CALIFORNIA LAND MATTERS.-There is no subject in the internal policy of our State, which at this time attracts so much attention as the land question. Every day this matter becomes of more importance, and no other is of such paramount interest to the people of the State at large. ment and satisfactory adjustment of many of these disputes. During his stay on this side, Commissioner Williamson, in conpany with Surveyor-General Wagner, visited a considerable portion of Southern California, extend. ing their trip into Arizona. Another important matter in connection with General Wagner's visit to Washington is the alleged necessity for an increased appropriation by Congress commensurate with the rapid in The appro. So important has the question of land matters become, that the Secretary of the Interior some two months since dispatched the head of the Land Bureau in his Department, crease of field and office work. Commissioner J. A. Williamson, to this State priation for this purpose made by Congress is to examine personally into disputed cases, said to fall far short of covering the actual which required to be investigated on the spot. expenditures arising out of the increased deCommissioner Williamson returned to Wash-mands of the service here. Work of the utmost importance, and of the most urgent ington two weeks since. necessity, for want of the necessary appro. pration of funds necessarily remains undone, or is subject to long delay, working hardship and unnecessary expense to parties most directly interested. Call Jan. 1st Another drawback, and dead-lock in expediting the land business of this State has been the insufficiency of the appropriation made by the last Congress, for the making of surveys of the public lands of this State and the performance of the necessary clerical work in the office of the Surveyor General. When the present incumbent succeeded the late Gen. Ames who died some months since, he found himself, so hampered from this cause as to be unable to meet the increased demand for surveys for which the parties directly interested were loudly clamoring. It will be seen from the following editorial which we copy from the Morning Call of Dec. 4th, that Gen. Wagner who left for Washington on Monday, goes to the National Capital with special reference to this matter; and it is to be hoped that for the good of all parties interested his efforts may be crowned with success. WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT AS A LAWYER profession of the law has been generally un-Mr. Bryant's early abandoument of the derstood as the result of a conviction of his unfitness for it, rather than from any positive failure in it. His work as a lawyer extended from 1815 to 1825, and he attained a throughly respectable position before thə courts. the Boston Advertiser some account of a ɔase But George S. Hillard contributes to which Bryant lost in 1823 entirely through a legal error. It was a case of verbal slander. Bloss, storekeeper in Alford, Berkshire county. had had his store burned down under suspicious circumstances, and there was a THE U. S. SURVEYOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE. good deal of uncharitable gossip about it. United States Surveyor-General Wagner One of the villagers, named Toby, was sued has just left for Washington on businss by Bloss for slander in using the phrases (as connected with his office. The numer-stated in the declaration, which was drawn ous and varied questions arising from up by Mr. Bryant), "He burnt it," and the disposition of the public domain of "There is no doubt in my mind that he burnt this State require the closest scrutiny it himself; he would not have got his goods and most serious attention of the land insured if he had not meant to burn it." The authorities at Washington. In this connec- case was tried upon the general issue, and the tion, the recent protracted visit of the Com- verdict was returned for the plaintiff with missioner of this Department to this portion $500 damages. An arrest of judgment was of the Pacific Coast was most opportune, and asked for at the September term of the Sumay result in much good in the final settle-preme Court for 1823, on the ground that the SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN. Hon. J. V. CAMPBELL, Chief Justice. Associate Justices. FOSTER vs. SCRIPPS. NEWSPAPER LIBEL - PUBLIC OFFICERS- language set forth iu the declaration did not charge any criminal offencc. Mr. Bryant presented, in support of the declaration, a written argument which was, says Mr. Hillard, "learned and elaborate, and showed a power of legsl reasoning of no common order." But unfortunately, Chief Justice Parker, while expressing his regret, was obliged to show that the law and the facts were against Bryant. Toby's remark about Bloss, as quoted in the declaration, only accused him of burning his own store, which is not in itself a criminal offence. The allusion to the insur- paper is never exempt from liability where other pubance of his goods did not help the matter, as there was no averment or postive statement that there were goods burned or insured. And the arrest of judgment was granted. It does not seem at all unlikely that this mortifying failure had much to do with Bryant's change of residence and work. 1. LIBEL NEWSPAPER NOT PRIVILEGED.