by producing the instrument before a collector of in- ternal revenue and having it stamped in his presence. (C. P.) Cresson v. Phillips, 448.
STARE DECISIS. The law is not changed to suit the barometer of public opinion, and where, in a long line, rules of property have been recognized, the Courts will hold to the maxim stare decisis. Struthers v. R. R., 161.
STATUTES. A statute granting an exclusive privilege of maintaining a ferry may be repealed, un- less founded upon a valuable consideration. Johnson v. Crow, 33.
TAXES AND TAXATION-Continued. by those claiming the right of payment out of moneys collected from road taxes. Commonwealth v. Thomp- son, 129.
A purchaser of land sold at tax sale is entitled to re- cover the purchase-money paid, if the lands sold were not in the county. The rule of caveat emptor does not apply to tax sales of lands not in the county or sold under double assessments. Bredin v. Cranberry Town- ship, 408.
TRADE-MARK. The proprietors of mills manu- facturing muslin well known in the market as Wam- sutta muslin, are entitled to restrain by injunction the STOCK EXCHANGE. See BROKER. use of the word "Wamyesta" for an inferior article. STOCK GAMBLING. Illegality of. See CON- (C. P.) Wamsutta Mills v. Allen, 189. TRACT. Fareira v. Gabell, 490.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. Right of, when exercisable. See CONTRACT. R. R. v. Wireman, 480. SUBROGATION. The right of a defendant who pays a judgment against himself and others to have it marked to his use, for the purpose of compelling contribution from his co-defendants, does not exist if the defendants are partners. (C. P.) Clark v.Martin, 30. The rule that where one creditor has a lien upon two funds of a common debtor, and another creditor has a lien only upon one, the first creditor may be compelled in equity to levy his debt out of the fund to which the other cannot resort, does not govern in cases where the fund for distribution arises from different debtors. Blank's Appeal, 25.
See, also, Appeal of the Workmen's Association, 141; Scott's Appeal, 269.
SURETY. See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
TAXES AND TAXATION. The State has the right to impose a tax upon the gross receipts of an insurance company, irrespective of whether they are received from home or foreign business. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 177.
The collectors of bounty taxes should settle their accounts with the authorities who levied the tax. But, in a case where a collector offered to settle with these authorities, who directed him to go to the township auditors who settled his account, and retained and de- stroyed his vouchers, the authorities are estopped from afterward demanding the collector to give either pri- mary or secondary evidence of his vouchers. Scott v. Strawn, 132.
The lien of city tax against real estate is not af- fected by the failure of the collector to distrain, al- though personal property amply sufficient could have been found on the premises at any time during the year. Harrisburg v. Orth, 121.
Where the fund produced by a judicial sale of real estate is insufficient to pay taxes, their lien is not dis- charged. Ib.
In order to enable a person upon whom there rests no legal liability to pay a tax, to reclaim such tax, there must have been a protest or notice of an inten- tion to reclaim at the time of payment. McCrickart v. Pittsburg, 278.
On adjoining mine. LORD AND TENANT. Freck v. Coal Co., 5.
For mesne profits. The record of proceedings upon a writ of estrepement from which it appears that the defendants in trespass appeared as defendants in the estrepement, and by their tenant entered security, after which the estrepement was dissolved, is sufficient evi- dence of possession by the defendant to send the case to the jury. Longenberger v. Kase, 74.
TRESPASS ON THE CASE. A demurrer to a narr. in trespass on the case wherein the defendant is charged with having maliciously and wilfully poisoned the plaintiff. (C. P.) Platt v. Hospital, 346.
Per quod servitium amisit. See PARENT AND CHILD. Trespasser. Erections by a railroad company upon land entered upon without authority of law do not be- come the property of the real owner of the land. Jus- tice v. R. R., 374.
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES. Although a trust has ceased to be executory, if it still remains active and operative to effectuate some purpose of the testator, the trustee is still entitled to retain control of the estate. Penn Gaskell's Estate, 84
A trust created by will for M. and H., neices of the testator, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, with a provision that if either of them die without issue then the share of the deceased was given to the survivor, and if both died without issue then the estate was given to C., is active, because the failure of issue referred to is definite. Campbell v, Ingersoll, 125.
Courts are more ready to uphold trusts covering personal property than real estate, and where there is a manifest intention that the first taker should only have a life estate, the Court will sustain the trust for the protection of the remaindermen. (O. C.) Craige's Estate, 318.
