Greek as well as English: for in Greek C. 11I. they fay, yeypapas troμar, and in English, I fhall have written, where the junction of the future and paft is manifeft from the expreffion; but the Latins have been fo lucky as to hit upon one form of the verb to exprefs it, fcripfero. The tenfe plainly expreffes a future action, and it implies another future action, with refpect to which the first future action is past, and which other future action is always expreffed in fome part of the difcourfe. Thus when I fay, I fhall have written the letter, it plainly expreffes a future action, and alfo that it is paffed with respect to fome other future action; and if I add, when he will come in, then I exprefs likewise that fecond future action. This is the beft account I am able to give of the tenfes of verbs; in which I have taken no notice of the fecond future and fecond aorift of the Greek verbs; because I agree with thofe grammarians who think that they have no fignification different from the first futures, and first aorifts, and are no more than the obfolete presents and imperfects of the old theme of the verb, which were ftill retained after the w C. 11. new theme came into use, but were used as different forms of the future and aorift; fo that they only ferve to enrich the analogy, and make the founds of this fo various part of speech, ftill more various. Neither can I admit that there is any fuch tenfe in the Greek, or any other language that I know, as what is called in the Hermes the inceptive, fuch as Mennw ypaper, or rather ypate, (for that is more commonly ufed), which is faid to be the inceptiveprefent. I know there are inceptive verbs in Latin, as there are defiderative verbs in Greek; but there is no form of any other verb that expreffes either the one or the other. For as to μenaw ypafen, it is plainly a future, as much as fcripturus fum; and the only difference that I know betwixt it and ypa is, that not only expreffes futurity, and therefore is joined with the future infinitive, but alfo very often implies deliberation, efpecially in the Attic ufe of the word. CHAP. Continuation of the fame fubject. — Authorities in fupport of the doctrine of the tenfes laid down in the preceding chapter. — Dr Clarke's fyftem upon this fubject examined. Should be forry if the reader thought C. 12. that I gave the doctrine of the Greek tenfes, laid down in the preceding chapter, for a discovery of my own. All I pretend is, to have explained more fully, I think, than has hitherto been done, what the antients have delivered upon this fubject; and particularly Theodorus Gaza, whom I reckon among the antients, though he lived as late as the fifteenth century, on account of his learning, and the elegance and accuracy of his Greek ftyle. He has left us a Greek grammar in that language, wherein he has explained fome things belonging to the art, in fo masterly a manner, that while I am reading him, I am fometimes difpofed to forget the refugee Greek, and think that it is Aristotle I am studying. C. 12. ftudying. He is fhort upon the tenses, as upon every thing elfe, and has given us little more than definitions of them, but fuch definitions as agree perfectly with my notion of them. The prefent he defines τὸ ἐνισταμενον καὶ ἀTexes; from which it appears, that being imperfect, was, according to his notion, of the effence of the prefent time. Nor does he feem to have any idea of a prefent that was aoriftical, that is, did not determine whether the action was perfect or imperfect, any more than of a prefent which was only inceptive. His definition of the præter-perfect is, τὸ παρεληλυθος ἀρτι καὶ ἐντελες τῇ ἐνεστῶτος. Here is plainly laid down the compofition which I fuppofe in this tenfe, of the present and the paft; but with this reftriction and limitation, that it must have been lately past; that is, it must have happened in a portion of time paft which connects with the prefent now, not being divided from it by any boundary or limit, which I have made to be an effential part of the fignification of this tenfe. He further fays, that it must be present as well as paft; but then it must not be going on, which is the cafe of an action expreffed by C. 12. the present tense, but it must be completed; fo that it is past, perfect, and prefent. That the meaning of this expreffion, the perfect of the prefent, is no other than that the action, though prefent, must not be imperfect or going on, but perfect and complete, is evident from the fame author's definition of the imperfect tenfe, viz. τὸ παρατεταμενον καὶ ἀτελες το παρωχημένο; by which this tenfe is diftinguifhed, firft, from the present, which is άrees, or imperfect likewife, but then it is 78 Tapers, and not waxuere, that is to fay, of the prefent, not the paft; and fecondly, it is diftinguished from the preter-perfect, by its going on, and not being present. And the names given to thofe two tenfes, agree with the definitions of them: for in Greek the preter-perfect tenfe is called Tapazeμeros, which fignifies lying befide, denoting that the action, though past, is befide or contiguous to the imperfect is called the present; and παρατατικός, extended, or going on, by which it is ef fentially distinguished from the preterperfect. Dr Clarke, in his edition of Homer, has |