BILLS AND NOTES-Continued.

The insertion in a promissory note of a direction to
send notice of non-payment to a specified place does
not render the note non-negotiable. (C. P.) Freedley
v. Watts, 269.

When the payee's indorsement appears in regular
order, any indorser will be held responsible to subse-
quent holders, unless there is actual notice that such
payee's name was written after the other indorsement.
(C. P.) Warren v. Thompson, 175.

Where the plaintiff claims title to negotiable paper
through an indorsement not in the usual form, he
must establish his title by evidence before he will be
entitled to judgment. Prahl v. Smaltz, 571.

Simple failure of consideration between the maker
and payee is not a defence to an action by an indorsee,
who is entitled to judgment for want of a sufficient
affidavit of defence, unless it is averred that he is not
a holder for value. (C. P.) Gatzmer v. Pierce, 433.
The giving of time and the release of an indorser is
sufficient consideration to render the payee of a note a
holder for value. Ib.

In an action against the maker by a holder to whom
a note has been transferred as collateral security for
the payment of a loan, proof that this loan had been
repaid is not sufficient to defeat the right of the plain-
tiff to recover, unless the defendant has a defence
against the payee. Logan v. Cassel, 444.

The omission of a note broker to pay over to the
maker the proceeds of a note placed with him for dis-
count is no defence to a suit brought by a subsequent
holder of the note, unless there is a distinct averment
that the plaintiff is not a holder for value. Lingg v.
Blummer, 459.

Where the indorsement of a defendant is obtained
through the false representation of the maker that the
note is to be used in taking up another note previously
indorsed by the defendant, the plaintiff must show
affirmatively that he is a holder for value. (C. P.)
Poultney v. Baird, 486.

Rights of the holder of negotiable paper discounted
at usurious rates of interest. (C. P.) Wilson v.
Leinbach, 483.

One who takes negotiable paper in payment of an
antecedent debt is a holder for value. Bardsley v.
Delp, 479.

One who takes negotiable paper as collateral security
for an antecedent debt is not a holder for value.
(C. P.) Bardsley v. Delp, 539.

An accommodation acceptor of a bill of exchange,
pledged by the drawer to the plaintiffs as collateral
security for the payment of $1000, is discharged from
liability thereon if, after its maturity, the $1000, with
interest and costs of protest, is tendered to the holder.
(C. P.) Huntington v. Thomas, 541.

The failure of a bank to return vouchers for certain
drafts paid on account of a depositor is not a sufficient
defence to a suit upon his note, due six months there-
after, brought by the bank, as holder, against the
depositor or his indorser. Cake v. Northumberland
Bank, 121.

An indorser of a promissory note cannot relieve
himself from responsibility by calling himself a surety,
and pointing out to a bona fide holder for value a legal
mode by which he may be able to obtain his money
from the maker. (C P.) Gray v. McDonald, 94.

A notice of protest, by mistake misdated, though
duly sent and received, is insufficient to hold indorsers.
Ashland Banking Co. v. Wolf, 555.

Any words sufficient to indicate an intention on the
part of an indorser to waive demand of payment upon
the maker, and notice of his failure to pay, are suffi-

BILLS AND NOTES-Continued.
cient in law to operate as a waiver of such notice.
Stahl v. Wolf, 143.

An admission of liability by an indorser at the time
the note falls due, accompanied by an offer to arrange
the matter with the holders, operates as a waiver of
notice of dishonor. Moyer's Appeal, 163.

A notary public is not responsible for failing to make
demand upon the maker for payment of a note, unless
he is informed by the holder of the place where demand
is to be made. (C. P.) Vandewater v. Williamson,
350.

The drafts of a third party given for a pre-existing
debt constitute only a conditional payment, unless
there be an agreement that they are to be received as
absolute payment. The burden of proving such agree-
ment is upon the defendant. League v. Waring, 131.
See AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE LAW.

