ROWE ROWE. [*296] Rowe, of &c., 600l., for which I do consent to pay 4l. 10s. per cent. per annum from the date hereof." On the 24th of June, 1831, the executor of R. Sobey borrowed of William Rowe, the husband of the plaintiff, a further sum of 6001. upon his promissory note. On the 11th of April, 1843, Mr. and Mrs. Rowe both applied to the executor of R. Sobey, as follows: "DEAR SIR,-We give you notice to pay the loan you hold of us, on or before Midsummer next, when your year ends." In answer to this application the executor's solicitor sent *to Mr. Rowe a letter, stating, that his client would be prepared with the amount necessary to discharge the demand; but that, as a portion of it, as he understood, was settled on Mrs. Rowe, it would be necessary to see her marriage settlement, in order draw the release. On the 12th of April, 1843, Mr. Rowe wrote to the solicitor as follows: "In reply to your letter I beg to say, there is no marriage settlement, and to refer you to the late Mr. John Sobey's will, where it is particularly stated my wife's receipt shall be a sufficient release for the trustees." Upon the receipt of this letter the executor, in December, 1843, with the privity and consent of the plaintiff, paid both sums of 600l., with interest, to Mr. Rowe; and thereupon Mr. Rowe delivered up the promissory note, and also the acknowledgment for the legacy of 600l., and at the same time signed a receipt for the principal money and interest due in respect of the legacy. Mr. Rowe did not invest his wife's legacy of 6001. On the 10th of November, 1845, he made his will, containing the following bequests, on which the question in the cause turned: "I give to my wife all my household furniture, plate, linen, and watch, wearing apparel, provisions and liquors that shall be in my house at the time of my decease; and also 2,8001. in lawful money, to be paid to her at my decease, or securities for the above sum now in my possession for the same amount, if my said wife, Elizabeth Rowe, like to receive the same. I also appoint my nephew, Joseph Rowe, senior, son of my brother Joseph Rowe, of Falmouth, to be my sole executor, to pay all my just debts, funeral expenses, costs of proving this my will, taking to himself all the remainder and residue of the said property of whatsoever kind and wheresoever." Mr. Rowe died on the 4th of December, 1845. Mr. Rowe's executor by his answer admitted that he had received assets sufficient to answer what, if anything, was due to the plaintiff from Mr. Rowe's estate, on account of the legacy of 6001. and the interest thereon. The legacy of 2,8001. had been paid to the plaintiff, who, on the 20th of April, 1846, executed to the defendant a release of all her claims under the will. Mr. Russell and Mr. Dickinson, for the plaintiff, cited [Rich v. Cockell (1), Moodie v. Reid (2), Wathen v. Smith (3), Wood v. Wood (4), and some cases from reports of earlier date]. Mr. Swanston and Mr. T. H. Terrell cited Wallace v. Pomfret (5), and Bartlett v. Gillard (6). THE VICE-CHANCELLOR : The just inference from the evidence, I think, is, that the plaintiff did not intend to allow her husband to receive the 600l. which belonged to her for her separate use, with the intention of giving him that money or relinquishing to him her right to it. I think that the proper conclusion is, that, at the time of his death, he was, in equity, indebted to her in this sum. Then comes the question, whether the legacy is to be taken as a satisfaction of the debt. With reference to that point it is well to observe, that the testator, the husband, thus expresses himself: "I also appoint my nephew" "to be my sole executor, to pay all my just debts, funeral expenses, *costs of proving this my will, taking to himself all the remainder and residue of the said property, of whatsoever kind and wheresoever." The authorities do not, I think, render it right for me to disregard these expressions on a question of intention. This, however, is not all. Lord LYNDHURST, in Bartlett v. Gillard (7), held, that the circumstance of the gift of the original annuity to the lady being for her separate use, and of the other annuity given to her not being for her separate use, was a material (1) 7 R. R. 227 (9 Ves. 369). And see Cuton v. Ridout, 1 Mac. & G. 599; S. C. 2 Hall & Tw. 33. (2) 16 R. R. 257 (1 Madd. 516). (3) 20 R. R. 302 (4 Madd. 325). (4) 64 R. R. 54 (7 Beav. 183). ROWE r. ROWE. [297] [ *298 ] ROWE v. ROWE. fact. Whether I should have thought such a difference material, I need not say; but I find that authority, and I follow it. There is a distinction in the circumstance, that there the legatee was not the wife of the testator; whereas, in this case, she was the legatee, the creditor, and the wife of the testator. At the instant, therefore, of his death, she became an unmarried woman. That is a distinction; but still, I do not think it enough to support a variance in decision between the two cases. Assuming the case of Bartlett v. Gillard to be right, as I do, and not saying what I should have thought, but for the decision, I am of opinion, that the correct conclusion in the present case is in favour of the plaintiff, and I so decide. The lady is entitled to the 600l., with interest at 41. per cent., from the death of the testator. There can be no costs on either side. 1848. May 11. KNIGHT BRUCE, V.