BOOK NOTICES. A Treatise on the Law of Descent: By Anson Bingham, author of "Treatise on the Law of Real Property." Albany: John D. Parsons, Jr. 1870. The author says in his preface: "Two general purposes are sought to be fulfilled in the preparation of this work: First, to put the student in possession of all knowledge necessary to a clear and familiar understanding of the origin, operation and principles of the laws of inheritance as they now exist, including all the incidental questions connected therewith: and second, to place before the practical lawyer the adjudications upon the different points and questions from the reported decisions of England, and of the several States of this country, so fully set forth, explained and reviewed, that he can learn therefrom what is necessary in order to understand the law and its practical application as so established without having a copy of the decisions themselves before him." The plan here set forth is certainly comprehensive and important. There are few branches of law of which an accurate knowledge is so essential as that of the law of Descents, or which have of late years received less attention at the hands of text writers. Writers on the law of real property have usually dismissed the subject with a few pages, while those few treatises devoted exclusively to the subject have become practically useless by reason of the important changes made since their publication. It is fortunate that the preparation of a new treatise has fallen to the hands of one of the ablest real property lawyers in the State of New York. There are so many collateral questions bearing directly on the subjects discussed-extending or limiting their general principles-that one not thoroughly familiar with the entire real property law would make but sorry work at the law of Descents. After a careful examination of the book we are satisfied that Mr. Bingham has done his work accurately and well, and that he has very fully carried out the plan proposed in his preface. It is a treatise in the strict sense of that term, and not a mere digest of cases. The principles involved in the reported decisions have been, so far as we have been able to examine, carefully extracted, and, on the whole, accurately set forth. The profession may, we think, be pretty confident that whatever has been decided on most points of the law of descent will be here found. The author has devoted considerable space to the subject of" Advancements," which, though of great importance in the adjustment of estates, has heretofore received but slight consideration from writers. The decisions on this subject, of late years very numerous, have been fully examined, and the principles evolved from them have been systematically arranged. It We confess to some surprise at finding that the author has devoted only five pages to "the rule in Shelley's case." We are not prepared to coincide with him in the reason given for this meagre treatment of the question. Не says: "The rule in Shelley's case is not entitled to as much consideration in this country as in England, because it is not as important in its bearings upon the rights of the different parties connected with estates in fec. makes but little if any difference here whether parties take the fee by descent or by purchase. There are no feudal lords to suffer loss in the fruit of their tenure here as in England, by reason of the estate passing by purchase instead of by descent; and the creditors of the devisor are as well protected in one event as in the other." Now we do not apprehend that the rule referred to has of late received much consideration in England on account of its bearing on the tenures of" feudal lords." Its chief and almost only importance there, as here, is on the questions whether and in what cases a devise to the first taker for life with remainder to his heirs, will place the fee in abeyance during the life-time of the first taker. Although the rule in Shelley's case has been abolished in several of the States by statute, yet in many of them it exists as a part of the common law, and questions of great intricacy frequently arise under it. That the rule has ever been regarded of the highest importance and of difficult application, is evident from the multitude of cases under it. Many will remember that Baron Surrebutter, in his stroll round the limbo of departed lawyers and litigants, is made to say: "My attention was arrested by a miserable looking ghost, surrounded by books and paper, which, with a bewildered countenance, he was vainly endeavoring to read through. Upon inquiry I found that this was the shade of the celebrated Shelley, who, for some misdeed committed upon earth, had been sentenced to read and understand all the decisions and books relating to the celebrated rule laid down in his own case." In every other respect Mr. Bingham's book is very full and satisfactory, and will be found a very valuable work to every student and lawyer who wishes to obtain a thorough knowledge of the law relating to the title of lands by descent. A Selection of Leading Cases in 'Criminal Law: with notes. By Edmund H. Bennett and Franklin Fiske Heard. Second edition, entirely revised and partly re-written. Vol. 1, by Edmund H. Bennett; Vol. 2, by Franklin Fiske Heard. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 1869. Since the time when John William Smith adopted the suggestions made in Warren's "Law Studies" and prepared his "Leading Cases," that method of presenting important legal principles has become very fashionable, as it certainly is very valuable. There have ever been a certain class of cases so well considered, and on subjects of such grave and general importance as to become "Leading Cases," and to be everywhere received as authority on the principles involved. To make these the nuclei around which to group subsequent decisions bearing on the questions involved, is a very excellent plan; but much learning and judgment is required to carry it out properly. After a very careful examination of the two volumes before us, we are satisfied that Messrs. Bennett and Heard were fully equal to the undertaking. The cases- of which there are some ninety in number- have been selected with great judgment, and have most of them an undoubted claim to be considered "leading cases" in criminal law. The selections have been so made also as to present nearly every important principle involved in criminal law and practice. These are the two fundamental essentials to every work of the kind. But in addition to these, to render a compilation of select cases of any great value, it is necessary that the notes appended to each case shall be of such a character as to enable the reader to fully understand the consequence and authority of the case and to trace the current of subsequent adjudication. We cannot speak too highly of the manner in which our authors have performed this, the most difficult part of their task. These notes display an amount of research, subtlety of discrimination, and familiarity with the progress of the decisions, that is alike creditable to them and to the profession. For instance, the note to Commonwealth v. Rogers-a very celebrated case on the subjects of insanity, delusion, etc. occupies thirtyone pages, and is one of the most satisfactory examinations and expositions of the question, how far insanity is an excuse for crime? that we have ever seen. Three questions are discussed in the light of the decisions: 1. What is such insanity as exempts from punishment. 2. Of the evidence competent on the issues of insanity, and especially of the opinions of witnesses on that subject. 3. The degree of proof sufficient to authorize a jury to find insanity. The English and American decisions are very fully reviewed, the principles involved clearly grasped, logically arranged and elegantly expressed. The same may be said of a large number of the notes in both volumes. So far as we know it is the only collection of leading criminal cases ever published, and we have no hesitation in pronouncing it a very worthy follower of Smith's masterly performance. New York Practice Reports: By Nathan Howard, Jr., Counselor at Law. Albany: William Gould & Son. 1870. This is the second monthly number of volume thirtyeight of Howard's Reports, and contains seventeen cases, some of them of considerable importance. Mr. Howard publishes a notice that he will continue his reports, notwithstanding the appointment of a "State Reporter," and invites all judges and lawyers who have opinions of importance to forward them to him. Under a proper system of reporting authorized by the State, Mr. Howard would receive but slight encouragement from the profession, but under the present management the profession will be compelled to rely mainly on his and the other "unauthorized” reports for their knowledge of the law. CORRESPONDENCE. BUFFALO, Jan. 28th, 1870. Editor ALBANY LAW JOURNAL: Sir-Some eight or nine months ago it was announced that a certain Mr. Lansing of Albany had been appointed "Supreme Court Reporter," under the act of 1869, chap. 99. That act requires that the opinions "shall be promptly reported," and, although nearly three-quarters of a year have elapsed since his appointment, the profession have thus far seen nothing of the results of his labors. Can you inform me of the reason of this unnecessary and unprofitable delay in making public the decisions of our courts? There certainly have been important decisions enough rendered during the interval since his appointment to have filled two volumes, and Mr. Lansing must either entertain an unwarrantable disregard to the requirements of the law under which he holds his office, or must have been grossly negligent in the discharge of his duties. Yours very truly, J. A. [We are unable to give the information asked. From what we can learn it appears that it will be some time yet before Mr. Lansing will have ready his first volume. It is very clear that he has not thus far exhibited that promptness which the requirements of the profession and of the law demand. ED. L. J.] TERMS OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR FEBRUARY. 1st Monday, Special Term (Motions), New York, Cardozo. 1st Monday, Oyer and Terminer and Circuit (Part 1), New York, Ingraham. 1st Monday, Circuit (Part 2), New York, Brady. 1st Monday, Special Term (Chambers), New York, Barnard. 1st Monday, Special Term (Motions), Kings, Gilbert. 1st Monday, Special Term, Newburgh, Barnard. 1st Monday, Circuit and Öyer and Terminer, Sullivan, Miller. 1st Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Fonda, James. 1st Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Onondaga, Morgan. 1st Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Monroe, Johnson. 2d Monday, General Term, Kings. 24 Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Rensselaer, Peckham. 2d Monday,Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Utica, Mullin. 24 Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Ontario, Dwight. 2d Monday, General Term, Buffalo. 3d Monday, Special Term (Issues), Kings, Gilbert. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Greene, Miller. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Chenango, Boardman. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Angelica, Marvin. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Canton, James. 3d Tuesday, Special Term, Oswego, Foster. 4th Tuesday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Malone, James. 4th Tuesday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Salem, Rosekrans. Last Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Tioga, Parker. Last Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Chemung, Murray. Last Monday, Special Term, Monroe, J. C. Smith. COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. James Cullaman, Jr., and another, App's, v. Jasper T. Van Vleeck et al., Resp's. On and prior to June 1st, 1857, A. J. Stevens & Co. were engaged in business as "bankers and real estate brokers" at Des Moines, Iowa, and the defendants were bankers in New York. The latter acted as agents of the former, in New York, to receive remittances, pay drafts, and to redeem the bills of the Agricultural Bank of Tennessee, and return the latter, by express, to A. J. Stevens & Co. at Des Moines, applying the funds of the latter in their hands, as such agents, to these purposes. About the 27th of April, 1857, defendants received a letter from A. J. Stevens & Co. directing them to "pay John Thompson, of Wall street, for such packages of bills of the Agricultural Bank of Tennessee as he may hand you. Charge same to our account, and forward packages to us per express." On the 10th of June following, defendants received another letter from A. J. Stevens & Co., in which they said: "You will notice by the inclosed card that we have admitted new partners on the 1st instant." The card announced the business of the firm in the same terms as theretofore. Subsequently defendants, in pursuance of the instructions in the letter of the 27th of April, received from John Thompson packages of bills of the Agricultural Bank of Tennessee, paid him for them, charged the amount to Stevens & Co. and forwarded the packages to that firm at Des Moines. When the packages arrived there, Stevens claimed that they were for him individually,` under arrangements of the old firm, and received them, and fraudulently misappropriated their contents. This action was brought by the new partners admitted into the firm of A. J. Stevens & Co. on the first of June to recover the amount of the firm funds appropriated by the defendants to the purchase of the said packages. Plaintiffs claimed that the redemption of bills of the Agricultural Bank of Tennessee was no part of the business of the new firm, and that the defendants had never received authority from such firm to make such redemption, and that they had done so without the knowledge or consent of plaintiffs. Held, that the notice to defendants that the new members had come into the firm of A. J. Stevens & Co. was notice that they had come into a participation in the identical business theretofore in progress, and that the defendants were justified in carrying out the instructions previously given by the firm, and transacting the business in the same manner. Stephen May v. William C. Rhinelander, Executor, etc. The defendant's testator gave a lease of certain lands to one Howard, for twenty-one years. When this lease was given there were no buildings on the prop THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. erty demised, and the lease stipulated that at the expiration of the term the lessor should, at his option, either grant a new lease to the lessee or his assigns, for a like term, or pay the value "of all such stone and brick buildings as shall have been erected on the said hereby demised premises." Howard entered under the lease and erected certain buildings of brick, Afterward and during his term, the plaintiff became assignee of the lease and owner of the buildings. Before the expiration of the lease, the defendant, in pursuance of the agreement in the first lease, executed to the defendant a second lease, which contained a condition, that the defendants should, at their election either grant a new lease for the further term of twen ty-one years or pay unto the plaintiff the value of all such stone and brick buildings as may have been erected by the said party of the second part (the plaintiff), his executors, etc., in the said demised premises, and be then standing thereon," At the expiration of the second lease the defendants elected not to renew the lease, but offered to pay the plaintiff for all such stone or brick buildings as he himself had erected. The only buildings on the premises were those erect ed by Howard, before the assignment of the lease to plaintiff, and which had passed to plaintiff under the assignment. Held, that by a fair construction of the language of the two leases, the covenants in the second lease included all buildings of stone and brick standing on the premises at the expiration of the second lease, whether built by the plaintiff or his assignor, and that the defendants were bound, either to renew the lease or pay the value of the buildings. Michael Connolly v. Cornelius Parlton. While engaged in the defendant's service, in the relation of master and servant, the plaintiff was injured by the fall of some staging. Held, 1st, that an injury sustained through the negligence of a fellow workman gives no right of action against the common employer; 2d, that this rule prevails though the fellow workman causing the injury is of a superior grade and the party injured subject to his order and direction; 3d, that the master is bound to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the selection of his other servants, and in the employments and materials and conveniences furnished to his servants; 4th, that the master