BILL OF REVIEW. See DECEDENTS' ESTATES.
BOND. Parol evidence is admissible to show that
the lien of a judgment entered upon a bond and war-
rant of attorney was limited to specified real estate.
(C. P.) Baillie v. Kessler, 527.

A bond given in consideration of the abandonment
of a criminal prosecution for embezzlement against the
son of the obligor is valid. (C. P.) Phila. and Read-
ing R. R. Co. v. Slemmer, 451.

The measure of damages for breach of condition of
bond of indemnity against liens is the amount of liens
found to exist. (C. P.) Gorman v. Mountjoy, 67.

In an action upon a bond which has been assigned,
it is not necessary for the equitable plaintiff to show
his title, unless for the purpose of meeting some de-
fence, which, though valid as against the legal plain-
tiff, is not good as against him. Berks Co. v. Levan,
63.

The secretary

BUILDING ASSOCIATION.
and treasurer of a building association cannot bind
the corporation by a promise to one giving a mortgage
that he will be accepted as a member of the Associa-
tion. (C. P.) Association v. Gibson, 502.

Where the borrower from a building association fails
to exercise his right of applying payments to the re-
duction of the mortgage debt, a sheriff's vendee of the
mortgaged premises cannot make such application of
the mortgagee's payments. Kreamer v. Springfield
Building Association, 267.

Borrowing stockholders cannot in order to wind up
an association before the time limited by the charter
compel non-borrowers to accept a sum per share less
than the amount fixed by the charter. (C. P.) Pfaff
v. Association, 349.

Withdrawing stockholders cannot take their funds
from an association except in the method provided by
the charter, which must be strictly pursued. (C. P.)
Building Association v. Britten, 330.

CANALS, damages for widening. See DAMAGES.'
Penna. Canal Co. v. Hill, 182.

CAPIAS, when allowable. See PRACTICE. (C. P.)
Coal Co. v. Huntzinger, 300.

CAVEAT EMPTOR, rule of, when it applies to
purchasers at tax sales. Bredin v. Cranberry Town-
ship, 408.

CHECKS. See BANKS AND BANKING.

An Act of Assembly entitled “An Act supplementing
the several Acts incorporating the borough of K." is
sufficient to comply with the requirements of Art. XI.

CHURCH. What are proper uses of a church
building. Craig v. Church, 421.

See

K. was incorporated under the general law by proceed-
ings in the Quarter Sessions. McKeesport v. Owens,
492.

Art. I. § 7 of the Constitution protecting publishers
from prosecution for libels, which without malice criti-
cize the conduct of public officers, refers only to indiet-
ments for libel, and has no application to a civil action
to recover damages. Barr v. Moore, 273.

COMMITTEE. The members of a committee who
sign a contract under seal are personally liable for its
fulfilment although they add to their names the word
"Committee." Ulam v. Boyd, 337.

COMMON CARRIER. A common carrier is re-
sponsible for the sate delivery of goods beyond the
termination of its own line whenever a special contract
for such safe delivery has been made, or an agreement
to that effect is fairly deducible from the bill of lading.
Clyde v. Hubbard, 532.

Although a railroad company received articles for
transportation under a special contract whereby they
were relieved from liability for loss from fire, they are
bound if the goods are injured by fire to give to the
owners some explanation of the loss, and the refusal
so to do is prima facie evidence that the fire occurred
through the negligence of the carrier. Penna. R. R.
Co. v. Miller, 257.

When goods are given by a consignor to a common
carrier to be delivered without qualifications to the con-
signee, the consignor cannot by a subsequent direction
to the carrier prevent the delivery of the goods to the
consignee unless he would at the same time be justified
in exercising the right of stoppage in transitu. Phila.
& R. R. Co. v. Wireman, 480.

Where a carrier in spite of such subsequent instruc-
tion from the consignor delivers the goods to the con-
signee, and in consequence of such delivery is sued by
the consignor in another State, the fact that judgment
is obtained against the carrier in such suit will not
avail him in a subsequent suit against the consignee
for the recovery of the goods. Ib.

CONFLICT OF LAWS. See CONTRACT.
CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Art. I. § 7, 273.