An obscure will construed to create an active trust. Varner's Appeal, 409.
Resulting trusts. What constitutes. (C. P.) Eichart v. Grayson, 298.
A resulting trust in land can only be raised from frand in obtaining title thereto or from the payment of purchase-money when that title is acquired. Bickel's Appeal, 225.
Powers. Where a power of revocation reserved in The Act of 24 March, 1851, which awards the collec-a deed of trust has once been exercised it is exhausted. tion of certain taxes to the lowest bidder and directs What instrument will be construed to be an exercise payment to the school district of the difference between of such a power. (U. S. C. C.) Hidell v. Girard the bid and the five per cent. commissions secured to Trust Co., 435. the tax collector under the Act of 15 April, 1834, is practically a reduction of the legal commissions to the amount of the bid, and the county may recover this difference in a suit on the official bond of the collector. Berks Co. v. Levan, 63.
Under the Act of 15 April, 1834, the township super- visors must be joined as co-defendants in suits brought
The property of a fire company is held in trust for the public, and its members have no power to divide it among themselves. Humane Fire Co.'s Appeal, 442.
A trustee, who in the exercise of an honest discre- tion has failed to exercise a power of sale, will not be surcharged with the depreciation of the value of the estate. (O. C.) Getz's Estate, 416.
WAGERING. Whether a particular contract is or is not a wagering contract is a question for the jury. Fareira v. Gabell, 490.
WAGES. When not entitled to preference in dis- tribution of proceeds of execution. See EXECUTION. Fell v Duffy, 44. Dunn v. Magarge, 204.
What not exempt from attachment as wages. (C. P.) Schwaake v. Langton, 124.
WAIVER, of condition in lease. See LANDLORD AND TENANT. Wilgus v. Whitehead, 537.
Waiver of notice of protest. See BILLS AND Notes. Waiver of exemption. See EXECUTION. WARRANTY. See INSURANCE.
Warranty of quality. See SALE.
Warranty of title. See VENDOr and Vendee. WATERCOURSE. Non user of a watercourse
USE AND OCCUPATION. See LANDLORD for a time will not be treated as an abandonment of AND TENANT.
USES AND TRUSTS. Although a deed may not in strictness come within the statute of uses and trusts, 27 Henry VIII., if the consideration be a valua- ble one, parties equitably interested can enforce it as well as if a bargain and sale, or a covenant to stand seised to uses. Taylor v. Mitchell, 378.
USURY. Creditors cannot claim that usurious interest paid by their debtor is a fraud upon them unless they show a fraudulent combination between the debtor and the creditor receiving usury to deprive other creditors of their rights. Titusville Bank's Ap- peal, 153.
State Courts have jurisdiction over actions against national banks to recover the penalty prescribed by the Act of Congress for the reservation of usurious in- terest. Bletz v. Bank, 1.
National Banks may, under sec. 5197 of the Revised Statutes, take such interest on loans made by them, as any State bank of issue doing business in the same State may take. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant v. Duncan, 158.
Whether the circumstances of a particular case dis- closed a usurious contract or an honest sale of paper at a discount, discussed. (C. P.) Wilson v. Lein- bach, 483.
See CONFLICT OF LAWS. Mills v. Wilson, 325.
VARIANCE. See PLEADING.
VENDOR AND VENDEE. In an action upon a purchase-money mortgage, damages arising from breach of warranty of title may be set off. Wacker v. Straub, 381. Ib.
See MEASURE OF DAMAGES. Where land was sold, and through an uncertainty as to the county lines a deed was delivered describing the property in one county, whereas it really lay in another adjoining, the vendor, in the absence of fraud, was not responsible for damages alleged to have been suffered by the vendee through the misdescription. Holmes v. McGee, 265.
Breach of covenant for title. See COVENANT. Shaffer v. Greer, 323.
In the absence of special contract in regard to the use of land, the vendee stands to his vendor just as he does to others, and, the maxim applies sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas. Brown v. Torrence, 280.
A vendor is not responsible for expenses of convey ancing, nor is he required to furnish a brief of title, but it is the duty of the vendor to supply missing links in the title at his own expense, but remuneration for so doing cannot be claimed against vendor by convey- ancer of the purchaser in the absence of a previous contract. (0. C.) Frowert's Estate, 239.
the right to use it. Gordon v. R. R., 405. Obstruction of. See DAMAGES. Ib. WATER-PIPE. Cost of laying in Chester, how collected. Baker v. Gartside, 315.