-C. [ 301 ] [ *302 ] NUNN v. HARVEY. (2 De G. & Sm. 301-303.) Upon the petition of an infant plaintiff for an order for present maintenance and education, and to provide for a future increased allowance on his entering at a specified time and continuing at the University, the COURT ordered a present allowance, and made a prospective provision for an increased allowance from the future date until twenty-one, or the further order of the Court, to be applied by the testamentary guardian of the infant. THIS was the petition of the infant plaintiff in the suit, which had been instituted for the administration of the infant's estate. The following facts and circumstances appeared upon the affidavit in support of the petition: The clear income of the infant's property in Court was 9167. a-year. Under an order made on a former petition, the annual *sum of 2001. was payable for the maintenance and education of the infant whilst at school. The petitioner having attained the age of sixteen, his testamentary guardian was desirous to place him under the care of a private tutor for two years, to prepare him for the University of Cambridge, and he proposed to pay 2001. a-year for his board and education. It was estimated that 100l. would be required, at the end of two years, to pay the caution-money, fees, and incidental expenses on the infant's entering the University; and that 400l. a-year would be a proper sum for his maintenance and education, from the time of his entering the University, until he should attain his age of twenty-one years. The prayer was for an increase of the allowance for the two years to 3001. a-year; that the 100l. might be raised for the caution-money and expenses on the infant's entering the University; and that, after the 19th of June, 1849, the income of 300l. a-year might cease, and that thenceforth 400l. a-year might be allowed. during the minority, or until the further order of the Court. Mr. Borill, for the petition, asked that an order might be made without a reference, by one order providing prospectively for the infant's maintenance, according to the prayer of the petition. His Honour made an order, of which the following is an extract: "This Court doth order that the present allowance of 2001. a-year, for the maintenance and education of the petitioner, the infant plaintiff William Henry Nunn, do cease as from the 19th day of December, 1847; and it is ordered, that the allowance for the maintenance and education of the petitioner be the sum of 4001. a-year, as from the said 19th day of December, 1847. But it is ordered, *that the sum of 300l. a-year only be raised and paid on account of such allowance from the said 19th day of December, 1847, to the 19th day of June, 1849: and, from and after the said 19th day of June, 1849, it is ordered that the full amount of such allowance of 4001. a-year be raised and paid for the maintenance and education of the petitioner, until he shall attain the age of twenty-one years." NUNN v. HARVEY. [ *303 ] MOORE v. GREG. (2 De G. & Sm. 304-308.) [AFFIRMED on Appeal, as reported in 2 Ph. 717; see 78 R. R. 254.] 1848. June 2. KNIGHT BRUCE, V.-C. [304] LORD v. THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF COPPER (2 De G. & Sm. 308-320; on app. 2 Ph. 740; 1 Hall & Tw. 85; 18 L. J. Ch. [REVERSED on appeal, as reported in 2 Ph. 740; see 78 R. R. 270.] 1848. June 2. KNIGHT BRUCE, V.-C. [308] 1848. June 2. KNIGHT BRUCE, V.-C. [321] [ *322 ] WRIGHT v. SNOWE. (2 De G. & Sm. 321-324.) Where a person represents to another that he is of age, and executes to him a release, upon which the latter acts: Held, that he could not afterwards impeach the validity of the release on the ground of his minority; and that it was immaterial whether he was aware or not of the incorrectness of the representation. Where the answer of an executrix alleged a release to have been executed by the plaintiff, a legatee, and that he had then stated that he was of age, but contained admissions from which his minority at the time might be inferred: Held, that such admissions did not entitle the plaintiff to an inquiry whether he was a minor at the date of the transaction. THIS was a bill for an account, by the residuary legatee under a will, against the executrix, alleging that the defendant refused to account. The bill stated a pretence, on the part of the defendant, that the plaintiff had executed a release, and charged the contrary of such pretence to be true; and that the plaintiff had never executed any release since he came of age; and that, if he signed any such release, he was at the time under the age of twenty-one years, and that the same was void. The defendant by her answer stated the terms of the release, which was dated November 9th, 1841, and that it had been executed by the plaintiff. It recited the terms of an arrangement which had been entered into for settling certain claims therein mentioned on the testator's estate, and upon which the defendant had since acted, and had made various specified payments, including one of 150l. to the plaintiff. The answer then contained the following statements, with regard to the circumstances respecting the execution of the release: That, at the time of the arrangement and release, one Mr. Cookney was the defendant's solicitor; that the defendant was informed and believed that the plaintiff then stated and represented to Mr. Cookney that he was then of the age of twenty-one years and upwards; and also stated to a clerk of Mr. Cookney as follows: "Thomas Wright, christened at Haggerston New Church, Kingsland Road; born 16th March, 1819;" that the clerk at the same time took down such statement in writing, and that such statement in writing was now in the defendant's possession or power; that she was informed and believed that Mr. Cookney, in consequence of such statement and representation of the plaintiff, directed a clerk then in his service to go to Haggerston and search *the registers; and that the clerk did so, and found an entry, which the answer set out, and according to which the plaintiff was baptized |