resource, to which men look when they devolve the care of their safety upon others. No Englishman of common reflection can be easy to think, that the safery of the state is in the hands of men, who, in every difficult case of war or negotiation, or domestic administration, have always shown themselves inferior to the occasion. The whole history of our relations and discussions with France during the last peace, betrays such a scene of rashness, inconsistency, and timidity, that must convince every impartial mind that peace could not be preserved with honour, with Mr. Addington and his colleagues at the head of affairs; yet, though the war be justifiable, it is not justifiable on the grounds which ministers have taken in their discussions with the French government. Indeed, the publication of that negotiation has lowered the reputation of our English statesmen very much on the Continent of Europe. If we look at measures of war, what shall we say of a war of nine months, without any single enterprize of difficulty or danger successfully achieved? Measures of defence continually changing, and after all, the regular disposible army of the country still unequal to any considerable offensive operation. If we look for proofs of their activity and yigilance, where shall we find them? Can we resign ourselves into the custody of men, who were surprised at noon-day by open insurrection in the streets of Dublin? Is this a foundation for confidence, to a people surrounded on every side by bold and daring enemies? Can wise men, if they would, put such a violence on their understandings as to confide in ministers, who not only have given no evidence of superior capacity, but on the contrary, have given the most decisive proofs of signal incapacity? Is it possible that wise men should be unanimous in sacrificing their reason on the altar of folly? And, if such a sacrifice could be made, would it enable a weak and precarious administration to carry through those extraordinary measures which the circumstances of the times require?--It certainly is no easy matter, in a free country, where parties necessarily and happily exist, (for parties are the only organs of free discussion and a public spirit), to form any administration which shall unite the confidence of all. Some prefer the principles and admire the talents of one leader, some of another; constancy in such attachments is called consistency. Having once chosen their party, men of generous, honest natures, have taught their Confidence to go in a certain channel, and to Follow certain leaders. In the constitution

of society, this tendency of mankind is of the utmost advantage. A free constitution could not exist, without subordinate associations and unions to secure the object of the general society. The influence of the Crown is of itself too much for the mass of individuals who have no union, no concert, no means of taking common measures to resist what is wrong. The association of the court is always active, vigilant, and united, and their views do not always tend to public liberty and to wise administration. Constitutional parties are the embodied defenders of public freedom. They oppose the corruption of the court, they mitigate the violence of the people; they nourish able and active men, and by their very conflicts give stability to the constitution. No free, no great, active, and energetic government, ever existed without such parties, and their decay is a certain symptom of degraded sentiment and approaching despotism. But it is in the nature of such parties to sacrifice personal objects, and the more exclusive interests of the party to the general good of the state. Not to speak of the standing parties of the ancient republics, it is undeni able that all the parties of this country, whether parties of interest or of principle, as Mr. Hume divides them, whether court or country, have acted together upon aryextraordinary emergency.Some have adduced the restoration, the revolution, and such great events, as proofs of the tendency, the beneficial tendency of parties in this country to unite. But it is not necessary to insist on such extraordinary instances. It is denied, however, that coalitions ever have produced an able, efficient, and lasting ministry. This is an assertion wholly false. Who can forget the extraordinary coalition which took place in the year 1757, and the glorious war which that ministry carried on? Who is ignorant of the causes which rendered that coalition necessary? Sach was the number, yet such the strength of several conflicting parties, that no vigorous, steady administration could be formed on an exclusive bottom. It was felt that the spe. culative opinions of political leaders were necessarily suspended by the parts they were called upon to perform.--The only object was to beat the enemy, and he who could best contribute to that was the man for the time. Au administration of able men was necessary to carry on the war against France. An administration was necessary which, combining all the great talents and connexions, could carry with it the whole people, and call forth their whole energy; an administration so strong in itself as to be

