lytical examination of the 10th section of the Act of 1793, on which the claim of summary jurisdiction rested, and vindicated the construction which they assumed, in opposition to that taken by the District Court. The jurisdiction of the judges of the district courts, in cases of bankruptcy, has presented for consideration some important questions on the point of jurisdiction. We have no bankrupt system in existence under the government of the United States; but there may be some lingering traces of business yet arising and undetermined, under the Bankrupt Act of the year 1800, and many questions may be expected to arise under the Bankrupt Act of 1841, which has been recently repealed. (a) In the case of Comfort Sands, (b) in the District Court of New York, it was observed, that in England, the sole power of directing the execution, and controlling the administration of the bankrupt system, in all its departments, and in every *383 stage of the proceeding, resided in the lord-chancellor. This jurisdiction of the English chancellor is not in the Court of Chancery, but in the individual who holds the great seal; and it is exercised summarily upon petition, and his judgment upon the petition is without appeal, unless the chancellor, in his discretion, allows a bill to be filed, in order to found an appeal thereon. The judge then proceeded to examine the several provisions of the Bankrupt Act of the United States of 1800, in order to show, that upon the principles of construction adopted in England, the district judge had the same jurisdiction in cases of bankruptcy as is exercised by the lord-chancellor. The same course of reasoning which sustains the jurisdiction of the one, would confer that of the other. He insisted that the jurisdiction was given, not to the District Court, but to the individual who happened to hold the office of district judge, and that, consequently, all his decisions in bankruptcy were without appeal, for appeals lie only from the appeals of the District Court. But that extraordinary doctrine has since been overruled; and it has been held, (c) that the circuit courts of the United States had (a) See infra, vol. ii. 391. (b) United States Law Journal, vol. i. p. 15. jurisdiction of matters arising under the bankrupt law, and the district courts had not exclusive jurisdiction over the entire execution of such laws. They could not remove the assignees, nor compel them to account. An appeal lay in proceedings under the Bankrupt Act from the district to the circuit courts, and the state courts had a concurrent jurisdiction in matters of account between the bankrupt and his creditors, and which has been freely and extensively exercised. (a) Territories (6.) Of the territorial court of the United States. belonging to the United States. *384 With respect to the vast territories belonging to the United States, Congress have assumed to exercise over *them supreme powers of sovereignty. Exclusive and unlimited power of legislation is given to Congress by the constitution, and sanctioned by judicial decisions. (b) Congress was, by the constitution, (c) clothed with authority "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as might, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States." The (a) See the case of Sands v. Codwise, 4 Johns. Rep. 536. In the case Ex parte Christy, 3 How. U. S. 292, it was held that the Supreme Court had no revising power over the decrees of the District Court sitting in bankruptcy, under the Act of 1841; but it had over proceedings as a court of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The District Court, when sitting in bankruptcy, has plenary power over liens and mortgages on the bankrupt's property, and summarily to decide on their validity and extent, and may operate upon the parties in the state courts by injunction, and in that way control the proceedings in the state courts. S. C. But in the case of Peck v. Jenness, Sup. Court of New Hampshire, July, 1845, it was adjudged that the Bankrupt Act of 1841, neither limited nor enlarged the jurisdiction of the state courts, and that creditors of a bankrupt may pursue their remedies in the state courts, notwithstanding their claims are debts capable of being asserted under the bankruptcy, and that mortgages and liens saved by the Bankrupt Act may be enforced in the state courts, and that the district courts cannot interfere with or control the exercise of it. See supra, 247, and infra, 411. On the other hand, in Lewis v. Fisk, 6 Robinson's Louis. R. 159, it was held that a decree of bankruptcy, under the Act of 1841, devested all jurisdiction in the state courts, and they had no authority to decide questions involving the adjustment of privileges and liens among the creditors of the bankrupt, or the distribution of the funds of the estate. All the estate of the bankrupt is, by the decree of bankruptcy, ipso facto vested in the assignee. (b) Const. art. 4, sec. 3. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters's Sup. C. Rep. 511. See, also, supra, p. 258. (c) Art. 1, sec. 8. under District of Columbia was created for that purpose, cessions from the states of Maryland and Virginia. The territorial jurisdiction of that district, known as the District of Columbia, and which embraces the city of Washington, and throws its municipal protection over all the officers and agents of the government of the United States, is extremely important. (a) The general sovereignty existing in the government of the United States over its territories, is founded on the constitution, which declared (b) that Congress "should have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territories, or other property belonging to the United States." (c) In the territories northwest of the (a) The powers of the judiciary of the District of Columbia were ably discussed and declared by Ch. J. Cranch, in the Circuit Court of that district, on the 6th of June, 1837, in the case of The United States, ex. relat. Stokes, Stockton, and Moore v. Amos Kendall, Postmaster-General of the United States, (5 Cranch, C. C. 171.) It was decided, that the court had authority to issue a mandamus to compel the defendant to credit the relators with the amount of an award made by the Solicitor of the Treasury in their favor, under an Act of Congress of July 2d, 1836. The defendant had refused to appear under a citation in that cause, and claimed exemption from all personal responsiblility, as one of the heads of the departments, to the jurisdiction of the court. The Chief Justice held that the Circuit Court of the District had all the jurisdiction that any Circuit Court of the United States could have, under the Acts of Congress of 13th February, 1801, sec. 11, and of the 27th February, 1801, c. 15, sec. 5, and it had more — it was inferior only on