Art. I. § 17, 421.

Art. III. § 3, 421.

Art. V. § 5, 305.

Art. V. § 24, 565.
Art. XVI. § 8, 145.
CONSTITUTION

STATES.

Art. IV., 83.

The Act of 20 March, 1877, imposing a tax upon
the gross receipts of insurance companies, is not re-

United States relating to the regulation of inter State
commerce. Ins. Co. of North America v. Common-
wealth, 177.

Impairing obligation of contracts. The Act of 18
April, 1877, providing for the removal of dead bodies
from church yards is not in conflict with the constitu-
tional prohibition against laws impairing the obligation
of contracts. Craig v. Church, 421.

No one is entitled to take advantage of the constitu-
tional invalidity of the Act unless he has a vested
right of sepulture in the ground; and a pew holder, or
one who has relatives buried in the ground, is not pos-
sessed of such vested right. Ib.

A legislative grant of an exclusive privilege to main-
tain a ferry may be repealed unless founded upon
valuable consideration. A valuable consideration
given to the State for an Act of Assembly creating a
ferry will not support a supplement to the Act making
that privilege exclusive. Johnson v. Crow, 33.

The right of the Legislature to authorize the re-
moval of the remains of the dead from cemeteries is
settled. It is an exercise of the police power necessary
to the public health and comfort. Craig v. Church,
421.

Constitutional provisions relative to the division of
counties and the formation of judicial districts con-
strued and explained. Commonwealth v. Harding,
305.

Constitutional provision relative to writs of error in
capital cases. See CRIMINAL LAW. Sayres v. Common-
wealth, 565.

See COURTS.

CONTRACT. A supplementary contract without
new consideration cannot be supported on the consider-
ation which gave validity to the original contract.
Johnson v. Crow, 33.

The terms of a contract under seal and not within
the statute of frauds may be varied by a subsequent
parol agreement upon a sufficient consideration. Wilgus
v. Whitehead, 537.

Where there is any benefit accruing to one who pro-
mises to pay the debt of another, the case is not
within the statute of frauds. Thomas v. Wiltbank,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The Acts of As-
sembly authorizing the entry of judgment for want of
an affidavit of defence do not infringe upon the con-
stitutional right of trial by jury. Lawrance v. Smed-
ley, 42.

An Act of Assembly entitled a supplement to a pre-
vious Act, sufficiently indicates its subject to meet the

The abandonment of a criminal prosecution against
the son of an obligor is a good consideration to sup-
port a bond given by the father to pay the amount
embezzled by the son from the obligee. (C. P.)
Phila. and Reading R. R. Co. v. Slemmer, 451.

Notes given by a principal to a stock broker to
cover losses incurred by the broker in stock gambling
on the principal's account are void. Fareira v. Gabell,
491.

CONTRACT-Continued.

A covenant, based upon a valuable consideration,
that the covenantor would not dispose of or incumber
certain real estate belonging to him, but would permit
it to descend to his heirs-at-law, is valid, and the
heirs may enforce it as against a devisee of the cove-
nantor. Taylor v. Mitchell, 378.

Parties who sign a contract under seal in their own
names are personally bound for its performance, al-
though they write under their names the word Com-
mittee. Ulam v. Boyd, 337.

An agreement providing for payment of a debt by
paper drawn on W., construed to mean that the paper
must be drawn by and in the name of the principal
debtor. League v. Waring, 131.

An agreement not to press the indorser of paper
until all remedies were exhausted against the maker,
will prevent judgment in an action against such in-
dorser unless all legal remedies have been exhausted
against the maker. (C. P.) Moore v. Muirhead, 237.
Where a broker sells South Carolina bonds which
are subsequently discovered to have been repudiated
by the State before the sale, it is his duty to return
the price to the purchaser upon a re-tender of the bonds,
and he is entitled to recover the money so refunded
from his principal. Maitland v. Martin, 52.

