boxes, was not entitled to be allowed a drawback under Rev. Stat.
§ 3019. Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, 210.


1. As neither the plaintiff nor those under whom he claims title availed
themselves of the remedy provided by the statutes of West Virginia
for removing the forfeiture arising from the fact that, during the
years 1884, 1885, 1886, 1887 and 1888, the lands in question were not
charged on the proper land books with the state taxes thereon for
that period or any part thereof, the forfeiture of such lands to the
State was not displaced or discharged, and the Circuit Court properly
directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff
was entitled to recover only on the strength of his own title. Whether
the defendants had a good title or not the plaintiff had no such inter-
est in or claim to the lands as enabled him to maintain this action of
ejectment. King v. Mullins, 404.

2. Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Virginia, 226, approved and followed to the point
that "In an action of ejectment the plaintiff must recover on the
strength of his own title, and if it appear that the legal title is in
another, whether that other be the defendant, the Commonwealth,
or some third person, it is sufficient to defeat the plaintiff. If it
appears that the title has been forfeited to the Commonwealth for the
non-payment of taxes, or other cause, and there is no evidence that
it has been redeemed by the owner, or resold, or regranted by the
Commonwealth, the presumption is that the title is still outstanding
in the Commonwealth." Ib.


1. Under the circumstances disclosed in the statement of the case and in
the opinion of the court in this case, the Union Trust Company can-
not be allowed to set up its alleged title to the stock and bonds in
controversy, as against third parties taking in good faith and without
notice, and the same principle is applicable to its assignee, and to
creditors seeking to enforce rights in his name; and, so far as this
case is concerned, there is nothing to the contrary in the statute of
Iowa regulating assignments for the benefit of creditors, as expounded
by the Supreme Court of that State. Hubbard v. Tod, 474.

2. This court concurs in the conclusion feached by the Circuit Court and
the Circuit Court of Appeals on the fact that the respondents' right
to the securities was superior to that asserted by the petitioner. Ib.






NEW MEXICO, Laws of, 3.


1. When the committing court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and
of the person, and power to make the order for disobedience to which
a judgment in contempt is rendered, and to render that judgment,
then the appellate court cannot do otherwise than discharge a writ
of habeas corpus brought to review that judgment, and secure the
prisoner's discharge, as that writ cannot be availed of as a writ of
error or appeal. Tinsley v. Anderson, 101.

2. It was competent for the District Court to compel the surrender of the
minute book and notes in Tinsley's possession, and he could not be
discharged on habeas corpus until he had performed, or offered to per-
form so much of the order as it was within the power of the District
Court to impose, even though it may have been in some part in-
valid. Ib.



See NEW MEXICO, Laws of, 2.


1. Thirty-one railroad companies, engaged in transportation between
Chicago and the Atlantic coast, formed themselves into an associa-
tion known as the Joint Traffic Association, by which they agreed
that the association should have jurisdiction over competitive traffic,
except as noted, passing through the western termini of the trunk
lines and such other points as might be thereafter designated, and to
fix the rates, fares and charges therefor, and from time to time change
the same.
No party to the agreement was to be permitted to deviate
from or change those rates, fares or charges, and its action in that re-
spect was not to affect rates disapproved, except to the extent of its
interest therein over its own road. It was further agreed that the
powers so conferred upon the managers should be so construed and
exercised as not to permit violation of the Interstate Commerce Act,
and that the managers should coöperate with the Interstate Commerce
Commission to secure stability and uniformity in rates, fares, charges,

etc. The managers were given power to decide and enforce the course
which should be pursued with connecting companies, not parties to the
agreement, which declined or failed to observe the established rates.
Assessments were authorized in order to pay expenses, and the agree-
ment was to take effect January 1, 1896, and to continue in existence
for five years. The bill, filed on behalf of the United States, sought
a judgment declaring that agreement void. Held, (1) That upon
comparing this agreement with the one set forth in United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, the similarity between
them suggests that a similar result should be reached in the two cases,
as the point now taken was urged in that case, and was then inten-
tionally and necessarily decided; (2) That so far as the establishment
of rates and fares is concerned there is no substantial difference be-
tween this agreement and the one set forth in the Trans-Missouri case ;
(3) That Congress, with regard to interstate commerce, and in the
course of regulating it in the case of railroad corporations, has the
power to say that no contract or combination shall be legal, which
shall restrain trade and commerce, by shutting out the operation
of the general law of competition. United States v. Joint Traffic
Association, 505.

