation; and that each party was presumed to know what requisites the law demanded, in order to create a corporation. Childs v. Smith. ATTACHMENT. 1. What is a valid levy. — In regard to real estate, it is not necessary that an officer holding an execution or an attachment go upon the property; it is not necessary that it should be even within his view. Though he must do some act, make some entry or memorandum indicative of his intention, yet, having done that, with such purpose in his mind, although he makes no vocal proclamation of the fact, he has made a legal levy. Rodgers v. Bonner. 2. A sheriff, having attachments against the property of the defendant, went to the home of the defendant, where he resided, with a view of levying upon the latter's property. He made no proclamation to the defendant that he should seize or levy on the house and lot; but he did, on the same day, make a pencil memorandum, on a loose piece of paper, of the house and lot, with the intention to seize the same on the attachments; and early the next morning, his clerk, by his direction, indorsed upon the attachments a memorandum of the seizure thereunder, but the same was not then fully completed, nor signed by the sheriff until some days thereafter. He subsequently put the house and lot into the inventory of the property seized under the attachments. Held a valid levy. Ib. 3. It is not necessary to the validity of a levy made under an attachment that the warrant be returned to the officer issuing it. Ib. 4. If there is any statutory provision touching the return of an attachment to the officer issuing it, the statute is merely directory to the sheriff; and his omission to do his duty cannot be availed of in a collateral action to defeat the remedy of the plaintiffs in the attachment suit. Ib. 5. Notice of lis pendens. - The omission to file a notice of lis pendens, in an attachment suit, until after another creditor has obtained a judgment against the defendant, has no effect to postpone the lien of the attachment to that of the judgment. Ib. 6. Such notice, or the want of it, only affects a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer whose conveyance or incumbrance is afterward executed or recorded. As respects a mere judgment creditor, it is never necessary that he should have notice of a prior lien, in order to give it priority. Ib. thorize it to retain the moneys received thereon, as against the true owner, on account of overdrafts of the remitting bank. Lindauer v. The Fourth National Bank of the City of New York. 2. A bank, receiving from another bank negotiable paper for collection, obtains no better title to it, or the proceeds, than the remitting bank had; unless it becomes a purchaser for value, or makes new advances on the faith of it, without notice of any defect of title. Ib. 3. And it does not become such purchaser, or make such advances, by reason of its having a balance against the remitting bank, for which it had refrained from drawing, or from having made further advances after the receipt of the negotiable paper. Ib. 1. Conclusive as to agreement. — Where a bill of lading is made out by the carrier and delivered to, and accepted by, the shipper, all previous parol agreements are merged in it, and the shipper, by such acceptance, becomes bound by its terms. Bostwick v. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. 2. Where, by a bill of lading, goods were to be transported from Cincinnati to New York over certain specified railroads to Belle Air, and there delivered to the agents of the next connecting steamboat, railroad company or forwarding line," etc.,-Held, that the bill of lading was conclusive evidence as to the contract which the carriers made; and that under it they were not bound to carry entirely by railroad. Ib. 3. If a carrier has acted under a bill of lading as delivered to the shipper and accepted by him, and a loss occurs from one of the perils mentioned in such bill, as exempting the carrier from liability, no recovery can be had therefor. Ib. CORPORATIONS. 1. Filing of certificate. — Under the general act authorizing the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining or mechanical purposes (Laws of 1848, chap. 40), which requires a certificate to be filed in the county clerk's office, and in the office of the Secretary of State, stating the name of the corporation to be formed, and the nature of its business, etc., and declares that "when such certificate shall have been filed," the persons who shall have signed the same, and their successors, shall be a body politic, etc., it is essential that such a certificate be filed in the offices specified. Until that is done, no corporation can be formed. Childs v. Smith. 2. Creation of organization. However necessary or convenient a meeting of the persons intending to constitute themselves a corporation, the adoption of resolutions or by-laws, choice of officers, or any other proceedings may be, in securing a due organization, and to bind the action of its members to that object, whether performed before or after their incorporation, they are of themselves no part of the statutory requirement; and they confer no statutory power- no legal right to act as a corporation. Ib. 3. Such acts of the parties, without even an act of user, do not create either a corporation de facto or a corporation de jure, as between the parties themselves. Ib. EVIDENCE. 