With respect to the behavior of the master and seamen, and the discipline on board of merchant ships, it is held, that the master is personally responsible in damages for any injury or loss to the ship or cargo, by reason of his negligence or misconduct. Being responsible over to others for his conduct as master, the law, as well on that account as from the necessity of the case, has intrusted him with great authority over the mariners on board. Such authority is requisite to the safe navigation of the ship, and the preservation of good order and discipline. He may imprison,1 and also inflict reasonable corporal punishment upon a seaman, for disobedience to reasonable commands, or for disorderly, riotous, or insolent conduct; and his authority, in that respect, is *182 analogous to that of a master on land over his apprentice or scholar. (a) The books unite in the lawfulness and ne

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decisions of the federal courts in relation thereto, is given in the notes to Abbott on Shipping, 5th Am. edit. Boston, 1846, pp. 257 to 264.

The Athenians had humane institutions for the relief and support of disabled soldiers, and which afterwards embraced the aged, the sick, the blind, and infirm, of every description; and this charitable provision has been attributed to Solon. St. John's History of the Manners and Customs of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. 69-74. The ancient Romans never provided any asylum for the poor. Humanity was no part of their national character. Its cultivation, as a public duty, is one of the inestimable blessings of the introduction of Christianity. Constantine, the first Christian Cæsar, founded the first public system of relief of pauperism. There did not exist in the Roman legislation any provision for the poor, unless, says Hugo, (History of the Roman Law, sec. 154,) we may consider the law of the twelve tables, which regulated funeral expenses, to have been introduced in their favor, as a means to prevent the ruin of families. But there was a provision in favor of the Roman soldiers, which shows the wise policy, if not humanity, of the Roman discipline. Half of the donatives of the soldiers was withdrawn and placed in security in camp for their use, to prevent its being wasted in extravagance and debauchery. Vegetius considered it a divine institution. There was likewise a contribution by each soldier, to a common fund in camp, to defray his funeral expenses. Vegetius, De Re Militari, 1. 2, c. 20. Chelsea Hospital, in England, for the reception of sick and superannuated soldiers, has infinitely better pretensions than the Roman provision to be regarded as divinitus institutum.

(a) Molloy, b. 2, c. 3, sec. 12; Thorne v. White, Peters Adm. 168; Rice v. The Polly and Kitty, Ibid. 420; The United States v. Smith, 3 Wash. C. C. 525; Michaelson v. Dennison, 3 Day, 294; Comersford v. Baker, before Lord Stowell, June, 1825; The United States v. Dewey, New York Circuit, June, 1828; Lord Stowell, in the case of The Agincourt, 1 Hagg. Adm. 272; The Lowther Castle, Ibid. 384; The United States v. Freeman, 4 Mason, 512; Turner's case, 1 Ware, 83; Butler . McLellan, District Court of Maine, Ibid. 219; Bangs v. Little, Ibid. 506; Carleton v. Davis, Id.

1 Something more than a suspicion that a sailor is a dangerous man is required to justify his imprisonment. Jay v. Almy, 1 Wood. & Minot, 262. Mere complaint of a seaman by the mate, without other cause, will not justify his punishment by the mas ter. Schelter v. York, Crabbe, 449.

cessity of the power. Without it, authority could not be maintained nor navigation made safe. Subordination is essential to be strictly enforced, among a class of men whose manners and habits. partake of the attributes of the element on which they are employed.2 Disobedience to lawful commands is a more noxious offence, and the most dangerous in its nature, for it goes at once to the utter annihilation of all authority. But care must be taken that the punishment be administered with due moderation. The