superior to all tricks and expedients, which could venture on bold measures, conscious that even their errors would be pardoned, because men reposed the most unbounded confidence in their vigour, their capacity, and their intentions. With such a ministry there was to be no petty balancing and dividing of parties-no sacrifices to undue influence, either in the choice of commanders or in the direction of measures. Different patching coalitions of underlings had been fried, but in vain; at last, however, (the late King, being the first patriotically to sacrifice his personal feeling to the public good,) a grand coalition was formed, comprchending all the leading interests, all the leading talents; and that coalition lasted till it was overthrown, not by the discord of its own elements, but by the malignant influence of favouritism, by an influence which for the last forty years has been steadily opposed to all men of ability and natural weight, and which has been uniformly exerted in the protection of underlings, drivellers, minions, and sycophants.———It is impossible to carry one's mind back to the fluctuating state of public councils, to the degraded state of the country, during the first period of the seven years' war, without thinking of the miserable state of the government of this country now; and yet, who would be so unjust to the memory of the dead, so faithless to the truth of history, as to compare the present drivellers with a ministry of which the powerful connexions and the sound judgment, diligence, and experience of the Duke of Newcastle, and the great abilities of Mr. Henry Fox, formed a part. Far less would any man compare the object, the nature, and the scale of the war in which we are now engaged against France, with a war carried on against the monarchy under a doating debauchee, governed by a profligate mistress. The novelty of the contest, indeed, is a matter of most serious consideration. England never beforewas engaged corps to corps with France as she is now, and this of itself, though it ought not to appal, ought to put us upon every effort to meet the untried danger. The Romans were cautious when they had to do with a new enemy. France, revolutionary France, aggrandized, republican France, is, indeed, a new enemy to England. But shall we not fight France single handed, which, by the way, France is too wise to do, for she has Hoiland, and would have more if she could get them. Yes, to be sure! But is fighting France single handed a thing to be laughed at like a Harlequin's jest in the holidays? If we must

fight single handed, should we not call forth all our means, all our abilities, to equal the magnitude and novelty of the occasion--Mr. Sheridan can tell Mr. Addington what sort of an enemy we have to contend with in Buonaparté. Let him read to ministers that brilliant and eloquent eulogy which he pronounced upon the First Consul of France, a few days after the victory of Marengo had consummated the ruin and degradation of Europe. They will there find, to sum up every thing in Mr. Sheridan's quotation from Cicero, that Buonaparté is a man who, plures provincias confecit quam alii concupeverunt; cujus adolescentia ad scientiam rei militaris; non alienis præceptis, sed suis imperiis; non offenso melius belli, sed victoriis; non stipendiis, sed triumpbis est erudita. Buonaparté, indeed, at the head of all France, at the head of all which the event that inspired the panegyric have gained him, is a most formidable enemy. And who are those who oppose him? Mr. Addington, Mr. Bragge, Lord Hobart, with the rest of the present Cabinet! And in what camps or fields, in what commands or victories, or triumphs have they learnt to oppose so mighty a foe? Or rather, might we nct say, under what gowns and wigs, behind what desks and counters have such men learnt to defend an empire? How, in such eventful circumstances, can such presume to lay their hands upon the ark of "our magnificent and awful cause?" From such a responsibility, did not duty command wise men would shrink, if not with dismay, at least with sacred awe and discerning fear. Yet Mr. Addington, Mr. Bragge, and Lord Hobart, amidst so many wiser and abler, venture to stand forth as the leaders and rulers in a contest which involves the destinies of England and of the civilized world.Whatever may have been the causes of this war, the consequences must be either to raise the British nation to an eminence great and glorious beyond example, or to decide our inferiority for ever. Even were a ministry formed of underlings, without any leading connexions, without parliamentary interest independent of the Treasury Bench, yet possessed of much greater abilities than their friends will claim for them, they could not act with vigour and effect in the present circumstances. Men, like the present ministry, have every thing to fear. They dare not venture upon any bold and strik ing enterprizes, because they dare not take the risk of bad success. They are so feeble and precarious that any puff of bad fortune would blow them down. They dare

