- a of course fall to the ground, and we should bave at least Lewis XVIII. with all Buonaparte's power, instead of Buonaparté; most desirable change no doubt; but which would not, to my mind, be quite sufficient. I do not wish to see Lewis XVIII. wielding so immense a power as that of the First Consul.For the liberties of Europe 1 deprecate it. And for the sake of the kingly cause, the cause of justice against fraud, the cause of lawful claims against usurped qnes. I hope not to see that Monarch extending his dominion over countries added to his empire by treachery, fraud, and vilJany.-3d. On account of the dangers of the plan. These are in truth so many and so great, that I doubt whether they would not altogether be an absolute impediment to it.In my mind they are such, that I certainly would not choose to adopt any plan subject to them; and, I think, no reasonable man would.-Let us consider a little what they are In the first place there is the danger of a discovery.-Any event of that sort would be of course fatal to those whose assistance may thus have been gained; and this to an honourable mind would be sufficient, I should imagine, to outweigh all the supposed advantages of the plan. For how would a man feel, when he heard of the execution of persons, who only became liable to it through his means, and at his instigation? But the bad consequences of a discovery do not end here. The whole scheme would of course be entirely detected, and whatever progress had been made, and whatever money spent, the work would be to be begun afresh. And then it could not be a work of the same difficulty and danger only; but a work of increased dangers, and increased difficulties; increased on account of the fear persons would entertain of entering on a scheme already once detected, and on account of the additional precautions and vigilance, that would be exerted after the discovery of our attempt to detect new ones. The discovery too, in this case, is not a very pleasant circumstance. That a country, which has even a pretence to call itself, and esteem itself a great country, should attempt to pursue a great plan of policy by bribes and underhand means, is not a very dignified nor a very noble line of policy. It is worthy only of a people, who think of nothing but money; whose God is their gold; who think it will clothe them and feed them, and fight for them, and do every thing for them. The discovery of such a plan of action, would, I am afraid, fully justify all the reproaches thrown out against us as a nation of shop-keepers. It The might authorize too somewhat of the accu- in the French Treasury; or, suppose, that the civil war were to be protracted to a great length. In any of these cases who will venture even to calculate the expense. In short, this plan is, I think, fundamentally bad. Its object is to do that by money, which should be done, and can be done effectually, by nothing but principle; and in its progress, it is as bad as in its principle. It attemps to establish a just and virtuous claim by underhand means; and the agents it employs for this purpose are bought traitors. The second argument in favour of this plan, viz that thereby the country is pledged to nothing specific; is, I think, more specious, but equally fallacious. In point of fact, if a general is bought, and when bought acts fairly by us; we are as much pledged to him as we can be to any body by an open declaration. I much fear, however, that the feeling which dictates this argument is very general. I fear it because it is very base. No one objects to the re-establishment of Lewis XVIII. I believe there are few who would not be glad of it; but people are afraid that to accomplish it would give them a great deal of trouble, and would take up a great deal of time. They are, therefore, well enough inclined to begin the work, but wish to do it in such a way as to be able to skulk out and avoid the trouble, if they find a favourable opportunity. This is just the way never to accomplish any thing at all. Not that I ever did or ever can recommend the making the restoration of Lewis XVIII. to the throne of France the sine qua non of peace with France. I should think the professing such a thing, would be braving the dispensations of Providence, and amount to absolute impiety. But this I will say; I said it before the treaty of Amiens; I repeat it now, that I would make a wellgrounded expectation of security, the sine qua non of peace; and in my conscience, I believe, that that expectation can never be obtained till the revolution of France is entirely put an end to, and the power of France is curtailed. Of this I am sure, that nothing can produce that expectation so entirely and so completely as the accomI have no hesitation in recommending the plishment of these objects; and, therefore, pursuit of them openly, unreservedly, and in the manner most likely to render that pursuit effectual. Now, there is, I should hope, no one at this time of day, who will attempt to maintain the opinion, that we have no right to interfere in the internal government of France. We