A mortgage upon property in Pennsylvania, al-
though executed in Kansas by a resident of Kansas,
but delivered to the mortgagee in Pennsylvania, is
governed by the law of Pennsylvania as to the rate of
interest which could be recovered. Mills v. Wilson,
325.

The property in coal agreed to be delivered at the
purchaser's wharf at Pittsburgh free of all charges,
does not pass to the purchaser until the coal arrives at
Pittsburgh, although it has been placed in his barges,
which were prevented by low water from reaching
Pittsburgh, and in consequence thereof the coal was
levied upon by execution creditors of the vendor.
Sheathen v. Grubbs, 342.

Where goods are given by a consignor to a common
carrier to be delivered without qualification to the con-
signee, the consignor cannot, by a subsequent direc-
tion to the carrier, prevent the delivery of the goods
to the consignee unless a state of facts is shown to ex-
ist which would justify the exercise of the right of
stoppage in transitu. Phila. and Reading R. R. Co. v.
Wireman, 480.

In an action to recover damages for the failure of
the defendant to furnish to the plaintiff a free pass
for himself and family for life, the measure of dam-
ages is the sum which such a pass for life would be
worth in cash. Erie R. R. Co. v. Douthet, 494.

A public officer furnishing a search is not liable for
a mistake except to the person who employs him, but
where the one ordering a search takes it to another
about to loan upon its faith, who takes it to the officer
and obtains from him a verbal affirmation of its truth,
such officer is liable to the one to whom such verbal
affirmation is made. Siewers v. Commonwealth, 17.
When a contract may inure to the benefit of one not
a party to it. See MORTGAGE. Moore's Appeal, 474.
Corporation Contract. When ultra vires. See
CORPORATION. Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Berks R. R.
Co., 115. (C. P.) Willis v. Darby R. R. Co.,461.
Contracts with decedents. See DECEDENTS'
ESTATES.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. See NEG-

LIGENCE.

CONVERSION. See PARTNERSHIP.
CORPORATIONS. Subscription to stock
of. When a supplement to the charter of a corporation

CORPORATIONS—Continued.
entirely changes the purposes for which it is created,
the original subscribers are freed from liability to as-
sessments upon their subscriptions to its stock. South-
ern R. R. Co. v. Stevens, 70.

Meetings and Elections. In the absence of any
specific direction in a church charter of the method of
giving notice of corporation meetings, notice from the
pulpit, for three successive Sundays of a proposed
meeting is sufficient "public notice" to meet the re-
quirements of the Act of 18 April, 1877. Craig v.
Church, 421.

Where the meeting of a church corporation is duly
called, the vote of a majority present binds the cor-
poration in the absence of charter provision requiring
the presence or vote of a definite number. Ib.

Unless the charter of a corporation makes provision
for voting by proxy, the right so to vote does not ex-
ist. Ib.

When the charter of a church provides that any
member contributing to its support one year previous
to an election a sum not less than two dollars, for a
pew or a portion of a pew, shall be entitled to vote at
corporate elections; but, by the practice of the church,
the sittings were all free and its expenses were paid
by the voluntary contributions of its members, any
member who so voluntarily contributes the requisite
sum is entitled to vote. (C. P.) Commonwealth v.
Morrison, 346.

The contribution, however, must have been actually
paid in one entire year prior to the election. Ib.
Corporators who have acquiesced in the violation of
a charter are not entitled to maintain a quo warranto
founded upon such violation. Ib.

Illegal votes cast at a corporation election which,
however, make no difference in the result, do not in-
validate the election. (C. P.) Craig v. Church, 421;
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 346.

An obscure church charter construed. (C. P.) Com-
monwealth v. Morrison, 346.

Powers of. A corporation doing business outside
of the State granting its charter, does so by the permis-
sion of such foreign State; all its corporate powers are
derived from the home State. Ins. Co. of North Ame-
rica v. Commonwealth, 177.

Powers of mutual insurance companies. See
INSURANCE.

Taxation of insurance companies. See TAX-
ATION.