not take upon themselves the responsibility of measures. Hence they keep the country in the present pining state in which there is no hope. We wait the attack to be sure, but if the enemy will not come, how are we to gain the victory-how are we to gain the war? A defeat would be preferable to this languishing state, because defeat would rouse our faculties, and prove the necessity of exerting all our mental and physical resources. At present what have we to hope but from accident? We trust every thing to fortune, but do nothing to deserve her favour.This, to wise and reflecting men, constitures the greatest danger of our situation. Fuit boc quondam fuit proprium Populi Romani longe à domo bellare, et propugnaculis imperii Sociorum fortunas non SUA TECTA DEFENDERE. Hannibal is indeed at our gates, but where is the Scipio to call him back to Carthage? This is the first war in which England was ever besieged so disgracefully. We have been often threatened with invasion, but the answer to the menace was to send our fleets and armies to gather laurels in every quarter of the globe-on the Continent of Europe, in Asia, Africa and America. In those days the messengers of victory crowded every avenue to the metropolis. But now we boast and bluster, because we are not subdued. The whole cry of a stupid, gaping rabble, at the head of which are the ministry, is, "Are they come! Are they coming!" Gracious God! and is this to fight France singlehanded? Is this giving a great and glorious example to Europe? Is this the path of renown, of honour, or of safety?Amidst a disgusting and senseless contest of ribbaldry and reproach with our enemies, it is in their power to render England the scorn and derision of Europe, unless England has a government with spirit and talent, to make France feel that it is dangerous to provoke the British nation. At present France has the whole plan and conduct of the war in her own hand. By no one act of war or negotiation does she encounter a serious opposition from the British government. While Mr. Addington governs England, there is no coalition on the Continent to be feared by Buonaparté. His undivided attention, his undivided means are given to our destruction. Mr. Addington is resolved to fight France single handed, but he seems determined never to strike a blow. Will Mr. Addington dare to undertake any thing great No-he "must consult the peos ple! He must wait for the public opinion before he initiates a measure, either legislative or administrative; and the mixed go

vernment of England is to be converted into the feeblest and most inefficient of all democracies, without form or freedom of deliberation; without energy in the administration, and with a man at the head of its affairs, who boasts, that in every measure he waits to make the people of England, the dupes, the partners, and the apologists of his imbecility. If the people of England indeed, can submit in torpid indifference to all this, the brains are out, and there should be an end of them at once.-- -What is the remedy for this deplorable situation? the more deplorable, perhaps, that it is without any crisis, and may be, nay must be, without any till the moment of dissolution? We answer, bold, vigorous government, founded upon the union of all the talents fitted to serve the country, at this time of peril and difficulty. What! shall it be said that every measure of administration shall have the sanction of a Plebiscitum ? unheard of, abominable in this constitution! What! shall the spirit of the people, and nothing but the people, not in their assemblies, tribes, or centimes, but the people in an indefinable mass, and in the first resort, supply counsel to Ministers, Parliaments, and Kings? Shall the responsibility of a minister be destroyed by this monstrous kind of democracy? God forbid that we should undervalue the spirit and voice of the people, for whom all government exists. But let the opinion and the voice of the people be led to their true interests, by men in whom they confide; let the voice and opinion of the people, deter all bad men, and bad ministers, from doing, or advising, what is repugnant to their rights, their liberties, and their safety. But let not Mr. Addington make the dispersed mass of the people, the legislative and executive power in the first instance, to the overthrow of every thing in government that is rational in theory, and beneficial in practice.--We repeat then, however, that if we are not wise to prevent calamity by resorting to it, calamity will compel us to fly to a system of administration on a comprehensive basis. All the patching and turning of the underlings will not do. Even partial unions of men of greater reputation will not give that government, calculated to produce an undivided effort; that government, which conscious in its integrity and in its strength, will venture every thing for the safety of the state.

