for in the case before us the Supreme Court neither annulled nor affirmed the proceedings complained of; nor does the language of the new Code, to which we are referred (§ 190, subds. 2 and 3) differ in meaning from that of the old (§ 11), which was in force when the cases above referred to were decided. We think the appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. The writ of certiorari will not issue if there is another adequate remedy, even a statutory appeal. Tucker's petition, 27 N. H. 405; Road in Selim's Grove, 2 S. & R. 419. III. WHAT IS REVIEWABLE. PEOPLE EX REL. MASTERSON V. FRENCH. Court of Appeals of New York. October, 1888. RUGER, Ch. J. The relator was tried before the police commissioners of New York, upon an issue formed by a plea of not guilty to a charge of conduct unbecoming an officer, with a specification alleging that during "his tour of duty at 4:50 p. m., October 14, 1887, he was so much under the influence of intoxicating liquor as to render him unfit for duty," and was found guilty and dismissed from the force. Upon a removal of the proceedings, resulting in the relator's dismissal, to the General Term by certiorari, that court reversed the order of the commissioners and reinstated the relator in his office upon the ground, as stated in the order of reversal, "that the facts proven are insufficient to authorize the judgment and determination by said commissioners." We are not entirely clear as to what the General Term means by saying that their reversal is made for the reason that the facts proven are insufficient to authorize the decision of the commissioners. If this language be taken literally and held to mean just what it says, that the charge proved did not authorize the order made by the commissioners, the decision was manifestly erroneous. The order, as thus construed, presented a question of law simply as to whether the board had authority, under the rule applicable to the subject, to dismiss an officer for the cause stated. Those rules expressly provide that any member of the police force may be reprimanded, forfeit his pay, or be dismissed from the service for either of the following offenses, viz.: Intoxication, neglect of duty, or conduct unbecoming an officer. The case is, therefore, brought directly within the letter and spirit of the rule, and fully justified the order of dismissal. Under the practice prior to the Code, the General Term had power to examine the evidence returned upon a common law certiorari, only for the purpose of seeing whether the subordinate tribunal had kept within its jurisdiction, and that there was evidence legitimately tending to support its decision, and no rule of law affecting the right of the relator had been violated. People ex rel. Murphy v. French, 92 N. Y. 309; People ex rel. Hart v. Bd. of Fire Comrs. 82 id. 360. By section 2140 of the Code of Civil Procedure their jurisdiction was somewhat enlarged, and they are now, when there is any competent proof of the charges made, authorized to review the facts and determine whether there was "upon all the evidence, such a preponderance of proof against the existence of any of those facts, that the verdict of a jury affirming the existence thereof, rendered in an action in the Supreme Court, triable by jury, would be set aside by the court as against the weight of evidence." It is quite impossible, we think, to bring this case within the class authorized to be reviewed by the General Term upon the facts. The fact in controversy under the issue made was whether, upon the occasion in question, the relator was rendered unfit for duty by reason of his intoxication. The proof on this question was clear and positive, and practically undisputed on the trial. There was here no such conflict of evidence, much less such a preponderance of proof, as authorized a reversal by the General Term of the determination of the commissioners within the rule prescribed by the Code. Conceding the existence of an ailment on the part of the relator, as claimed by him, it affords no justification of his conduct. Neither does it produce conflict of evidence upon the issue tried, but operated, at the most, as a palliation of his offense entitling him, perhaps, to the favorable consideration of his judges in determining the degree of his punishment. If, however, we should give a strained construction to the language of the General Term, and hold that they thereby intended to pass upon the adequacy of the excuse offered by the relator, and determined that it was sufficient to purge the offense, we still think they exceeded the authority for review conferred upon them by the Code. Upon the view we take of the case, it stands as though the relator had pleaded guilty to the charge and alleged the extenuating circumstances in mitigation of the punishment which he had incurred by reason of his offense. This would present a question pertaining solely to the general government and discipline of the force, and must, from the nature of things, rest wholly in the discretion of the commissioners. Such a question we do not think reviewable in an appellate court. When a dereliction of duty on the part of an officer has been proved, the sufficiency of an excuse therefor, presents no question of law or fact for the courts, but is addressed solely to the judgment and discretion of those who are primarily charged with the duty of maintaining the discipline and efficiency of the force. The government of a police force assimilates to that required in the control of a military body, and the interference of an extraneous power in its practical control and direction, must always be mischievous and destructive of the discipline and habits of obedience, which should govern its subordinate members. If its determinations upon all questions are subject to review, and appeals to some tribunal outside the force may be taken without restraint, it must necessarily lead to a want of respect towards their official superiors, and an impairment of the habits of obedience and discipline which are so essential to the efficiency and good conduct of a well regulated police force. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this question was exclusively for the consideration of the commissioners, and that the appellate court had no authority to review the exercise of their discretion on the subject. People ex rel. Hart v. Brd. of Fire Comrs., supra. The order of the General Term should be reversed and that of the commissioners affirmed, with costs against the relator in both courts. All concur. Ordered accordingly. IV. COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION. EX PARTE VALLANDIGHAM. Supreme Court of the United States. December, 1863. This case arose on the petition of Clement L. Vallandigham for a certiorari, to be directed to the Judge Advocate General of the Army of the United States, to send up to this court, for its review, the proceedings of a military commission, by which the said Vallandigham had been tried and sentenced to imprisonment: Mr. Justice WAYNE, court: delivered the opinion of the Our first remark upon the motion for a certiorari is, that there is no analogy between the power given by the Constitution and law of the United States to the Supreme Court, and the other inferior courts of the United States, and to the judges of them, to issue such processes, and the prerogative power by which it is done in England. The purposes for which the writ is issued are alike, but there is no similitude in the origin of the power to do it. In England the court of King's Bench has a superintendence over all courts of an inferior criminal jurisdiction, and may, by the plentitude of its power, award a certiorari to have any indictment removed and brought before it; and where such certiorari is allowable, it is awarded at the instance of the king, because every indictment is at the suit of the king, and he has a prerogative of suing in whatever court he pleases. The courts of the United States derive authority to issue such a writ from the Constitution and the legislation of Congress. To place the two sources of the right to issue the writ in obvious contrast, and in application to the motion we are considering for its exercise in this court, we will cite so much of the third article of the Constitution as we think will best illustrate the subject. "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassa dors, other public ministers and consuls," &c., &c., and "in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." Then Congress passed the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States (1 Stat. at Large, 73, chap. 20), and in the 13th section of it declared that the Supreme Court shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers or their domestics or other domestic servants as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the laws of nations, and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction, of suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party. In the same section, the Supreme Court is declared to have appellate jurisdiction in cases hereinafter expressly provided. In this section, it will be perceived that the jurisdiction given, besides that which is mentioned in the preceding part of the section, is an exclusive jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers or their domestics or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the laws of nations, and original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party, thus guarding them from all other judicial interference, and giving to them the right to prosecute for their own benefit in the courts of the United States. Thus substantially reaffirming the constitutional declaration, that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, and that it shall have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases before mentioned, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. The appellate powers of the Supreme Court, as granted by the Constitution, are limited and regulated by the acts of Congress, and must be exercised subject to the exceptions and regulations made by Congress. Durousseau v. The United States, 6 Cranch 314; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 119; United States v. Curry, 6 id. 113; Forsyth v. United States, 9 id. 571. In other words, the petition before us we think not to be within the letter or spirit of the grants of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. It is not |