Contracts between railroad companies. When
ultra vires. Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Berks R. R. Co.,
115.

Receivers. When stockholders show that the di-
rectors are about improperly to discontinue a suit in
a foreign jurisdiction involving $2,000,000, a new suit
for which sum would be barred by the statute of limi-
tations, a Court of equity will appoint a receiver of
the corporation. (U. S. C. C.) Hazzard v. Credit
Mobilier, 417.

Fraudulent stock. Bona fide purchasers of stock
fraudulently issued in excess of the amount allowed
by its charter, are entitled to relief against the corpor-
ation, who are estopped from denying the validity of
an instrument issued under their corporate seal. (C.
P.) Willis v. Darby R. R. Co., 461.

What relief will be granted to such a purchaser, dis-
cussed by HARE, P. J. Ib.

Service of Process. A corporation chartered
under Act of Congress, empowering it to sue and be
sued in any Court within the United States, whose
principal office was in New York, whose business was
conducted in the Western States, but whose President

CORPORATIONS—Continued.

resided in Philadelphia, may be sued in a Penna. State
Court, and valid service of process made upon the
President at his residence. (C. P.) Eby v. Northern
Pacific R. R. Co., 385.

A boom company, whose business was transacted in
Carbon and Lehigh counties, and whose charter em-
powered it to sue or be sued in those counties, may be
sued in Philadelphia County, and service of process
may be made upon its President while temporarily
within the county. (C. P.) Lehigh Coal Company
v. Lehigh Boom Company, 222.

Execution against. A sheriff's sale of the prop-
erty and franchises of a railroad company does not
pass to the purchaser any right to the debts or mere
choses in action due to the company. Hogg's Appeal,
377.

Dissolution of. Upon the dissolution of a fire
company, it being a corporation organized for a charit-
able purpose, its property reverts to the Common-
wealth, for its members had previously held the legal
title as trustees for the public. To attempt to dis-
tribute the assets among the members would be a per-
version of the trust upon which they were donated by
the contributors. Humane Fire Co.'s Appeal, 442.

In order to entitle the members of a fire company in
Philadelphia to take advantage of the provisions of
the Act of 28 May, 1872, relating to the distribution of
the assets of dissolving companies, such members must
show a strict compliance with all the requirements of
the Act. Ib.

COURTS-Continued.
diction of the United States Courts a proper petition
and bond have been duly filed in the State Court, the
jurisdiction of the latter ceases ipso facto, provided the
removal is perfected by the filing of the copy of the
record in the Federal Court. (U. S. C. C.) Arthur v.
New England Ins. Co., 403.

Although it is optional with the party petitioning
whether he file the copy of the record on or before the
first day of the then next term of the Circuit Court
the other party may if he pleases file the copy himself
and in so doing is considered to have acted for the
party petitioning, and this may be done at any time
after the filing of the petition in the State Court. Ib.

Any case which might have been begun in the Cir-
cuit Court either because of its subject matter or the
citizenship of the parties may be removed from the
State into the Federal Courts. (U. S. C. C.) Taylor
v. Rockafeller, 283.

The Act of 3 March, 1875, seems to confer upon the
Federal Courts jurisdiction over all controversies be-
tween citizens of different States, irrespective of the
question whether some of the indispensable parties on
either side are citizens of the same State as that of
some though not all of the parties on the other side. Ib.
Upon a question of citizenship the Court looks at the
residence of the trustee not the cestui que trust. Ib.
A controversy wholly between citizens of different
States, fully determinable as between them, entitles
either of such parties to removal though not fully deter-
minable as between the remaining parties. Ib.

A successful respondent in proceedings for divorce
a mensa et thoro under the Act of February 26, 1817,
is entitled to costs. (C. P.) Brincklé v. Brincklé, 123.
An unsuccessful libellant and her next friend in
proceedings for a divorce are both liable for costs, but
the primary responsibility rests on the libellant. Ib.
Which party in proceedings for a divorce shall pay
witness fees incurred when the case was previously
assigned for trial but continued, is within the discre-
tion of the Court. Ib.