2. The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange was an unincorporated volunteer
association of men, doing business at its stock yards, situated partly
in Kansas City, Missouri, and partly across the line separating Kansas.
City, Missouri, from Kansas City, Kansas. The business of its mem-
bers was to receive individually consignments of cattle, hogs, and other
live stock from owners of the same, not only in the States of Missouri
and Kansas, but also in other States and Territories, and to feed such
stock, and to prepare it for the market, to dispose of the same, to re-
ceive the proceeds thereof from the purchasers, and to pay the owners
their proportion of such proceeds, after deducting charges, expenses
and advances. The members were individually in the habit of solicit-
ing consignments from the owners of such stock, and of making them
advances thereon. The rules of the association forbade members from
buying live stock from a commission merchant in Kansas City, not a
member of the exchange. They also fixed the commission for selling
such live stock, prohibited the employment of agents to solicit con-
signments except upon a stipulated salary, and forbade the sending of
prepaid telegrams or telephone messages, with information as to the
condition of the markets. It was also provided that no member should
transact business with any person violating the rules and regulations,
or with an expelled or suspended member after notice of such viola-
tion. Held, that the situation of the yards, partly in Kansas and partly
in Missouri, was a fact without any weight; that such business or occu-
pation of the several members of the association was not interstate
commerce, within the meaning of the act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, "to
protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopo-

lies;" and that that act does not cover, and was not intended to cover,
such kind of agreements. Hopkins v. United States, 578.

3. The Traders' Live Stock Exchange was an unincorporated association
in Kansas City, whose members bore much the same relation to it, and
through it carried on much the same business as that carried on by
the members of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange, considered and
passed upon in Hopkins v. United States, ante, 578. The principal differ-
ence was, that the members of the Traders' Exchange, defendants in
the present proceedings, were themselves purchasers of cattle on the
market, while the defendants in the former case were commission
merchants who sold cattle upon commission as a compensation for
their service. The articles of association of the Traders' Exchange
contained the following preamble: "We, the undersigned, for the
purpose of organizing and maintaining a business exchange, not for
pecuniary profit or gain, but to promote and protect all interests con-
nected with the buying and selling of live stock at the Kansas City
Stock Yards, and to cultivate courteous and manly conduct towards
each other, and give dignity and responsibility to yard traders, have
associated ourselves together under the name of Traders' Live Stock
Exchange, and hereby agree, each with the other, that we will faith-
fully observe and be bound by the following rules and by-laws and
such new rules, additions or amendments as may from time to time
be adopted in conformity with the provisions thereof from the date of
organization." The rules objected to in the bill in this case were the
following: "Rule 10. This exchange will not recognize any yard
trader unless he is a member of the Traders' Live Stock Exchange.
Rule 11. When there are two or more parties trading together as
partners, they shall each and all of them be members of this exchange.
Rule 12. No member of this exchange shall employ any person to buy
or sell cattle unless such person hold a certificate of membership in
this exchange. Rule 13. No member of this exchange shall be
allowed to pay any order buyer or salesman any sum of money as a
fee for buying cattle from or selling cattle to such party." Held:
(1) That this court is not called upon to decide whether the defend-
ants are or are not engaged in interstate commerce, because if it be
conceded they are so engaged, the agreement as evidenced by the by-
laws is not one in restraint of that trade, nor is there any combination
to monopolize or attempt to monopolize such trade within the mean-
ing of the act; (2) That, following the preceding case, in order to
come within the provisions of the statute the direct effect of an agree-
ment or combination must be in restraint of that trade or commerce
which is among the several States, or with foreign nations; (3) That
where the subject-matter of the agreement does not directly relate to
and act upon and embrace interstate commerce, and where the undis-
puted facts clearly show that the purpose of the agreement was not to
regulate, obstruct or restrain that commerce, but that it was entered

into with the object of properly and fairly regulating the transaction
of the business in which the parties to the agreement were engaged,
such agreement will be upheld as not within the statute, where it can
be seen that the character and terms of the agreement are well calcu-
lated to attain the purpose for which it was formed, and where the
effect of its formation and enforcement upon interstate trade or
commerce is in any event but indirect and incidental, and not its pur-
pose or object; (4) That the rules are evidently of a character to
enforce the purpose and object of the exchange as set forth in the pre-
amble, and that for such purpose they are reasonable and fair, and
that they can possibly affect interstate trade or commerce in but a
remote way, and are not void as violations of the act of Congress.
Anderson v. United States, 604.






1. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361, affirmed to the points: (1) That to give
this court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a state court it must
appear affirmatively not only that a Federal question was presented
for decision by the state court, but that its decision was necessary to
the determination of the cause, and that it was actually decided
adversely to the party claiming a right under the Federal laws or
Constitution, or that the judgment as rendered could not have been
given without deciding it; (2) That where the record discloses that
if a question has been raised and decided adversely to a party claim-
ing the benefit of a provision of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, another question not Federal has been also raised and
decided against such party, and the decision of the latter question
is sufficient, notwithstanding the Federal question, to sustain the
judgment, this court will not review the judgment. Harrison v.
Morton, 38; Pierce v. Somerset Railway, 641.

2. The appellate jurisdiction of this court from a state court extends to a
final judgment or decree in any suit, civil or criminal, in the highest
court of a State where a decision in the suit could be had, against a
title, right, privilege or immunity, specially set up and claimed under
the Constitution or a treaty or statute of the United States. Tinsley
v. Anderson, 101.

3. If the order of the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas,
being the highest court of the State having jurisdiction of the case,

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