because the existence of war between the United States and the Con-
federate States did not relieve those who were within the insurrection-
ary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds
of society, nor do away with civil government or the regular adminis-
tration of the laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course
of civil society as organized within the enemy's territory, although
they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto
or unlawful government organized to effect a dissolution of the Union,
were without blame "except when proved to have been entered into
with actual intent to further invasion or insurrection." Ib.
4. Judicial and legislative acts in the respective States composing the so
called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they
were not "hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the
authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights
of citizens under the Constitution." Ib.
5. Applying these principles to the present case, the court is of opinion
that the mere investment by Hunter, as guardian, of the Confederate
funds or currency of his ward in bonds of the Confederate States
should be deemed a transaction in the ordinary course of civil society,
and not, necessarily, one conceived and completed with an actual in-
tent thereby to aid in the destruction of the Government of the
Union. lb.
1. Oleomargarine has, for nearly a quarter of a century, been recognized in
Europe and in the United States as an article of food and commerce,
and was recognized as such by Congress in the act of August 2, 1886, c.
840; and, being thus a lawful article of commerce, it cannot be wholly
excluded from importation into a State from another State where it
was manufactured, although the State into which it was imported
may so regulate the introduction as to insure purity, without having
the power to totally exclude it. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 1.
2. A sale of a ten pound package of oleomargarine, manufactured, packed,
marked, imported and sold under the circumstances set forth in detail
in the special verdict in this case, was a valid sale, although made to
a person who was himself a consumer; but it is not decided that this
right of sale extended beyond the first sale by the importer after
its arrival within the State. Ib.
3. The importer had not only a right to sell personally, but he had the
right to employ an agent to sell for him, and a sale thus effected was
valid.
4. The right of the importer to sell does not depend upon whether the
original package was suitable for retail trade or not, but is the same,
whether made to consumers or to wholesale dealers, provided he sells
in original packages. Ib.
5. Act No. 21 of the legislature of Pennsylvania, enacted May 21, 1885,
enacting that "no person, firm or corporate body shall manufacture
out of any oleaginous substance, or any compound of the same, other
than that produced from unadulterated milk or of cream from the
same, any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese pro-
duced from pure unadulterated milk, or cream from the same, or of
any imitation or adulterated butter or cheese, nor shall sell or offer
for sale, or have in his, her or their possession with intent to sell the
same as an article of food" and making such act a misdemeanor,
punishable by fine and imprisonment, is invalid to the extent that
it prohibits the introduction of oleomargarine from another State,
and its sale in the original package. lb.
6. Following the decision in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, the court holds
that the statute of New Hampshire prohibiting the sale of oleomar-
garine as a substitute for butter, unless it is of a pink color, is invalid,
as being, in necessary effect, prohibitory. Collins v. New Hampshire, 30.
7. The right to equal protection of the laws is not denied by a state court
when it is apparent that the same law or course of procedure would be
applied to any other person in the State under similar circumstances
and conditions. Tinsley v. Anderson, 101.
8. The act of the legislature of North Carolina of January 21, 1891, must
be regarded as an act providing for the inspection of fertilizers and
fertilizing materials in order to prevent the practice of imposition on
the people of the State, and the charge of twenty-five cents per ton as
intended merely to defray the cost of such inspection; and as it is com-
petent for the State to pass laws of this character, the requirement of
inspection and payment of its cost does not bring the act into collision
with the commercial power vested in Congress, and clearly this can-
not be so as to foreign commerce, for clause two of section ten of
article one expressly recognizes the validity of state inspection laws,
and allows the collection of the amounts necessary for their execution;
and the same principle must apply to interstate commerce. Patapsco
Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 345.
9. The act of the legislature of Missouri of April 8, 1895, Missouri Laws
1895, page 284, providing that "comparison of a disputed writing with
any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine shall
be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings and the
evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the
court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writ-
ing in dispute," is not ex post facto, under the Constitution of the
United States, when applied to prosecutions for crimes committed
prior to its passage. Thompson v. Missouri, 380.
10. The system established by the State of West Virginia, under which
lands liable to taxation are forfeited to the State by reason of the
owner not having them placed or caused to be placed, during five
consecutive years, on the proper land books for taxation, and caused
himself to be charged with the taxes thereon, and under which, on
petition required to be filed by the representative of the State in the
proper Circuit Court, such lands are sold for the benefit of the school
fund, with liberty to the owner, upon due notice of the proceeding,
to intervene by petition and secure a redemption of his lands from the
forfeiture declared by paying the taxes and charges due upon them,
is not inconsistent with the due process of law required by the Con-
stitution of the United States or the constitution of the State. King
v. Mullins, 404.
11. The statutes of the State of New York, providing that "every cor-
poration, joint stock company or association whatever, now or here-
after incorporated, organized or formed under, by or pursuant to law
in this State or in any other State or country and doing business in
this State, except only saving banks and institutions for savings,
life insurance companies, banks, foreign insurance companies, manu-
facturing or mining corporations or companies wholly engaged in
carrying on manufactures or mining ores within this State, and agri-
cultural and horticultural societies or associations, which exceptions,
however, shall not include gas companies, trust companies, electric
or steam heating, lighting and power companies, shall be liable to
and shall pay a tax as a tax upon its franchise, or business into the
state treasury annually, to be computed as follows:" and that "the
amount of capital stock which shall be the basis for tax . . . in the
case of every corporation, joint stock company and association liable
to taxation thereunder shall be the amount of capital stock employed
within this State," as construed by the highest court of that State,
are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. New
York v. Roberts, 658.
