danger because it was apparently trifling. What in one hour appeared an inconsiderabe, or contemptible riot, might in a week. be a formidable insurrection. What to day was an insurrection, might be in a condition to-morrow to brand with a similar epithet, the regular government which it had originally opposed. It was imprudent; it was worse-it was a desertion of our duty to tamper with popular feelings, or popular prepossessions, to disaffection. But, it was said, his Majesty's speech declared that every thing was quiet in Ireland, and held out a hope that the deluded people of that country had come to a sense of their folly. This, he maintained, was not a fair inference to be drawn from his Majesty's speech. By the vigilance of government, and by the effect of the late trials, any open appearance of disaffection had been stopped; and the speech, too, held out a hope that bis Majesty's deluded subjects in that country were now restored to their senses. Might it not, however, be fairly inferred that one of the grounds of that hope was the existence of the very measures now under consideration, and the consciousness that such measures were calculated to aid the loyal subjects of that country in maintaining good order and tranquillity. He could not refrain from paying, not a compliment, but a merited tribute to the criminal jurisprudence of that country, for the temperate, yet firm and vigorous justice, which on the late rials it had administered. While its temperance and moderation must have conciliated the minds of those not lost to every sense of justice and reason, and have taught them to prize that law which, as British subjects, they enjoyed, its vigour must have greatly tended to keep in awe the licentious and unruly, and to convince them that its firmness was equal to its moderation and justice. The circumstance, that it was only found necessary on one occasion to resort to the extraordinary means now proposed, so far from evincing that such measures were not necessary, only shewed the delicacy which government observed in the use of them, and that such powers were properly entrusted to the Irish government. The knowledge that such powers might, when necessary, be employed, might have been the very cause which rendered the adoption less frequent.

The notoriety of the recent outrages in Ireland; the uncertainty whether they were completely crushed, and the spirit of insurrection totally extinguished, were, his lordship conceived, sufficient grounds of the measure. Other grounds might exist, but it was unnecessary to press them forward,

when circumstances to justify the measure were notorious to all. His lordship concluded by giving his hearty assent to the bills; an assent which, in similar circumstances, he should deem himself deficient in his duty were he to with hold from similar applications, as to this country.

Earl Darnley insisted that no parliamentary ground was laid for the present measures. He did not, however, presume to say that they were not necessary. The House, however, ought to be fully convinced of their necessity, and that upon parliamentary grounds, before they passed them. He adverted to the conduct of the government of Ireland, which he was clearly of opinion, was surprised on the 23d of July. Blame, on this account, must attach to ministers, and the recal of the commander in chief seemed to fix it upon him. A noble lord (Limerick) had quoted the opinions of certain state doctors, viz. M.Neven, Emmet, and O'Connor.- "For my part," said Lord Darnley, "experience has taught me to expect no "good in politics from a doctor!"

Lord Hobart said, that he would not have troubled the House on the present occasion, had it not been for the concluding observations of the noble lord who spoke last. He knew that no blame did attach to government on that day. They were aware of the attack, and had given intimation to the commander of the forces and to the Superintendant of the Police. Government could not divine in what street the insurrection might break out; but had the rebels pro ceeded to the Castle, to the Bank, or to the depôt of arms, they would have found every thing in readiness for their reception. He thought it proper to state, that no blame was imputable to the commander of the forces. His dismissal from that situation was at his own request, and his immediate employment afterwards was not meant as a recompence for that situation, but because government would have deemed themselves culpable, had they allowed the military ta lents of an officer of such known abilities to remain unemployed at the present period. The two bills were then read a se◄ cond time, and ordered to be committed to

morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, December 12.

