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him more extensively into criticism and controversy than he had originally contemplated entering. In such a work it was especially impossible not to advert to the scholastic logic j and as his theory is at variance with some of its fundamental principles, he has had occasion to comment upon it at considerable length.
If, in doing this, he has, on the one hand, been obliged to differ very widely on certain points from several of the ablest logical writers of the day, he has, on the other, found himself in accordance on many of the same points with some of the most eminent philosophers of the past and present ages.
February 22. 1851.
THEORY OF SEASONING.
THE INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS WHICH PASS UNDER THE NAME OP REASONING.
In scrutinizing our own minds, several different operations are easily distinguishable, and have accordingly received particular appellations. When present objects are discerned through the senses the act is usually named perception; when objects formerly perceived by us, or facts formerly known to us, are recalled, the mental event is denominated recollection, or mere conception; when objects or facts occur to the mind in a different order or combination from that in which they were actually perceived, there is something more than conception, and it has been termed imagination; lastly, when facts perceived determine the mind to the belief of facts which it does not perceive, although here also
conception is implied, the operation is evidently as distinct from the former three operations as they are from each other.
This intellectual process may be illustrated by a few familiar instances.
I am walking, I will suppose, on the sea-shore, and perceiving a quantity of sea-weed lying on the beach, while the water is at the moment a quarter of a mile from it, I conclude that the tide has ebbed, and left the weed where I perceive it lying. I notice the print of a small foot on the sand, and I feel pretty sure that it was made by a child. I look upon the multitude of gay people walking along the beach, and I am struck with the thought that sooner or later, and, at the latest, in no very long period, they must all die.
I observe the sun to be exactly on the meridian, and I calculate that at a place where a friend of mine resides, 15 degrees in longitude to the west of my position, it is just eleven o'clock.
In these several cases my mind is determined by the sight of present phenomena, conjoined with knowledge previously acquired, to believe something which I do not actually perceive through the organs of sense; something past, something future, or something distant; or, in other words, to believe that some event has happened, will happen, or is happening, although beyond the sphere of my observation.
But the actual presence of any facts to the senses