See Cun- ing Press Co. vs. Lowell, -For the term, by plaintiff claims, is not good law. This cause being tried without the intervention of a jury, after an exhaustive review, among other matters the Court found that "Johnson did not at any time have possession, in good faith, of any portion of said premises, but the same were held by Redman in his life-time, by his estate after his death, and by Maclay to his own use, and for his own benefit, and not for the use or as the agent in any way of Johnson." APPEALS DISMISSED. Feb. 4. No. 6203-Floyd et al. vs. Lick et al. Without prejudice,-On motion of Cohen of Cunsel for Respondent. Feb. 5. No. 6460-Gold Bar Mining Co. vs. Mammoth Bar Gold Mining Co.-Oo motion of J. K. Byrne for Respondent. Feb. 6. No. 6464-Cushing et al. vs. Hooper et al.---On motion of Meredith for Appellant. Feb. 12. No. 6476---North Beach and Mission, R. R. Co. vs. City R. R. Co.,-On motion of E. B. Drake for Respondent REHEARING. Feb. 5. No. 6098-Wells vs. Harter et al. "Judgment being accordingly rendered for Petition for, and stay granted,-On motion defendant, plaintiff appealed." J. P. Dameron and A. H. Townsend, attorneys for plaintiffs and appellants. Moore, Laine, & Leib, attorneys for defendants and respondents. of Lawrence for appellant. Feb. 7. No. 5605-Black vs. SpraguePetition for, and stay granted, -On motion of Laine for appellant. No. 4988-Winter vs. Belmont Mining Co. -Petition for, and stay granted,—On motion “Judgment and order affirmed. Remittitur of Holladay for Respondent. forthwith." [NOTE. We learn from one of the counsel in the case that the point on which the deci sion of the Supreme Court mainly turned was that the Mexican grantee, under whom plaintiff claims, was never in actual possession of the land.-Ed. LEGAL RECORD.] Supreme Court Record. JANUARY TERM, 1879. (For the 2 weeks ending Feb. 15. 1879.) CASES DECIDED. Feb. 3. No. 6415-Burke vs. Twelfth District Court, and Daingerfield Judge. Application denied and Petition dismissedNo opinion-Reported this week. Feb. 5. No. 6453-Wells Fargo & Co. vs. Coleman et al., Bank Commissioners--Order affirmed-Opinion-Reported. Feb. 6. No. 5910-Brown vs. Murray et al.-Affirmed-No opinion-Reported. Feb. 12. No. 6133--Dameron et al. vs. Davis et al.-Affirmed-No opinion-Reported this week. CASES CONTINUED. Feb. 7. No. 5833-Stewart vs. Tipton et al.-For the term, by stipulation. Feb. 14. No. 5534-Chicago Taylor Print HABEAS CORPUS. Feb. 5.-Ex Parte Isadore Isaacs--Writ denied. WRIT OF MANDATE. Feb, 3. No. 6463-Bacon vs. Thirteenth District Court, Campbell Judge--Writ ordered, returnable before this Court Friday Febuary 28th 1879 at 11 A. M. Feb. 12. No. 6473-Laura De Force Gordon vs. Hoge et al., Directors of the Hastings Law College-Application for writ denied. SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY. Feb. 6. No. 6141-La Societe Francaise etc. vs. Beard et al.-Substitution ordered. ADMITTED TO PRACTICE. Feb. 4. Frank M. Clough,-On motion of W. H. Levy, and license from Supreme Court of Nevada. Wm. O. Minor-On motion of Arthur Rodgers, and license from Circuit Court of Missouri. Feb. 6. Matter of John C. Burch-It Appearing by affiadvit and presentation of license that he was admitted on March 10th 1857 but no entry on the minutes,-Ordered entered nunc pro tunc-a full admission as of that date. Robert W. Pearson-On motion of R. B. Saffold, and license from Mass. M. John Eagan,-On motion of George L. Woods, and license from Colorado. Feb. 7. M. J. Saffold-On motion of H. I. Thornton, and proof of license from Alabama claims, amounting in the aggregate to $21, Feb. 11. In the matter of John Reynolds -It appearing by affidavit and the presentation of license that he was admitted to practice on Dec. 5th 1853, but no entry on the minutes, ordered entered nunc pro tunc a full admission as of that date. U.S. Circuit Court. (DISTRICT OF OREGON.) ACTION TO RECOVER MONEY. (1.) TITLE OF AN ACT.-The subject of an act is expressed in the title thereof, although the provisions in the act concerning the subject may be different from what may be inferred from or suggested by such title. (2.) ATTACHMENTS.---A provision in an act concerning the dissolution of attachments is a matter properly connected with the "subject" of disposing of an insolvent debtor's property. (3.) TITLE AND BODY OF ACT.--Where the title of an act states that it is to provide a just disposition of an insolvent debtor's property, it cannot be maintained that the "subject" of the act is not expressed in the title because the disposition of such property provided for in the body of the act, is in the opinion of the Court not just. (4.) REPEAL BY IMPLICATION.