MINUTES.-Mr. Baldwin presented a petition from the prisoners confined for debt in the county gaol of Cardigan. Ordered to lie upon the table.-Mr. Corry brought up an estimate of the expenses attending

the Linen Board in Ireland for one year, from Jan. 5, 1804, to Jan. 5, 1805.-Leave was given to bring in a bill to enable his Majesty to grant certain lands in Chertsey, &c. to H. R. II. the Duke of York. - Mr. W. Dundas gave notice, that he should not bring forward, till after the recess, the motion which it was his inteution to make respecting the militia of Scotland.-Leave was given to bring in a bill for punishing mutiny and desertion, and for the better payment of their quarters.-Leave was given to bring in a bill for the regulation of his Majesty's royal marine forces while on shore. -Mr. Secretary Yorke moved the second reading of the bill for explaining two acts, passed in the 42d and 43d of his present Majesty, relating to volunteers and yeomanry corps. It was accordingly read a second time, and ordered to be committed to-morrow. The House resolved itself into a Committee of Supply, in which a variety of small sums were voted for the maintenance of convicts at home and abroad, and other miscellaneous services voted annually.Mr. Corry also moved the miscellaneous services for Ireland, which were agreed to; and the report ordered to be received to-morrow.

[REPORT ON THE ARMY ESTIMATES.] On the motion for bringing up the report on the army estimates,

Colonel Craufurd rose and spoke as follows: Sir; in the debate which took place on Friday last, the Committee was so long occupied in attending to the speeches of gentlemen either the most distinguished for their talents or of the greatest weight from their official situations, that I thought it better to defer offering my opinions on the subject until the report should be brought up.-Amongst the various topics which have been, or natural y may be introduced into this discussion, there is no one which more prominently presents itself to my mind, than that which in the last session formed the ground of a specifick motion in this House. I mean, the establishment of a military council.-At a time when (in addition to the immense sums that the public is called upon in other ways to contribue for military pu: poses) Parliament deems it necessary to vote establishments so large and expensive as those contained in the estimates now before us; at a time, Sir, when we are engaged in a war the most arduous and critical in which this country wasever involved, it undoubtedly is the first duty of every member of this House, to suggest all those means which in his judgment would conduce to the bringing our military system to the highest pitch of perfection, and to the placing the national defence and security upon a great,

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solid, and permanent basis; and the accomplishment of these most important objects. would, in my opinion, be greatly promoted by the establishment of a military council, properly composed. When this subject was mentioned on Friday, last by an hon. gent. not now present (Mr. Fox), the Chancellor of the Exchequer told us, that he had reason to believe that many of those who formerly had wished for such a council, were now, upon further consideration of it, convinced that it would be productive of no advantage, and of many inconveniencies to the public service.I cannot pretend to say what change may have taken place in the opinions of others, but I think it right to declare, that mine remains unaltered, that the vote which I formerly gave, when the question was agitated in this House, was not lightly given, and that having tully considered the subject since, I am confirmed in my conviction of the propriety of that vote.-But, before I proceed to state my reasons for adhering to this opinion, I cannot help expressing my surprize, that whenever the measure has been recommended on the one side, and resisted by his Majesty's ministers on the other, it has been, resisted chiefly on the ground that it would imply a want of confidence in the abilities of the commander in chief.-For my own part, Sir, I am very sure that I never made any proposal, never stated any opinion or uttered a single expression in this House, which, if liberally or fairly construed, could possibly be considered as conveying any thing disrespectful or disparaging of that illustrious personage; although I well recollect that such insinuations were thrown out against me both in and out of this House. -I am, however, totally regardless of what may be the effect of these or similar misrepresentations; they shall never deter me from freely and openly delivering my opinions; and, therefore, I have no hesitation in declaring that, in the present situation of affairs, I do not believe his Royal Highness to be capable, without further assistance, of doing ample justice to the country in the administration of the various branches of the military department of the public service. When I say this, it is not that I do not think as highly as any man of his Royal highness's abilities and exertion; but I do not hold him to be equal to such a task, because I believe that no one man can perform it.--I am fully sensible, Sir, of the great advantages which the country has derived from his being placed at the head of the army; and I know that he devotes himself to the discharge of his public duties with a degree of laborious assiduity, rarely to be met with in any man, and still more rarely, per

