The reasoning here is elliptical but it is demonstrative. There is a change of terms also to be noted, which renders the whole less clear than it would be if a uniformity of language were observed, as in the following version of it:

The share of infamy falling on each individual is in the inverse ratio of the number of those who abuse power;

Therefore the share of infamy falling on each individual in a democracy (which consists of a large number) is small.

The only premise in this argument is of the nature of a major premise, being a general proposition gathered from observation, and the conclusion is a particular instance coming under it. The principle exemplified is the dictum de omni et nullo. As the reasoning is a little complex, a minor premise might be introduced without puerility, and the logical dependence of the whole rendered clearer to common apprehension by a little amplification.

The share of infamy falling on each individual is in the inverse ratio of the number of those who abuse power; i. e. if the number is large the share is small, if the number is small the share is large;

The number of persons in a democracy who abuse power is large;

Therefore the share of infamy falling on each individual is small.

The argument No. 7. is short: "A perfect democracy is the most shameless thing in the world, because their own approbation of their own acts has to them the appearance of a public judgment in their favour."

It is scarcely needful to point out that here again, although the reasoning is somewhat elliptical, there is no need of a major premise.

Argument No. 8. is of a precisely similar character: "A democracy is the most fearless thing in the world, because

no man apprehends in his person he can be made subject to punishment."

The next passage exhibits a complication of reasoning; it consists, in fact, of two arguments numbered 9 and 10, and denoted by the causal conjunctions "for" and "as." The conclusion maintained is, "the people at large never ought to become the subject of punishment," and the reason assigned is, "because the people at large can never become the subject of punishment by any human hand;" which last proposition is in its turn supported by the reason because "all punishments are for example towards the conservation of the people at large."

The first of these arguments, No. 9., is singular: "The people cannot be punished by any human hand; therefore they never ought." No one probably will contend that it will be mended by generalising it for the sake of obtaining a major premise, "Whoever cannot be punished by any human hand, never ought."

The second argument, No. 10., is, in brief, " All punishments are for example to the people at large; therefore none can be inflicted on the people at large by any human hand."

This is an instance of an enthymeme consisting of a major premise and conclusion. To bring it into regular form as a syllogism would require the language to be altered:

All punishments which can be inflicted are for example to the people at large;

No punishment of the people at large can be for example to themselves;

Therefore no punishment of the people at large can be inflicted.

The passage No. 11. argues that as the people at large cannot be punished, it is of infinite importance that they should not imagine their will to be the standard of right and wrong.

Here again we have an enthymeme not to be strengthened in force by the introduction of a general proposition.

The next argument, No. 12., is somewhat longer and less plain. It may be summed up as follows:

The people are not more entitled, and are less qualified,

than kings to use any arbitrary power;

Therefore they are not tyrannically to exact from those who officiate in the state an abject submission to their will.

This concluding argument of the extract is manifestly of the same character as the last.

The examination of geometrical and moral reasoning, which we have now gone through, may appear tedious, but it will not be fruitless in confirming the principles of the present treatise. It shows that both mathematical demonstration and argumentative composition, such as mankind actually employ in appealing to the understandings of each other on moral and political subjects, abound with reasoning of a varied character, exemplifying divers general principles or maxims, and it especially proves that many of the arguments employed are at once non-syllogistic and demonstrative.

ARTICLE II.

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF ARGUMENTATIVE

COMPOSITION.

THE preceding examination of the nature of arguments may be useful to the student of Logic, by furnishing an example of the way in which such an analysis may be accomplished. It is confined, however, to exhibiting the species and varieties of reasoning, while the points of the greatest importance to him are the truth of the premises and the validity of the conclusion; and it has occurred to me that a few hints indicating the mode of proceeding to

investigate these points would form a proper sequel to what has already been done. They are not designed for adepts but for students in Logic.

On the supposition, then, that the student has a piece of reasoning or portion of argumentative composition before him, the following suggestions might be found useful in dealing with the arguments seriatim.

1. Find the exact conclusion sought to be established by the writer, and state it as briefly but as nearly as possible in his own language.

2. If the conclusion is obscure or ambiguous, endeavour to find out what the author meant; and if it is doubtful which of two or more propositions he intended to maintain, examine the argument, as suggested in the following rules, first on the assumption of one and then on that of the other or others.

3. Next find the reason or reasons assigned, and state them as the writer has done and as nearly as possible in his own language, stripping them, however, of redundant expressions and irrelevant matter. 4. Examine the nature of the argument.

a. If it is direct contingent reasoning, consider well whether the facts alleged are sufficient to warrant the general law, or, as the case may be, the particular inference: if not sufficient, it is needless to proceed further.

b. If the reasoning is ostensibly demonstrative and in the form of enthymemes, it may be well, when you are doubtful whether it is class-reasoning or not, to make it syllogistic by supplying what is called the missing or suppressed premise, since even should the last turn out to be needless, you will at all events have all the possible propositions before you; and although needless, it must be true if the enthymeme is valid. When the argument has been thus brought into a definite form examine the validity of

the syllogism; and if it is fallacious, in consequence of confusion or ambiguity in the language or other cause, mark the fallacy, and your task is ended. 5. In both the above cases (a and b) since the premises are insufficient to prove the conclusion deduced from them, it will be well to consider whether a modified inference may not be drawn from the facts as stated. The facts do not bear out the asserted conclusion, but they may bear out something short of it: what conclusion do they enable us to deduce ?*

6. Suppose, however, the inference to be valid, the next step, whether the argument belongs to direct contingent reasoning or to demonstrative reasoning, is to examine the truth of the premises, or, in other words, of the facts asserted in them. The conclusion is warranted by the premises; but are the premises themselves to be relied upon?

7. In this investigation of the truth of the premises, you may possibly find that although the propositions, as stated by the author, are inadmissible, yet the substance of them is true, or at least susceptible of being put into a less objectionable shape. In such cases, as your object is not to take advantage of mere errors in form, but to come at the truth, whatever it may be, throw the argument into the most forcible shape in which it can be exhibited, and then reexamine the whole.

8. If you satisfy yourself that the premises are erroneous, and can point out the circumstances which make them so, it will be useful to trace the source of the error in the mind of the writer. Nothing seems to give us a greater command of a subject than to be able not only to see the mistakes which have been made regarding it, but to ascend to their origin.

*See Chap. XI. sect. 2. of the preceding Treatise.