have, according to all the most approved writers on the Law of Nations, a right to interfere in behalf of lawful claims against usurpation and rebellion; and this right is as fresh, as entire, and as good now as it was the day after Lewis XVI. was beheaded. I have no book by me at present, but if you wish to refer to books you can easily do it; and in the last edition of Mr. Burke's Works you will find extracts from different authors to that point. But our right is now of a much stronger kindstronger kind-for the usurping and rebellious power bears towards us the most bitter hatred and animosity; it has the will, and gigantic means to injure and destroy us. Is it then to be stated, that we have no right to prevent it from carrying that avowed hatred into execution? If every authority was on the other side instead of being with us, I should still say we had. Among individuals a man has a right to slay his adversary, if such slaughter is necessary to preserve his own life. In nations, the principle goes one step farther, and it is morally impossible for a country to do any thing, which can conduce to its own destruction. But we are told by ministers themselves, that it is impossible to be at peace with the revolutionary government of France. Eternal war is a most prodigious evil; peace, with the revolutionary govern ment of France, is destruction; what then remains, but to destroy that revolutionary government? The Law of Nations authorizes us to do so, even if it were not dangerous; the Law of Nature commands us to do so, because it is dangerous; who then, or. what law then, shall prevent it? So much for this plan of defence, which may be called the moral mode of defending the country at the present emergency, as in opposition to the physical mode by strength of troops and artillery. I do not mean to set it up in opposition to the other; but to urge it as a very efficacious and salutary plan, which may go along with it. They will both work at the same time, and both tend to the same object, the permanent security of the country and of peace.-With respect to the physical defence of the country, since my last the House of Commons have received and passed a bill for further arming and training the people. I have been prevented by various occupations from taking advantage of 's kindness, and getting a seat in the gallery during the debates on this bill. The outline, however, as far as I understand it, I will endeaven. to describe. All the males in the kingdom between the ages of 17 and 60 are to be enrolled. These are to be divided into fi classes, according to their respective as and situations, with respect to wives and families. The first class is to be immediately trained to arms on stated days of the week, and the other classes are to be liable to be called upon, as the preceding ones are called away to service. This, I believe, is tre general plan, though not having read it, I am not very positive as to the fact. I do not know any of the details, nor do I wish to discuss them. The fundamental principle is good; which is, to train all the men in the kingdom to arms, and to make this a military people. This, I believe, is now necessary for our salvation. The thing is good in itself, and it is good in its consequences. I rejoice that we are likely to become a military people; as such, I rejoice too, that we are likely to cease to be a commercial people, a purely commercial people, a nation dealing in ribbons and hardwares, actuated by no principle, but that of advan tage, and seeking no object, but that of luere. I assume, that we are likely to cease to be such, because war and commerce are incompatible with each other. A warlike people cannot be a commercial people, nor a commercial people a warlike one. A retailer of ribbons, a measurer of muslins and gauzes cannot wield a sword or handle a musket. The things are in their nature inconsistent, and cannot go together. A warlike people must have a high sense of honour-a commercial people must be meek and submissive. A warlike people must be proud-a commercial people must be base. A warlike people must ever resent every insult on their honour, and every attack on their dignity a commercial people must not see the insults, nor feel the blows. I rejoice at the change, because by commerce the mind of the country is debased, and its spirit lowered; by commerce we are now brought to the very edge of the precipice, one step farther we submit to the yoke of France, and to the most ignominious as well as cruel slavery; but by war, and the renewal of a martial spirit, we may yet escape, we may yet get the better of the present dangers, and rise, in a short time, to a state of grandeur and power, yet unparalleled in the history of Britain. By a vigorous martial spirit alone can we now save ourselves from destruction, save Europe from chains, and the world from the yoke of the most horrible despotism and tyranny that ever appeared upon earth. By this spirit, our character retrieved, France restored to peace, to good order, to the worship of God; the liberties of Europe restored, and assumed, we may yet see the day when this country will flou To rish, not in luxury as of late years, not in effeminacy and debauchery, but in power magnificent, in honour conspicuous, în liberty most happy; admired by all, respected and teared, yet not beheid with jealousy or hatred, because using all its power and all its means for the good of others, for the support of justice and of liberty. All Europe will own its safely due to the exertions, and its happiness to the valour and generosity of Britain.