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Certainty," says Lord Bacon," is so essential to law, that law without it cannot be just." One of the maxims of English law, of which Lord Coke speaks in terms of reverential awe, is a perfect echo of this opinion: Ubi jus est vagum et incertum, ibi miserrima est servitus. That the law of libel is deficient in those requisites which Bacon and Coke pronounce to be essential to it, is a fact confirmed by experience; and indeed it is so notorious and undeniable, that the most hardened improbity dares not openly controvert it.

The following case affords an illustration of our argument :-The very same paragraph was published in 1811, by Mr. Drakard in the Stamford News, and by Mr. Hunt in the Examiner: both were brought to trial; the former, at Lincoln, was found guilty; the latter, in London, was acquitted. If Mr. Drakard was guilty, so was Mr. Hunt; and if Mr. Hunt was not guilty, there could be no justice in the punishment inflicted on Mr. Drakard. Under the present system all is doubt and uncertainty, and the condemnation or acquittal of any man prosecuted for libel, does not depend on any acknowledged rule or precedent, but on the particular opinions, which the jury may happen to entertain on the liberty of the press.

The

When the judge charges the jury in case of libel, he does not lay down any legal rules to direct them in the discharge of their duty, but merely delivers his own private sentiments, which are not more worthy of attention than those of any individual of education. jury must therefore be left to their own discretion, which must necessarily be as various as their different habits and modes of thinking. One juryman may conceive that public discussion is beneficial to the state, and instead of sentencing the defendant to a prison, may consider him worthy of the thanks of his country; another, equally anxious to act conscientiously, may have been educated in opposite principles, and being biassed by the force of early impressions, which the best men are unable totally to subdue, pronounces a verdict of guilty.

The judges have determined that every

The

*This must not be understood in a literal sense. Judges merely mean to declare, that unless this presumption were admitted, a criminal by pleading ignorance of the law, would defeat the ends of justice; and it is quite obvious that if this indulgence were permitted, there would be no security for persons or property. Cases have occurred in this country, in which persons convicted of forgery, have pleaded ignorance of the law. In France, the penalty of death is engraved on the note, as a caution, so that every forger must write his own death warrant.

man is bound to be acquainted with the law; a knowledge of which, Lord Coke says, required in his time, the incessant study of twenty years, and it is apprehended that the difficulties of the science have not been diminished since his days. Without disputing the general expediency of this declaration of the Bench, it may be reasonably inquired, whether a man is bound to know and understand those branches of law, which the most eminent practitioners have pronounced inexplicable? In cases of murder, arson, forgery, and others that might be mentioned, the rule of law is fixed: precedents are established, and the certainty of punishment, which takes away all chance of escape, deters from the commission of crime. In cases of libel nothing is determined the reports afford no elucidation of the subject; but on the contrary, by recording contrary decisions, hold out to every man of ardent and sanguine temperament, the prospect of offending with impunity. The consequence of this vagueness in the law is, that whenever a verdict of guilty is recorded, the individual convicted considers himself as peculiarly unfortunate, and as far as his influence extends, he endeavours to excite hatred and animosity against the constituted authorities.

These observations on the general character

of the law of libel, appear to warrant the following conclusions: first, that by leaving a discretionary power in the hands of the judges, it becomes a formidable instrument against public liberty; and secondly, that it in no respect whatever operates as a prevention to the offence, on account of the uncertainty of punishment. Having established these points, and shewn the general character of the law of libel, we proceed to the particular object of this inquiry, viz. the legality of prosecutions for religious opinions,

It has been already stated, that the doctrine at present acknowledged and acted upon in the King's Bench, is founded on the dictum of Sir Mathew Hale, pronounced more than a -century and a half agone. It is quite essential to forming an accurate opinion on this important subject, that the reader bear in mind that blasphemy is not a statutable offence; and when it is said that" Christianity is put and parcel of the law of the land," it must be recollected that the doctrine has no other support than the dictum of a judge. There are two considerations which immediately present themselves: first, the reputation of the judge who pronounced this decision; secondly, the spirit of the times in which he lived. Sir Mathew Hale is justly acknowledged to have been a man of

spotless integrity, and extensive knowledge; a pious christian, and a profound lawyer. But the age, in which he flourished, was, in comparison with modern times, dark, ignorant, and superstitious. And though nature had gifted him with a comprehensive mind, it cannot be supposed that he was totally free from the prejudices of his day. Ample proof can be adduced to show beyond all doubt, that he shared in the notions of the vulgar; that he believed in ghosts, witchcraft, and sorcery; and that in his judicial capacity he punished these imaginary crimes with the severest penalties of the law. These facts, which we shall prove beyond all possibility of dispute, are quite sufficient to make us pause before we pay implicit obedience to his authority. His talents and integrity justly entitle his opinions to respect, but we must be careful lest that respect degenerate into servility; for nothing has contributed so effectually to check the progress of improvement, as a silly, slavish deference to antiquity.