1. Of accomplice: verdict on: impeaching witness. — It is not an inflexible rule of law that a jury may not, in a criminal case, convict a defendant upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; the fact of the witness being a confederate going to his or her credibility only. The People v. Haynes. 2. The statements of such a witness are to be received with great caution. If, however, they carry conviction to the mind of the jury, and they are fully convinced of its truth, they may convict upon it. Ib. 3. It is, however, the duty of a jury to scan the testimony of an accomplice with the utmost severity; and as verdicts rendered wholly on the uncorroborated evidence of confederates are of doubtful propriety, they will not, in general, be allowed to stand if the witness be otherwise impeached. In such cases a just regard to the rights of the accused demands an observance of the strictest rules in the admission or rejection of evidence. Ib. 4. The mere fact that evidence tends to prove the accomplice is truthful in some respects, is not sufficient to authorize its admission. It should be as to some fact, the truth or falsehood of which goes to prove or disprove the offense charged against the prisoner. It must tend to fix the guilt on the particular person charged, and the rights of the accused should not be prejudiced by confirmation on immaterial points, or as to facts which in no way connect him with the offense. 1b. 5. Where, on the trial of an indictment for arson, the alleged accomplice testified that the defendant promised her $400 to burn the building, and afterward paid her forty dollars upon it, thirty of which she paid to W:,-Held, it was improper to allow the district attorney to prove by W, in corroboration of such statement of the accomplice, that she paid him thirty dollars about the time stated by her. Ib. 6. Where witnesses were called to impeach the general character of the accomplice, and the district attorney called witnesses to sustain it, who testified that prior to the fire they would have believed her on oath,-Held, that although such testimony might be proper, the jury were to determine the credit of the accomplice at the time she testified. That the defendant was entitled to ask them, on cross-examination, whether they would believe her on oath at the time of the trial, and that the court erred in sustaining an objection to such question. Ib. 7. Held, also, that the fact that the court had limited the number of impeaching and sustaining witnesses to six, and the defendant had called that number, did not change the rule. Such restriction did not limit the right of putting questions, on cross-examination, of the sustaining witnesses with a view to test the value of their opinions as to the integrity of the accomplice as a witness at the time of the trial. Id. INSURANCE. 1. Right to terminate risk. — Under a condition, in a policy of insurance, reserving to the insurers the right to terminate the insurance at any time, on giving notice to that effect, and refunding a ratable proportion of the premium for the unexpired term, the return of the premium is the essential part of the condition to be performed, and a prerequisite to the right to terminate the risk. Hathorn et al. v. The Germania Insurance Company. 2. Notice, without a return of, or offer to return, the premium, amounted to nothing. Whatever negotiations may take place, until a return or tender of the premium is made, the policy still remains in force. Ib. 3. A promise, by the insured, to bring the policy to the office of the agent to be canceled, when he is to receive the return premium, neither amounts to a valid agreement that the policy shall be held and deemed canceled, without a return of the premium, nor to waiver of performance of the condition on which the right to terminate the risk depends. Ib. 4. Where the agent of the insurers informed the insured that he had been instructed to cancel the policy, under a condition therein reserving the right to do so, telling him that he would give him (the insured) a check for the return premium, and cancel the policy the next day at 12 o'clock, to which the assured assented; but the premium was not paid the next day, nor tendered, nor was any attempt made to cancel the policy, the company retaining the premium, and the insured the policy, until a loss occurred: Held, that the policy was still in force. Ib. PLEDGE. 