is responsible to the servant for injuries arising from his personal negligence. The Town of Gravesend v. John T. Hoffman et al. Where neither the complaint nor affidavits on which an application is made for an injunction to restrain defendants' proceedings to acquire, under an act of the Legislature, title to certain property for purposes of quarantine, do not show that such proceedings will work great and irreparable injury to the plaintiff, the application should be denied; a general allegation to that effect is not sufficient, but the facts must be so set forth as to enable the court to see that such results would be likely to flow from the proceedings. John Monty v. Second Avenue Railroad Co. In an action for damages sustained by the plaintiff by being run over by defendants' horse-car, it appeared that the former, in going over the railroad track 99 of defendants, fell, and, while attempting to get up, was struck by the horses and seriously injured. It appeared by the evidence on the part of the plaintiff, that the car was some thirty-five or forty feet away when he undertook to cross, and that the driver was conversing with passengers with his back to the horses. This was denied by defendants, however, and some evidence introduced to show that the plaintiff, who was a lad of ten years, ran against the horses. At this point defendant asked the judge to charge that the fact that the plaintiff, before attempting to cross, did not look up or down the street to see if a car was approaching, was negligence on his part, wh precluded his recovery; also that the fact that the plantiff fell on the track did not affect the question of defendants' negligence, unless accompanied with evidence of the driver's having actually seen him on the track in time to have stopped the car; also that the jury must find that the driver, if he had seen him, must have been able to have stopped the car by the exercise of ordinary care. Held, 1. That the fact that the plaintiff did not look up and down the street was not of itself proof of negligence; if the car was far enough away to allow time to cross under ordinary circumstances, it was not negligence for plaintiff not to look up or down. 2. That to fall by accident, by sickness, by the interference of another, by means of a broken rail, or by stumbling, is not a result that a prudent man is bound to anticipate or provide against in crossing a public street; and that in such an event the defendants must show themselves free from all negligence. 3. That the defendants were bound to exercise the highest degree of care, and that ordinary care was not sufficient. Orrin Swan v. Abram Brotyman. The premises in question were conveyed in 1832, to an organized school district by the then owner. The conveyance was to "the trustees of school district No. 1, of the town," etc., to be held by them and their successors in office, so long as the said premises house." The district thereupon took possession thereshould be occupied by them "for a site for a school of, under the deed, and continued that possession for the purpose named, down to the time of the trial of this action. The same premises were afterward, and over twenty years after the conveyance to the school district, deeded to the plaintiff by the heirs of the grantee to the district. The deed to the district was not recorded until after that to the plaintiff. This action was brought by plaintiff against the defendant, one of the trustees of said district, for a trespass in removing a certain fence placed by plaintiff around the land in question. It was insisted on behalf of the plaintiff that the deed to the school district was void, on the ground that it was not made to the district or to the trustees by name; also, that the plaintiff's deed being first recorded, that to the district became void as to time. Held, 1st. That the deed to the trustees of the lot for a school house site vested the title in them. 2d. That, the school district having been in possession and claiming title for over twenty years, and this claim and possession being notorious, the plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser, and his deed not within the protection of the recording act as against the deed to the trustees. Leonard Buck, Receiver of John R. Briggs, v. Gertrude Briggs ct al. The defendant, Mrs. Gertrude Briggs, wife of John R. Briggs, had executed a mortgage of her separate real estate to one Cliave, to secure a debt of her husband. Some time after, the said John R. Briggs executed a chattel mortgage on the property in question to Cliave, who thereupon, and on the same day, by the direction of Briggs, gave a bill of sale thereof to Mrs. Briggs. This transaction is sought to be set aside as a fraud on the husband's creditors. Held, that the husband had the undoubted right to transfer the said property to his wife in the manner he did as a part indemnity to her against the mortgage she had executed in his behalf; also, that the chattel mortgage was not invalidated by reason of being antedated. Roome v. Nicholson. This was a motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment. The action was brought in the Superior Court of New York to recover the value of a cargo of coal. Defense a general denial. Motion was made at the Special Term to strike out the answer as sham and frivolous, which motion was granted and an order entered striking out the answer and ordering judgment for plaintiff. An appeal from the order and judgment was taken to the General Term, which affirmed the judgment. An appeal from the order and from the judgment was then taken to the Court of Appeals, where a motion was made by