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criminal cases (3 Cranch 169); which could not revise this judgment; could not reverse or affirm it, were the record brought up directly by writ of error. The power, however, to award writs of habeas corpus is conferred expressly on this court by the fourteenth section of the judicial act and has been repeatedly exercised. No doubt exists respecting the power; the question is, whether this be a case in which it ought to be exercised. The cause of imprisonment is shown as fully by the petitioner as it could appear on the return of the writ; consequently the writ ought not to be awarded, if the court is satisfied that the prisoner would be remanded to prison.

No law of the United States prescribes the cases in which this great writ shall be issued, nor the power of the court over the party brought up by it. The term is used in the Constitution as one which was well understood; and the judicial act authorizes this court, and all the courts of the United States, and the judges thereof, to issue the writ "for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment." This general reference to a power which we are required to exercise, without any precise definition of that power, imposes on us the necessity of making some inquiries into its use, according to that law which is in a considerable degree incorporated into our own. The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is in the nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the commitment. The English judges, being originally under the influence of the crown, neglected to use this writ where the government entertained suspicions which could not be sustained by evidence; and the writ when issued was sometimes disregarded or evaded, and great individual oppression was suffered in consequence of delays in bringing prisoners to trial. To remedy this evil the celebrated habeas corpus act of the 31st of Charles II was enacted, for the purpose of securing the benefits for which the writ was given. This statute may be referred to as describing the cases in which relief is, in England, afforded by this writ to a person detained in custody. It enforces the common law. This statute excepts from those who are entitled to its benefits, persons committed for felony or treason plainly expressed in the warrant, as well as persons convicted or in execution.

The exception of persons convicted applies particularly to the application now under consideration. The petitioner is detained in prison by virtue of the judgment of a court, which court posses

ses general and final jurisdiction in criminal cases. ment be re-examined upon a writ of habeas corpus?

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This writ is, as has been said, in the nature of a writ of error, which brings up the body of the prisoner with the cause of commitment. The court can undoubtedly inquire into the sufficiency of that cause; but if it be the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, especially a judgment withdrawn by law from the revision of this court, is not the judgment in itself sufficient cause? Can the court, upon this writ, look beyond the judgment, and re-examine the charges upon which it was rendered? A judgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which it is rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. The judgment of a court of record, whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this court would be. It is as conclusive on this court as it is on other courts. It puts an end to inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it.

The counsel for the prisoner admit the application of these principles to a case in which the indictment alleges a crime cognizable in the court by which the judgment was pronounced; but they deny their application to a case in which the indictment charges an offense not punishable criminally according to the law of the land. But with what propriety can this court look into the indictment? We have no power to examine the proceedings on a writ of error, and it would be strange if, under color of a writ to liberate an individual from unlawful imprisonment, we could substantially reverse a judgment which the law has placed beyond our control. 'An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous. The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia is a court of record, having general jurisdiction over criminal cases. fense cognizable in any court, is cognizable in that court. If the offense be punishable by law, that court is competent to inflict the punishment. The judgment of such a tribunal has all the obligation which the judgment of any tribunal can have. To determine whether the offense charged in the indictment be legally punishable or not, is among the most unquestionable of its powers and duties. The decision of this question is the exercise of jurisdiction, whether the judgment be for or against the prisoner. The judgment is equally binding in the one case and in the other; and must remain in full force unless reversed regularly by a superior court capable of reversing it.

Without looking into the indictment under which the prosecution against the petitioner was conducted, we are unanimously of opinion that the judgment of a court of general criminal jurisdiction justifies his imprisonment, and that the writ of habeas corpus ought not to be awarded.

On consideration of the rules granted in this case, on a prior day of this term, to wit, on Tuesday, the 26th of January of the present term of this court, and of the arguments thereupon had; it is considered, ordered and adjudged by this court, that the said rule be, and the same is hereby, discharged, and that the prayer of the petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus be, and the same is hereby, Refused.