1. Deposit of stocks with a broker as margin. Where certificates of stock are deposited with a broker, by a customer, as margin or additional security against loss to him while carrying other stock for the depositor, the transaction is, in law, a pledge; and being such, annexing to the scrip pledged a power of attorney from the owner, authorizing the transfer of the scrip, does not change the character of the transaction, but is merely a necessary act to put the pledge in a condition to be available as such, in case of the pledgor's default. McNeil v. The Tenth National Bank in the City of New York. 2. Right of pledgee to sell the thing pledged. -As between the pledgor and the pledgee, in such a case, the latter has no legal right, secretly or without the knowledge of, or notice to, the pledgor, to sell the stock pledged. Ib. 3. Title of purchaser from the pledgee. - A transfer of the certificates by the broker to a third person gives no title to the latter as purchaser, though he pays a valuable consideration therefor, and though the scrip has a blank power of attorney attached, and even though such purchaser believed he was dealing with a person who had authority to sell. Ib. 4. Right of redemption. If the transaction is a pledge, then the pledgor has a right of redemption, and before a sale can be made by the pledgee, the pledgor is entitled to reasonable notice, and demand of payment of his liability; and there must be default of such payment on his part. Ib. STATUTES. Rule of construction. - When a statute which grants power or authority has expressly fixed, limited or declared the time when such authority shall begin to be exercised, all other time is excluded. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Childs v. Smith. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Title from executors. A purchaser from executors will get a good title if the will gives them a valid power of sale. Hunnier v. Rogers. WILL. - Power of sale: validity of trusts. · A testator, after making various bequests, and giving "all the rest, residue, and remainder" of his estate, both real and personal, unto his children living at his decease, and to the issue of such of them as should then be dead, empowered his executors to sell his real estate, in these words: "And I authorize and empower my executors ✶ ✶✶ to sell all or any part of my real estate, at any time, in his or their discretion, at public or private sale, and to execute valid deeds of conveyance for the same, to the purchaser or purchasers thereof." Held, that the will gave a clear power of sale to the executors, as to the testator's lands; that the power was a general power in trust under our statutes, and the trusts were authorized by the statute; and that a sale of the lands by the executors, under the power, was legal, and passed a good title to the purchaser. Hunnier v. Rogers. The younger members of the Waterbury (Conn.) bar are quite exhilarated over the prospect of several breach of promise cases. DIGEST OF RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. (Q. B. refers to Queen's Bench; C. P. to Common Pleas; Ex. to Exchequer; P. and M. to Probate and Matrimonial; M. C. to Magistrate Cases, and L. J. R. to the Law Journal Reports.) ARBITRATION. Boat-race: jurisdiction of referee.-K. and S., two watermen, agreed to row a "right away sculler's race" upon the river Thames; the start to take place at half-past two P. M.; the rowing to be according to the recognized rules of boat-racing, and a referee to be chosen, "whose decision shall be final." In watermen's races it is the practice for the men to start themselves. A referee was appointed, and the race commenced, but a foul having taken place, the men were ordered by the referee to row over again. On the following day they came to the starting place. After several fruitless attempts to start, K. rowed up to the referee's steamboat, which had drifted out of sight of the men, and complained that S. would not start. The referee looked for S., but not seeing him, told K. to inform S. that he must start, and that if he would not, to row over without him. K. then rowed off, and the referee afterwards saw him row over the course, but did not hear him speak to S. The referee thereupon decided that K. was entitled to the stakes; and it was found by the jury in an action against the stakeholder, that the referee's order was not communicated to S., and that a fair opportunity of starting was not given to him:Held, affirming the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, that, under the agreement, it was necessary, to empower the referee to award the stakes, that there should be a race or a start, and that it was essential to a start that the referee's directions should be conveyed to S; that, in the absence of any such communication, there could have been no fair start, so that the referee's decision was without jurisdiction and void. Per WILLES, J.-That, if the referee had decided, though upon insufficient evidence, that the communication was duly made to S., his decision as to the person entitled to the stakes would have been final, but that he appeared to have neglected to decide, whether what he had imposed as a condition of the start had been fulfilled. Sadler v. Smith (Ex. Ch.), Q. B. 39, L. J. R. 17. ATTORNEY AND SOLICITOR. Personal liability to pay costs: attachment: affidavit sworn before agent of solicitor on the record.