WATER-POWER. Grant of, construed. See DEED. Klaer v. Ridgway, 113.
WHARVES AND DOCKS. The dock room in a navigable river belongs to the Commonwealth, and a vessel mooring between docks unless it prevents ves- sels from approaching the wharves is not chargeable with any sum of money to the owner of the adjacent wharves. (C. P.) Easby v. Patterson, 318.
WILL. An issue devisavit vel non is not the pro- per method of trying the validity of an agreement pleaded as a revocation of a will. Bridaham v. King, 261.
Where an estate is given to A. for life, and at her death to descend in fee simple to such of her children as she may direct in a writing signed by herself, the power is not well executed by a will directing the es- tate to be sold by an executor, and the proceeds to be divided among certain of her children. Stephenson v. Richardson, 184.
A covenant not to sell or incumber lands, but to permit the same to descend to the heirs of the cove- nantor is not overcome by a will. Taylor v. Mitchell, 378.
A lapsed legacy goes to the residuary legatee, while a lapsed devise descends to the heir-at-law. Massey's Appeal, 529.
Where technical words used in a will have a clearly- defined object upon which to operate, no extrinsic evi- dence can be introduced to limit or extend their appli- cation. (O. C.) Wright's Estate, 387.
A presumption of an intent to die intestate, as to any part of the testator's estate, will not be allowed when the words of the testator are sufficient to carry the whole. Raudenbach's Appeal, 213.
Although the grammatical construction of language is always entitled to weight in the interpretation of a will, the rule will be relaxed when the testator is evi- dently a person not familiar with grammatical rules and usage. Ib.
A bequest of the income of a fund without limitation as to time, is a gift in perpetuity, and carries the corpus with it, and the estate of the legatee is not reduced by the provision that such income be paid to him if he shall be sober and industrious, at such time and in such a manner as the trustee might deem right and proper. Millard's Appeal, 211.
Words which by themselves import a fee, may, when taken in connection with other clauses in a will show- ing the general intent, be construed as a devise of a life estate only. Uhrick's Appeal, 247.
A devise of lands to A. and B. to enjoy and to hold the same as tenants in common, in the absence of any words showing a contrary intent, vests a fee simple in the devisees. Crosky v. Dodds, 246.
A legacy is to be deemed vested or contingent just as the time when it is to take effect shall appear to be annexed to the gift or the payment of it. When there is no substantive gift, and it is only implied from the direction to pay, the legacy is contingent, provided a contrary intention is not to be collected from the words or circumstances. Chess's Appeal, 250.
after a life or lives in being and twenty-one years there- after, he may give an estate in fee, subject on certain contingencies to be reduced to an estate for life with a remainder over, but if these contingencies do not hap- pen the gift in fee to stand. Campbell v. Ingersoll, 125.
Construction of obscure wills. (O. C.) Varner's Appeal, 409; Craige's Estate, 318.
Where a testator's intention is evident, but it is incorrectly expressed, the Court will supply a word or words to express such intention. (O. C.) Holland's
The inclination of the Courts is to favor the vesting Estate, 469. of legacies. Ib.
Where a sum of money is left in trust to a legatee a provision in the will directing the trustee to pay the corpus of the fund to the beneficiary, does not in any way prevent the vesting of the legacy. Millard's Ap- peal, 211.
The rule in Shelley's case is not to be applied to a will until the intention of the testator has been dis- covered by the application of the ordinary rules of con- struction. Leightner v. Leightner, 37.
A will gave real estate to trustees to pay the income to the testator's son for his life, and at his death to convey such estate, such person or persons as would, by the intestate laws, be entitled to the same if he had died intestate, seised thereof in fee. After the death of the testator, the son adopted a child under the Act of 4 May, 1855, and subsequently died without issue, leaving the adopted child surviving: Held that the adopted child was entititled to the estate. Ann John- son's Appeal, 437.
A married woman cannot by will appoint a guardian for her minor children. (O. C.) Darmody's Estate,
Although a testator cannot create a perpetuity by an executory devise after an indefinite failure of issue, or at any other future period, which may not be until 487.
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