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POWER OF ROMAN GENERALS.

[CH. III. the perpetual monarchs of Rome always solemnized the tenth years of their reign."

Without any violation of the principles of the constitution, the general of the Roman armies might receive and exercise an authority almost despotic over the soldiers, the enemies, and the subjects, of the republic. With regard to the soldiers, the jealousy of freedom had, even from the earliest ages of Rome, given way to the hopes of conquest, and a just sense of military discipline. The dictator, or consul, had a right to command the service of the Roman youth; and to punish an obstinate or cowardly disobedience by the most severe and ignominious penalties, by striking the offender out of the list of citizens, by confiscating his property, and by selling his person into slavery.+ The most sacred rights of freedom, confirmed by the Porcian and Sempronian laws, were suspended by the military engagement. In his camp the general exercised an absolute power of life and death; his jurisdiction was not confined by any forms of trial, or rules of proceeding; and the execu tion of the sentence was immediate, and without appeal.‡ The choice of the enemies of Rome was regularly decided by the legislative authority. The most important resolutions of peace and war were seriously debated in the senate, and solemnly ratified by the people. But when the arms of the legions were carried to a great distance from Italy, the generals assumed the liberty of directing them against whatever people, and in whatever manner, they judged most advantageous for the public service. It was from the suc cess, not from the justice, of their enterprises, that they expected the honours of a triumph. In the use of victory, especially after they were no longer controlled by the commissioners of the senate, they exercised the most unbounded despotism. When Pompey commanded in the east, he rewarded his soldiers and allies, dethroned princes, divided kingdoms, founded colonies, and distributed the treasures of Mithridates. On his return to Rome, he obtained by a

* Dion. 1. 53, p. 703, &c. + Livy Epitom. 1. 14. Valer. Maxim. 6, 3. See in the eighth book of Livy the conduct of Manlius Torquatus and Papirius Cursor. They violated the laws of nature and humanity, but they asserted those of military discipline; and the people, who abhorred the action, was obliged to respect the principle.

single act of the senate and people, the universal ratification of all his proceedings.* Such was the power over the soldiers, and over the enemies of Rome, which was either granted to, or assumed by, the generals of the republic. They were, at the same time, the governors, or rather monarchs, of the conquered provinces, united the civil with the military character, administered justice as well as the finances, and exercised both the executive and legislative power of the state.†

From what has been already observed in the first chapter of this work, some notion may be formed of the armies and provinces thus intrusted to the ruling hand of Augustus. But as it was impossible that he could personally command the legions of so many distant frontiers, he was indulged by the senate, as Pompey had already been, in the permission of devolving the execution of his great office on a sufficient number of lieutenants. In rank and authority these officers seemed not inferior to the ancient proconsuls; but their station was dependent and precarious. They received and held their commissions at the will of a superior, to whose auspicious influence the merit of their actions was legally

* By the lavish, but unconstrained, suffrages of the people, Pompey had obtained a military command scarcely inferior to that of Augustus. Among the extraordinary acts of power executed by the former, we may remark the foundation of twenty-nine cities, and the distribution of 3,000,000l. or 4,000,000l. sterling to his troops. The ratification of his acts met with some opposition and delays in the senate. See Plutarch, Appian, Dion Cassius, and the first book of the epistles to Atticus. [Our author has much over-stated the power of the imperator, in the days of the republic. He could not, of his own accord, either engage in war or conclude a treaty of peace; nor without the concurrence of the ten senatorial delegates, could he settle the administration of conquered lands. What was done by Pompey and Cæsar affords neither rule nor proof. In the first place, a peculiar and before unheard-of authority had been expressly committed to Pompey, by that pernicious Manilian law, which Cicero so unwisely advocated. He afterwards arrogated more to himself than was even then granted. The ratification of his acts, therefore, not only met with some opposition, as Gibbon says, but could only be obtained by that coalition with Crassus and Cæsar, which destroyed for ever the freedom of Rome. Under the title of imperator, the emperors obtained a power that was unknown to the free republic. They acquired by it an unlimited command over the whole military force, the right of making peace and war, and the power of life and death over all the ci izens, even of Rome itself. After he had rendered himself absolute master of the state, Cesar obtained all this authority, with the dignity

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DIVISION OF THE PROVINCES.

[CH. III. attributed. They were the representatives of the emperor The emperor alone was the general of the republic, and his jurisdiction, civil as well as military, extended over all the conquests of Rome. It was some satisiaction, however, to the senate, that he always delegated his power to the members of their body. The imperial lieutenants were of consular or prætorian dignity; the legions were commanded by senators; and the præfecture of Egypt was the only important trust committed to a Roman knight.

Within six days after Augustus had been compelled to accept so very liberal a grant, he resolved to gratify the pride of the senate by an easy sacrifice. He represented to them, that they had enlarged his powers, even beyond that degree which might be required by the melancholy condition of the times. They had not permitted him to refuse the laborious command of the armies and the frontiers; but he must insist on being allowed to restore the more peaceful and secure provinces to the mild administration of the civil magistrate. In the division of the provinces, Augustus provided for his own power, and for the dignity of the republic. The proconsuls of the senate, particularly those of Asia, Greece, and Africa, enjoyed a more honourable character than the lieutenants of the emperor, who commanded in Gaul or Syria. The former were attended by lictors, the the latter by soldiers.† A law was passed, that wherever the of dictator, and it was even made hereditary. See Dion Cassius, lib. 43, c. 44, p. 371; lib. 53. c. 17, p. 711.)-WENCK.] * Under the commonwealth, a triumph could only be claimed by the general, who was authorized to take the auspices in the name of the people. By an exact consequence, drawn from this principle of policy and religion, the triumph was reserved to the emperor; and his most successful lieutenants were satisfied with some marks of distinction, which, under the name of triumphal honours, were invented in their favour.

