GUIZOT'S APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION.

393

without being discovered; but it is equally certain that in regard to the treaty itself he was as ignorant as M. Thiers. At all events when differences arise between two political rivals-for the moment coalesced—their several partizans are sure to inflame the differences, and in the present case, there were not only disputes about the past but debates as to the future.

M. Guizot said that the whole question at issue had depended on the strength of Mehemet Ali. The French Government had considered he was strong enough to resist the forces that had been directed against him. If they, the French Government, had been right, the allies would have had to give way, and France, without any effort, would have been triumphant. As it was, the French Government was wrong. Mehemet Ali had been ignominiously worsted; the French Government therefore had to give way, and submit to the consequences of its erroneous opinion. To enter into a war to support Mehemet Ali's pretensions-pretensions which had no other basis but his supposed strengthafter his weakness had been proved, would be an inconsistency in logic and a blunder in policy.

So argued M. Guizot. M. Thiers, on the contrary, maintained that France had been insulted; that a great European question had been settled without her and in spite of her; that the position of Mehemet Ali was now a secondary affair; that French honour was a primary one, and that France, when prepared, should demand, and if necessary insist in arms on, some satisfaction. It is clear that, under such circumstances, no intrigue was necessary to bring forward M. Guizot as the successor of M. Thiers; he became so naturally when the King determined in favour of peace instead of war.

The result of the treaty had thus been the defeat of Mehemet Ali; the overthrow of a warlike Ministry in France; and the installation of a peaceful one; but the affairs of the East were not yet settled, and the peaceful Ministry said, 'We are peaceful, therefore let us have

the air of doing what the warlike ministry could not do.'

It will be seen what Lord Palmerston says on this subject:

Carlton Terrace: Nov. 26, 1840.

My dear Granville,―There are several objections to authorising M. Guizot to say that the intervention of France has induced the allies to grant Egypt to Mehemet Ali. First of all, to do so would imply on our part an engagement towards France which we never have taken, and which we have pointedly, by my despatch of the 2nd of November, as well as by other despatches, explained that we have not taken. We have informed France that we have advised the Sultan to leave Mehemet Ali in Egypt, if Mehemet shall submit within a certain period of time; but we have also explained, that if Mehemet shall not so submit, he must take the consequences, and abide the chances which await him. We have never told France that Mehemet would at all events be left in Egypt; and therefore we could not acquiesce in a declaration by which the French Ministers would be able to say that the interference of France has retained Mehemet in Egypt.

Besides, we cannot acknowledge any protectorship of Mehemet Ali in France. Mehemet is the subject of the Sultan, and nothing more, and never can or will be anything more; and neither France, nor any other foreign Power, has any right whatever to erect itself into the protector of that subject against his legitimate sovereign, unless France intends to make war upon the Sultan.

I am very sorry to find that M. Guizot is still hankering after Mehemet Ali, and clinging to the broken-down policy of

Thiers.

Pray communicate the substance of this letter to M. Guizot.

The crowning event of the campaign had yet to come. St. John d'Acre was supposed to be impregnable, and had resisted all the efforts of Napoleon. It was now taken by the British fleet after a three hours' bombardment. This exploit-for such it was brought about Mehemet's submission, and he was allowed to retain Egypt, but was compelled to restore Syria to the Sultan.

DECLINES CONCESSIONS TO FRENCH VANITY. 395

Foreign Office: Nov. 27, 1840.

My dear Granville, This is indeed glorious news from Syria; and our fleet has maintained its old reputation. This exploit must settle the Eastern Question, and will, moreover, when coupled with our previous successes in Syria, place England on a footing with respect to other Powers which will be greatly conducive to the permanent maintenance of

peace.

This result will also render Guizot's task more easy; for nobody can think in France of going to war now to revive a lead man.

Carlton Terrace: Nov. 30, 1840.

In your letter of the 20th you say that what the French wish is, that the final settlement of the Eastern Question shall not appear to have been concluded without their concurrence.' But this is exactly what I now wish should appear. If France had joined us in July, and had been party to the coercive measures we undertook, we should have been delighted to have had her assistance, and she would then have come in as an ally and protector of the Sultan. But France having then stood aloof, and having since that time avowedly taken part with the Pacha, morally although not physically, if she were now to come in and to be a party to the final settlement, it would not be as a friend of the Sultan, but as the protector of Mehemet Ali; and of course we could not permit her to meddle with the affair in that capacity and with such a view.

As to the stale pretence of wounded amour propre and mortified vanity, the recent debates prove that she acted from much deeper and more rational motives than vanity and amour propre, and that she had laid down to herself during the last fifty years a systematic plan of aggrandisement in the Levant, to the intended detriment of England. It is the being baffled in this scheme when close upon its accomplishment that excited the fury which has lately burst forth; and the fury was the more intense and ungovernable, because they who felt it could not in decency avow its real cause, and were obliged to charge it upon feelings of which any man out of his teens must necessarily be ashamed.

The following letter of the 8th December shows Lord Palmerston at the culminating point of his desires :

Foreign Office: Dec. 8, 1840. My dear Granville,-This day has brought us a flight of good news: Mehemet's submission, Dost Mahomed's defeat, and the occupation of Chusan. The first settles the TurcoEgyptian question. The great point now will be to decide on what yet remains to be arranged, in such a way that Mehemet shall be really and bona fide a subject of the Sultan, and not a protected dependent and tool of France.

One general result of this long but successful contest over Eastern affairs was to produce the same respect for the names of Palmerston and England in the East, as had been already produced in Europe. Those names were whispered in the tents of the Arabs with fear and reverence. Who could measure the strength of that nation which had so easily and so rapidly accomplished such mighty results? They saw that England acted with energy and decision, and carried out to its full accomplishment whatever she announced to be her set intention. No wonder that the star of Queen Victoria appeared to them to be in the ascendant.

CHAPTER XII.

AFFGHANISTAN AND CHINA-DISPUTES WITH NAPLES AND UNITED STATES-SPEECH AT TIVERTON ON DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENTRETIREMENT OF MELBOURNE MINISTRY.

THE narrative of Turkish and Egyptian affairs must now be succeeded by a brief account of what had been passing relative to the affairs that Lord Palmerston has just alluded to, in Affghanistan and China; for though they did not belong practically to the Foreign Office, they were within the range of its administration.

Our relations with Eastern nations were until lately managed by companies. This arrangement was on the one hand disadvantageous-by confining commercial relations; while on the other it was advantageous-by regulating political ones. The company was represented by a small body having the enjoyment of privileges on the acceptance of obligations, which a company could easily compel its own limited number of servants to observe.

When the Chinese trade became open to all comers, all sorts of irregularities commenced, the most notable of which was the smuggling of opium contrary to Chinese law. An officer, called a superintendent, who had been sent out to regulate our commercial intercourse, ought to have had the power to do so; but he was impotent; and the question constantly arose as to whether he should attempt to protect the illicit practices of his countrymen, or allow them to be put down and punished. The declaration that we were not to protect British subjects in violating the Chinese laws came out from the Home Government, but it came out late.