the respondents to dismiss the appeal, on the ground, that, as the answer had been stricken out as sham, this was a judgment by default, and as there was no appeal from such a judgment the appeal should be dismissed. It was contended on the part of the appellants that inasmuch as judgment (in virtue of an order) was given by direction of a single judge after argument by counsel for both parties, it was not a judgment by default, actual or constructive, even though the answer had been stricken out as sham. It was further contended, that, inasmuch as the General Term had affirmed the judgment, this court could not go behind the record, and their affirmance of a judgment as such had cured all defects, if any existed. Held, that a judgment entered on an order of the court striking out an answer as sham was appealable. George Bowman, Resp., v. William M. Tallman, Appl. The defendant, who was the executor of a will, employed the plaintiff, an attorney, to institute proceedings for the sale of certain lands devised by the will. The plaintiff did so, and a contract of sale was made. The purchaser refused to complete the purchase, on the ground that a perfect title could not be given. Another contract was then made with another person, who declined to complete the purchase for the same reason. Application was then made for an order to compel the last purchaser to perform his contract, but the Supreme Court, first at Special, and then on appeal at General Term, held the proceedings insufficient to convey title, and refused the application. In the meantime, the first purchaser brought suit to recover back moneys advanced upon his contract. No defense was made, and the moneys were repaid him. The plaintiff, as attorney, then instituted a partition suit, and the lands were sold under the judgment obtained therein. This action was brought to recover the value of the plaintiff's services in effecting sale of the real estate. At the trial, defendant moved for nonsuit, on the ground that he was not personally liable to plaintiff for his services, and that his services in partition suit were worthless. Held, 1st. That, as the services were instituted and carried on under his employment of the plaintiff and his agreement to pay for them, the defendant was liable for their value. 2d. That, even if the plaintiff had been grossly unskillful and inattentive in resorting to and carrying on the special proceedings first instituted, it constituted no valid objection to recovery for services in the partition suit. 3d. It is not sufficient to deprive an attorney and counsel of his compensation that the services rendered by him were productive of no real value to his client. But it is necessary that such a result should be caused by his unskillfulness, inattention or other misconduct. 4th. It is not unskillfulness in an attorney where he advises and institutes proceedings under an erroneous opinion concerning the construction of a statute when such construction has not been authoritatively decided, and conflicting opinions concerning it have been expressed in the court of last resort. ABSTRACT OF RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS. WHAT PROPERTY VESTS IN ASSIGNEE. The petition in bankruptcy was filed on the 5th of October, 1868, by Vogel, and on the 7th he was declared a bankrupt. On the 6th he surrendered to the Register, to whom the case was referred, a stock of goods in store at No. 39 Murray street, New York. Assignees were afterward duly appointed. Certain creditors of the bankrupt, who had sold to him a part of his stock in trade, upon the ground that he had made a fraudulent purchase of the same, replevied the goods in a State court on the 6th of October, and also on the 10th. The assignees claimed that the title of the goods had vested in them, and petitioned the Judge for a delivery of them into their hands. The Judge made an order accordingly. Held, 1st. That the property of the bankrupt in his actual possession at the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy passes into the hands of the assignees the instant they are appointed. 2d. That the proper remedy for the creditors under the circumstances was to apply to the District Court for relief, or to wait the appointment of the assignees, and institute a proper action against them in the District or Circuit Court. (U. S. Circuit Court, NELSON, J., In the Matter of Vogel.) COMMERCIAL PAPER. The alleged act of bankruptcy was, that the Company, a corporation, on the 10th of March, 1869, being a merchant and trader, fraudulently stopped or suspended, and did not resume payment of its commercial paper within a period of fourteen days. Such paper consists of two instruments. One is a promissory note dated November 12, 1868, and signed by the President and Secretary of the Company, and reading as follows: "On demand, after date, we, the McDermott Patent Bolt Manufacturing Company, promise to pay to the order of John E. Walsh, three hundred dollars, at the office of Company, value received." The other is a receipt or due bill, signed by the Treasurer of the Company, and in the words following: "Received, New York, November 7, 1868, from Mr. J. C. Brinck, two hundred dollars for the McDermott Patent Bolt Manufacturing Company, as a loan for their use, the same to be returned, due on demand." Held, that neither of these instruments could be regarded as "commercial paper" within the meaning of those words in the 39th section of the bankruptcy act. The consideration was unconnected with merchandise, trade or commerce, or with any mercantile trading or commercial transaction. The object to which the money borrowed by the