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the respondent that the right to construct a station, and its necessity, carries with it an obligation to do so in a proper manner. In regard to the facts there is no dispute. A plainer case could hardly be presented of a deliberate and intentional disregard of the public interest and the accommodation of the public.

The railroad commissioners have thought that it was essential for those purposes that a new and enlarged building for passengers and freight should be erected. That it is true, was a question for them to decide. The statute (Laws of 1882, chap. 353), created a commission of "competent persons," required from them an official constitutional oath, assigned to them an office for the transaction of business, provided a clerk to administer oaths to witnesses and a marshall to summon them, gave full power of investigation and supervision of all railroads and their condition with reference not only to the security, but accommodation of the public, and declared that whenever, in their judgment, it shall appear, among other things, that any addition to, or change of the stations or stationhouses is necessary to promote the security, convenience or accommodation of the public, they shall give notice to the corporation of the improvements and changes which they deem to be proper, and if they are not made, they shall present the facts to the attorneygeneral for his consideration and action, and also to the legislature. All these things have been done. The commissioners have heard and decided. They can do no more. After so much preliminary action by a body wisely organized to exercise useful and beneficial functions, it might well be thought unfortunate that some additional machinery had not been provided to carry into effect their decision. By creating, the statute recognizes the necessity for, such a tribunal to adjust conflicting interests and controversies between the people and the corporation. It has clothed it with judicial powers to hear and determine, upon notice, questions arising between these parties, but there it stops. Its proceedings and determinations, however characterized, amount to nothing more than an inquest for information. We find no law by which a court can carry into effect the decision. At this point the law fails, not only by its incompleteness and omission to furnish a remedy, but by its express provision that no request or advice of the board, "nor any investigation or report made by" it, shall have the effect to impair the legal rights of any railroad corporation. The attorney-general is given no new power. He may consider the result of the investigation made by the commissioners, and their decision, and so may the company, but we must look further for his right of action, and

the corporation, disregarding the judgment of the commissioners, may continue the management of its business in its own way, may determine, in its own discretion, to what extent and in what manner, the exercise of a public trust requires it to subserve the "security, convenience and accommodation of the public.”

It may say, as in this case, the accommodations we furnish are not sufficient, they are not suitable, the omission to furnish different and better entails injury upon the public, but we will give no better, nor make alterations until we choose. The railroad commissioners are powerless, and as the law now stands, neither the attorney-general of the State nor its courts can make their order effectual.

Cases are cited by the respondent in support of a different contention. Some of them turn upon statutory provisions, as do those arising in Connecticut, where the law makes an order of the commissioners effectual by authorizing its enforcement (State v. N. H. & N. R. R. Co., 37 Conn. 153). Under our statutes the public gain nothing in any legal sense from the determination of the commissioners. It is not enforceable as a judgment; it is not even a command; if it affects the railroad company at all, it is as advice merely. It can compel them only through the interposition of the legislature, who may indeed make it effectual by action upon their report, or by some general law, if it be deemed expedient, giving force and efficacy to their determinations.

In the next place, as the duty sought to be imposed upon the defendant is not a specific duty prescribed by statute either in terms or by reasonable construction, the court cannot, no matter how apparent the necessity, enforce its performance by mandamus. It cannot compel the erection of a station-house, nor the enlargement of one. The power of the company to provide such buildings is, under the statutes, a permissive one only. If the corporation choose to exercise it, it may. The statute does not exact it. It specifies certain things which the company shall not do. It specifies many things which it shall do. The statute is

peremptory as to many matters, but it nowhere says that for its intending passengers, or waiting freights, cover by building of any kind shall be provided. As to that the statute imports an authority only, not a command, to be availed of at the option of the company in the discretion of its directors, who are empowered by statute to manage "its affairs," among which must be classed the expenditure of money for station buildings or other structures for the promotion of the convenience of the public, having regard also to

its own interest. With the exercise of that discretion the legisla ture only can interfere.

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The grievance complained of is an obvious one, but the burden of removing it can be imposed upon the defendant only by legislation. The legislature created the corporation upon the theory that its functions should be exercised for the public benefit. It may add other regulations to those now binding it, but the court can interfere only to enforce a duty declared by law. The one presented in this case is not of that character. Nor can it by any fair or reasonable construction be implied. The whole subject of the relation between the company and its passengers and freightors appears to have been in contemplation of the legis lature. Certain acts towards them as we have seen are made imperative as duties (§ 36); others, and among them the erection of stations and buildings, are made possible by permission (§ 28, subd. 8). We cannot disregard this difference in language, and give by implication to one phrase the same force and meaning which the legislature has by express terms conveyed in the other. We are constrained, therefore, to hold that the appeal must succeed.