N. Y. Legal Observer, vol. iii. 86; Fuller v. Colby, 3 Wood. & Minot, 1. Though the maritime codes of continental Europe, such as the Consolato, the laws of Oleron, of Wisbuy, of the Hanse Towns, and of Denmark, carefully avoid the direct mention of any legal authority of the captain to correct by corporal chastisement the misbehavior of mariners; yet, as the learned judge of the District Court of Maine observed, in the case above mentioned, this power in the master seems either to have been inferred, or to have become silently established by usage. Casaregis (Disc. 136, n. 14) admits, that the master may inflict slight chastisement, by analogy to the power of a father or domestic master; and the ordinance of Louis XIV. (liv. 2, tit. 1, art 22) confers a strong power of personal punishment on the captain, in aggravated cases, and acting under the advice of the mate and pilot. The act of Congress, 3d March, 1835, c. 40, sec. 3, makes it an indictable offence, punishable by fine and imprisonment, for the master or other officers of any American vessel, on the high seas or other waters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, from malice, hatred, or revenge, and, without justifiable cause, to beat, wound, or imprison any of the crew, or withhold from them suitable food and nourishment, or inflict upon them any cruel and unusual punishment. In the case of The United States v. Proctor, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, in November, 1835, it was held, that, as a general rule, seamen must obey the last order coming from any officer, as it may arise from some sudden emergency requiring it; and that for unjustifiable disobedience, moderate personal punishment might be inflicted. Again, in the Circuit Court U. S. for Massachusetts, in 1841, in the case of United States v. Hunt, 2 Story C. C. 120, it was held, that the right of the mate to inflict punishment on the seamen, when the master is on board and at hand, is justified only by the immediate exigencies of the sea service, or as a necessary means to suppress mutinous, illegal, or flagrant misbehavior on the part of the seamen, or to compel obedience to pressing orders. In the case of The United States v. Colby, District Court U. S. for Massachusetts, (the Law Reporter for March, 1846,) it was decided, that if the master of a ship at sea, in the exercise of a sound and honest judgment, believes danger to be imminent, and to require the use of a dangerous weapon, (a loaded pistol, for instance,) to reduce to obedience a seamen in open mutiny, with deadly weapons in his hand, and threatening the lives of the officers, and the master should use such a weapon from honest motives, he would be justified.1

1 Fuller v. Colby, 3 Wood. & Minot, 1.

2 By an act of Congress, passed 28th September, 1850, “flogging in the navy, and on board vessels of commerce, was abolished, from and after the passage of the act.” Acts 31st Cong. ch. 80. Mr. Justice Curtis considers this act as extending to vessels engaged in the whale or other fisheries. Charge to Grand Jury, 1 Curtis C. C.

law watches the exercise of discretionary power with a jealous eye. If the correction be excessive or unjustifiable, the seaman is sure to receive compensation in damages on his return to port, in an action at common law. (b) And it must be an extreme case that will justify a master to confine a seaman in a common jail *183 in a foreign port. He cannot do it as a punishment, but only by way of precaution under the existing circumstances. (a)1 The master may also restrain, or even confine a passenger who refuses to submit to the necessary discipline of the ship. (b)

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The master has also the right to discharge a seaman for just cause, and put him ashore in a foreign country; but the causes must be, not slight, but aggravated, such as habitual disobedience, mutinous conduct, theft, or habitual drunkenness; and he is responsible in damages if he discharges him without just cause. (c) This power of discharge extends to the mate and subordinate officers, as well as to the seamen, for the master must be supreme in the ship, and subordination and discipline are indispensable to the safety and welfare of the service. But it would require a case of flagrant disobedience, or gross negligence, or palpable want of skill, to authorize the captain to displace a mate, who is generally chosen with the consent of the owners, and with a view to the better safety of the ship, and the security of their property. (d) The marine law requires the master to receive back a seaman whom he has

(b) Watson v. Christie, 2 Bos. & Pull. 224.

(a) United States v. Ruggles, 5 Mason, 192; Magee v. Ship Moss, Gilpin, 219, 233; Wilson v. Brig Mary, Gilpin, 31. The subordinate officers have no authority to punish a seaman when the master is on board, unless by his orders. Elwell v. Martin, Ware, 53; Butler v. McLellan, Ibid. 219; United States v. Hunt, supra.

(b) Boyce v. Bayliffe, 1 Campb. N. P. 58; Prendergast v. Compton, 8 Carr. & Pa. 454. See, also, the remarks of Mr. Justice Story, on the duty of decorous deportment to passengers by the master. Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242.

(c) Relf v. The Ship Maria, Peters Adm. 186; Black v. The Ship Louisiana, Ibid. 268; Hulle v. Heightman, 2 East, 145; Sir William Scott, in the case of The Exeter, 2 Rob. Adm. 261. The French law affords peculiar protection to seamen; and among other things, in this, that it prohibits the master from discharging a seaman, in any case, in a foreign country. This was by a royal declaration of 18th December, 1728, art. 1, mentioned in 1 Valin's Com. 734; and it is adopted in the Code de Commerce, art. 270.

(d) Atkyns v. Burrows, 1 Peters Adm. 244; Thompson v. Busch, 4 Wash. C. C.

838.