-A news lications of libel would not be excused. 2. ATTACKS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS.-Persons in public employment are subjoct to the fullest criticism for their conduct in which the public is interested, but are not to be falsely traduced. 3. NON-ELECTIVE OFFICER ONLY COMPLAINT ΤΟ PROPER AUTHORITIES PRIVILEGED.—Where an officer is not elected by the public but appointed by the municipal government, e. g., a city or district physician Bulletin Jan. 7th 1879. no libel against him is privileged except a bona fide representation made without malice to the proper authority complaining on reasonable grounds. Supreme Court Record. NOVEMBER TERM, 1878. CASES CONTINUED. Jany. 4. No. 10.390-People vs. HicksOrdered on calendar for January term-on motion of Tyler for appt. WRIT OF REVIEW. 4. LIBEL AGAINST CITY PHYSICIAN.- A newspaper article charging a city physician with causing the death of a patient by introducing scarlet fever into his system during vaccination, is libelous and not privileged. This was an action of libel brought against the proprietor of the Detroit Evening News, for publishing in that paper an article charging plaintiff with causing the death of an infant child, by introducing scarlet fever into its system during the operation of vaccination, which operation was alleged to have been CAMPBELL, C. J., after stating the facts of the case, said: No. 6402-McCloud vs. the County Court of Stanislaus County, E. F. Stone, Judge of said Court. Upon reading the sworn petition and affidavit of the above named petitioner, and it manifestly appearing therefrom to us that the above named respondents have ex-performed by the use of the trochar. The ceeded their jurisdiction in passing judgment case was tried in the Superior Court of Deupon the above named petitioner, as in his troit, and there the utterance was held to be sworn petition alleged, and that the proceedings of the County Court of Stanislaus county, privileged because plaintiff was a city phyState of California, and the Judge thereof sician. ought to be reviewed; it is ordered that the writ of review do issue from the office of the Clerk of this Court, directed to said County Court of Stanislaus county, State of California, and to E. F. Stone, Judge of said County Court, and to J. W. McCarthy, Clerk of said Court, commanding them that they do certify, under seal of said Conrt, all the proceedings had and done in the case of the People of the State of California vs. J. F. McCloud, as fully as the same ramains before said Court, to be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of California, upon the 21st day of January, A. D. 1879, and in the meanwhile all proceedings to be stayed. That the article, if not privileged, was libelous is beyond question. The authorities on the non-actionable character of spoken words have no necessary bearing on the character of written or printed libels. The doctrine is elementary that written articles which in any way tend to bring ridicule, contempt, or censure on a person are libelous, and are actionable unless true or privileged. This article not only traced the death of one person and the sickness of another to plaintiff, but laid the blame on his willful misconduct upon sordid motives. It was not claimed on the trial, and the plea disclaims the truth of the principal charge that the trochar was used-whether its use was or was not im proper. there is no reason, for holding any libel privileged except a bona fide representation made without malice to the proper authority, complaining on reasonable grounds. The case of Purcell vs. Sowles, 1 C. P. D. 781, affirmed on appeal, 2 Č. P. D. 215, is a case as nearly like the present one as is often found; and, while the court of appeal--on this point differing from the lower court- held the office of public physician gave the public an inter We are, therefore, not required to discuss the someweat extraordinary proposition that the city Roard of Health are authorized to determine ex cathedra the methods of med-est in having it properly lled, it was held no ical treatment. The question is simply whether such false and damaging charges as have a necessary tendency to ruin the reputation and business of a medical man, may be made without responsibility to legal redress, simply because he happens to be a city physician. discussion or publication was privileged of facts charged against him, except when made in the course of a lawful proceeding against him. The good sense of such a rule can hardly be doubted. Every man's reputation is as sacred as his property. He can not complain It is not and cannot be claimed that there when the truth is told. But he can always is any privilege in journalism which would complain of falsehoods, which are not told in excuse a newspaper when any other publica- an honest attempt to make him responsible tion of libels would not be excused. What- to a proper tribunal, or in some other perever functions the journalist performs are as-formance of duty. The publication in such sumed and laid down at his will, and performed under the same responsibility attaching to all other persons. The greater extent of circulation makes his libels more