--Such is the prospect which the present disastrous times would open to the view of an intelligent, lofty-minded, generous, and enlightened statesman. Can this be so now? Never; so long as the grovelling, sordid stupidity of little minds, and low birth are palsying, not directing the energies of the state accomplish this great plan, we must have statesmen of great abilities, of generous minds, and high birth. The dunghill cock cannot fight, nor can the dray horse start for a plate. --I have been led a little rambling into these reflections by the very last measures of ministers; this plan which I am commending-I praise the bill, not the time at which they have brought it forward. How slow and dilatory they are! If the danger exists now, it existed many weeks and months ago. Why was it not brought forward as soon as possible? Why was it not proposed to the House the gth of March? That would have been the way to settle the pretended differences between the two governments mentioned in the message of the 9th. Then ministers might have claimed a little praise for activity and vigour. But no; the militia must be first called out, and then the supplementary militia, and then the Army of Reserve Bill was to be passed. I do not know why all this was to be done before every male could be enrolled. Would the men have been less fit for the militia, or the supplementary, or the army of reserve, or for the line, if they chose to enlist, for being enrolled? Or would the young men of the first class have been less fit for these corps for being already drilled and accustomed to the firelock? Or would they have been less likely to enlist on that account? In all this I can see no good reason; but I can give you a very good one--a good one for the ministers. If this measure had been brought forward as soon as it ought, it would have been much better for the country; but that with his Majesty's present wise advisers is an after-thought, it would have been much worse for them, inasmuch as they would probably have lost their places. They have, I believe, no objection to save the country if they conveniently can; but the preservation of their places is the first object, the saving of the country the second; if they can do both they are not Sorry; but the two objects stand, as to precedence, as I have stated. With respect to this measure, if it had been adopted the 9th of March, the country would have been in much greater security than it is at present; but what would have been said to the ministers? Why, then, every fool would Lave bad sense enough to say, "what is this immense danger grown up immediately on your peace? We were in no "such danger before the peace pro"dued it; you made the peace, therefore you have brought us into this dilemima, "and must suffer for it." The minister kaew that this would be said, and he knew what would be the consequence; and accordingly, with all the cunning imaginable, puts off this most pressing work, till by other preparatory measures he has so occupied the minds of men with the dẳnger, and the means of resisting it, that they hardly have time to stop to think of his folly or wickedness. They are so taken up with the means of defence, the danger appears so great and so near, that they never enquire, who brought it on? Foolishly, I think, do they not enquire. For if it should prchance turn out, on examination, that those persons on whom they are now relying for safety, and in whom they are reposing more confidence than was almost ever before reposed in any ministers, are the very individual persons by whose mismanagement, or, if they like it, under whose management, this country has been reduced from the state in which it was in February 1801, to that in which it is at this moment. I think they would not wish to trust the means of extricating them from their present difficulties, to these persons. This, then, I think, they ought well, to weigh, well to consider, and immediately to act in consequence. By cunning this wise and natural mode of proceeding has hitherto been delaye. I wish it may not be put off till it is too late. Suoner or later justice must come, and those will be called upon who have abilities, courage, and honesty to do I only wish that we may not be too dilatory.