-The Court will not order the costs of proceedings to be paid personally by the solicitor conducting them, on account of any misconduct unconnected with those proceedings, or upon an application not giving him proper notice of the charges against him. In re Gregg and in re Prance, Ch. 30, L. J. R. 107. BILL OF EXCHANGE. Notice of dishonor.-The holder of a bill of exchange, which was dishonored on Friday, the 17th of September, gave notice to his immediate indorser on Saturday, the 18th. He did not then know the address of the prior indorser (who was also the drawer of the bill); but after ascertaining the address, he posted a notice to him on the evening of Saturday, the 18th, but so late, that the latter could not and did not receive it till Monday, the 20th. All parties resided in London; and if the last mentioned notice had been posted before 6 P. M. on the 18th, the drawer would have received it the same evening: - Held, that the drawer could not, under the circumstances, set up as a defence to an action by the holder of the bill, that he had not received due notice of dishonor; and that the verdict which the jury found for the plaintiff ought not to be disturbed. Gladwell v. Turner, Ex. 39, L. J. R. 31. COMPANY. Power to accept bills. .-A company, the nature of whose business required that it should accept bills of exchange, entered into an arrangement to make an advance to L. upon the security of certain specified shares and other similar securities. The regulations of the company provided that the directors might accept and indorse bills, and the number of directors necessary for the transaction of business was left to the discretion of the board. A resolution of the board empowered the chairman to accept on behalf of the company, and in favor of L., bills to the amount of the agreed loan upon L., depositing the securi. ties to the amount agreed upon. The chairman professing to act under the authority of this resolution, accepted the bills and gave them to L., who deposited the securities, but to an amount considerably below the agreed amount. No one in fact examined the securities deposited on behalf of the company. The board afterward confirmed the transaction, but apparently in ignorance that the securities had not been duly deposited :Held, affirming the Master of the Rolls, that the bills in the hands of a bona fide holder for valuable consideration were valid against the company. In re Land Credit Co. of Ireland (Lim.); Exparte, Overend, Gurney & Co., Ch. 39, L. J. R. 27. COVENANT. 1. In restraint of trade: restrictive covenant by assignor against carrying on business in Europe so as to interfere with assignees. All restraints upon trade are bad as being in violation of public policy, unless they are natural and not unreasonable for the protection of the parties legally dealing with some subject matter of contract. Public policy requires, on the one hand, that a man should not be at liberty by any contract to deprive himself or the State of his labor and skill, but on the other hand, that a man having a commodity to sell should be permitted to sell it most advantageously by precluding himself by any not unreasonable agreement from entering into competition with the purchaser. The Leather Cloth Co. (Lim.) v. Lorsont, Ch. 39, L. J. R. 86. 2. Upon sale to plaintiffs of certain patents for the manufacture of an article of commerce, the vendors agreed with plaintiffs not to carry on or allow to be carried on in any part of Europe any manufacture or sale of productions similar to those which were the subject of the patents, and not to communicate to any person the processes of such manufacture so as to interfere with the exclusive enjoyment by plaintiffs of the benefits purchased: - Held, that this was a valid covenant capable of being enforced. Ib. DIVORCE. Undue exercise of marital authority.-The wife, being seriously ill, was advised by her medical attendant to leave home for a time. The husband refused. Having become worse, she left home without his consent, and staid away some months, which she passed with her relations. On her return home she was deposed by her husband from her natural position as mistress of his house; she was deprived of the use of money entirely; all that she required had to be put down on paper, and her husband provided it if he thought proper. Having refused to tell her husband on one occasion of going into town everywhere that she had been, an interdict was placed on her going out at all; those whom she desired to see were forbidden the house, and she was prohibited from writing any letters unless the husband saw them before they were posted. Under this treatment her health again broke down:- Held, an undue exercise of marital authority, and to constitute legal cruelty. Kelly v. Kelly, P. and M. 39, L. J. R. 9. EVIDENCE. Oral contemporaneous agreement limiting operation of wrilten contract: bill of exchange.-In an action by payee against drawer of a bill of exchange, payable twelve months after date, defendant pleaded that the bill was drawn for the accommodation of the acceptor and as surety for him, and at the time of the drawing and delivery of the bill to plaintiff, it was agreed between plaintiff, defendant, and the acceptor, that the latter should deposit |