haps, in a man of his high birth. But, completely occupied as he is, in dispatching the urgent and pressing business that daily occurs in the command of such a force as we now have on foot, it is not possible that he should have sufficient time and leisure left for reflecting, as deeply and maturely as the subject requires, on all the possible ineans of improving the national defence, and establishing it upon one great combined and permanent system.---But, it has been said, has he not already a council of able officers to assist him? Are not the staff this council? Undoubtedly, Sir, his Royal Highness's staff is composed of very able and respectable officers; but they, too, are fully engaged with the details of their respective departments. It has also been urged, that all the general officers who are employed, are, in fact, his council, as he has constant opportunities of having recourse to their advice; but here, again, I must object, not only that these general officers are greatly occupied with the particular business of their respective commands, but also that their being necessarily dispersed, at a great distance from the commander in chief, and from each other, is an obstacle to their rendering that service, which might be expected from such a council as I have in view.-But let it not be supposed that I am proposing a council, for the purpose of controlling the commander in chief, in the direction of the active operations of the army in the field. What I mean to recommend is a council, comprising within it some officers of great experience and acknowledged abilities, who would devote the whole of their time to the mature investigation of every means, that might be proposed by others, or should occur to themselves, for increasing our military strength, digesting and combining the whole into one great and comprehensive system.— The establishment of such a council, of which the commander in chief would be president, and the master and lieutenant general of the ordnance (amongst others) would be members, would have the advantage of uniting and bringing, under one view, those different branches of the military service which are now independent of each other; as every thing relating to the military branch. of the ordnance department would come under its cognizance,-I say the military, as contradistinguished from the naval branch.

I also think, that, without being accused of speaking slightingly either of his Royal Highness the commander in chief, or of the noble lord at the head of the ordnance, I may be allowed to say, that any proposal for the defence of the country, coming from such a council, would carry with it greater weight

than if proceeding either from the commander in chief or from the master general; and that ministers would feel, that in neg. lecting to attend to such a recommendation, they would take upon themselves a serious responsibility.-Ministers, indeed, and those who approve of their conduct, contend, that nothing necessary for the defence of the empire has been neglected; from whence they infer, that we have not felt the want of such a council; but, as I deny the premises, I cannot grant the conclusion. I contend, that there has been much neglect and mismanagement; and, to prove this assertion, I must shortly revert to a period which was referred to in the former debate, I mean that immediately subsequent to the treaty of Amiens.-Without at all entering into the merits of that treaty, I shall merely say, that, even if after the conclusion of it, the conduct of the French government had been apparently pacific; yet, when we consider that by that treaty we recognized them as legitimate sovereigns of the Netherlands, and that the possession of that country, which at any time would have given France a predominant influence in Holland, does in the present state of Europe give them the absoJute command of it; it undoubtedly behoved us to adopt a new and more enlarged military system than had ever before been deemed necessary, and to employ ourselves during the peace in strengthening our means of defence in proportion to the increased means of offence which France would possess in case of a renewal of war.—This, I say, was obviously necessary, even supposing the conduct of the French government had been apparently pacific. But, what was their conduct? What it really was, Sir, it is unnecessary for me to examine; it is sufficient for my argument to consider in what light his Majesty's ministers themselves viewed it, which they have fully explained to us in their declaration on the renewal of hostilities. They there tell us, that "It may with truth be asserted, that the period which has elapsed since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, has been marked with one continued series of aggression, violence, and insult on the part of the French government." That it is impossible to reflect on the different proceedings, and the course which the French government have thought proper to adopt respecting them, without the tho rough conviction that they are not the effect of accident, but that they form a part of a system which has been adopted, for the purpose of degrading, vilifying, and insulting his Majesty and his government." Now, Sir, I ask, is it possible that his Majesty's ministers, viewing the conduct of France in

