difficulty in finding the spirit of the act, we had better adhere strictly to the letter." [His lordship 1805. Moss versus. MILLS nade these observations in reply to an argument from and Others Littledale, that the form in the 16th section would necessarily lead to the stating of a falsehood on the face and Another. of the certificate, by referring to a transfer made "on this day," which yet, from circumstances, must appear to be made ten days before.] LITTLEDALE. "The order of the commissioners in London bore date the 6th, but the register was not made till the 17th, and they would not alter the date of the bill of sale, though in fact it was not executed till the 17th, The court then required a second argument, and LE BLANC, J. recommended it to be stated, if possible, whether at the time of making the bill of sale in question, the register or certificate actually existed. On the second argument, THE COURT put the question in limine to HOLROYD, whether, as the indorsement was made on a register that was perfectly cancelled, he could, in a case where the law was strict, say that it was a proper indorsement? To which he could only answer that, if the indorsement could not be completed after the register was cancelled, it could never, by any means, in case of an improper register de novo, where the register was cancelled, be again properly registered; and that the officer had no power to cancel it, and should not have delivered it up till the other register was made. Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. "This is a case strictissimi juris, and these are difficulties which we cannot provide against; but we must, I repeat, be obliged to decide according to the letter of the act, where the spirit of it is so difficult to be ascertained." GROSE, J. "This indorsement has never answered to give the public notice of the transfer of the property, 1805. Moss and Others versus MILLS and it is no better than if it was done upon a blank piece of paper." LAWRENCE, J. "On the last argument it was said the cancelling of an instrument does not destroy the and Another. interest which passes by it. This is true if the interest is vested under it; but these acts require the interest to be passed by indorsement on a certain instrument. This is an indorsement on such an instrument which is cancelled, and which is null and void under the act. It is too a most unrighteous action on the part of the bankrupt." JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT. Dor dem. Wife versus JESSON. Doe on the demise of GEORGE and wife against JES SON. Where the ancestor died seised leaving a son and daughter infants, and the son, still an infant, went abroad, and there, as was found by the jury, died under age; held that the daughter, under the statute of limitations, had only 10 years after her coming of age, or 20 years after the death of the ancestor to bring an ejectment. THIS was an ejectment tried at Northampton, summer assizes, 1804, before RooKE, J. At the trial it was GEORGE and proved, that one Thomas Jesson received the rent of the premises in 1776, which was held sufficient seisin, and died in 1777. He had a son, John Jesson, who was baptized in 1767, and also a daughter, one of the lessors of the plaintiff who was baptized in 1771, both infants at the time of Thomas Jesson's death. This John Jesson went abroad in 1778, still being an infant, and never returned. The learned judge directed the jury to presume that he was dead, and to fix a period when they supposed him to die, which, with some difficulty, they fixed at between 7 and 10 years after he 1805. Doz dem. Wife versus JESSON went abroad, and not before, he then being an infant. And upon this supposition a question arose, whether the person last seised, John Jesson, dying under disability, his sister had 10 years after her coming of age or GEORGE and 20 years after his death, under the statute of limitations, in which to bring her ejectment. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, under the direction of the learned judge, in order to take the opinion of the court upon this point, and also upon another question, upou the will of Edward Jesson, the father of Thomas Jesson, wherein this land was devised to him, and whether that devise was for life or in fee. CLARK, N. G. for the defendant, obtained a rule to shew cause, in last Michaelmas term, why there should not be a new trial; and, now, cause was shewn by VAUGHAN, serjeant, who, after reading the statute 21 Jac. 1. c. 16, s. 1, 3, and 4, admitted that if the stat. rau from the time when the person died who was last seised, then the present action would be too late. And he said that the difficulty arose from the jury being pressed to say when John Jesson died. If they had found that he died within the last 10 years, which they might very well have done, then the action would be within time; for though the title of John Jesson would have accrued more than 20 years, yet he had been under a continued disability during all the time. He therefore contended that the lessor of the plaintiff had 20 years during which to bring her action, after her brother's death. Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. "It is clear the sister, though an infant, could not have 20 years after the brother's death, but only 10 years after she came of age herself. If it were not so, and an infant heir had a child at 18, and died under age, it might go on to the end of time, a new disability growing out of a former one, and the right would never be barred." LAWRENCE, J. "The right must have descended on 1805. DoE dem. Wife versus JASSON. John Jesson and then, he being an infant, his heir, who is also an infant, has 10 years after her disability is reGLORGE and moved, that is to say, after she comes of age. The lessor of the plaintiff has not claimed within 10 years, and she is now barred. In Plowden, there is a case on the statute of fines, in which great difficulty occurred from the wording of that statute; but in order to avoid the like inconvenience, the word death is omitted in a similar passage in the statute of limitations, and the time runs from the day when the title accrued." WOOD versus RULE ABSOLUTE. The court being clear on this point, the other question was not agitated. Woon against HARVEY.-January 26. Upon an order of justices, under 42 Geo. II. c. 90. s. 41; and 43 Geo. III. c. 82, s. 44, against a master to pay 51. to his servant, who was enrolled in the army of reserve, held, that after notice of the order, and 21 days elapsed, and the order confirmed upon appeal to the quarter sessions, the sum might be levied by a warrant of distress, without shewing a demand by the servant or militia man, &c. after the determination of the appeal. THIS was an action of trespass tried at Maidstone last summer assizes, before Runnington, Serj. for HARVEY. levying 51. on a warrant of distress under the militia and army of reserve acts, 42 Geo. III. c. 90, s. 41; and 43 Geo. III. c.82, s. 44; verdict for the plaintiff for 51. damages, subject to a question reserved by the learned judge, whether it was necessary to prove a demand and refusal of the money mentioned in the distress warrant; which he had been of opinion was not necessary. A rule having been obtained to shew cause why there should not be a nonsuit entered, SHEPHERD, Serjeant, and MARRYAT, for the defendant, stated that the plaintiff's servant had been drawn for the army of reserve; and by the first of the above acts," If any servant shall be enrolled as a militia man, it shall not alter his engagement with his master unless the militia is embodied;" and with respect to the settlement of disputes concerning wages, &c. it is enacted, "that where any dispute shall arise touching any sum of money due, &c. it shall be lawful for such justices, &c. to examine any such master or masters, touching the same, and to make such order as may seem fit; and in case of refusal by 21 days next after such determination, such justices may issue a warrant of distress of the same on the goods and chattels of such master or masters," &c. This provision is by the latter statute incorporated also into that act. The plaintiff's servant had been drawn for the army of reserve, and the defendant, upon complaint made to him, ordered 51. to be paid to him by the plaintiff. He appealed from this order to the sessions, and they confirmed the order, Whereupon, a warrant of distress was issued by the defendant, in which warrant the original order was stated, and also that "on the 10th day of August last," the said Thomas had notice thereof, and did not pay, &c.; but no complaint was stated to have been made to the justices subsequent to the appeal. When the appeal was determined, the servant was gone to join his regiment; and the mother of the servant, and also the constable, before he executed the warrant, demanded the money, but Wood said he would not pay them. There was no evidence that he objected to pay, because they had no authority to receive it, only that he refused to pay them; but the objection was taken at the trial, that no demand and refusal was proved after the confirming of the order by the quarter sessions; and it was therefore insisted that the warrant of distress was illegal. GARROW aud LAWES, for the plaintiff, contended, that upon the general law of the land the plaintif 1805. WOOD versus HARVEY |