MUST BE FORCE CALCULATED TO INTIMIDATE.-To constitute forcible trespass there must be a demonstration of force, as with weapons or a multitude of people, so as to involve a breach of the peace, or directly tend to it, and be calculated to intimidate or put in fear. Ray, 32 (Ired.), 39.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORCIBLE DETAINER AND TRESPASS.-The only distinction between forcible trespass and forcible entry and detainer is that the former is as to personal property, and the latter as to realty. Lawson, 123-740.

TITLE NOR RIGHT OF POSSESSION.-On indictment for a riot and forcible trespass in entering a man's dwelling house, he being in the actual possession thereof, and taking from his possession certain personal property, it is not necessary to show that the prosecutor had the right to the property, or the right to the possession, but whether he had in fact the possession thereof at the time when that possession was charged to have been invaded with such lawless violence, and any evidence tending to establish that possession is admissible. Bennett, 20 (4 D. & B.), 43.

INDICTMENT. It is not necessary to allege in the bill of indictment that the prosecutor at any time forbade the entry of the defendants, or that he was put in fear, and then failed to forbid such entry by reason of the great numbers or by the force manifested. Austin, 121-620.

GIST OF THE OFFENSE. The gist of the offense of criminal forcible trespass is that there be such an offer of violence or demonstration of force as is calculated to bring about a breach of the peace, and this may be implied, even if there be no actual violence or fear inspired by those committing the trespass, if the person whose possession is invaded be present at any time during the commission of the act and forbidding it. Woodward, 119–836.

MERE NAKED POSSESSION.-A mere naked possession with pretense of right on the part of the prosecutor will not sustain a prosecution for forcible trespass. Fender, 125-651.

NUMBERS.-Where five or six men enter upon the land of an old colored woman and cut and carry off trees outside of the enclosure of the owner, and refuse to desist when she comes and orders them off, they are guilty. Elks, 125-603.

MUST BE VIOLENCE. To support an indictment for taking away the property of another it must be a violent taking from the actual possession of the owner at the time. McDowell, 8 (1 Hawks), 450.

TAKING CHATTELS.-The forcible taking of chattels from the owner is per se indictable as trespass without laying an assault or other breach of the peace. Love 19 (2 D. & B.), 267.

FORCE MUST TEND TO BREACH OF THE PEACE.-While it is not necessary to show an actual breach of the peace the trespass must be such as tends to involve a breach of the peace. Love, 19 (2 D. & B.), 267.

WHAT IS SUFFICIENT FORCE.-If the prosecutor was restrained from insisting on his rights by a conviction that it would be useless for want of physical power, this constitutes sufficient force. Armfield, 27 (5 Ired.), 211.

SHOOTING DOG IN PRESENCE OF CHILDREN.-Defendant, having his gun for the purpose of hunting, and being fiercely attacked by a dog on passing the house of the prosecutor, shot and killed the dog, after two children of the prosecutor, aged 13 and 11, who came up during the scuffle with the dog, had driven the dog off with a stick. The prosecutor and his wife were in the field out of sight. The defendant at no time manifested any ill feeling toward the children who were present and who became much alarmed by the scuffle with the dog and the explosion of the gun. Held, that defendant was not guilty. Phipps, 32 (10 Ired.), 17.

GETTING PROPERTY BY ARTIFICE.-Defendant, being sued on a note executed by him, asked the magistrate to let him look at it, and, on receiving it, slipped it in his pocket and refused to return it, saying he did not have it: Held, that he was not guilty. Ray, 32 (10 Ired.), 39.

KIND OF TRESPASS NECESSARY.-Some person must be present who has a right to defend the premises or to be provoked at its invasion. Walker, 32 (10 Ired.), 234.

OFFICER-EXECUTION.-An officer is not obliged to have in his hands the execution under which he seizes property. Lutz, 65-503.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRESPASS AND ROBBERY.-Forcible trespass is the taking of the personal property of another by force, while robbery is the fraudulent taking by force the personal property of another. Sowle, 61-157.

FORGERY.

Sec. 344 (3424). Deeds and other papers.

If any person, of his own head and imagination, or by false conspiracy or fraud with others, shall wittingly and falsely forge and make, or shall cause or wittingly assent to be forged or made, or shall show forth in evidence, knowing the same to be forged, any deed, lease or will, or any bond, writing obligatory, bill of exchange, promissory note, endorsement or assignment thereof; or any acquittance, or receipt for money or goods; or any receipt, or release for any bond, note, bill, or any other security for the payment of money; or any order for the payment of money or delivery of goods, with intent, in any of said instances, to defraud any person or corporation, and thereof shall be duly convicted, the person so offending shall be punished by imprisonment in the state's prison or county jail not less than four months nor more than ten years, or fined in the discretion of the court.

Code, s. 1029; R. C., c. 34, s. 59; 1801, c. 572; 5. Eliz., c. 14, ss. 2, 3; 21 James I., c. 26 (A. D. 1623).

PAPERS NOT THE SUBJECTS OF FORGERY.-A prosecution bond given by a husband to his wife in an action against her for divorce can not be the subject of forgery, since the husband is liable for her costs until the divorce is obtained, and the bond is binding on no one. Lytle, 64–255.