this light, should really have thought that the peace would be of long duration? Is it possible that any set of men, composing the government of this brave and powerful nation, of a people jealous of their honour, and at all times ready to resent an insult offered to themselves or their Sovereign? Is it, I say, possible, that the ministers of such a country should have been capable of believing, that we could long remain at peace with a government which, as they themselves tell us, had, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, acted upon a system of degrading, vilifying, and insulting his Majesty and his government? Under such circumstances, I cannot help supposing that they must at least have considered the duration of the peace to be very precarious: and if it was easy for them to foresee the probability of war, it was no less easy to foresee what would be the nature of it. Has a single circumstance occurred which was not expected? Did they reckon upon the co-operation of allies, who have since deserted them? No; they could have no such expectation. Is Buonaparte's project of invading this country any thing new and unexpected? Cert inly not. When they made the peace of Amiens, they knew he had it in contemplation, if the war had continued; and, therefore, might be sure that if it should be renewed under such circumstances, he would again prepare to invade us? Since then, they must have foreseen both the probability of a rupture, and the precise nature of the war that would ensue. Did it not once occur to them to consider a little what measures were or might eventually become necessary to meet such an attack? Did they not consider that a rapid increase of the army would become necessary, and that, therefore, it was their duty to prepare beforehand the means of effecting it? Could they not foresee, that in a war of such a nature, they would be obliged to call upon a great part of the population of the Country to assist the army in its defence? And did it never occur to them, that, in order to enable the people to fight, it would be necessary to give them arms? I am perfectly ready to admit, that the statement made by a noble lord (Castlereagh) on Friday last, respecting the number of arms that have been issued, is more satisfactory than circumstances had led me to expect; and I have no hesitation in declaring, that, in my mind, it fully acquits the board of ordnance of any imputation of neglect or want of exertion since the breaking out of the war. But, I am not the less of opinion, that the ministers were, in the highest degree culpable, for not having long ago enabled

mean

that department to fill the arsenals; and, it is a notorious fact, that much less than two months ago, nay, at the very period ([ Michaelmas) when, by the general Training Bill, as first brought into the House by his Majesty's ministers, all exercising and drilling was to have been suspended till Lady Day next, not one half of the volunteers were armed. Another precaution, which the situation of this country, after the peace of Amiens, naturally suggested the propriety of adopting, but which appears, during that period, to have been wholly overlooked, is that of defensive works: and no man, I think, will deny, that if these had been commenced, as they ought to have been, during the peace, our coasts would now have been in a state of much greater security, than any which they can derive from such imperfect works as have since been hastily thrown up. No man, for instance, can doubt that the towers mentioned on Friday by my right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) or other works possessing the properties of these towers, I mean security against assault, would afford much more effectual opposition to disembarkation, than can be expected from low and weak batteries, which may be easily taken possession of by the enemy's infantry. These, Sir, and other such measures of defence and precaution, would probably not have been neglected by his Majesty's ministers, if they had been recommended, as no doubt they would have been, by such a council as I have proposed; because, as I have before observed, the neglecting to attend to the advice of such a council (recorded as it would be on their minutes) would have thrown upon ministers a greater degree of responsibility than attaches to the not adopting the advice of any one man, however elevated his rank. It will be said, I suppose, that all these measures would have been expensive, and that it was, therefore, advisable to practise economy, to keep up the funds, &c.; a mode of reasoning which does not deserve an answer. But, what will be the excuse for having neglected those precautions which were not attended with any expense? If it was foreseen, as it certainly must have been, that a rapid increase of the regular forces, and a great armamentof the people would be necessary, why, at least, were not those laws prepared at leisure, which, when a rupture took place, it would become the duty of government to propose to Parliament for the carrying these measures into effect? As an excuse for the imperfect state in which the different bills were brought forward, it is said, that they were framed under the pressure of critical