damag-tidote. ing, and imposes special duties as to care to prevent the risk of such mischief, proportioned to the peril. But whatever may be the measure of damages, there is no difference | in liability to suit. cases put him in a direct way of having the truth established, and the wrong can not actually be done without furnishing its an If a medical officer is charged in the public press with professional misconduct, the immediate and necessary effect is to destroy confidence in him, and prevent him from gaining a livelihood by his profession. The Allowing the most liberal rule as to the readers of the paper have no means of invesliability of persons in public employment to tigation, and may never have. The charge criticism for their conduct in which the pub- may never reach an investigation, and he lic are interested, there certainly has never may have no means of compelling one. If he been any rule which subjected persons pub-is obliged to put up with such a wrong, the lic or private to be falsely traduced. The consequence will be monstrous. The law nearest approach to this license is where the can not recognize any such immunity from person vilified presents himself before the responsibility, nor can the rights of individ body of the public as a candidate for an elec-uals be so trifled with. tive office, or addresses the public in open The case of Dickson vs. Hilliard, L. R. 9 public meetings for public purposes. But Ex. Ch. 79, sums up the cases of privileges even in such cases we shall not find support very neatly and briefly. In that case, withfor any doctrine which will subject him out contemplating any petition, or any other without remedy to every species of malev- method of examining into the facts, two days olent attack. after an election, the agent of one of the candidates sent to an agent of the other a document charging plaintiff with bribery. This was held not privileged; and the court, in deciding the point, mentioned the various de But where a person occupies an office like that of a city or district physician, not elected by the public, but appointed by the council, we have found no authority, and we think cisions of privileged communications outside of those which were never questioned, and puts them in three classes. The first includes such cases as Harrison vs. Bush, 5 El. & B. 344, where a bona fide attempt was made to INSURANCE POLICIES. Contributed to the Leyal Record BY C. M. DUNBAR, OF IOWA: Author of PAROL WAIVER OF CONDITIONS IN INSURANCE POLICIES BY AGENTS.-CONSIDERATION. have a magistrate removed from office by ap- "Suits by and against Foreign Corporations." pealing to a person in authority. It was claimed that the application should have been made to the Chancellor instead of to a Secretary of State, but held that, as the Queen herself was the acting power, a communication made to either officer was in effect made to her, and privileged if made in good faith to redress a grievance. The second class included communications like those made by military officers to courts of inquiry, or to the proper authority, to aid in the prosecution of such inquiry. Dawkins vs. Lord Rokeby, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255, affirmed, 7 H. L. 744; 2 Cent. L. J. 491, was such a case. The third class included those cases in which information was given by one who was under a legal or moral duty to give it to another who had a right to ask it. The most familiar instance of this is in the answering inquiries concerning servants. Rut, as it was very well pointed out, there was no right to make untrue and injurious statements concerning others, when they are not made to persons having the right and power to investigate, and in an honest attempt to invoke said investigation or answer such inquiry. In our opinion the libel in the present case was not privileged, and the plaintiff was improperly deprived of his remedy. No particular form is necessary in an insurance policy, provided however that its scope and meaning import an insurance. The contract usually sets forth the names of the parties, the insured, and the names of the president, and secretary of the corporation, or the name of the individual insuring, a con sideration paid by the insured, a description of the subject of the insurance, the risk against which the policy is issued, the term during which the insurance is to continue, the amount of indemnity to be paid in case of loss, the conditions as to the use of the property insured by the insurer, and the conditions to be fulfilled by the insured after loss, in case of loss to properly fix the liability on the insurer. Frequently some of those conditions are set forth in the application for insurance, while the others are embodied in the policy, but together with the policy they are one sole contract. The same rules of construction which are used in construing other contracts, govern in the construction of a policy of insurance. Custom has ever been of considerable weight in their interpretation, they being purely commercial contracts. And, yet, they are to be construed according to the sense and The judgment must be reversed with costs, meaning of the terms used. Nowhere are and a new trial granted. Marston, and Graves, J. J., concurred. Cooley, J., concurred upon the facts of this particular case. SELECT SOCIETY.