- -I am, &c. their duty. INQUISITOR. Patscript, July 25, 1803. Though my letter is already grown to so unwieldy a size, i vet cannot refrain from noticing the publication that has appeared in all the Morning Papirs of this day; and which has, it is said, bein spread about by Monsieur, the brother of the King of France. You will observe, all the additional weight and force which the arguments of my two last letters acquire from that publication. You will observe, that by the proposal m de to the King of France by Buonaparté, he has hinself acknowledged in the most explicit terms, the justice and force of the claims, which I wish to be set up. You will observe too, that the tact of his having made this proposal, is an acknowledgment of the countenance, which such claims, if properly set up, would meet with in France. What possible inducement could he have to make so toolish and ridiculous a proposal, but a hope of being able thereby to stifle those claims, and consequently, to rid himself of all the danger that could accrue to him on their assertion? He might have other inducements mixed with this one.-To offer an insult to an unfortunate Prince, must always be a gratification to such a mind as that of the First Consul. To make a legitimate Sovereign, such as the King of Prussia, disgrace hiraself and his regal title by being the bearer of such a message from such a sender, to such a receiver, must deubtless be a great gratification to the mind of a jacobin, a rebel, and an usurper. But these motives alone would not be sufficient to induce the First Consul to expose himself to the mortination of a refusal. He must have had some faint hope, that his offer might be accepted. A ridiculous expectation, no doubt, probably founded on his wishes. But we continually see this, that when a man desires a thing areently, he soon bring himselt actually to expect it. This, probably was the case in this stance; Buonapané knows how good the claim of Lewis XVIII is ; Le knows iba that claim asserted mancully and vigorously, would soon overthrow his power; and he wished to deprive his enemics of so powerful and effectual a weapon against him; but, fortunately for France and the civilised world, he has failed. He has failed; and has failed in such a manner, that he has now put it into the power of the King of France to call upon his people by a new argument, to uphold his rights, and as ert his claims. Allegiance, fidelity, love, and respect, all those urged them before to do so. Now gratitude comes in aid of these; for their sakes has he refused power, ease, and comfort; for their sakes is he willing to brave all the miseries of poverty and distress; and to submit to the scuffs and insults of those, whom his cruel persecutors may compel to violate the laws of hospitality and charity in his instance? Out of love for those wil, he submit to all this? and will they not feel,hemselves bound in gratitude to make some little return for these sacrifices? Will they bear to see their lawful King insulted by the very man who oppresses them? No: the people of France would rejoice to shed their blood in his cause; they wonld rejoice to overthrow the pre,ent tyranny, and to see again among them, their lawful King. Bet alone and unsisted they cannot do this. Kept down by an army 500,500 men, they cannot stir. They must have succour from without; they must have some foreign aid, some pot d appui, or they can never advance one sten England, y every rule of policy, and every call of justice, ought to step forward for this purpose. The work is glorious, it is easy, and it is short; it is a decision of England's glory and greatness, and of the peace of the world. If this step is not taken the governors of England are responsible, they are responsible to their King and Country for the dangers, which, by their not doing so, will be entailed on them. But they are responsible not to them only, they are responsible to the whole civilised world, for the impending calamities not averted; to all the Christian world for the cause of their religion not asserted; they are responsible to the present age, to posterity, and to God.I shall not detain you any longer now to reason, on the proof contained in the Letter of the King of France, of the numerous faithful adherents that still remain to him. "I could yet appeal," says he, " to my "faithful subjects, and I know I shall never be in "want." Nor will I say any thing about the magnanimity and loftiness of sentiment; the real kingly feeling that pervades these letters. He who reads them cannot fail to see and notice it; and he who does not at once feel this, by no argument will ever be made to understand or conceive it.That all may feel and perceive it, and act in consequence as good and faithful subjects of a King, and prosecute this noble cause to a successful issue, is the hearty wish and prayer of your sincere friend. I. PUBLIC PAPERS. Notification respecting the Blockade of the WESER, dated London, July 26, 1803. The King has been pleased to cause it to be signified by the Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury, his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the Ministers of Neutral Powers residing at this Court, that the recessary measures having been taken by his Majesty's command for the blockade of the entrance of the River Weser, in consequence of his Majesty having recently received authentic