Opinion of the Court. within the exception in the bill of lading. 8 Wall. 162. Although this statement was perhaps not absolutely necessary to the decision, it was upon a point argued by counsel, and shows clearly that the court was of opinion that the explosion, and not the sinking, was the proximate cause of the loss. In The Portsmouth, it was decided that a jettison made to lighten a steamboat, which had been run aground by her captain's negligence, was not within an exception of "the dangers of lake navigation" in a bill of lading; and Mr. Justice Strong, in delivering judgment, said: "A loss by a jettison occasioned by a peril of the sea is, in ordinary cases, a loss by perils of the sea. But it is well settled that, if a jettison of a cargo, or a part of it, is rendered necessary by any fault or breach of contract of the master or owners of the vessel, the jettison must be attributed to that fault, or breach of contract, rather than to the sea peril, though that may also be present, and enter into the case. This is a principle alike applicable to exceptions in bills of lading and in policies of insurance. Though the peril of the sea may be nearer in time to the disaster, the efficient cause, without which the peril would not have been incurred, is regarded as the proximate cause of the loss. And there is, perhaps, greater reason for applying the rule to exceptions in contracts of common carriers than to those in policies of insurance, for, in general, negligence of the insured does not relieve an underwriter, while a common carrier may not, even by stipulation, relieve himself from the consequences of his own fault." 9 Wall. 684, 685. Generally speaking, the words "perils of the sea" have the same meaning in a bill of lading, as in a policy of insurance. There is a difference, indeed, in their effect in the two kinds of contract, when negligence of the master or crew of the vessel contributes to a loss by a peril of the sea; in such a case, an insurer against "perils of the sea" is liable, because the assured does not warrant that his servants shall use due care to avoid them; whereas an exception of "perils of the sea" in a bill of lading does not relieve the carrier from his primary obligation to carry with reasonable care, unless prevented by the excepted perils. But when, as in the present case. it is Opinion of the Court. distinctly found that there was no negligence, there is no reason, and much inconvenience, in holding that the words. have different meanings in the two kinds of commercial contract. The Portsmouth, above cited; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312, 322-325; Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 438, 442; Compania La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104; The Xantho, 12 App. Cas. 503, 510, 514, 517. In the case at bar, the explosion of the case of detonators, besides doing other damage, burst open the side of the ship below the water line, and the sea water rapidly flowed in through the opening made by the explosion, and injured the plaintiff's sugar. The explosion, in consequence of which, and through the hole made by which, the water immediately entered the ship, must be considered as the predominant, the efficient, the proximate, the responsible cause of the damage to the sugar, according to each of the tests laid down in the judgments of this court, above referred to. The damage to the sugar was an effect which proceeded inevitably, and of absolute necessity, from the explosion, and must therefore be ascribed to that cause. The explosion concurred, as the efficient agent, with the water,' at the instant when the water entered the ship. The inflow of the water, seeking a level by the mere force of gravitation, was not a new and independent cause but was a necessary and instantaneous result and effect of the bursting open of the ship's side by the explosion. There being two concurrent causes of the damage the explosion of the detonators, and the inflow of the water— without any appreciable interval of time, or any possibility of distinguishing the amount of damage done by each, the explosion, as the cause which set the water in motion, and gave it its efficiency for harm at the time of the disaster, must be regarded as the predominant cause. It was the primary and efficient cause, the one that necessarily set the force of the water in operation; it was the superior or controlling agency, of which the water was the incident or instrument. The inflow of the sea water was not an intermediate cause, disconnected from the primary cause, and self-operating; it was not a new and independent cause Opinion of the Court. of damage; but, on the contrary, it was an incident, a necessary incident and consequence, of the explosion; and it was one of a continuous chain of events brought into being by the explosion events so linked together as to form one continuous whole. The damage was not owing to any violent action of winds. or waves, or to the ship ccming against a rock or shoal or other external object; but it was owing to an explosion within the ship, and arising out of the nature of the cargo, which cannot be considered, either in common understanding, or according to the judicial precedents, as a peril of the sea. As was observed by this court in Insurance Co. v. Boon, above cited, "Often, in case of a fire, much