The rule of the principal case that the writ will issue only on probable cause shown, is not adopted in all states, Nash v. People, 36 N. Y. 607, while in some states its issue may be forced by mandamus, Ex parte Mahone, 30 Ala. 49. Where its issue is not merely ministerial, its allowance or refusal is appealable. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.

III. EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

EX PARTE REED.

Supreme Court of the United States. October, 1879.
100 U. S. 13.

Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court. There is no controversy in this case about the facts. The questions we are called upon to consider are all questions of law. A brief summary of the facts will therefore be sufficient.

The petitioner, Reed, was a clerk of a paymaster in the navy of the United States. He was duly appointed and had accepted by a letter, wherein, as required, he bound himself "to be subject to the laws and regulations for the government of the navy and the discipline of the vessel." His name was placed on the proper muster-roll, and he entered upon the discharge of his duties. While serving in this capacity, charges of malfeasance were preferred against him, and on the 26th of June, 1878, he was directed by Rear Admiral Nichols to appear and answer before a general courtmartial, convened pursuant to an order of that officer on board the United States ship "Essex," then stationed at Rio Janeiro, in Brazil. The court found the petitioner guilty, and sentenced him ac

cordingly. The admiral declined to approve the sentence, and remitted the proceedings back to the court, that the sentence might be revised.

This sentence was different from the preceding one in two particulars, and in both it was more severe. It was approved by the admiral and ordered to be carried out. The court was subsequently dissolved. While in confinement, under the sentence, on board a naval vessel at Boston, the petitioner sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and brought his case before the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. After a full hearing, that court adjudged against him, and ordered him back into the custody of the naval officer to whom the writ was addressed. The petitioner thereupon made this application in order that the conclusions reached by the Circuit Court may be reviewed by this tribunal.

Three points in support of the petition have been brought to our attention. It is insisted

1. That the court had no jurisdiction to try a paymaster's clerk. 2. That when the first sentence was pronounced, the power of the court was exhausted, and that the second sentence was, therefore, a nullity.

3. That the court could revise its former sentence only on the ground of mistake, and that there was no mistake, and consequently no power of revision.

The court had jurisdiction over the person and the case. It is the organism provided by law and clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class of cases. Having had such jurisdiction, its proceedings cannot be collaterally impeached for any mere error or irregularity, if there were such, committed within the sphere of its authority. Its judgments, when approved as required, rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tribunals, including as well the lowest as the highest, under like circumstances. The exercise of discretion, within authorized limits, cannot be assigned for error and made the subject of review by an appellate court.

We do not overlook the point that there must be jurisdiction to give the judgment rendered, as well as to hear and determine the cause. If a magistrate having the authority to fine for assault and battery should sentence the offender to be imprisoned in the peni

tentiary, or to suffer the punishment prescribed for homicide, his judgment would be as much a nullity as if the preliminary jurisdiction to hear and determine had not existed. Every act of a court beyond its jurisdiction is void. Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall. 226; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274; 7 Wait's Actions and Defences, 181. Here there was no defect of jurisdiction as to anything that was done. Beyond this we need not look into the record. Whatever was done, that the court could do under any circumstance, we must presume was properly done. If error was committed in the rightful exercise of authority, we cannot correct it.

A writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the functions of a writ of error. To warrant the discharge of the prisoner, the sentence under which he is held must be, not merely erroneous and voidable, but absolutely void. Ex Parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2. The application for the petition is, therefore, denied.

EX PARTE SIEBOLD.

Supreme Court of the United States. October, 1879.
100 U. S. 371.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. The petitioners in this case, Albert Siebold, Walter Tucker, Martin C. Burns, Lewis Coleman and Henry Bowers, were judges of election at different voting precincts in the city of Baltimore, at the election held in that city, and in the State of Maryland, on the fifth day of November, 1878, at which representatives to the Fortysixth Congress were voted for.

At the November Term of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, an indictment against each of the petitioners was found in said court, for offences alleged to have been committed by them respectively at their respective precincts whilst being such judges of election; upon which indictments they were severally tried, convicted, and sentenced by said court to fine and imprisonment. They now apply to this court for a writ of habeas corpus to be relieved from imprisonment.

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