be its apparent defects in the eye of a theorist, yet that the entire machine works well, and that all human institutions are liable to imperfections; in illustration of which, it is said, that there are even spots in the sun. It would be irrelevant to the object of this chapter, to enter into any detailed examination of these arguments; but, it is indispensable to the full and lucid exposition of our subject, that the fatal consequences which must necessarily result from a superficially informed legislative assembly, should be pointed out. It cannot be denied, that men of defective education and imperfect knowledge, are easily led away by authority, and also, that the authority to which they most willingly submit, is the authority of power. The inseparable adjuncts of power, rank, show, decoration, and the usual fripperies of monarchy, have attractive charms for such characters, who, having no idea of general principles, and consequently no opinions of their own on politieal affairs, generally imbibe the sentiments of those persons who, from their official station, have the most frequent opportunities of gratifying their vanity. It would be invidious to select any individuals to whom these observations apply; but it would not be difficult to select from the ministerial majorities, a list of monied men,

M

who have been occupied all their lives in procuring the "legal qualification." If any one suspects that these remarks spring from an ill-natured illiberality, let him count the number of Indian members, and then ask himself, what opportunities these gentlemen (by far the greater number of whom quitted their own country with no other accomplishment, than common arithmetic) have had, of making themselves acquainted with the principles of morals, legislation, or politics?

Let it be remembered, that there is no via regia, no short cut to knowledge; but that it can only be acquired by a long course of close and industrious application. There are, no doubt, exceptions, but they are very rare; nor can any argument be drawn from their existence, to invalidate the general rule. The famous Gerard Hamilton, better known by the distinguishing appellation of " Single Speech," has written a work on Parliamentary Logic, in which he instructs in the art the worse appear the better reason. He was perfectly aware of the advantages which a minister may derive from the support of the "legally qualified members," and the object of his book is to teach the tact of securing a majority, by the use of ingenious sophisms. Among them, none is more recommended, than

of making

the SOPHISM OF AUTHORITY. A striking

instance was exhibited in the last Session of Parliament, of the success with which this fallacious and dishonourable finesse may be employed. In the debate on the Usury Laws, the opponents of the repeal contended, that as the country had risen to prosperity under the existing law, it would be dangerous to make any alteration in a system which had been sanctioned by the "wisdom of our ancestors." Here the sophism of authority was made use of in a double sense: for the argument was considered as solid; first, because the remarks derived weight and authority from the character of the speakers; and secondly, because the speakers represented our ancestors, as having sanctioned, by their authority, the existing law. These arguments satisfied a majority of the House, and the Bill was thrown out; but it is impossible that these arguments would have had any influence, if all the members had been capable of judging for themselves, instead of pinning their faith on the sleeves of their leaders. Indeed, quite the contrary result must have taken place. Our ancestors thought it wise "to temper the wind to the shorn lamb," and varied the rate of interest according to the circumstances of the country, without suffering themselves to be scared by the raw-head-and-bloody-bones of

innovation. The statute 37 Hen. VIII. c. 9, confined interest to ten per cent. and so did the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 8. But as, through the encouragements given in her reign to commerce, the nation grew more wealthy: so, under her successor, the statute, 21 Jac. I' c. 17, reduced it to eight per cent.: as did the statute 12 Chas. II. c. 13, to six, and by the statute 12 Anne, c. 16, it was brought down to five per cent., at which point it has remained ever since.

If then we are to model our conduct after the manner of our ancestors, these repeated alterations in the value of the interest of money, would raise a strong presumption in favour of a further reduction. Now, the fallacy of the sophism made use of in the recent debate, consisted in this: that though the truth was told, the whole truth was not. It was the duty of those members, who argued against the repeal, not only to have mentioned the last statute of Anne, but also the preceding statutes. And they were also bound to show that "the wisdom of our ancestors," who lived in the reign of Anne, was a safer guide to us than the wisdom of their predecessors. If all the cases were collected, in which sophisms have been employed to mislead the

judgment, they would fill many volumes. The preceding one is sufficient to illustrate our argument. Er uno disce omnes.

In the wide range of legislative and political subjects, which interest the feelings and engage attention, there is none in which parliamentary logic and sophisms have been more instrumental in retarding the progress of truth, than in discussions concerning the liberty of the press, as it regards religious opinions. In the present chapter, we shall endeavour to show that no legislative assembly, in a free country, has any right to interfere in matters of religious opinion. This proposition must be understood in the widest possible sense, without any exceptions or reservation whatever. A disciple of the Blackstonian school may regard this doctrine as founded in error, dangerous in its consequences, and irreconcileable with the idea of legislative supremacy. He would shape his objection somewhat in the following form:-" In every state there must exist some power from which there is no appeal, whether that power is lodged with an individual, or an assembly. In England the legislative authority is vested in the King and the two Houses of Parliament. When these three functionaries agree to pro