1 Johnson v. The Coriolanus, Crabbe, 239.

discharged, if he repents and offers to return to his duty and make satisfaction; and if the master refuses, or if the seaman has been unduly discharged, he may follow the ship, and recover his

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wages for the voyage, and the expenses of his return. (a) *184 The laws of the United States make it highly penal, and subject the master to fine and imprisonment, if, without justifiable cause, he maliciously forces an officer or mariner on shore while abroad, or leaves him behind in any foreign port or place, or refuses to bring home those whom he took out, and who are in a condition and willing to return. (b)

It was a question which received a profound discussion, and led to a learned research in Harden v. Gordon, (c) whether a seaman, who became sick and disabled on the voyage, was entitled to medical advice and aid, such as medicine, sustenance, and attendance, at the expense of the ship. It was there shown and decided, that the expense of curing a sick seaman in the course of the voyage was a charge upon the ship, according to the maritime law of Europe, (d) and the rule recommended itself as much by its intrinsic equity and sound policy as by the sanction of its general authority. Such an expense was in the nature of additional wages during sickness, and it constituted a material ingredient in the just remuneration of seamen for their labor and services. The statute law of the United States (e) has not changed the maritime law and exempted the vessel, except so far as respects medicines and medical advice, and which must be borne by the seamen and not by the owner, when there was a proper medicine-chest and medical directions on board the ship; and it does not apply to nursing, diet, and lodging, or even medical advice, if the seamen be carried ashore, and which, under the general maritime law,

(a) Laws of Oleron, art. 13; Laws of Wisbuy, art. 25; Code de Commerce, art. 270; Relf v. The Ship Maria, 1 Peters Adm. 193, 194; Hutchinson v. Coombs, District Court of Maine, Ware, 65; The Nimrod, Ibid. 9.

(b) Act of Congress, 3d March, 1825, c. 67, sec. 10. So, by the statutes of 5 and 6 Wm. IV. c. 19, the master of a merchant ship is indictable, if he wilfully and wrongfully leaves a seaman behind, before the termination of the voyage.1

(c) 2 Mason, 541.

(d) Laws of Oleron, art. 7; Laws of Wisbuy, art. 19; Laws of the Hanse Towns, art. 45; Code de Commerce, art. 262, 263; App. to Peters Adm.

(e) Vide supra, 179.

1 See Merchant Shipping Act, 17 & 18 Vict. ch. 104, §§ 205-213.

are to be borne by the vessel. (f) The claim for such expenses, equally with a claim for wages, may be enforced in the courts of admiralty; and Judge Story, in the case of Harden v. Gordon,2

with great force, and moving on solid principles, vindicated 185 the admiralty jurisdiction over the whole compensation, in all its varied forms, when due to seamen for their maritime services. (a)

The act of Congress requires, that in seamen's shipping articles, the voyage, and term of time for which the seamen may be shipped, be specified. (b) The regulation relates to voyages from a port in the United States, and it does not apply to a voyage commencing from a foreign port to the United States. The voyage, within the intendment of the statute, means one having a definite commencement and end, and a general coasting and trading voyage from state to state is within the statute. (c) The terminus a quo, and the terminus ad quem, must be stated precisely; and in a case of a general adventure, the term of service must be specified. A voyage from New York to Curacoa, and elsewhere, means, in shipping articles, a voyage from New York to

(f) The Nimrod, Ware, 19; The Forest, Ibid. 420.

(a) This subject received ample discussion in Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sumner, 195, and it was shown to be a settled principle of maritime policy, that a seaman was entitled to be cured at the expense of the ship, of all sickness and all injuries sustained in the service of the ship. The rule applied not only during the voyage, but when the vessel was in her home port, either at the commencement or termination of the voyage, so long as the seaman was in the service of the ship, and as one of the crew. The acts of Congress, supra, 179, for the relief of sick and disabled seamen, were deemed to be auxiliary to the maritime law.1

(b) Act of Congress, 20th July, 1790, c. 29. This principle, as Mr. Curtis observes, (Treatise on Seamen, 106,) may be traced, with remarkable uniformity, through the marine laws and ordinances of all maritime states. It has been recognized as a universal rule by the text-writers of France and England, and fully carried into effect by the courts in this country.

(c) The Crusader, Ware, 444.

2 In a subsequent reference to this case, Mr. Justice Story favors a construction of the act of Congress more favorable to the sailors. The Brig George, 1 Sumner, 154. 1 And so the law was laid down in Ringold v. Crocker, 1 Abbott Adm. 344. In Nevitt v. Clarke, 1 Olcott Adm. 316, Betts J., qualifies the rule laid down in Reed v. Canfield, and holds that a disabled seaman is entitled to maintenance and medical care at the expense of the ship, only so long as he is bound to the service of the ship, and has a claim on her for wages. The Atlantic, 1 Abbott Adm. 451. The captain has no implied authority to make the ship-owner responsible for the care of injured sear men. Organ v. Brodie. 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 530.

Snow v. Wope, 2 Curtis C. C. 301.