of the destruction is caused by water applied in efforts to extinguish the flames; yet, it is not doubted, all that destruction is caused by the fire, and insurers against fire are liable for it." 95 U. S. 131. If damage done by water thrown on by human agency to put out a fire is considered a direct consequence of the fire, surely damage done by water entering instantly, by the mere force of gravitation, through a hole made by an explosion of part of the cargo, must be considered as a direct consequence of the explosion. Upon principle and authority, therefore, our conclusion is that the explosion, and not the sea water, was the proximate cause of the damage to the sugar, and that this damage was not occasioned by the perils of the sea, within the exceptions in the bill of lading. Nor can the damage to the sugar, attributable, not to a peril of the sea, but to the explosion of part of the cargo after the ship had ended her voyage, and had been finally and intentionally moored at the dock, there to remain until her cargo was taken out of her, be considered as "occasioned by accidents of navigation." Canada Shipping Co. v. British Shipowners' Association, 23 Q. B. D. 342; The Accomac, 15 Prob. Div. 208; Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 12 App. Cas. 484; The Mohawk, above cited. Much reliance was placed by the appellee upon a recent English case, in which the House of Lords, reversing the de Syllabus. cision of Lord Esher and Lords Justices Bowen and Fry in the Court of Appeal, and restoring the judgment of Lord Justice Lopes in the Queen's Bench Division, held that damage to goods by sea water which, without any neglect or default on the part of the shipowners or their servants, found its way into the hold of a steamship through a hole which had been gnawed by rats in a leaden pipe connected with the bath room of the vessel, was within the exception of "dangers or accidents of the seas" in a bill of lading. Hamilton v. Pandorf, 12 App. Cas. 518; 17 Q. B. D. 670; 16 Q. B. D. 629. There is nothing in the report of any stage of that case to show that the sea water entered the ship immediately upon the gnawing by the rats of the hole in the pipe; and any such inference would be inconsistent with one of the opinions delivered in the House of Lords, in which Lord Fitzgerald said: "The remote cause was in a certain sense the action of the rats on the lead pipe; but the immediate cause of the damage was the irruption of sea water from time to time through the injured pipe, caused by the rolling of the ship as she proceeded on her voyage." 12 App. Cas. 528. However that may have been, that case differs so much in its facts from the case now before us, that it is unnecessary to consider it more particularly. Question certified answered in the negative. THE SILVIA. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 5. Argued March 8, 1898-Decided October 17, 1898. A ship, whose port holes between decks are fitted with the usual glass covers and the usual iron shutters, and have no cargo stowed against them, is not unseaworthy by reason of beginning a voyage in fair weather with the glass covers tightly closed, and the iron shutters left open for the admission of light, but capable of being speedily got at and closed if occasion should require; and any subsequent neglect in not closing the iron covers is a "fault or error in navigation or in the management Opinion of the Court. of the vessel," within the meaning of section 3 of the act of Congress of February 13, 1893, c. 105, known as the Harter Act. Section 3 of the Harter Act applies to foreign vessels. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles C. Burlingham and Mr. Harrington Putnam for the Franklin Sugar Refining Company. Mr. J. Parker Kirlin for the Silvia. MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court. This was a libel in admiralty, filed June 14, 1894, in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by the Franklin Sugar Refining Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, against the steamship Silvia, of Liverpool, owned by the Red Cross Line of Steamers, to recover damages for injuries to a cargo of sugar, owned by the libellant, which had been shipped on or about February 15, 1894, upon the Silvia at Matanzas, Cuba, for Philadelphia, under a bill of lading, by which the sugar was "to be delivered in the like good order and condition at the port of Philadelphia (the dangers of the seas only excepted)," upon payment of agreed freight, "and all other conditions as per charter party dated New York 31st January, 1894." The charter party, which had been made and concluded at New York January 31, 1894, provided that the Silvia, then at Tucacas, Venezuela, should proceed as soon as possible in ballast to Matanzas for a voyage thence to Philadelphia, New York or Boston; and contained these provisions: "The vessel shall be tight, staunch, strong and in every way fitted for such a voyage, and receive on board, during the aforesaid voyage, the merchandise hereinafter mentioned (the act of God, adverse winds, restraint of princes and rulers, the Queen's enemies, fire, pirates, accidents to machinery or boilers, collisions, errors of navigation and all other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers and navigation, of whatever nature and kind soever during the said voyage al |