themselves, as well as intelligent Franks who know the country, seem rather to incline towards the less. revolutionary, but perhaps not really easier, expedient of attempting, even after so many failures, to improve the Turkish administration. Respecting a certain number of the reforms that are needed, there is a general agreement. Christian evidence ought to be made necessarily receivable in all courts, and placed in all points on a level with that of Mussulmans. The Mohammedan law, whether based on the Koran or on the Traditions, ought to be declared inapplicable to causes in which Christians are concerned; or, in other words, jurisdiction over them ought to be (as the Hatt i Humayun provided) confined to the so-called Nizam or civil courts, instead of going to the Sheri or ecclesiastical Mohammedan courts. They ought to be admitted or required to serve in the army and the police; and as it would probably be found impossible to disarm the Muslim population, it may, perhaps, be necessary to permit (as has been done in the Lebanon) the Christians to carry

After all, however, it is not so much changes in the law that are wanted as more faithful administration of the reforming ordinances so often issued by successive Sultans, and in practice so constantly neglected or overridden. How to secure their proper execution, how to check the corruption and partiality of the judges and the extortions of the tax-gatherers, is the real problem.

The plan most commonly proposed is to set up side by side with the local governor an adjunct,

whether a European consul or some other trustworthy Frank, who shall watch the governor, report upon his proceedings, receive complaints from the district of any oppressions practised there which the governor may not have properly dealt with, and forward such complaints, with his own comments, to Constantinople. Some think such an adjunct ought also to have a veto on the governor's proceedings, but as this might make the whole thing unworkable, it would clearly be better to limit him to the duty of watching and reporting. But, then, what security is there that these reports would be attended to at headquarters? The Armenian Assembly, through the Patriarch at Constantinople, makes frequent complaints of wrongs suffered by their co-religionists; the European consuls sometimes set in motion their respective ambassadors, yet how seldom and how tardily is redress granted. It would seem necessary to supplement the local protectors of Christian subjects by a central commission at the capital, which could bring a permanent and effective pressure to bear upon the Porte. And what what would this be but to put the Sultan's government into tutelage, and involve the European powers in the dilemma either of themselves administering the Turkish empire or of seeing their efforts baffled by a policy of non possumus and perpetual delays?

Moreover, it is not merely, perhaps not so much, an honest purpose and good laws that are wanting to the Ottoman administration: it is force and power. Except by sudden and spasmodic efforts, the government cannot make itself obeyed. The police are

inefficient, save for mischief; the irregulars cannot be kept in order; the Kurds systematically defy all authority, and, indeed, though living within the bounds of the empire, have never been properly its subjects. No amount of supervision and reporting will get over this fatal defect of weakness.

These are some of the difficulties which will have to be faced when terms of peace come to be discussed, for it is hardly to be supposed that things can be allowed to fall back to their old footing without at least an attempt to better the state of the Asiatic as well as of the European Christians. Although he would be a sanguine dreamer who should expect that any reforms can make Turkish rule satisfactory or permanent, still it may be quite possible to ensure such a measure of security for person and property as would allow the inhabitants of these provinces to advance in numbers, in wealth, and in intelligence, and thereby make them ultimately fitter for selfgovernment. The European powers effected this in the Lebanon, after the massacre of 1860, by substituting for the Turkish officials local Christian governors and mixed courts, by establishing a local police force of all races, and excluding the Turkish soldiery. That security would also render possible another beneficial influence which one hears occasionally discussed on the spot, I mean colonization from Europe. There are, even close to Constantinople, large tracts of fertile land suitable for the plough and for pasture, which are now lying untouched, tracts where industrious settlers ought to be welcome, and

which they might probably have for a merely nominal payment. But it would be necessary for them to come in numbers sufficient to protect one another; roads would have to be made to give them access to the sea, and special arrangements must be made respecting taxation. Nothing would do so much for Asia Minor as an influx of such settlers; and any government but the Turkish would have long ago tried to attract them.

It remains to say a few words on those British interests in the re-settlement of the East of which we have heard so much. I pass by the question how far England would be justified in maintaining a reign of cruelty and oppression for the sake of avoiding certain possible but remote dangers to her own dominion, and at the cost of disgracing her own best traditions and of alienating from her the sentiments of the other peoples of Europe. I propose rather to look at the matter from the most purely sordid and selfish point of view. It does not often happen that the conscience of a nation prescribes one line of policy, and its interest (taking "interest" in the narrowest sense) another; and I think it will appear that this case shews no such divergence.

There are two spots in the possession of which by the Turks our advantage or security is supposed to be involved, firstly Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and secondly Armenia; and there are two modes in which it is supposed that the possession of those spots may affect us, first as regards our trade, secondly as regards our dominion in India. So far as trade is

concerned, it would undoubtedly be an injury to us if Russia were to become mistress of the Bosphorus. At present she has a rigidly protective tariff, and may possibly be misguided enough to cling to it for a good while yet. Her customhouses could check our import business with the southern shores of the Black Sea and with Northern Persia, into which we send some goods via Trebizond and Erzerum. However, the total value of this trade is but small, for the bulk of our Persian trade goes to Southern Persia by Bussorah, and both Persia and Asia Minor are poor countries, daily growing poorer. The utmost loss we could suffer by its stoppage would not exceed, say, £150,000 a year; and what part would that sum be of the cost of fighting to protect it? So much for that branch of our interests.

India, and the route to India, are far more serious matters. True it is that we conquered India without the aid of the Suez Canal, and re-conquered it, one may almost say, twenty years ago, at a time when we were doing our best to discourage the incipient canal project. Still it will be generally admitted that the freedom of the canal is important, even if far from vital, to our military position in the East. But how does Constantinople affect the Suez Canal? Simply in this way, that it supplies a strong, perhaps an impregnable position, where a fleet might be kept

The total value of our imports into Asiatic Turkey during the year 1875 was (if I do not mistake, being unable to get at the figures at this moment) not much over £3,000,000. Of course it is impossible to estimate exactly the profit on this trade, but it cannot amount to any very large sum.