-"No, your Honor," said an old offender at the bar of justice, "don't send me back to Sing Sing again. With the Insurance Presidents and Savings Bank Cashiers and such, its society is getting too exclusive for me. A fellow like me can't find nobody in his own set to associate with but the keepers."-Albany Times. courts disposed to admit parol testimony to explain or control them. The whole contract must be read and construed together, and clauses in which inconsistencies appear must receive such an interpretation and construction as will not conflict with the main object in view. The rule, that a contract must be construed so as to give effect, if possible, to all its parts, must be, and generally is, applied by the courts in construing a policy of insurance. And yet as the insurers have power to choose their own words and phrases, and to insert all conditions and provisos, not only necessary to protect themselves against fraud, but appearing in many instances to relieve them almost entirely from liability, it is just and proper that the courts construe the language actually used most strongly against them. The contract of insnrance, at the present time, is not generally made directly between the parties to the contract, but through the intervention of an agent. Now for a more lucid understanding of the points that I am about to call the readers attention to hereafter, I will give in as brief a manner as I possibly can, the powers and duties of these same agents. His authority is determined, not by private instructions from his principle, but either by the instructions actually communicated, or by the nature of the business iutrusted to the agent to do, and of the situation in which he is placed. For example, if he be intrusted with the execution of certain business he impliedly and actually has authority to do every thing necessary to that end. Verbal notice to an agent is enough as to matters occurring after the insurance has been effected, unless a written notice is required by the contract. They are frequently clothed with authority to fix rates of premiums, to give consent to an increase of risks, and changes in the occupation of buildings, and to exercise supervision over the property covered by the policies issued at his agency; and when so authorized, and in the absence of any limitation on his authority known to the assured, has power to dispose with conditions and waive forfeitures arising from a breach of any of the conditions set forth in the policy issued by him. Agents of insurance companies owe duties to the principals by whom they are employed, and to the parties seeking to effect through them policies of insurance on their property. The agent must use care in the selection of risks; must fix a remunerative rate of premiums; must advise his employers of any changes in the risk and be prepared to advise them on all matters pertaining thereto. It is his duty to serve his principal only. He cannot have an interest adverse to that of his principal. He cannot act as agent of both parties. If he applies for insurance on his own property, as to that property he is not an agent of the company. The foregoing are principal amongst the duties of an agent the breach of which would give to his principal a right of legal redress. The foregoing being necessary to fully elucidate the principles hereinafter enunciated, I will now proceed to consider: 1st The waiver of conditions in insurance policies. 2d In what form the said waiver is necessary to be. 3d What will amount to a waiver. 4th Should said waiver be founded on a new consideration. 5th Power of agent to waive forfeiture. I. At the present time it is a common practice for insurance companies to insert in their policies a stipulation, to the effect, that if any change of the premises insured is made, and with the consent of the insured, which increases the risk, then the policy shall be void. Under a policy containing such a stipulation, the insured must studiously abstain from any alteration in the building, or its use, or the discontinuing of any precautions which he may have taken in protecting the property from loss at the time of the issuance of the policy. But yet, (the cases of Lee vs. Howard Ins. Co.) 3 Gray 583. Murphy vs. People & c Ins. Co. 7 id 239, 3 Hill 509, 4 Bing N. C. 484, et alias to the contrary notwithstanding, and which is unnecessary to further notice in connection with this.) Although the condition stipu lates that upon a breach thereof the policy shall be void, its legal effect is to render it voidable only, and that at the election of the insurers. If the insurers would not avoid the policy the assured or his assignees could not, even after the breach of the conditions, treat it as void. It will readily be seen, following this proposition, that the insurers have the right of waiver, and can waive the forfeiture and continue the policy in force. David vs. Hartford Ins. Co. 13 Iowa 69. 22 N. Y. 202. 35 N. H. 328, 16 Pet. 495. 1 Denio 516. 12 Iowa 126. 5 Denio 154. 5 Cushing 273. II. It is usual with insurance companies issuing policies, especially on city business property, that in case of an increase of risk, by the insured, the written consent of the |