Costs accrued before the entry of a non-suit which
was afterwards ordered to be taken off on payment of
costs cannot be recovered by the plaintiff after verdict
and judgment in his favor. (C. P.) Hartley v. Lee, 560.
A writ of error in appeals from orders for removal
of paupers, under the act of 16 March, 1868, suspends
the determination of the appeal so that the bill of costs
and expenses may be allowed by the Court at any time
up to the determination of the writ of error. Overseers
v. Overseers, 188.

The payment of the costs of an ejectment will not be
enforced by an attachment. (C. P.) Lewis v. Eddy,
451.

Security for Costs. See PRACTICE.

COUNTY. A county is not a municipal corpora-
tion within the meaning of Act XVI. § 8 of the con-
stitution or of the Act of 13 June, 1874. (C. P.)
Freeze v. Columbia County, 145.

The taking of property under the general road laws
is not by virtue of any right or privilege vested in the
county, but is an act of eminent domain exercised on
behalf of the State. Ib.
COURTS. United States Courts. Removal
of Causes Where in an action within the juris-

No order or allowance by the State Court for a re-
moval is necessary under the Act of 3 March, 1875.
By the filing of a proper petition and bond, the suit is
withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the State Court. Ib.
The jurisdiction of the State Court is not ousted un-
United States Court has jurisdiction, but the judgment
of the State Court to that effect is not binding upon
the United States Courts. Ib.

Where the declaration consists of the common counts
only the amount in controversy to give jurisdiction to
the United States Circuit Court is the amount claimed
in the bill of particulars. (U. S. C. C.) Healy v. Pre-
vost, 579.

A party interpleading in an issue in the State Court
is entitled to removal of the case to the Federal Court
even though the parties originally upon the record
would not have had such right. Ib.

State Courts. The State Courts have jurisdiction
of an action against a national bank to recover the
penalty imposed by the Act of Congress for taking
usurious interest. Bletz v. Bank, 1.

The State Courts have jurisdiction over a corporation,
organized under an Act of Congress empowering it to
sue or be sued in any court in the United States,
whose principal office is in New York, whose business
is transacted in the Western States, but whose presi-
dent resides in Philadelphia, and is there served with
process. Eby v. R. R. Co., 385.

When money payable at a future time has been
charged upon real estate in a proceeding in the Or-
phans' Court, that Court has jurisdiction to order the
payment of the charge, when due, out of the real estate,
but this jurisdiction is not exclusive; there are con-
current remedies in the Common Pleas. Neel's Ap-
peal, 365.

Where the Orphans' Court having jurisdiction over
a fund has specifically awarded it to certain claimants,
this decree in rem is binding upon all parties after-
wards claiming an interest in it. (C. P.) Common-
wealth v. Palmer, 486; Otterson v. Gallagher, 555.

COURTS-Continued.

CRIMES-Continued.

Effect of a division of county upon courts. See CoN-
STITUTIONAL LAW. Com'th v. Harding, 305.
See COSTS.

COVENANT to build, when enforced by injunc-
tion. (C. P.) Penna. Co. v. Lynch, 446.

COVENANTS running with land, what are.
Simons v. Van Ingen, 61.

COVENANTS OF TITLE. The words "grant,
bargain, and sell" in a conveyance of land in fee simple
constitute under the Act of May 28, 1715, a covenant
only against acts done or suffered by the grantor. But
municipal claims for work begun before a conveyance,
being liens from the beginning of the work, are a
breach of covenant although not filed until after the
conveyance. Shaffer v. Greer, 323.

CRIMES. Criminal law and procedure.
Homicide. In a criminal conspiracy, the parties to
which are members of the same criminal organization,
declarations of a fellow member and co-conspirator are
evidence against all the conspirators. Donnelly v.
Commonwealth, 104.

It is a rule of practice to instruct the jury not to
convict on the unsupported evidence of an accomplice.
Ib.