-A repeal by implication is as much within the purview of § 22 of Art. IV. of the Constitution of Oregon, and the mischief intended to be prevented by it, as an amendment in terms; but it appearing that the Supreme Court of the State has decided otherwise, this Court follows such decision. DEADY, J. This action is brought by the plaintiff, a citizen of California, against the defendant to recover the sum of $7,967 93, the balance due upon certain goods, wares and merchandise theretofore sold and delivered to him. On December 23, 1878, the defendant sued out an attachment upon which the marshal took the defendant's stock in trade into his possession. The defendant now moves to dissolve the attachment upon the ground that on December 30, 1878, he made an assignment of all his property, of the value of $12,979 55, to an assignee for the benefit of all his creditors, in proportion to the amount of their several 338 52, in accordance with the provisions of the act entitled "An act to secure creditors a just division of the estates of debtors who convey to assignees for the benefit of creditors," approved October 18, 1878; and, that on January 7, 1879, the assignee aforesaid demanded of the marshal the property taken on said attachment, which he refused to surrender. This act (Ses. Laws, 1878, p. 30), provides that no general assignment for the benefit of creditors shall be valid unless made for the benefit of all the creditors pro rata; and, that "such assignment shall have the effect to discharge any and all attachments, on which judgment shall not have been taken at the date of such assignment." It may be remarked in passing, that judgments are not taken on attachments but are given in cctions wherein attachments may be or have been issued. 66 By § 933 of the R. S. an attachment of property in the national courts to satisfy any judgment that may be recovered therein, "shall be dissolved when any contingency occurs by which, according to the laws of the State where said Court is held, such attachment would be dissolved upon like process in the Courts of the State. Upon this section counsel for the plaintiff admits that if the act of October 18, 1878, aforesaid, is valid, this motion must prevail, but maintains that this act is unconstitutional and void because: (1) It was passed in contravention of § 20 of Art. IV. of the constitution -the subject thereof not being expressed in the title; and (2) It was passed in contravention of § 22 of said article-certain sections of the code on the subject of attachments being thereby amended withont being set forth and published at full length. void. But I think the dissolution of attachments is certainly a "matter properly connected" with the "subject" of the distribution of an insolvent debtor's property—particularly in a country where such property may be liable to attachment at the suit of a creditor-and therefore need not be otherwise expressed in the title. which may have been made in the meantime, the body of the act, and therefore it is so far or at any time, for the very purpose of preventing a just distribution of the property in full force. Upon these judgments executions may issue and be levied upon all the property of the debtor, and leave nothing for the assignment to operate on-its only effect in such cases being, to dissolve the attachment for the benefit of creditors who have, with the assistance of the debtor, obtained judgments by confession. Besides, it provides that the assignment shall not pass any property not mentioned in the inventory, thus leaving such property liable to be taken on attachment by any creditor after the assignment. The effect of this is practically to invite and legalize a partial and fraudulent compliance with the act itself. As to the second objection: § 22 aforesaid provides that No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or section amended shall be set forth and published at full length." In answer to this objection counsel for the dedendant insist : (1), that the act in question does not amend any existing act; and, (2) that if it does, it is only by implication, and Evidently the object of the act was to pro- such an amendment is not within the purhibit insolvent debtors from preferring one view of this provision of the constitution as creditor te another, and so far it is not obnox construed by the Supreme Court of the State; ious to the charge that its subject is not ex-citing, Fleishner v. Chadwick, 5 Or. 153; pressed in its title. But it must be admitted Grant Co. v. Sells, Id. 243; Hurst v. Hawn, that in practice it will not accomplish such purpose. and that most probably it will operate as counsel contend-to secure an unequal and therefore