* It is not amiss to observe here, that these people, while they are thus courting the rabble, have the modesty to take to them elves exclusively, the appellation of "the king's friends."Editor.

LETTER V.

FROM A CONTINENTAL OBSERVER.

Hamburgh, Nov. 10, 1803. SIR,When you read my last letter, you may, perhaps, have supposed that some of the reflections which it contained, bore the marks of an influence foreign from that which I profess. In this, however, you would have been totally mistaken. I have no connexion, whatever, either direct or indirect, with those who are most interested in the subject which I have discussed. The situation of the affairs of Europe is, at this time, so particularly important, as to excite universal attention. Every country, and every individual has the right of being an observer, because all are interested in the great scene which is passing; and because the happiness of all depends, essentially, upon the decision of the present war. This right I have exercised in submitting to your consideration, my ideas upon some of the most important objects which are involved in the present state of Europe. They appear to me to be conformable both to reason and justice; but if you should think them different, I can produce no authority to add to their weight. I will, however, beg a little further indulgence, while I examine, whether it would be proper to make any declarations to the people of France, relative to the future state of the internal government of that kingdom, in case the restoration of monarchy should be attempt ed, upon the plan of Inquisitor? and, it it should be proper, what those declarations ought to be?Relative to this subject there are four ways of proceeding. To make no declaration at all: 2. To declare that every thing shall remain in its present state: 3. To declare that every thing shall be immediately restored, as nearly as possible, to its former state and 4. To declare that certain of the revolutionary innovations shall remain, and that certain others shall be abolished.1. As to the first of these modes, it appears to me to be absolutely unreasonable. If this revolution had been an ordinary one, or such as most of its historians have represented it; if the renunciation of the monarchy had not been enforced for at least ten years; if the alterations and the changes of every sort had not been universal; it the system now existing in France, did not materially affect the happiness of mankind, and even the foundation of all so. ciety; then, it might be wise and politic to make no stipulations whatever, but to leave every thing to be determine between the monarch and his people, Bus, under the

present circumstances, every thing seems to require, that, if we really wish to prevail on the French to receive their king, some explanation should be given, generally, at least, of the principal consequences which will ensue from such a measure. If this be not done they may suspect that some snare is laid for them; and say, that, after what has happened to them, they cannot be too cautious in their engagements. But if, notwithstanding, the project should be successful, that state of uncertainty would render the first measures of the government infinitely more difficult; its progress would become wavering and precarious; and its intentions would be constantly misrepre sented, and its acts constantly calumniated, In fact, it appears to me, when it is so difficult to gratify or even to conciliate so many opposite sentiments, to make no declaration or explanation on the subject, would be the most effectual means of rendering every one dissatisfied.———2. Although many of the existing institutions of France, and the general inclination of the people are favourable to the principles of royalty; it is, nevertheless, certain that the present state of France is very different, indeed, from that of a true and legitimate monarchy. The government seems to aim at the impracticable combination of all the freedom of a democratic republic, with all the vigour of an arbitrary dictatorship. This is the most effectual mode of keeping it constantly balancing between despotism and anarchy. The worst is, that not only every thing is changed, but that every thing is destroyed or subverted. A lawful monarch, if he were established in France, as she now is, would find himself, in the midst of such incongruity, entirely out of his sphere. Usurpation takes advantage of every thing; and tyranny controls every thing. It could not be thus with a king; who ought to reign without violence, and whose justice alone ought to be dreaded. I can readily imagine that it may seem easier to declare to the people of France, that all the effects of the resolution shall remain entire. would be cutting the gordion knot, which ought, and indeed, which I think, the actual state of things absolutely requires should be untied. Can we forget that it is the revolution which we affect to combat: and shall we begin by abandoning to it all its usurpations? We wish to re-establish a monarchy which has been destroyed by the revolution; and shall we surround it with revolutionary elements? In announcing the reign of justice and moderation, shall we introduce it by sanctioning violence and

