premise, as, for example, "For when laws are adapted to the genius of the people they are cheerfully obeyed."

In reference to such cases it is to be considered that to discern one fact to be implied in another requires a certain degree of knowledge. Where the subjects of the reasoning are simple, and the necessary knowledge is a common possession, the implication appears at once self evident, as in geometry, which is concerned exclusively with lines and angles. But where the subjects of the reasoning are complex, one fact may be really implied in another, although the implication is not discernible without considerable knowledge and study. Whether the implication, however, is immediately self-evident or not, a general proposition in the form of a major premise is alike inoperative as a proof. It could be obtained only by generalising the particular argument, and general propositions so obtained are wholly inefficient and supererogatory in establishing the conclusion. When, on the other hand, they are obtained by collecting facts, or are the result of previous deduction, they are, as remarked in the last chapter, essentially necessary to the inference.

If we compare the instances last adduced with a syllogism or enthymeme which has for its major or only premise either a collective fact respecting a class of objects, or a law of nature deduced from such a fact, we shall find that, in the latter case

the force of the argument is wholly dependent on the general proposition, or on the collective fact from which it has been deduced.

As an example, the old well-worn syllogism before cited will do as well as any other: All men are mortal;

Peter is a man;

Therefore he is mortal.

Here the allegation that Peter is a man would constitute no sufficient ground for concluding him. to be mortal; it merely brings him within the general fact or law which is the real reason. It is the latter that makes the argument good; the minor premise would be of non-effect without it.

But in the case of the enthymemes, and more conspicuously the mathematical demonstration before cited, the minor, or rather the only premise, suffices of itself, and can borrow no strength, as a reason, from the addition of the major; which being a mere generalisation of the argument after its cogency must have been seen, would be more properly termed a corollary than a premise.*

To sum up in reverse order what has been said of the forms of demonstrative reasoning:

* In reference to the same argument, the author of Sematology observes, "In this instance the axiom which forms the major proposition is superfluous: it is not an inductive whole, like "Man is mortal," from which we deduce the more particular comprehended in it; but the particular, suppose it to occur to the mind for the first time, is as certainly understood to be true as if it came after millions of instances."- Sequel to Sematology, p. 112.

In arguments where a particular fact implies another fact, or, to express it differently, where what is usually called the minor premise implies the conclusion, a general proposition or major premise is redundant; and such reasoning, so far from being syllogistic, cannot even be considered as classreasoning at all, or as in anywise exemplifying the dictum de omni et nullo or other allied dicta. Of these acts of reasoning the geometrical enthymeme is the best type.

On the other hand, where the major premise or a general proposition implies the conclusion, a minor premise is sometimes needful and sometimes superfluous: - needful when the subject of the conclusion does not manifestly belong to the class designated by the middle term or spoken of in the major premise; superfluous when it manifestly does.

All such reasoning, whether with or without a minor premise, exemplifies the scholastic dictum or other dicta allied to it.

We are thus brought to the conclusion that in numerous cases of demonstrative reasoning, one premise is alone sufficient for the inference, although it may be granted that, even in those cases, it is possible to form a complete syllogism by thrusting in a fruitless and redundant proposition.

It follows, also, from what has been said, that it is inappropriate and incorrect to call the syllogism an analysis of the process of all demonstrative

reasoning, and much more so to apply the assertion to all reasoning whatever.

An analysis of reasoning ought to be an account of what takes place in the mind when it draws an inference, or is determined to a conclusion. Now from the preceding representations, it is manifest that a single fact or combination of facts, capable of being expressed in one proposition, frequently determines the mind to a conclusion without reference to any thing else. This is the whole of which the mind is conscious, or which can be discerned as having taken place on reflection.

Supplying in such cases the missing premise, as it is called, when it is not introducing a mere identical assertion, is simply stating a certain proposition which may be enunciated with truth if the argument is valid, but which neither forms nor represents any part of the mental process. To contend that a second premise is necessary to the completion of an argument, because it may by some expedient or other always be added to it, is like contending that a shawl is an indispensable part of a lady's dress because it may always be thrown over every thing else in which she may be attired.

This introduction of two premises is in many arguments proper and needful, but in some it is mere impertinence or supererogation, and in others nothing more than the obtrusion of identical propositions.

CHAP. VIII.

PRIMARY OR ORIGINAL PREMISES.

THE preceding chapters have endeavoured to show, amongst other things, that what are termed principles of reasoning, or maxims, give no force to arguments. They do not constitute real premises in any case, and cannot, therefore, be the original premises from which we set out.

What, then, it may be asked, are the primary propositions with which our reasonings commence?

To this inquiry, it may be at once replied, that, with the exceptions to be hereafter named, we always commence with particular facts; or, to express it more precisely, that particular facts, or propositions expressive of them, are, in every case, taking into view the whole train of reasoning from beginning to end, the first premises from which we start, and the ultimate ground at which, in tracing back our reasonings, we invariably arrive.

It has been said, indeed, in contrariety to this, that all our reasonings about events, if traced back to their origin, will be found to rest on the maxim or general principle, as a major premise, that similar causes produce similar effects, and that all our reasonings in mathematics rest in the same way on the several axioms of that science.