an unjust distribution of a debtor's property. But I do not think that a Court can say that the "subject of an act is not expressed in its title because it may appear that owing to unintentional errors and imperfections in its composition, its practical operation may be somewhat or altogether different from what was expressed or intended. What constitutes a just distribution of a debtor's property is a subject about which a variety of opinions may be entertained, and as to which there is no absolute or fixed standard to which we may refer as authority. The "subject" of this act is the distribution of an insolvent debtor's property among his creditors, in a certain contingency, and beyond a doubt so much is expressed in the title. It also purports that such distribution is just that is, according to the understanding of the Legislative Assembly, which I do not think is subject to judicial review. It is also urged against the act under this head that the "subject of attachments is not expressed in the title, though embraced in Id. 279. It I think the act does amend the code as to the effect and discharge of attachments. is not merely cumulative, as was the case in The State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 59, cited by counsel for defendant. It changes, limits, and restrains the operation of § 142 of the Code so that the property taken on an attachment is no longer held as an absolute "security for the satisfaction of such judgment" as the plaintiff may obtain, but only upon condition the defendant in the meantime does not make an assignment, which he is almost certain to do, unless he is in collusion or friendly co-operation with the attaching creditor. The same is true of § 159. In effect this section by a reference to §§ 128-9, provides that an attachment shall not be discharged or dissolved unless it satisfactorily appears that there was not sufficient cause for its allowance-that it was issued wrongfully. But this act provides that it shall be discharged if the debtor makes an assignment before judgment. In short the provisions of the Code in relation to the effect of an attachment upon property taken thereon as security for a judgment and the dissolution thereof prior to judgment and the provisions of the act cannot co-exist. The application of one to the subject necessarily excludes the other. They are plainly repugnant to one another. The provisions of the Code are by this act rendered null and of no effect whenever the defendant wills it to be so. "amend" without qualification or limitation, and thereby includes both modes of amend. ment or repeal, and one just as much as the other. As I read it, the constitution does not contemplate any such immaterial distinction as amendments in terms and by implication. In effect it says that an amendment of a statute shall not be valid unless the section amended is set forth and published at length. The evil intended to be prevented by this section of the constitution is a very serious one, and unless amendments by implication, which are more mischievous than those in terms, are held to be within its purview, the provision is practically nullified. The average legislator will never take the Upon the question of whether the act was passed contrary to section 20 aforesaid, counsel for the plaintiff insist that the provisions of the Supreme Court of the State cited from (5 Or., supra) are not in point; that they only decide that a statute may be repealed by implication, but not that it may be so amend ed. But in Crant Co. v. Sells, which is the case most relied on, while the Court speaks of a repeal by implication, and not an amend-risk or trouble of amending a statute by ment, the facts of the case, by the light of which the language of the Court is always to be read, show that it was the case of an amendment of a section and not the repeal of a statute. In Portland v. Stock, 2 Or., 70, and Doland v. Bernard, 5 Or., 391, the Court held the amending act void. But in each of these cases the act purported to be an amendatory one. Yet in Portland v. Stock no weight is attached to that fact, and the supposed difference between repeals in terms and by implication is not even noticed. Neither is any significance attached to the fact in Dolan v. Bernard, where the act under consideration is said to be "not only amendatory in terms," but so "in its nature and effect." name when he can avoid both by doing it by implication without professing to do so. But while I have felt at liberty to throw out these suggestions on the subject, my duty is to follow the ruling of the Supreme Court of the State upon a question involving the construction of the constitution of the State. And