Company was applied by it cannot affect the character of the instruments given as evidences of the indebtedness, even though it was previously known to the lenders that the money would be applied to such object. Both the instruments are payable on demand. The 39th section requires a fraudulent stoppage or suspension of payment of commercial paper, given in the debtor's character as a merchant or trader. (U. S. District Court, BLATCHFORD, J., In the Matter of the McDermott Patent Bolt Manufacturing Company.) PROOF OF DEBT-AMENDMENT. WHEN VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT BARS DISCHARGE. A voluntary assignment made by a debtor, although without preferences, will be a sufficient bar to a discharge when it appears that it was made to delay and hinder creditors, though not to defraud them. (U.S. District Court, BATCHFORD, J., In the Matter of Goldschmidt.) SETTLING ESTATE. Under section 43, the trustees, under direction of the committee, may, if so ordered by the court, proceed to settle the estate just as if there had been no adjudication of bankruptcy and the bankrupt was managing his own affairs, taking care always to secure legal protection to each of the creditors. If, under such a general order, the interposition of the court is needed for the examination of witnesses under oath, etc., application therefor may be made to the Judge or Register, and if made by the Judge, he, on granting the same, will order the examination to be had before the Register or otherwise. In other words, wherever the trustees and committee are satisfied that demands are correct, and need no testimony to be taken, they can allow the same. When they are not satisfied, the demand should be proved before the Register on notice to the trustees. (U. S. District Court, E. D. of Mo., TREAT, J., In the Matter of Darby.) ASSIGNEE. An attorney for creditor of a bankrupt may be assignee of the bankrupt's estate. One member of a firm or copartnership, on behalf of the firm, may execute a power of attorney to some third person, author On the 24th of March, 1869, proof of debt was made by Thomas Montgomery on two notes, made by the bankrupt and one Griffin, dated October 19, 1853, each for $700, on which he claimed to be entitled to dividends. It subsequently appeared that these notes were taken up and settled by the bankrupt in Novem-izing him to cast the vote of the firm in the choice of ber, 1864, by giving a new note for $916, and a due bill for $162.71. The creditor thereupon moved to amend his proof of debt by proving the note for $916. Counsel for the assignee resisted the application on the ground that it came too late, and that a want of good faith was apparent. The Register now certifies the question to the court, stating that, in his opinion, the application should be denied. Held, that the proper course by which to obtain the relief sought by the alleged creditor, is not by an amendment of the proof of debt. The amendment sought relates to a new and different claim from any one of those embraced in the existing proof of debt. The proper course is for the creditor to prove his newly-discovered debt independently. (U. S. District Court, BLATCHFORD, J., In the Matter of Montgomery.) DISTRICT IN WHICH PETITION MUST BE FILED. On an application by one partner to have the firm declared bankrupt, it appeared that the firm had carried on business both in New York and in Massachusetts, but that the business in New York was terminated four months prior to the filing of the petition. Held, that section eleven of the act requiring petitions to be addressed to the Judge of the Judicial District in which the debtor has resided or carried on business for the six months next immediately preceding the time of filing the petition, or for the longest period during such six months, must be construed to mean "for the longest period during or within such six months that he has resided or carried on business in any district," and not for the longest part of six months. (U. S. District Court, BLATCHFORD, J., In the Matter of Elisha Foster.) assignees. (U. S. District Court, W, Va., JACKSON, J., In the Matter of Barrett.) PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. Where a lawyer, being under examination in proceedings in bankruptcy, was asked touching the making and consideration of a certain deed of property from the debtor to him, also of a subsequent deed of the same property from him to the debtor's wife, refused to answer on the ground that such transfers were made in the course of his professional business, and were, therefore, within the privilege of confidential communications between him and his client, - the Register, John Fitch, after a very able review of the authorities, held that such transactions were not within the rule of privileged communications, and this conclusion was fully confirmed by BLATCHFORD, J. (In re Bellis and Milligan). GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT. THIRD DISTRICT- DECEMBER TERM. [Owing to the engagement of Judge Hogeboom at Circuit we have been unable to procure an abstract of his opinions in time for publication this week. It will be given hereafter. Next week we propose to give an abstract of all the decisions rendered at the January Term in the Fourth District, and the week following, those rendered at the January Term in the Sixth District.] AGENT. See Parol Agreement. ANSWER. See False Imprisonment. ASSAULT AND BATTERY. Rape: reasonable resistance. - In an action of assault and battery it appeared that the defendant had had illicit connection with the plaintiff- an unmarried womanand the evidence on the trial was conflicting as to |