« ForrigeFortsett »
Decisions announced without Opinions.
No. 410. RUSSELL v. STEARNS & COMPANY. Sixth Circuit. Denied October 17, 1898. Mr. Henry M. Campbell, Mr. Ephraim Banning and Mr. Thomas A. Banning for petitioner. Mr. R. A. Parker and Mr. C. F. Burton opposing.
No. 413. SPRINGER V. JAKOBSON. Fifth Circuit. Granted October 17, 1898. Mr. Richard DeGray for petitioner.
No. 416. MACDANIEL v. UNITED STATES. Fourth Circuit. Denied October 17, 1898. Mr. Tracy L. Jeffords for petitioner. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Boyd opposing.
No. 426. GARDES v. UNITED STATES. Fifth Circuit. Denied October 24, 1898. Mr. J. R. Beckwith for petitioner. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Solicitor General Richards opposing.
No. 427. GALLOT v. UNITED STATES. Fifth Circuit. Denied October 24, 1898. Mr. J. R. Beckwith for petitioner. Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Solicitor General Richards opposing.
No. 430. MAST, FOOS & COMPANY v. STOVER MANUFACTURING COMPANY. Seventh Circuit. Granted October 24, 1898. Mr. Lysander Hill, Mr. H. A. Toulmin and Mr. Melville Church for petitioner. Mr. Charles K. Offield and Mr. Charles C. Linthicum opposing.
No. 346. CITY OF ATTICA, HARPER CO., KANSAS, v. SPRINGFIELD SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST COMPANY. Eighth Circuit. Denied October 24, 1898. Mr. William T. S. Curtis and Mr. C. V. Ferguson for petitioner. Mr. Henry A. King opposing.
Decisions announced without Opinions.
No. 370. CASTNER AND CURRAN v. COFFMAN. cuit. Granted October 24, 1898.
Mr. Arthur V. Briesen and
Mr. H. E. Everding for petitioner.
Mr. A. G. Safford opposing.
FULLER V. FIELD. Seventh Circuit. Denied Oc
tober 31, 1898. Ezerean Fuller for petitioner.
No. 418. P. LORILLARD COMPANY V. PEPER. Eighth Circuit. Denied October 31, 1898. Mr. M. B. Philipp and Mr. Frederic D. McKenney for petitioner. Mr. Smith P. Galt opposing.
CONTINENTAL NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK CITY v. HEILMAN. Eighth Circuit. Denied October 31, 1898. Mr. John L. Cadwalader and Mr. Addison C. Harris for petitioner. Mr. Charles W. Smith, Mr. John S. Duncan, Mr. Alexander Gilchrist and Mr. C. A. De Bruler opposing.
No. 431. WINSTON V. UNITED STATES. Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Granted October 31, 1898. Mr. George Kearney for petitioner.
No. 432. STRATHER v. UNITED STATES. Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Granted October 31, 1898. Mr. Samuel D. Truitt and Mr. Tracy L. Jeffords for petitioner.
No. 433. SMITH V. UNITED STATES. Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Granted October 31, 1898. Mr. Chapin Brown for petitioner.
KNIGHTS TEMPLARS AND MASONS' LIFE INDEMNITY COMPANY V. CONVERSE. Seventh Circuit. Denied October 31, 1898. Mr. Charles H. Aldrich for petitioner. Mr. James H. Hopkins opposing.
1. If a vessel, seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage, is afterwards
stranded by the negligence of her master, the ship owner, who has
exercised due diligence to make his vessel in all respects seaworthy,
properly manned, equipped and supplied, under the provisions of § 3
of the act of February 13, 1893, c. 105, 27 Stat. 495, has not a right to
general average contribution for sacrifices made and suffered by him
subsequent to the stranding, in successful efforts to save vessel, freight
and cargo. The Irrawaddy, 187.
2. The main purposes of the act of February 13, 1893, known as the Harter
Act, were to relieve the ship owner from liability for latent defects,
not discoverable by the utmost care and diligence, and, in the event
that he has exercised due diligence to make his vessel seaworthy, to
exempt him and the ship from responsibility for damages or loss result-
ing from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of the
vessel; but the court cannot say that it was the intention of the act
to allow the owner to share in the benefits of a general average con-
tribution to meet losses occasioned by faults in the navigation and
management of the ship. Ib.