while there may be some ground for the argument that as the last case on this subject decided by the Supreme Court-Dolan v. Barnard, supra-ignores the distinction between repeals in terms and by implication, yet I think that that being a case in which the act purported to be amendatory, 1 am not at liberty to assume that the case of Grant County v. Sells, supra, is thereby overruled, and must therefore hold upon the authority of that decision that this act is valid. This being so, the attachment is dissolved; and it is so ordered. John J. Whalley and M. W. Fechheimer, for the plaintiff. Joseph N. Dolph and Raleigh Stott, for the defendant. For myself, I have a decided conviction upon the question: I agree heartily with the able dissenting opinion of Ch. J. Bonham in Grant Co. v. Sells, and especially when he says:- "It is, in my judgment, wholly immaterial whether the act is eo nomine amendatory or not; the evil against which the constitutional provision was directed, is amendments which are such in effect, and is not limited to those which are so named in the WOMEN SUFFRAGE-The Salinas Index of title or preamble to the act. Febuary 6th is responsible for the following: It is said that the constitution is silent-One of the Delegates in the Constitutional upon the subject of implied repeals. But it Convention objected to woman suffrage on is no more silent upon that subject than upon the ground that "women would not fight." repeals in terms. The fact is, it speaks spe- If that delegate would call upon some women cifically of neither, but uses the term we know of, he would discover his mistake. When the mortgagee admits in his complaint that he has been in possession it is a confession that he has received the rents and profits, and ought to account for the same to be applied to extinguish the mortgage debt. And it is proper for the Court to appoint a referee to take such account and determine the amount of such rents and profits; and such findings, unless manifestly erroneous, should be accepted by the Court. An administrator holds possession of the property of his decedent as a trustee for the benefit of the creditors and heirs. The decree of the Court below will affirmed with costs. Opinion by Boise, J. (January 28, 1879.) STATE OF OREGON, respondent, VS. ARCHIE BROWN, appellant. SYLLABUS. be In this case the Court held ;1st. In the commission or attempt to commit the crime of robbery, it is not necessary to allege in the indictment that the prisoner purposely killed the deceased. 2d. In this case the prisoner being pursued having in his possession the goods which he had robbed from O'Shea, fired a pistol at one Sprague, an officer, which missed him and killed one Josephs, the prisoner is as guilty as though he had killed the officer at whom he fired. The crime of robbery is so far completed as to render the robber liable to conviction of robbery when he has seized the property from the possession of the owner, but is not fully consummated until the property is removed to the complete dominion of the robber. That is, the asportation of the property is a part of the crime, and said asportation continues until the property is secured in the possession of the prisoner, or he makes a rest in the asportation, or lays down, or abandons the property. Judgment affirmed. State of Oregon, respondent, vs. James Johnson, appellant. The prisoner being present assisting Brown who fred the shot that killed Josephs he is as guilty as Brown who fired the fatal shot. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by Kelly, C. J. SUPERIOR COURT OF CINCINNATI, (February 12th 1879.) LIBEL The right of Newspapers to comment upon the acts of Public Men and Measures. This case came up on demurrer to the second and third plea of the defendanth to the petition of the plaintiff seeking to recover damages for words alleged to have been maliciously published of the plaintiff by defendant. The second plea was that of privilege, and the third of justification. The Court, in disposing of the case said that, to the demurrer, the third plea is a single plea to the entire petition, and hence this being one plea to the entire petition if there is any good cause of action in any part of the petition, the plea is not a good plea. It being a unit it must be a good answer to the entire petition or else it fails, that is, it fails as a plea to the action. Now among the various things charged in the matters alleged to be libelous is the charge of theft. It is undoubtedly true, as claimed by counsel, where one calls another a thief the accompanying words may explain the way in which that term is used, so as to make it a mere term of general abuse, and |