circumstances and that such a system could not be expected to be made perfect at once. Now this, which they allege as an excuse, is, in fact, the very ground of my charge against them. Their defence, in this case, like their justification of the Irish government, only makes the matter worse; for, I ask, why were these measures hastily framed under the pressure of critical circumstances? Why were they not maturely considered and digested before the renewal of a war which must have been foreseen?-A most serious evil resulting entirely from the mistakes committed in drawing up these bills is, that we now have nearly 400,000 men exempted from the army of reserve and militia ballot. I have, indeed, heard the right hon. Sec. of State maintain, that the granting these exemptions was not, as I contend, the effect of a mistake; but that it was in the contemplation of Parliament, at the time, to give to the act, under which the volunteers claim the exemption, the full effect, which it has since ben discovered to have produced. Now, I am perfectly convinced, that the great majori y at least of this House had no such intention; and I have good reason to suppose, that his Majesty's ministers themselves had it not; for it appears, that sometime after the close of the session, the Sec. of State wrote a letter to the Attorney and So. licitor General, desiring to know, whether, in their opinion, the volunteers were really entitled to these exemptions? It is, indeed, curious to observe, how this clause, granting exemptions, got into the system.-In passing the act for raising the army of reserve, the greatest anxiety was shewn by the Com mittee, to confine the exemptions within as narrow limits as possible; and the act provides, that only such volunteers should be exempted as had been accepted before the 22d day of June, 1803.-In the general Training Bill, which followed the above, it is expressly enacted, that this act is not to exempt persons from being balloted for the militia or army of reserve.-In the 120th ch. Geo III. being an act for amending the last mentioned, no notice is taken of exemption from ballot. But there comes a Bill, of which, from its title, it was impossible for any member to suppose, that any thing contained in it would repeal one of the most important provisions of the preceding acts, but which has since been discovered to have produced this effect.-It is the 121st chap. Geo. III. and is entitled, "An Act for billetting Volunteers when assembled, for subjecting to military discipline Serjeants, Trumpeters, Drumm, rs, and Buglemen, who receive constant pay; and for the further re

gulating such Yeomanry and Volunteer Corps." And this is the Act, which, in the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, given in answer to a query from the Secretary of State, is declared to have repealed that clause of the Army of Reserve Bill, which denied the exemption from ballot to any volunteers, excepting those who had been accepted before the 22d of June. I. therefore, cannot believe that this was inteotionally done by his Majesty's ministers; and I am very sure it was without the knowledge of by far the greater part, if not the whole, of the other members of this House. Now, this general exemption, which I consider as the effect of a mistake in the framers of the last Bill, is, in my opinion, by far the greatest defect in the whole of the volunteer system. It greatly interferes with the recruiting the army of reserve and militia; it gives to certain persons in the volunteer corps a very improper power of deciding, who shall or shall not be subject to the ballots, accordingly as they please to accept or reject the offers of those who wish to enter their corps; and it gives a dubious character to the whole vo lunteer institution, inasmuch as it is now impossible to distinguish those who come forward from pure zeal and patriotism, from such as are actuated only by a desire of escaping the operation of the other Bills.Sir, before I conclude, I must take the opportunity of again reverting to the subject of fortifications; and, without entering into any detailed reasoning, I will assert, that, without fortifications, every defen sive system must be extremely imperfect. To execute them on a great scale is, doubtedly, a work of time; but, I ask, Fas any such system been commenced ?—In Ieland, for instance, where the necessity of fortresses has been recognised and pointed out, I believe, by every officer who ever gave an opinion on the subject, I do not understand that government has gone length of even marking out a single spot of ground for the purpose. With respect to the extent to which it would be advisa. ble to carry the system of tortifications in England, there may be some variety of opinion; but there is one subject upon which, if we are really exposed to invasion, no difference of opinion can possibly exist. I mean the propriety of fortifying a great military dépôt and place of arms; that is to say, of fortifying it at least to such a degree that it cannot be taken without a siege for, although I go, perhaps, as får as any man, in believing that the enemy may effect the disembarkation of a great force in this country, yet, I am aware,

the