Falsely putting a witness's name to a bond which is not required to have a subscribing witness does not vitiate the bond, and is not forgery. Gherkin,

29 (7 Ired.), 206.

Defendant was indicted for the forgery of the following order: "Mr. M., please send me 3 gals. whiskey I will send you money. Dec. the 24th, 1888. D. S": Held, that though the order was not such a one as is the subject of forgery under the statute, yet the indictment was good for misdemeanor at common law. Hall, 108-776.

Falsely, wittingly and corruptly rubbing out, erasing or obliterating a

release or acquittal

on the back of a note or bond is not forgery. Thorn

burg, 28 (6 Ired.), 79.

An "order for the delivery of goods" must have a drawer, a person drawn upon, and there must appear to be a person to whom the goods are to be delivered. Lamb, 65-419.

NOT NECESSARY TO SHOW THAT THE ORDER WAS FILLED.-On indictment for the forgery of an order for whiskey, addressed to one member of a firm, it is immaterial whether the member of the firm addressed, or his partner, filled the order, or whether the order was filled at all or not. Hall, 108-776.

MISDEMEANOR AT COMMON LAW.-The forgery of the following order, "Mr. Miller, please send me 3 gals. whiskey I will send you money. D. S. Dec. 24th, 1888," is a misdemeanor at common law, and an indictment therefor may be sustained independent of the statute. Hall, 108—776.

INDICTMENT. An indictment which charges that defendant did forge a certain paper-writing, commonly called a railroad pass, as follows: "Hillsboro, N. C., Oct. 17th, 1885-Conductor will please pass this man to Graham and return, J. B. Rosemond," is fatally defective. The indictment should charge that Rosemond had authority from the railroad company to issue such a pass, and that it was presented to the conductor, who was the agent of the company and authorized and required to receive it. Weaver, 94-836.

Defendant was indicted for forging the following order: "Oct. 27th, 1884, Mr. R. T. Long, Please let Henry Carmone have 500 dollars and I will be in Monday and pay you and oblige, J. M. Hawood." J. M. Haywood testified that he wrote his name "J. M. Haywood" and not "Hawood," and R. T. Long testified that he took the order to be for five dollars, and let the defendant have a pair of boots on it: Held, that an instruction that if the defendant presented the paper with intent to defraud, and it was intended to represent the name of J. M. Haywood, even though it was spelled improperly, he would be guilty, was not erroneous. Covington, 94-913.

An indictment for forging a bond by one of the obligors named therein against another of the obligors named, may allege the forging of the whole instrument by the obligor committing the forgery of the name of the other. Gardiner, 23 (1 Ired.), 27.

Where an order is forged and drawn in the name of an overseer and agent upon his principal and the purpose is to defraud the principal, the indictment for such forgery must aver that the person whose name is forged is the agent, and that he has authority to draw on his principal; otherwise the court can not see that the false paper had a tendency to defraud the principal, or how it could have been used for such a purpose. Distin guishing State v. Lamb, 65 N. C., 419. Thorn, 66–644.

On indictment for forging a money-order payable "at the store of" a certain manufacturing company, the words "store of" sufficiently indicate the existence of an association by that name, without the express averment that the company was a corporation. Shaw, 92-768.

Where the indictment alleges the forgery of "an order for the paymment of money and the delivery of goods," and the order is introduced as follows: "Fifty cents, 50, payable in merchandise at the store of the R. Mfg. Co. J. H. F., Treasurer," there is no variance. Shaw, 92-768.

The omission of the word "dollars" in the following order: "Please let young lady have the amount of 300 and charge the same to me," is not fatal to the indictment. Keeter, 80-472.

Where a genuine instrument is altered so as to give it a different effect, as changing the date of a note, the forgery may be specifically alleged as constituted by the alterations, or the forging of the entire instrument may be charged. Weaver, 35 (13 Ired.), 491.

An indictment for forgery contained four counts; the first count was for forgery under the statute, while the second was at common law for uttering

forged paper. The jury at first returned that they had disagreed, but on being polled, stated that they found defendants guilty on the first and second counts, but could not agree on the others. A nol pros. was entered as to the third and fourth counts, and the jury having retired again returned with a verdict of guilty: Held, that a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that there was a general verdict of guilty on an indictment containing two counts charging offenses not punishable alike could not be sustained, since there was in effect a distinct verdict of guilty on each of the two first counts, and the verdict on the first supported the judgment. Cross and White, 106-650, and 110-770.

Where the forged instrument is lost the bill need not allege this fact. Peterson, 129-556.

If the forged instrument is lost only its substance need be set out. Peterson, 129-556.

Where the instrument alleged to be forged, upon its face, has a tendency to deceive or prejudice the rights of persons, it is only necessary to set it forth in the indictment and aver its falsity; but if the tendency and capacity to deceive depend upon extrinsic facts they must be set forth in the bill in connection with the instrument and the averments of its fraudulent character. Covington, 94-913.