information of the occupation of parts of the banks of that iver by the French troops, the said river is declared to be in a state of blockade; and that from this time, all the measures authorised by the Law of Nations, and the respective Treaties between his Majesty and the different Neutral Powers, will be adopted and executed with respect to all vessels which may attempt to violate the said blockade. Lord Hawkesbury has been further commanded by his Majesty to signify to the Ministers of the Neutral Powers, that whenever the French troops will evacuate the positions which they now occupy on the parts of the banks of the Weser, and will remove to such a distance from them as to leave the course of that river perfectly free and secure to the vessels of his Subjects, as well as of other Nations, his Majesty will immediately direct his ships of war, which may be stationed at the mouth of the River Weser, for the purpose of blockading the same, to be withd: awn. DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS. Downing-street, July 30, 1803. —A Dispatch, of which the following is a copy, has been this day receiv ed from Lieut. Gen. Grinfield, Commander in Chief of his Majesty's troops in the Windward and Leeward Charibbee Islands, by the Right Hen. Lord Hobart, his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the War Department. Dated, St. Lucia, June 22, 1803. MY LORD,It is with satisfaction I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that this day the fortress of Morne Fortunée was carried by assault, and the Island of St. Lucia is in consequence unconditionally restored to the British Govt.I have to state to your Lordship, that in conse. quence of His Majesty's order, signified to me in 18104 your Letter, dated the 16th of May, and received on the 14th instant, which I immediately con municated to Commodore Hood, he arrived at Barbadoes on the 17th; the troops, stores, &c. were on board, or embarked on the 19th; sailed on the 20th. On the 21st, at day-break, they were off the north end of St. Lucia; in the course of the day the greatest part of the troops were disembarked in Choque-Bay; about half past five the out posts of the enemy were driven in, the town of Castries taken, and a summons was sent to the Commander of the troops of the French Republic. -In consequence of the refusal of Brigade-General Nogues to accede to any terms, and the expectation of approaching rains, it became necessary to get possession of the Morne with as little delay as possible. It was therefore determined, this morning, to attack the fortress by assault, which was done accordingly at four o'clock, and it was carried in about half an hour, and with less loss, considering the resistance, than could have been expected; but the loss has been chiefly among the higher ranks of officers, and those the most truly valuable; but it is yet to be hoped most of them will recover, for the real benefit of his Majesty's service.— I cannot omit a circumstance which reflects so much credit, as well on the British nation, as on the conduct of the soldiers actually employed, that, notwithstanding the severe and spirited resistance of the French troops, yet, no sooner were the works carried by assault, and the opposition no longer existed, than every idea of animosity appeared to cease, and not a French soldier was either killed or wounded.The return of the killed and wounded is herewith inclosed, which, excepting the number of officers of high rank, is not equal to what might have been expected, and, by far less than it would have been, in all probability, had a formal investment of the fortress taken place.These dispatches will he delivered to your Lordship by my Aid-du-Camp, Captain Weir, to whom I beg to refer your Lordship, for any information you may require. Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the troops in the assault and capture of the Fortress of Morne Fortunée, in the Island of St. Lucia, in the morning of the 22d June, 1803. Royal Military Artificers.-1 Serjeant, killed.— 2d Battalion Royals.-1 Serjeant, 8 Rank and File, killed; Field Offi. 1 Capt. 2 Serjs. 43 Rank and F. wounded; I R. and F. missing.-64th Reg.-I Serj. 5 R. and F. killed; 2 Field Offi. 1 Capt. 1 Sub. 2 Serj. 31 R. and F. wounded; 1 R. and F. missing.-68th Ditto.- Drum. missing.-3d West India Reg.-1 Serj. 3 R. and F. killed; 2 Sub 23 R. and F. wounded; 5 R. and F. missing.--Staff. 1 Field Offi. wounded. Total-4 Serj. 16 R. and F. killed; 4 Field-Offi. 2 Capt. 3 Sub. 4 Serj. 97 R. and F. wounded; 1 Drum. 7 R. and F. missingOfficers wounded.2d Bat. Royals.-Lieut. Col. Macdonald, severely; Capt. Chaloner, severely.64th Reg.-Lieut. Col. Pakenham, severely; Maj. Sir George Richardson, Cap. Galway, Lieut. Frederick Rowan, slightly.3d West India Reg.Lieut. Moultrice, slightly; Ensign Fagan, slightly. Staff-Lieut, Col. Morden, Deputy Adj. Gen. severely.-N. B. Hospital Mate Heynes, attached to 3d West India Reg. severely wounded, not included above, (Signed) W. TATUM, Captain Assistant Admiralty-Office, July 30, 1803.-Copy of a Letter from |