mentatorial literature, like that of the commentators on Aristotle, in the middle ages;-that the essence of mental activity consists in advancing from point to point, and not in clinging blindly to established points;-that the study of fixed subjects pursued in a prescribed manner, can do no more than fill the mind with certain conventional forms, and can produce no real education.

105 This, and much more of the same kind, may be said; and the reply to such remarks is so important in its bearing upon the subject of Education, that in stating it, I would beg the reader's especial attention. I reply then, that by the importance which we assign to Permanent Studies, we do not make our education stationary and unprogressive, because, along with these studies, we recommend also Progressive Studies, in which the subjects taught are brought up to their most recent condition; and the books on which our students are employed, are the Capital Works which mark the most recent epoch in each branch of literature and science. But in order to prepare the student for the reading and understanding of such works, there is a necessity for Permanent Studies, by which the habits of following scientific reasonings, and interpreting classical writings, may be formed and fixed. The progress of the human mind is, undoubtedly, one of the main objects of Education; and the progress of the individual mind, as a participator in the faculties and fortunes of the mind of man in general: but in order to present and future progress, an acquaintance with the past is requisite. In order that we may share in what men are doing in the world of intellect, we must share in what they have done. In order that we may walk onwards, we must feel the ground solid under our feet. Considered with reference to mental progress, a large portion of education is preparatory only; but it is an indispensable preparation. Any attempt to put aside

this permanent preparatory portion of education, would make our education worthless. It would make our real progress impossible. The past alone can make the present and the future intelligible. If we reject the discipline of our Permanent Studies, we may indeed still learn to use the phrases in which men express the recent Progress of science or literature, and may flatter ourselves that we share in the superiority which such a Progress bestows; but, in reality, such phrases have for us no real meaning. They are mere empty forms of language. The charge of filling the mind with conventional forms, void of real value and afficacy, lies far more truly against those who pretend to teach new truths to persons incapable of understanding them through their want of ordinary culture, than to those who dwell long upon those parts of human science and literature which have, in all ages, been found to be the most effective means of cultivating the intellect and the taste.

106 For in fact, (and this brings us to some of the other forms in which the objection is put,) the mind is not narrowed or made servile, by dwelling long upon models of real excellence, whether literary or intellectual. Works, which have acquired a sway over men's minds, and retained it for ages, by their truth, by their fidelity to the deepest and most universal parts of men's nature,-such works may continue to occupy the time and thoughts of our students, without giving ground for any fear that their minds will thereby become inert, or frivolous, or formal. We are to recollect that, when we insist upon Permanent Studies, we do not mean, by such Studies, any merely conventional selection of books or subjects. We take our selection from the universal voice of civilized man. The objects on which we permanently dwell are Homer, Æschylus, Sophocles, Herodotus, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Terence, Virgil, Horace, Cicero, Livy, Tacitus. We [Pr. I.]

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shall hardly be told that men's minds will become servile and narrow by dwelling upon the works of these writers till they fully understand them.

107 Even when such authors are studied and pondered over with the help of commentators and annotators, it does not appear likely that any intellectual harm will arise from such a commentatorial literature, if the commentator be really read in subordination to the author, which we require and assume. And in the same manner with regard to mathematical subjects; we need not be afraid that men's minds should become inert or narrow by dwelling upon the books of Euclid, or Archimedes, or Newton, till they fully understand them; and if, for this purpose, they find some comments and explanations necessary, it would be very foolish to take alarm at the sound of the word " commentator." We know that in these authors there is an irresistible reasoning, leading to solid truth, which may be understood by reasoning men, and which, being understood, must be valued as truth. If the commentator helps us, then, to understand the reasoning, and to perceive the truth, he renders us a good service. He puts us in possession of some of the indestructible intellectual possessions of our race; and thus aids us in our purpose of feeling our participation in the universal reason of mankind, and in its results. If, in doing this, we dwell long upon the subject, it is not that we are thus acquiring stationary habits of mind; it is that we are learning that, without which we must be for ever stationary. It may be that in those abstruse studies we advance slowly to the full apprehension of the cardinal truths there exhibited; but till we have apprehended them, we cannot really understand anything which lies beyond them. If we are so slow as to need a long time, or the aid of commentators, in order to understand the ancient reasonings, we cannot make ourselves quick by passing them

by, not understood. If we cannot understand that which wise and thoughtful men have written and have understood in the ages which have preceded us, we have not unfolded in us that intellectual element, in virtue of which men so reasoned. Our reason is not educed; we are, in that respect, uneducated.

108 And when the study of works of reasoning, by the aid of commentators, is likened to the study of Aristotle in the middle ages, we are to recollect that, in those periods, the works of Aristotle were studied, not as reasoning, but as authority. The commentators were employed in interpreting his dogmas, not in explaining his arguments. Aristotle himself is remarkable for the want of real mathematical insight, in the mathematical illustrations which he has introduced; and when the sway of that which passed for his philosophy was overthrown, the main instrument in the reform was, that mathematical education of man which we are here recommending, and which can only be carried on by the study of mathematical works occupying a permanent place in education on account of their real truth and excellence.

109 We have already mentioned the fear which, in speaking of education, men sometimes express; that fixed subjects of educational study should become an exercise for the memory, rather than for the intellect; the forms of speech, which seem to contain the knowledge required, being, in fact, retained by rote, and uttered with no real intelligence. We have stated that this fear is one with very little foundation; since one or two very simple questions will at once ascertain whether the student really understands the language which he pretends to translate, or the reasoning which he pretends to give. We may add, that if, in such employments, especially with slow intellects, memory and repeated attention come in for a share of the student's success in performing his task, we are not on

that account to suppose that the reason is left unculti vated. The truth is, that, in most persons, it is only by such exertions of memory and attention that the reason can be cultivated. To overcome the difficulties of a long train of mathematical reasoning, is one of the best ways of cultivating the reason; but to do this, is, with most persons, a matter of time and thought; and of memory also; for while the student is attending to one part of the chain, he loses, for the moment, his clear apprehension of the other; and only bears it in mind as what he had before proved. But by successive efforts of this kind, the whole becomes clear, and the reason acquires the power of grasping the whole at And thus the reason is educated by means of

once.

the memory. And the same is the case, not unfrequently, with the interpretation of difficult passages in ancient authors. Such interpretations, accepted at first upon authority, and retained in the memory, are afterwards made more fully intelligible by similar examples, till at last they are seen to belong to the genius of the language. Such exercises of memory and attention are the necessary means of intellectual culture. It is, no doubt, possible that the comment or the interpretation may be lodged in the memory, without producing any effect upon the reason; and in this case, it is an acquisition of small value. But then, in this case, it is also possible that the mind may be one to which it is difficult to impart anything much more valuable. The reason may be so inert and obscure in its operations, that the education of that faculty cannot proceed very prosperously by any process. The exercise of the memory may lead to the best developement of the mental faculties which their native constitution will permit. The case in which it is most likely that the employment of the memory will lead to no real education of the mental faculties, is when the memory is employed principally, not upon