The order appealed from should be reversed and the motion denied, with costs.

All concur, RAPALLO, J., in result.

Ordered accordingly.

5. Conclusiveness of Administrative Determinations.

HILTON V. MERRITT.

Supreme Court of the United States. January, 1884.
110 United States 97.

This was a suit brought by the plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs in the Circuit Court, to recover the sum of $1,037.40, an alleged excess of duties exacted by the defendant as collector of customs at the port of New York, on two cases of kid gloves imported by plaintiffs from Paris, France, in the steamer Mosel, in June, 1878.

Mr. Justice WOODS delivered the opinion of the court.

It appears from the bill of exceptions found in the record that the withdrawal entry of the packages on which the duty occasion

ing this controversy arose, was made October 23d, 1878. The local appraiser made and reported to the collector his appraisement of the goods. The importers being dissatisfied therewith, demanded a reappraisment according to law, which was allowed, and a merchant appraiser appointed to be associated with one of the general appraisers.

The merchant appraiser made an appraisement of the standard gloves at 42 francs per dozen, and of the invoice at 16,613.10 francs, which corresponded with the importer's invoice and entered valuation of the merchandise in question.

The general appraiser made a report of his appraisement on the same day, in which he put the value of the standard gloves at 52 francs, and the total valuation at 20,282.85 francs.

Upon receiving these and other appraisements, the collector wrote to the general appraiser a letter.

To this letter the general appraiser replied, by letter of the same date, stating, among other things, as follows:

"As to the invoices under consideration I do not feel at liberty to formally withdraw the reports I have already presented, because they were found on the evidence received on the reappraisements, and I think it best that they should stand as expressing my convictions based on that evidence. If, however, you are willing to retain them as memoranda for that purpose, and will accept as substitutes therefor the additional reports which I present herewith and have designated as 'amended' reports, I shall feel that I have met, to the best of my ability, the considerations which your letter set forth."

The amended report of the general appraiser fixed the value of the merchandise in question in this case at 49 francs

The collector, on October 23d, 1878, assessed the duty, 50 per cent. ad valorem, on the merchandise, based on the valuation of the standard glove at 49 francs, adopting the appraisement returned in the amended report of the general appraiser, that being an advance of the invoice value of 16.2 per cent., and imposed an additional duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem on account of undervaluation in the entry.

The importers, the plaintiffs in error, duly protested against the action of the collector and, under protest, paid the duties assessed and appealed to the Secretary of the Treasury, who, on November 11th, 1878, approved the decision of the collector, holding, however, that the correctness of the valuation was not a matter subject to appeal.

Upon the trial of the case the plaintiffs offered in evidence the records of the proceedings before the merchant appraiser and the general appraiser, including the testimony and various documents before those officers, and subsequently before the collector. They also offered the testimony of one Hildreth, an expert, and others, to show the foreign market value of gloves at the principal markets of France, whence the merchandise in question was imported. They also offered the testimony of the collector to show all the facts within his knowledge, or officially acted upon by him, in relation to the invoice in question, and to show what his experience was in valuing kid gloves. They also offered to prove the cost of the manufacture of goods similar to those in question. All the evidence so offered was excluded by the court, and the plaintiffs excepted.

The question presented by the exceptions of plaintiffs is whether the valuation of merchandise made by the customs officers under the statutes of the United States for the purpose of levying duties thereon is, in the absence of fraud on the part of the officers, conclusive on the importer, or is such valuation reviewable in an action at law brought by the importer to recover back duties paid under protest.

The solution of this question depends upon the provisions of the acts of Congress regulating the subject.

The provisions of the statute law show with what care Congress has provided for the fair appraisal of imported merchandise subject to duty, and they show also the intention of Congress to make the appraisal final and conclusive. When the value of the merchandise is ascertained by the officers appointed by law, and the statutory provisions for appeal have been exhausted, the statute declares that the "appraisement thus determined shall be final and deemd to be the true value, and the duties shall be levied thereon accordingly." This language would seem to leave no room for doubt or construction.

The contention of the appellants is, that after the appraisal of merchandise has been made by the assistant appraiser, and has been reviewed by the general appraiser, and a protest has been entered against his action by the importer, and the collector has appointed a special tribunal, consisting of a general and merchant appraiser, to fix the value, and they have reported each a different valuation to the collector, who has decided between them and fixed the valuation upon which the duties were to be laid, that in every such case the importer is entitled to contest still further the appraisement

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