12. It must be regarded as finally settled by frequent decisions of this
court, that, subject to certain limitations as respects interstate and
foreign commerce, a State may impose such conditions upon permit-
ting a foreign corporation to do business within its limits as it may
judge expedient; and that it may make the grant or privilege de-
pendent upon the payment of a specific license tax, or a sum propor-
tioned to the amount of its capital used within the State. Ib.
See INTERSTATE COMMErce.
1. In no way, and through no channels, directly or indirectly, will courts
allow an action to be maintained for the recovery of property delivered
under an illegal contract, where, in order to maintain such recovery, it
is necessary to have recourse to that contract; but the right of recovery
must rest on a disaffirmance of the contract, and is permitted only
because of the desire of courts to do justice, as far as possible to the
party who has made payment or delivered property under a void agree-
ment, which in justice he ought to recover, and no recovery will be
permitted which will weaken said rule founded upon the principles of
public policy. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transportation
Co., 138.
2. Acting upon those settled principles the court decides: (1) That the
Central Company is entitled to recover from the Pullman Company the
value of the property transferred by it to that company when the lease
took effect, with interest, as that property has substantially disap-
peared, and cannot now be returned; (2) That the value of that prop-
erty is not to be ascertained from the market value of the shares of the
Central Company's stock at that time, but by the value of the property
transferred; (3) That the value of the contracts with railroad compa-
nies transferred by the Central Company forms no part of the sum which
it is entitled to recover; (4) That the same principle applies to the
patents transferred which had all expired; (5) That it is not entitled
to recover anything for the breaking up of its business by reason of the
contracts being adjudged illegal. Ib.
1. An indictment under Rev. Stat. § 3296, for the concealment of distilled
spirits on which the tax has not been paid, removed to a place other
than the distillery warehouse provided by law, which charges the per-
formance of that act at a particular time and place, and in the lan-
guage of the statute, is sufficiently certain. Pounds v. United States, 35.
2. When there is nothing in the record to show that the jury in a criminal
case separated before the verdict was returned into court, and the
record shows that a sealed verdict was returned by the jury by agree-
ment of counsel for both parties in open court, and in the presence of
the defendant, the verdict was rightly received and recorded. Ib.
1. In order to authorize a denial of a plaintiff's motion to discontinue a
suit in equity, there must be some plain legal prejudice to the
defendant, other than the mere prospect of future litigation, rendered
possible by the discontinuance. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central
Transportation Co., 138.
2. Unless there be an obvious violation of a fundamental rule of a court
of equity, or an abuse of the discretion of the court, the decision of
a motion for leave to discontinue will not be reviewed here. Ib.
3. The decision of the Circuit Court in denying the motion of the Pullman
Company to discontinue its suit was right, as was also its decision
permitting the Central Company to file a cross bill. Ib.
The commissioners of the District of Columbia have no power to agree to
a common law submission of a claim against the District. District of
Columbia v. Bailey, 161.
The court of claims made the following findings of fact in this case.
I. During the years 1889, 1890 and 1891 the claimant was a corpora-
tion existing under the laws of New Jersey, organized in 1888, and
having a factory for carrying on its business at Bayonne, in that
State. II. In 1889 and 1890 the claimant imported from Canada box
shooks, and from Europe steel rods, upon which importation duties
amounting in the aggregate to $39,636.20 were paid to the United
States, of which sum $837.68 was paid on the importation of the steel
rods. III. The box shooks imported as set forth in finding II were
manufactured in Canada from boards, first being planed and then
cut into required lengths and widths, intended to be substantially
correct for making into boxes without further labor than nailing the
shooks together. They were then tied up in bundles of sides, of ends,
of bottoms, and of tops of from fifteen to twenty-five in a bundle for
convenience in handling and shipping. IV. The shooks so mann-
factured in Canada and imported into the United States as aforesaid
were, at the claimant's factory in Bayonne, New Jersey, constructed
into the boxes or cases set forth in Exhibit E to the petition herein,
by nailing the same together with nails manufactured in the United
States out of the steel rods imported as aforesaid, and by trimming
when defective in length or width to make the boxes or cases without
projecting parts, i.e.: the shooks were imported in bundles of ends, of
sides, of tops and of bottoms, each part coming in bundles separated
from the bundles of other parts. From one of these bundles of ends
the ends of a box are selected, to which the sides taken indiscrimi-
nately from any bundle of sides are nailed by nailing machines; then
the sides are trimmed off even with the ends by saws; then by bottom-
ing machines bottoms taken from any bundle of bottoms are nailed
on; then the bottoms are trimmed even with the sides by saws; then,
after being filled with cans, the tops are nailed on; and then the
boxes or cases are ready for exportation. The cost of the labor
expended in the United States in the necessary handling and in the
nailing and trimming of the boxes as aforesaid was equal to about
one tenth of the value of the boxes. The principal part of the labor
performed in trimming the boxes was occasioned by the Canadian
manufacturer not cutting the shooks into the required lengths and
widths for use in making the boxes, and for which the claimants
sometimes charged the cost of such trimming to the Canadian manu-
facturer. Held, that the company, when exporting these manufactured
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