IT «Ὁ ἐλαχίσων δεομενος εγίςα Θεων. Socrates apud Xen. was the common boaft of the heathen philofophers, that by the efficacy of their feveral doctrines, they made human nature resemble the divine. How much mistaken foever they might be in the feveral means they proposed for this end, it must be owned that the defign was great and glorious. The finest works of invention and inagination, are of very little weight, when put in the balance with what refines and exalts the rational mind. Longinus excuses Homer very handsomely, when he fays, the poet made his gods like men, that he might make his men appear like the gods: but it must be al lowed, that feveral of the ancient philofophers acted as Cicero wishes Homer had done; they endeavoured rather to make men like gods, than gods like men. According to this general maxim in philofophy, fome of them have endeavoured to place men in fuch a state of pleasure, or indolence at leaft, as they vainly imagined the happiness of the Supreme Being to confift in. On the other hand, the most virtuous fect of philofophers have created a chimerical wife man, whom they made exempt from paffion and pain, and thought it enough to pronounce him all-fufficient. This laft character, when divested of the glare of hu. man philosophy that furrounds it, fignifies no more, than that a good and wife man should fo arm himself with patience, as not to yield tamely to the violence of paffion and pain; that he should learn fo to fupprefs and contract his defires as to have few wants; and that he should cherish fo many virtues in his foul, as to have a perpetual fource of pleasure in himself. The Chriftian Religion requires, that, after having framed the best idea we are able of the Divine Nature, it fhould be our next care to conform ourselves to it, as far as our imperfections will permit. I might mention feveral paffages in the Sacred Writings on this head, to which I might add many maxims and wife fayings of moral authors among the Greeks and Romans. I fhall I shall only instance a remarkable paffage, to this purpofe, out of Julian's Cæfars. The emperor having reprefented all the Roman emperors with Alexander the Great, as paffing in review before the gods, and striving for the fuperiority, lets them all drop, excepting Alex. ander, Julius Cæfar, Auguftus Cæfar, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, and Conftantine. Each of these heroes of antiquity lays in his claim for the upper place; and, in order to it, fets forth his actions after the most advanta. geous manner. But the gods, instead of being dazzled with the luftre of their actions, enquire, by Mercury, into the proper motive and governing principle that influenced them throughout the whole feries of their lives and exploits. Alexander tells them, that his aim was to conquer; Julius Cæfar, that it was to gain the highest post in his country; Auguftus, to govern well; Trajan, that he was the fame as Alexander, namely, to conquer. The queftion, at length, was put to Marcus Aurelius, who replied, with great modefty, that it had always been his care to imitate the gods. This conduct feems to have gained him the most votes, and best place in the whole affembly. Marcus Aurelius being afterwards afked to explain himself, declares, that, by imitating the gods, he endeavoured to imitate them in the ufe of his understanding, and of all other faculties: and, in particular, that it was always his ftudy to have as few wants as poffible in himself, and to do all the good he could to others. Among the many methods by which revealed religion has advanced morality, this is one, that it has given us a more just and perfect idea of that Being whom every reasonable creature ought to imitate. The young man, in a heathen comedy, might justify his lewdnefs, by the example of Jupiter; as, indeed, there was fcarce any crime that might not be countenanced by thofe notions of the deity, which prevailed among the common people in the heathen world. Revealed religion fets forth a proper object for imitation, in that Being, who is the pattern, as well as the fource, of all fpiritual perfection. While While we remain in this life, we are fubject to innumerable temptations, which, if liftened to, will make us deviate from reafon and goodness, the only things wherein we can imitate the Supreme Being. In the next life, we meet with nothing to excite our inclinations, that doth not deferve them. I fhall therefore dismiss my reader with this maxim, viz. Our happinefs in this world, proceeds from the fuppreffion of cur defires; but, in the next world, from the gratification of them. quis enim virtutem ample&itur ipfam, Præmia fi tollas ? Juv. IT is ufual with polemical writers to object ill defigns to their adverfaries. This turns their argument into fatire, which, instead of shewing an error in the understanding, tends only to expofe the morals of thofe they write against. I thall not act after this manner with respect to the freethinkers. Virtue and the happinefs of fociety, are the great ends which all men ought to promote, and fome of that fect would be thought