1804. REX versus TRUSTEES OF LANE CHAPEL. or for what time, the court might have given the party an opportunity to try that upon an issue. And he said, "The history of the congregation explains the affidavits. The chapel, having been shut up, had lost its congregation; the trustees in whom the legal estate vested were desirous of opening it; they engaged Nicholson for a salary, for a time within which they might obtain a congregation who could elect him to hold it for a longer time. Then what passed could not be an election; for a casual meeting could not be a congregation for that purpose." RULE DISCHARGED. JALASSIO against LONGHURST.-Nov. 13. The exception in the Lords' Act, 32 Geo. II. c. 28, s. 2+, applies only to persons having taken the benefit of general insolvent acts; not to persons discharged under the Lords' Act. The former cannot have the benefit of the Lords' Act; the latter may. JALASSIO THE defendant came up to take the benefit of the Lords' LONGHURST. Act, 32 Geo. III. c. 28. ESPINASSE opposed his versus discharge, upon the ground that he had taken the benefit of an Insolvent Act before; from his answers, it appeared at first that he had been brought up and discharged under the Lords' Act before, and this ESPINASSE urged as an objection, before GROSE, J. who was then the only Judge in court. The clerk of the rules reported to the learned Judge that in the case of one Annesley Shee, it was held that the exception in the Lords' Act applied only to general insolvent acts, and of that opinion was the Judge. But, it afterwards appearing that the defendant had been discharged under a general insolvent act, COLLINS against Lord MATHEW.-Nov. 13. Nul tiel record is no plea to debt brought here, on a judgment In the court of Exchequer in Ireland. DECLARATION by original in debt, on a judgment in the court of Exchequer in Ireland. "Whereas the plaintiff heretofore, to wit, in Hilary term, 44 Geo. III. in Er relatione J. ESPINASSE. Of the case cited by Mr. Card, as above, I have the following note, which corresponds with his note. Monday, Feb. 6, 1804. Chilton v. Shee, B. R. Shee was brought up to be discharged under the Lords' Act; and on being asked whether he had been discharged before, he said he had been discharged in 1804. ABBOTT then cited the statute 32 Geo. II. c. 28, s. 21, "Provided that no person, who has already taken, or shall hereafter take, the benefit of any act for the relief of insolvent debtors, shall have or receive any benefit or advantage under this act, or be deemed to be within the meaning thereof, so as to gain any discharge, unless compelled by any creditor to discover and deliver up his or her estate and effects." ESPINASSE, Contra, said, that, in Michaelmas term, he had taken a similar objection, before LAWRENCE, J. who overruled it, and said, that it applied only to persons discharged under that or any similar act, but not to any general insolvent act.' But by GROSE, J. "That cannot be the construction; the Words are very clear. The MASTER then shewed him a case, in which he had ruled as was contended for by ABBOTT.” The prisoner was therefore remanded. versus Lord MATHEW 1804. COLLINS versus Lord MATHEW. the court of our said lord the king, of Exchequer, then and there, holden, before the barons of our said lord the king, of his said Exchequer, at Dublin in Ireland, by the consideration of the said court, recovered against the said Francis Lord Viscount Mathew, as well a certain debt of-1. sterling money, being Irish currency, as 50s. 2d. being of the currency aforesaid, which were then and there adjudged to the said plaintiff with his assent, as well for his damages which he had sustained on occasion of detaining that debt, as for his costs and charges, &c. whereof the said Francis Lord Viscount Mathew is convicted; as by the record and proceedings thereof, remaining in the said court of our said lord the king of his Exchequer, at Dublin in Ireland aforesaid, more fully appears, to wit, at Westminster; which said judgment still remains, in the same court, at Dublin, in Ireland, in its full force, &c. whereby an action hath accrued, &c." PLEA. "That there is no such record of the said supposed judgment, in the said declaration mentioned, remaining in his said majesty's court of Exchequer, at Dublin, in Ireland, aforesaid as &c. and this he the defendant is ready to verify, wherefore, &c." Demurrer, with causes, that the plea of nul tiel record is not pleadable to an action of debt on a foreign judgment, or, if pleadable at all, it ought to have concluded to the country, and not with a verification, &c. Joinder in demurrer, &c. WOOD, for the plaintiff, cited Walker v. Whitter,† in which the plea of nul tiel record to an action on a foreign judgment was held bad. This was, he said, as a foreign judgment; for the House of Lords cannot have up this judgment by certiorari; neither can this court have the inspection of the record; it can only be proved as matter in pais by an examined copy. *There was no place previously mentioned in the copy from which this was taken, except Middlesex, in the margin. + Doug. I. LAWES, for the defendant. "This, since the Union, is matter of record, and not matter in pais; it is a record of one of his majesty's superior courts. And this plea is well concluded with a verification, for the party here selects a particular fact on which he relies. This is like debt on escape, where the judgment is one of the necessary facts, and the want of a record may be taken advantage of upon nil debet, yet nul tiel record may also be pleaded to it." Lord ELLEN BOROUGH, C. J. "It is true, this is, in fact, matter of record, but it is not in the power of the court to have it proved by inspection of the record in the usual way; we cannot obtain it by mittimus, or any other process; it is, therefore, to be proved only by an examined copy, as matter in pais; and there not being any new matter introduced in the plea, nor even the se-lection of a particular fact, this being the single fact alleged as a ground for the action, the plea should have concluded to the country. But whether that be so or not, aul tiel record cannot be pleaded to this judgment." GROSE, J. "I thought this was a sham plea." LAWRENCE, J. and LE BLANC, assented. JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 1804. COLLINS versus Lord MATHEW. DAY-RULES-Nov. 13. Where an attorney, a prisoner, applies for day-rules, in order to transact business in causes commenced before his confine. ment, he should state in his affidavit what causes. COMYN having applied, on the behalf of an attorney, Dax-aulas. a-prisoner, for additional day-rules, in order to trans 1804. DAY-RULES. act some business in certain causes in which he was concerned before his confinement, the court granted thei reluctantly, and said, that if he applied again, he should state in what causes, specifically, he was concerned. WOOLNOTH against MEADOWs.-Nov. 13. Declaration that the defendant, maliciously intending to subject the plaintiff to the penalties against persons guilty of the horrible and detestable crime of, &c. said of the plaintiff, that "his character was infamous; he would be a disgrace to any society; if he was inrolled in the Royal Society, he would cause his name to be erased; delicacy forbade him to make a direct charge, but it was a male child of nine years, that complained to him;" meaning that a male child of nine years old had complained of an unnatural crime committed by the plaintiff upon such child; with an averment that the defendant uttered the words with intent to convey, and they were by the persons to whom, &c. understood to mean that the plaintiff had committed that horrible crime of, &c. Held sufficient, without a colloquium more fully explanatory; for the words are sufficiently plain without an innuendo. WOOLNOTH THE declaration, after the usual introduction in case versus MAADOWS. for slander, stated, that the defendant had been proposed as a volunteer, at a certain society called the Society of Engravers, at the time of speaking the said words, assembled for the purpose of forming a corps of volunteers, to wit, at, &c. yet contriving, &c. to subject the plaintiff to the pains and penalties, &c. and to cause it to be believed that the plaintiff was a person of unnatural passions and propensities, and guilty of the crime aforesaid, &c. on, &c. at, &c. in a discourse with the said. certain person, then and there being members of the |