This

THRE

iniquity? Dare we require the French people, not only to return to the sway of their lawful sovereign, but to confirm every thing which oppresses and degrades them? Certainly not. That would only be placing Louis XVIII. at the head of the revolution, and would, if it were possible to be effected, contribute neither to the happiness of France nor the tranquility of Europe. If this be the course which is to be pursued, it would be better to abandon France 10 her fate, and to hold her purely and simply by the right of war. I am unacquainted with the intentions and dispositions of Louis XVIII. but, if I were in the situa tion of that prince, cruel and unfortunate as it is, I would never consent to such a negotiation; and if I were a Frenchman, I would never accept of terms so contradictory. But, perhaps, it may be asked whether those who proscribed the monarchy were not rebels; and whether those who rule in its stead are not rebels: whether those whose consent must now be obtained for the restoration of the king are not rebels; and whether, in order to satisfy and conciliate them, it will not be necessary to pass an act of oblivion for all that has been done, and, thus, provide for the future at the expense of the past? This reasoning is fallacious; because it is not from those who now wield the sword of authority, that the reinstatement of the monarch is to be obtained. Those must be foolish, indeed, who suppose that that could be done, on any terms whatever. But the mass of the people of France, who have already suffered, and who still suffer under the sway of the revolution, were never so essentially revolutionary as has been supposed, and are, now, still less anti-monarchical in their principles than ever. How can it be supposed that the French, harassed and disgusted with the revolution, and longing for their lawful king, would, willingly, see him return and sanction the revolution? No: the great body of the people look for no such monstrous association; and they would justly think, that for such a purpose, it would be unnecessary to change. It is by no means certain, they would say, that the government, vicious and illegitimate as it is, may not fall into the hands of those who would be more moderate and less oppressive. All its phases may not be so noxious. The present government condemns the Directory with the same justice as the Directory condemned the reign of terror; and another government may, perhaps, now be approaching, which will, in turn, acquire the right of anathematizing the reign of the

Consuls. Can we then be unmindful of those immemorable crowds of Frenchmen, whose persons and whose fortunes have suffered so grievously from the revolution, and who are still the victims of its tyranny? They, most assuredly, are not the faithful and zealous partisans of republicanism.- From these things, it is evident to me, that to assure the French people of the preservation of the fruits of the revolution, after the reinstatement of the king, would be unwise, impolitic, and unjust.

We

-3. The idea of making justice, that supreme attribute of kings, uncontroled and unlimited justice, the suite of a returning monarch, and of re-establishing with the throne, all that was destroyed with it, is noble and consolatory. It would be sound policy to sweep from the surface of France every thing which history wishes to obliterate from its records. Nothing could be better than, with one hand to repress the spirit, and, with the other, to destroy the effects of revolution. But these are delusive reveries. None but the Omnipotent exercises this complete justice; and, although he suffers men to conceive the idea, he reserves the power for himself. ought not, always, to wish for that which we can obtain. Summum jus, summa injuria. Justice, if carried too far, would produce. an overthrow, rather than a re-establishment; and we wish not to effect a counterrevolution, but a restoration.I therefore, think it, not only wise, but necessary, and even indispensable, that this third course should be rejected. 4. It would then seem most expedient to declare to the peo ple of France, that the return of the king should be signalized by the destruction of certain effects of the revolution; but that others should exist after the restoration, some provisionally, and some permanently. The selection would certainly be difficult: however, I will state my ideas on the subject.- -The present forms of government, at least in the executive departments, ought, I presume, to be preserved provisionally, as well as the army, and the taxes, which latter should, in the mean time, be levied with all possible gentleness.Every thing relating to religion, or rather to religious worship, ought to be exclusively under the direction of the prince; and should, therefore, I think, be passed over in silence. It might be well, however, to guarantee toleration, the free exercise of their own modes of worship, and the royal protection to those Frenchmen who are not Catholics.

I have already explained myself relative to the power of the king. On that