Evidence of various quarrels between the prisoner
and the deceased in relation to money matters is ad-
missible to show a motive for the homicide. Sayres v.
Commonwealth, 565.

Evidence of declarations made prior to a murder in
the presence of a prisoner charged as accessory before
the fact, which tend to show a conspiracy in which the
prisoner was a party, is admissible without express
evidence of assent on the part of the prisoner. So also
is evidence of similar declarations after the murder.
Duffy v. Commonwealth, 311.

Corroborating testimony to prove particular events
themselves unimportant in a chain showing a deep
conspiracy is admissible. Ib.

Insanity as a defence. The law regarding sanity
as the normal condition of every man's mind, the bur-
den of proof is on a prisoner claiming to be insane, and
the evidence to establish this defence must be satis-
factory to the jury, and the conclusion such as fairly
results from the evidence. Sayres v. Commonwealth,
565.

Evidence of declarations of the deceased after the
infliction of the fatal wound is not admissible to prove
the prisoner's insanity. Ib.

Letters of the prisoner ten years old are admissible
in rebuttal of the plea of insanity where the prisoner's
evidence of insanity extended over the period of his
entire life. Ib.

Alibi, how proved. Where the fact proved by the
Commonwealth is not defined distinctly in point of
time, but may have taken place between certain
periods, the alibi must cover the entire period in its
proof. Donnelly v. Commonwealth, 104.

Desecration of graves. To desecrate a grave is a
misdemeanor and indictable both at common law and
under the statute as an offence highly indecent and
contra bonos mores. Craig v. Church, 421.

Forgery. Under an indictment for forgery it is
unnecessary to prove an intent to defraud any parti-
cular person. To issue a diploma of a veterinary col-
lege with false signatures is forgery. M'Clure v. Com-
monwealth, 313.

Larceny. The history of criminal law relating to
larceny in Pennsylvania, reviewed by AGNEW, C. J.
Lynch v. Commonwealth, 392.

Embezzlement. A guardian who fraudulently
fails to account for the funds of his ward after a settle-
ment of his account, is liable to attachment, and is not
entitled to a discharge under the insolvent laws until
he has been tried in the Quarter Sessions under the
Act of 31 March, 1860, § 131. Ex parte Blumer, 171.

The treasurer of a school district who embezzles
funds committed to his care as such, is subject to in-
dictment under the Act of 31 March, 1860, § 65, as a
municipal officer charged with the safe keeping of
public money. Commonwealth v. Morrissey, 72.

Drinking Saloons. The Act of 28 March, 1878,
relating to the employment of females in drinking
saloons explained and enforced. Walter v. Common-
wealth, 389.

It is not necessary that there should be a separate
indictment for each female employed. Ib.

An indictment need not show that the defendant is
not within the protection of a proviso in an Act making
a certain offence a misdemeanor. Ib.

Evidence of a subsequent distinct criminal act, but
connected in character and purpose with the offence
charged, is admissible at the trial of the prisoner for
the principal offence. Kramer v. Commonwealth, 185.
Error. What not sufficient error in the description
of a juror summoned, to sustain a challenge. Sayres
v. Commonwealth, 565.

The absence at the time of rendering a verdict of one
convicted of larceny, who voluntarily absents himself,
being out on bail and failing to appear when called,
the verdict recorded and the sentence pronounced,
is not valid ground for a motion in arrest of judgment.
Lynch v. Commonwealth, 392. See EVIDENCE.

The Act of 24 March, 1877, limiting the time of tak-
ing out a writ of error or certiorari in capital cases to
twenty days from the date of sentence is constitutional.
Sayres v. Commonwealth, 565.

CURTESY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Evidence that the deceased was a man of brutal pas-
sions and of ferocious temper is admissible as part of a
chain of evidence to prove that a killing was done in
self-defence, but evidence of brutality or ferocity on
any particular occasion is not admissible. Ib.

In an action for breach of condition upon a bond of
indemnity against liens, the measure of damages is the
amount of liens existing against the premises. (C.
P.) Gorman v. Mountjoy, 67.