to have at heart above the rest of mankind. But fuppofing those who make that profeffion to carry on a good defign in the fimplicity of their hearts, and according to their best knowledge, yet it is much to be feared, thofe wellmeaning fouls, while they endeavoured to recommend virtue, have in reality been advancing the interest of vice, which, as I take to proceed from their ignorance of human nature, we may hope, when they become fenfible of their mistake, they will, in confequence of that beneficent principle they pretend to act upon, reform their practice for the future. The fages, whom I have in my eye, fpeak of virtue as the most amiable thing in the world; but at the fame time that they extol her beauty, they take care to leffen her portion. Such innocent creatures are they, and to great ftrangers to the world, that they think this a likely method to increase the number of her admirers. Virtue has in herself the most engaging charms; and Christianity, as it places her in the strongest light, and adorned adorned with all her native attractions, so it kindles a new fire in the foul, by adding to them the unutterable rewards which attend her votaries in an eternal state. Or if there are men of a faturnine and heavy complexion, who are not eafy lifted up by hope, there is the profpect of everlasting punishment, to agitate their fouls, and to frighten them into the practice of virtue, and an averfion from vice. Whereas your fober freethinkers tell you, that virtue indeed is beautiful, and vice deformed: the former deferves your love, and the latter your abhorrence; but then, it is for their own fake, or on account of the good and evils which immediately attend them, and are infeparable from their refpective natures. As for the immortality of the foul, or eternal punishments and rewards, those are openly ridiculed, or rendered suspicious by the most fly and laboured artifice. I will not fay, these men act treacherously or in the cause of virtue; but, will any one deny, that they act foolishly, who pretend to advance the intereft of it by destroying or weakening the strongest motives to it, which are accommodated to all capacities, and fitted to work on all difpofitions, and enforcing thofe alone which can effect only a generous and exalted mind? Surely they must be deftitute of paffion themselves, and unacquainted with the force it hath on the minds of others, who can imagine that the mere beauty of forti tude, temperance and juftice, is fufficient to fuftain the mind of man in a fevere courfe of felf-denial against all the temptations of prefent profit and fenfuality. It is my opinion, the freethinkers fhould be treated as a fet of poor ignorant creatures, that have not sense to discover the excellency of religion; it being evident thofe men are no witches, nor likely to be guilty of any deep defign, who proclaim aloud to the world, that they have lefs motives of honefty than the reft of their fellow fubjects; who have all the inducements to the exercife of any virtue which a freethinker can poffibly have, and befides, the expectation of never-ending happiness happiness or mifery, as the confequence of their choice. Are not men actuated by their paffions? and are not hope and fear the moft powerful of our paffions? and are there any objects which can roufe and awaken our hopes and fears, like thofe profpects that warm and penetrate the heart of a chriftian, but are not regarded by a free-thinker? It is not only a clear point, that a christian breaks = through ftronger engagements whenever he furrenders himfelf to commit a criminal action, and is ftung with a fharper remorfe after it, than a free-thinker; but it fhould even feem that a man who believes no future =ftate, would act a foolish part in being thoroughly ho neft. For, what reafon is there, why fuch a one should I poftpone his own private intereft or pleasure, to the doing his duty? If a chriftian foregoes fome prefent t advantage for the fake of his confcience, he acts accountably, because it is with the view of gaining fome greater future good. But he that, having no fuch view, fhould yet confcientiously deny himself a prefent good in any incident where he may fave appearances, is alto=gether as ftupid as he that would truft him at fuch a jun&ture. 1 It will perhaps be faid, that virtue is her own reward; that a natural gratification attends good actions, which is alone fufficient to excite men to the performance of them. But although there is nothing more lovely than virtue, and the practice of it is the furest way to folid natural happinefs, even in this life; yet titles, eftates, and fantastical pleasures, are more ardently fought after by most men, than the natural grati=fications of a reasonable mind; and it cannot be denied, that virtue and innocence are not always the readieft methods to attain that fort of happiness. Befides, the fumes of paffion must be allayed, and reafon must burn brighter than ordinary, to enable men to fee and relish all the native beauties and delights of a virtuous life. And though we fhould grant our free-thinkers to be a K fet |