A charge that defendant forged a receipt against "a book account" is too indefinite. Dalton, 6 (2 Murph.), 379.

A charge of the forgery of an acquittance and receipt for money is sustained by proof of the receipt of a "book account in full." since all debts are payable in money unless otherwise explained. Dalton, 8 (1 Hawks), 3.

On indictment for forgery of a deed the omission of a figure in the description of the land is fatal. Street, 1, (Tay. Rep.), 98.

On indictment for forging a bond it is not necessary to allege that there was a subscribing witness thereto, though there was in fact one. Ballard, 6 (2 Murph.), 186.

Defendant was charged with the forgery of the following order: "Dulks & Helker: You will please pay to the boy $3.00 in merchandise and oblige, J. B. Runkins." On the trial it appeared that the true name of the alleged drawer was J. B. Rankin, and of the drawee firm, Helker & Duts, that defendant could not write, and that he obtained merchandise from Helker & Duts on the faitn of the forged order: Held, that the variation in the spelling of the names comes within the principle idem sonans, and that the reversed order of the firm name is not material variance. Lane, 80-407.

EVIDENCE. The possession of a forged order and the fact that defendant obtained goods thereon is sufficient proof that he either forged or assented to the forgery of the order, and the fact that he could not write does not rebut the presumption of guilt. Lane, 80-407.

EVIDENCE OF VENUE.-Evidence that defendant received the identical paper alleged to be forged, in blank form, from the cashier of a bank in the county in which the forgery is alleged to have been committed, and that he produced it with the blanks filled out in that county about a week afterwards, is sufficient to justify a conclusion that he forged it in that county. Morgan, 19 (2 D. & B.), 348.

PUNISHMENT.-One convicted of forgery may be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary, though the indictment charges an offense not within the statute but at common law. Williams, 86–671.

JURISDICTION.-The forgery of a note which is placed in a national bank for the purpose of supporting a false entry on the books of the bank, and the making of the false entry for the purpose of deceiving the national bank examiner are distinct and separate offenses, and the fact that the courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction of the offense of

making the false entry, under Rev. St. U. S., sec. 5209, does not deprive the state courts of jurisdiction to try and punish for the forgery of the note, since neither crime is a constituent element of the other, and a person may be guilty of the one and not the other. Cross and White, 106-650, and 101-770.

Rev. St. U. S., sec. 5418, providing that "every person who falsely makes, alters, forges or counterfeits any bid, proposal, guarantee, official bond, public record, affidavit or other writing for the purpose of defrauding the United States," does not embrace a note forged by bank officials against individuals and placed in the bank for the purpose of deceiving the national bank examiner, since it does not appear that the federal government has any pecuniary interest in the matter. The statute is manifestly directed against frauds against the government in its fiscal operations, and the expression "or other writing" following the enumeration of the things to be forged, which omits bills and notes, must be restricted to the class to which it belongs and the obvious scope and operation of the statute. Ib.

In such case, a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the state court must aver that the forgery of the note was "for the purpose of defrauding the United States." 1b.

VARIANCE.Where the indictment charges the forgery of a deed and sets out the description, giving the first line as "South twenty West," and the deeds calls for "South twenty-two West," the variance is fatal. The misrecital extends beyond the mere form of the deed and affects the substance. Street, 2 (Taylor's Rep.), 98.

An indictment for forging an order for $60.07 is not sustained where the only evidence introduced relates to two orders, one for $60 and the other for $60.27. Smith, 78-462.

Where the indictment charges the forgery of the name of a firm with intent to defraud two persons whose names are stated, but it is not alleged that they composed the firm, and the testimony proves the forgery with an intent to defraud the firm, but it is not proved that the two persons named composed the firm, the allegations of the indictment are not sustained. Harrison, 69–143.

IDEM SONANS.-Where the indictment charged that the name forged was "Major Vass," and the signature proven is "Maj. Vase" there is no variance, the name being idem sonans. Collins, 115-716.

The state may show that a witness whose name is W. W. Vass is commonly known as "Maj. Vass." Collins, 115—716.

EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT.-There was evidence that the prosecutor's cashier missed from nis employer's check book two numbered blank checks; that on the afternoon of the same day defendant, who had been seen about the prosecutor's office during the forenoon, presented a check at the bank, numbered like one of the missing blank checks, and fraudulently purporting to be signed by the prosecutor; that, on being questioned by the bank teller, defendant tore up the check and ran away; and that when arrested a part of the signed check was found on him, together with a blank check, the number on which corresponded with one of the missing checks: Held, that the evidence was sufficient to establish the charge of forgery. Matlock, 119-806.

ONLY FRAUDULENT INTENT NECESSARY.-To sustain an indictment for forgery it is not necessary that the forgery should have been "calculated to deceive and did deceive," but only that there was a fraudulent intent to deceive by a forged paper, however awkwardly or clumsily the signature may have been written. Collins, 115—716.

A fraudulent intent is a necessary ingredient in the offense of forgery, and, therefore, a charge that signing the name of another without authority is forgery, without stating that it must be done with fraudulent intent, is erroneous. Wolf, 122-1079.