the Supreme Court. It had power to call before it any person found in the district, from the highest to the lowest. No officer of government in the district was too high to be reached by the process of the court. The defendant in the case could not shelter himself under the authority or command of the President. There is no law establishing a relation between the Postmaster-General and the President, or any authority in the latter to prescribe his duties, or control him in the exercise of his official functions. The Postmaster, in the exercise of his official duties, is as independent of the President as the President is of him. If the President has any power to control him, it is only through the fear of removal; and no act done under such a control would be justified. This decision was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, in January term, 1838. Kendall v. The United States, 12 Peters's S. C. Rep. 524. (b) Art. 4, sec. 3. (c) It was held, in the case of The Canal Company v. Railroad Company, (4 Gill & Johnson's Rep. 1,) by the Court of Appeals in Maryland, that Congress acted in the government of the District of Columbia and other districts, not as a local legislature, but as the legislature of the Union; and in the case of The State v. Orleans N. Company, (11 Martin's Rep. 38, 309), it was held, that the legislature of the Orleans territory could grant a charter binding on the future state of Louisiana. So, in the case of Williams v. The Bank of Michigan, (7 Wendell, 539,) the New York Court of Errors adjudged, that the power to incorporate a bank was within the scope of the river Ohio, and as separate territories were successively formed, Congress adopted and applied the principles of the ordinance of the confederation Congress of the date of the 13th of July, 1787. That ordinance was framed upon sound and enlightened maxims of civil jurisprudence. The organized territories belonging to the United States, and governed under the superintendence of Congress, at present consists of the territory of Columbia. The territories of Michigan and Arkansas were admitted into the Union as states, and upon an equality with the other states, by Acts of Congress of June 15th, 1836, and January 26th, 1837; and the territories of Iowa and Florida were admitted into the Union as states, and upon an equality with the other states, by Acts of Congress of March 3d, 1845, c. 48, and of December 28th, 1846, c. 1; and the territory of Wisconsin was admitted into the Union, on like equality, by Acts of Congress of August 6th, 1846, c. 89, and March 3d, 1847, c. 53; and the republic of Texas, by a joint resolution of Congress of March 1st, 1845, and of December 29th, 1845. * 385 *It would seem, from these various congressional regulations of the territories belonging to the United States, that Congress have supreme power in the government of them, depending on the exercise of their sound discretion. That dis general powers of terriorial legislation, conferred upon the Michigan territory by the Act of Congress of January 11th, 1805. The government of the United States, which can lawfully acquire territory by conquest or treaty, must, as an inevitable consequence, possess the power to govern it. The territories must be under the dominion and jurisdiction of the Union, or be without any government; for the territories do not, when acquired, become entitled to self-government, and they are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state. They fall under the power given to Congress by the constitution. This was the doctrine and decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of The American Ins. Company v. Canter, 1 Peters's U. S. Rep. 511; and see, also, 3 Story's Com. 193-198, 536, n. 1. In a case submitted to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in 1841, (1 Metcalf's R. 580,) it was held, that in places ceded to the United States for navy yards, arsenals, &c., and where there is no other reservation of jurisdiction to the state than that of a right to serve civil and criminal process on such lands, the persons residing there were not entitled to the benefit of the common schools of the town, nor liable to any tax assessments, nor acquired any town settlement by a residence therein, nor any elective franchise, as inhabitants of the town.1 1 Upon the exterritoriality of military sites see Opinions of Attorneys-General, vol. vi. 577. * cretion has hitherto been exercised in wisdom and good faith, and with an anxious regard for the security of the rights and privileges of the inhabitants, as defined and declared in the ordinance of July, 1787, and in the constitution of the United States. "All admit," said Chief Justice Marshall, (a) "the constitutionality of a territorial government." But neither the District of Columbia, nor a territory, is a state, within the meaning of the constitution, or entitled to claim the privileges secured to the members of the Union. This has been so adjudged by the Supreme Court. (b) Nor will a writ of error or appeal lie from a territorial court to the Supreme Court, unless there be a special statute provision for the purpose. (c) If, therefore, the government of the United States should carry into execution the project of colonizing the great valley of the Columbia or Oregon River, to the west of the Rocky Mountains, it would afford a subject of grave consideration, what *386 would be the future civil and political destiny of tnat country. It would be a long time before it would be populous enough to be created into one or more independent states; and in the mean time, upon the doctrine taught by the Acts of Congress, and even by the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court, the colonists would be in a state of the most complete subordination, and as dependent upon the will of Congress, as the people of this country would have been upon the king and parliament of Great Britain, if they could have sustained their claim to bind us in all cases whatsoever. Such a state of absolute sovereignty on the one hand, and of absolute dependence on the other, is not congenial with the free and independent spirit of our native institutions; and the establishment of distant territorial governments, ruled according to will and pleasure, would have a very natural tendency, as all proconsular governments have had, to abuse and oppression. (d) (a) 4 Wheaton, 422. (b) Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445. Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheaton, 91. (c) Clarke v. Bazadone, 1 Cranch, 212. United States v. More, 3 Ibid. 159. (d) Cicero, in his Oration for the Manilian Law, c. 14, describes, in glowing colors, the oppressions and abuses committed by Roman magistrates, exercising civil and military power in the distant provinces. |