[This distinction is not correct. The lieutenants of the emperor, under the name of pro-prætors, whether they had been prætors or consuls, were attended by six lictors; those who were intrusted with the power of the sword wore a military dress (paludamentum) and a sword. The governors appointed by the senate, if they had previously served the office of consul, had twelve lictors; but not more than six, when they had been only prætors. They were all styled proconsuls. The provinces of Africa and Asia, were never given to any but ex-consuls. Detailed accounts of the organization of the provinces are furnished by Dion Cassius (lib. 53, c. 12-16), and Strabo (lib. 17, p. 840). Consult the Greek text of the latter, for the Latin version is incorrect -WENC]

emperor was present, his extraordinary commission should supersede the ordinary jurisdiction of the governor; a cus tom was introduced, that the new conquests belonged to the imperial portion; and it was soon discovered, that the authority of the prince, the favourite epithet of Augustus, was the same in every part of the empire.

In return for this imaginary concession, Augustus obtained an important privilege, which rendered him master of Rome and Italy. By a dangerous exception to the ancient maxims, he was authorized to preserve his military command, supported by a numerous body of guards, even in time of peace, and in the heart of the capital. His command, indeed, was confined to those citizens who were engaged in the service by the military oath; but such was the propensity of the Romans to servitude, that the oath was voluntarily taken by the magistrates, the senators, and the equestrian order, till the homage of flattery was insensibly converted into an annual and solemn protestation of fidelity.

Although Augustus considered a military force as the firmest foundation, he wisely rejected it, as a very odious instrument of government. It was more agreeable to his temper, as well as to his policy, to reign under the venerable names of ancient magistracy, and artfully to collect, in his own person, all the scattered rays of civil jurisdiction. With this view, he permitted the senate to confer upon him, for his life, the powers of the consular* and tribunitian offices, which were, in the same manner, continued to all his successors. The consuls had succeeded to the kings of Rome, and represented the dignity of the state. They superintended the ceremonies of religion, levied and commanded the legions, gave audience to foreign ambassadors, and presided in the assemblies both of the senate and people. The general control of the finances was intrusted to their

Cicero (de Legibus, 3, 3) gives the consular office the name of regia potestas; and Polybius (1. 6, c. 3) observes three powers in the Roman constitution. The monarchial was represented and exercised by the consuls. As the tribunitian power (distinct from the annual office) was first invented by the dictator Cæsar (Dion, 1. 44, p. 384), we may easily conceive that it was given as a reward for having so nobly asserted, by arms, the sacred rights of the tribunes and people. See his own commentaries, de Bell

Civil. L 1.

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CONSULAR AND

[CH. III. care; and though they seldom had leisure to administer justice in person, they were considered as the supreme guardians of law, equity, and the public peace. Such was their ordinary jurisdiction; but whenever the senate empowered the first magistrate to consult the safety of the commonwealth, he was raised by that decree above the laws, and exercised, in the defence of liberty, a temporary despotism. The character of the tribunes was, in every respect, different from that of the consuls. The appearance of the former was modest and humble; but their persons were sacred and inviolable. Their force was suited rather for opposition than for action. They were instituted to defend the oppressed, to pardon offences, to arraign the enemies of the people, and, when they judged it necessary, to stop, by a single word, the whole machine of government. As long as the republic subsisted, the dangerous influence, which either the consul or the tribune might derive from their respective jurisdiction, was diminished by several important restrictions. Their authority expired with the year in which they were elected; the former office was divided between two, the latter among and as both in their private and public interest they were averse to each other, their mutual conflicts contributed, for the most part, to strengthen rather than to destroy the balance of the constitution. But when the con

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persons;

* Augustus exercised nine annual consulships without interruption. He then most artfully refused that magistracy, as well as the dictatorship, absented himself from Rome, and waited till the fatal effects of tumult and faction forced the senate to invest him with a perpetual consulship. Augustus, as well as his successors, afferted, however, conceal so invidious a title. [This balance

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was in general illusory. The appointment of tribunes was far from producing the fruits which might have been expected, and which it might have yielded. The power which it conferred was so organized, that it was often useless to the people, and no check on sometimes oppressively exercised authority of the senate. By intrusting to them only the right of deliberating, and reserving to themselves that of ratifying their decisions, the people retained an apparent sovereignty, but in fact overthrew the very bulwark which they had erected. "The senators," said De Lolme, "the consuls, the dictators, and the other great men in the republic, whom the people were prudent enough to fear, and simple enough to believe, continued still to mix with them, and play off their political artifices; they continued to make speeches to them, and still availed themselves of their privilege of changing at their pleasure the place and the form of the public meetings. When they did not find it possible by such means to direct