3. In determining the effect of this statute in restricting the operation of
general and well-settled principles, the court treats those principles as
still existing, and limits the relief from their operation afforded by
the statute to that called for by the language of the statute. Ib.
4. A provision in a bill of lading, that the carrier "shall not be liable for
loss or damage caused by the perils of the sea," or by "accidents of
navigation," does not exempt the carrier from liability for damage to
part of the cargo by sea water under these circumstances: While the
ship was being unloaded at the dock in her port of her destination, a
case of detonators in her hold exploded, without fault of any one en-
gaged in carrying or discharging the cargo, and the explosion made a
large hole in the side of the ship, through which the water rapidly
entered the hold, and damaged other goods. The G. R. Booth, 450.
5. A ship, whose port holes between decks are fitted with the usual glass
covers and the usual iron shutters, and have no cargo stowed against
them, is not unseaworthy by reason of beginning a voyage in fair
weather with the glass covers tightly closed, and the iron shutters left
open for the admission of light, but capable of being speedily got at
and closed if occasion should require; and any subsequent neglect in
not closing the iron covers is a "fault or error in navigation or in the
management of the vessel," within the meaning of section 3 of the act
of Congress of February 13, 1893, c. 105, known as the Harter Act.
The Silvia, 462.
6. Section 3 of the Harter Act applies to foreign vessels. Ib.
The decrees in the several cases are modified by striking from them the
words referred to in the application of the appellants, and set forth in
the opinion of the court. Smyth v. Ames, 361.
1. A description in a chattel mortgage of a given number of articles or
animals out of a larger number is not sufficient; but such a mortgage
is valid against those who know the facts. Northwestern Bank v.
2. A purchaser of personal property, which is mortgaged, is charged with
knowledge of every fact shown by the records, and is presumed to
know every other fact which an examination, suggested by the records,
would have disclosed.
3. Under the rule that the incident covers the principal, a mortgage of
domestic animals covers the increase of such animals, though it be
silent as to such increase. Ib.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, followed. Collins v. New
Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30.
Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U. S. 55, followed.
Clark v. Fitzgerald, 92.
Ely's Administrator v. United States, 171 U. S. 220, followed. United States
v. Maish, 242.
Camou v. United States, 171 U. S. 277, followed: Perrin v. United States,
Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U. S. 463, affirmed. Walreth v. Champion Min-
ing Co., 293.
White v. Berry, 171 U. S. 366, followed.
King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404, followed.
King v. Panther Lumber Co.,
Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Virginia, 226, followed. King v. Mullens, 404.
Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, followed. Anderson v. United
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6;
JURISDICTION, A, 1, 13;
MINERAL LAND, 8, 10;
1. Where an undertaking on one side is in terms a condition to the stipu-
• lation on the other, that is, where the contract provides for the per-
formance of some act, or the happening of some event, and the
obligations of the contract are made to depend on such performance
or happening, the conditions are conditions precedent; but when the
act of one is not necessary to the act of the other, and the loss and in-
convenience can be compensated in damages, performance of the one is
not a condition precedent to the performance of the other. New
Orleans v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 312.
2. It being shown by the record that the railway terminus from which the
extension along Claiborne street was to be made was never constructed,
and that the crossing from Westwego to the land in front of the park
was also never established, but, on the contrary, that the company ex-
tended its road down the river to Gouldsboro, where it made its main
crossing, the right to the extension and the right to the use of the
batture no longer obtains. Ib.
3. The suspensive condition, by which the rights of the company under
the original ordinance were held in abeyance, operates also upon the
lease, and the mere payment of rent did not change the nature of the
suspensive condition, or work an estoppel. Ib.
CONFEDERATE STATE LEGISLATION.
1. Transactions between persons actually residing within the territory
dominated by the government of the Confederate States were not
invalid for the reason only that they occurred under the sanction of
the laws of that government or of any local government recognizing
its authority. Baldy v. Hunter, 388.
2. Within such territory, the preservation of order, the maintenance of
police regulations, the prosecution of crimes, the protection of prop-
erty, the enforcement of contracts, the celebration of marriages, the
settlement of estates, the transfer and descent of property, and similar
or kindred subjects, were, during the war, under the control of the
local governments constituting the so called Confederate States. Ib.
3. What occurred or was done in respect of such matters under the author-
ity of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be disre-
garded or held invalid merely because those governments were organized
in hostility to the Union established by the National Constitution; this,