In Abrahams v. Taunton, there was no evidence that the award had come to the party's knowledge. (MAULE, J. The service of the copy and exhibiting of the original, must be contemporaneous. A man upon whom a copy is served is not bound to keep it in his pocket until the original is shown to him.) It is enough if he has substantial information as to what is required of him. WILDE, Ch. J.: It is highly inexpedient that any uncertainty should exist as to the practice upon applications of this sort: at the same time, it is not easy to lay down any general rule. Without, therefore, *saying how far these rules are to be considered analogous to motions for attachment, it is enough to say that there has been a clear and recognised mode of service of an award, in order to bring the party into contempt for not performing it, and which is only to be departed from under very special circumstances, viz. by personally delivering to him a copy of the award, and at the same time showing him the original. Here, a copy was served at the time when a demand was made in respect of a subject-matter totally different from that to which this rule relates. It seems to me that the award has not been well served, and that there is an entire absence of circumstances which might dispense with regular service. The rule, therefore, cannot be made absolute. COLTMAN, J.: I am of the same opinion. It is essential that there should be an intelligible and well-understood rule upon this subject: and there undoubtedly is a well-established rule; and that is, that, in the absence of special circumstances to dispense with it, there must be a personal service of the award, by delivering a copy and showing the original at the same time. That course has not been adopted here, and there are no special circumstances to justify a departure from it. MAULE, J.: This is an application for a rule of Court, in order to enforce the summary remedy given by the statute 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18, LLOYD V. HARRIS [73] LLOYD v. HARRIS. [ *74 ] [175] which enacts, amongst other things, that all rules of courts of common law, whereby any sum of money, or any costs, charges, or expenses, shall be payable to any person, shall have the effect of judgments in the superior courts of common law, and the persons to whom any such moneys, or costs, charges, or expenses shall be payable, shall be deemed judgment-creditors within the meaning of the Act; and all remedies thereby given to judg ment-creditors are in like manner given to persons to whom any moneys, or costs, charges, or expenses are by such orders or rules respectively directed to be paid. This practice was first introduced by a dictum of the Court of Queen's Bench in the case of Jones v. Williams; and it has since been adopted by all the Courts, and may now be considered as established (1). I think, however, that this summary remedy, or, rather, the proceeding that leads to it, ought not to be granted, unless the party against whom the application is made, has knowingly refused to do something which he was bound by a rule of Court to do. The present rule calls upon Mr. Lloyd to pay 5121. 15s., which it is said he has been directed by an award to pay. Now, I think that both principle and justice require that a man should not be subjected to an order of this sort, unless it is made to appear that he has wilfully refused to do what the award requires of him, with full knowledge, or means of knowledge, of his liability to do it: he cannot be said to have wilfully refused to perform the award, unless he has had due notice of the award and of the rule of Court, and has been properly called upon to perform it. There is but one known and established mode of giving notice of the award. If this were res integra, I should say the good sense of the thing requires that the party should be furnished with a copy, and at the same time be shown the original. And that is the practice in all cases. In Rex v. The Inhabitants of Alnwick, where the question was, whether an order of removal of a pauper had been well served, ABBOTT, Ch. J., says: "The service, in order to be valid, must be either by delivery of the order itself, or by leaving a copy of the order, and at the same time producing the original." In order to constitute a proper (1) Further consideration, however, has at length inclined this Court to take a more strict, and probably more correct, view of the statute, and to throw some doubt upon this "established practice" for, in a recent case of Creswick v. Harrison, M. T. 1850 (Nov. 22), they construed the statute as merely intending to give a new and additional force to such rules and orders as the Courts were already in the habit of granting, but not to authorise them to make rules which they never thought of making before. demand of a sum of money under an award, the party should be personally served with a copy, and should have an opportunity of satisfying himself at the time that it is a true copy, by comparing it with the original. Here, the copy was delivered on the 21st of October, no offer being then made to show the original; two days afterwards, when the money was demanded, the original was for the first time produced. That clearly is not a good service: and this is not a mere technical rule, but one that is essential to the due administration of justice. I think the party has not had that sort of notice which is essential to found a summary proceeding of this nature; and therefore I agree with the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE that this rule should be discharged. The rest of the COURT concurring, Rule discharged, with costs. LLOYD v. HARRIS. GREENE v. REECE. (8 C. B. 88-92.) The 26th section of the Solicitors Act, 1843, only disables an uncertificated attorney from suing for fees, rewards, or disbursements for any business, matter, or thing done by him as an attorney or solicitor in some suit or proceeding in one of the Courts mentioned in the Act. ASSUMPSIT. The declaration stated that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of 400l., for the work and labour, care, diligence, journeys, and attendances of the plaintiff, before then done, performed, and bestowed by the plaintiff as the attorney and solicitor of and for the defendant, and otherwise for the defendant, on his retainer, and at his request, and for fees due and of right payable from the defendant to the plaintiff in respect thereof, and for materials and necessary things by the plaintiff provided in and about the said work and labour, for the defendant, and at his request; and for money lent, &c.; and for money had and received, &c. There was a second count, for money found due upon an account stated (1). The defendant pleaded, amongst other pleas, fourthly, as to the (1) The particulars of demand, which were annexed to the paper-book, claimed 270l. 08. 2d. “for work done during the years 1847 and 1848, by the plaintiff, as an attorney, solicitor, and otherwise, materials provided, money paid, &c., the full particulars whereof 1849. June 19. [88] [ *90 ] GREENE REECE. [89] sum of 631. 8s. 6d., parcel of the said sum of 4001. in the first count mentioned, that the said debt or sum of 631. 8s. 6d., parcel &c., was and is composed, and consists, of certain fees, rewards, and disbursements alleged to be due to the plaintiff for and in respect of business, matters, and things done in England by him, the plaintiff, as an attorney and solicitor for him, the defendant, after the passing of the *said Act of Parliament (1) relating to attorneys and solicitors practising in England and Wales; that the plaintiff had not, at the times when the said business, matters, and things were done by him as such attorney and solicitor as aforesaid, or at any or either of such times, obtained a stamped certificate authorising him to practise as such attorney or solicitor, which was then in force; and that the said business, matters, and things, and each and every of them, were and was done while the plaintiff was without such certificate as last aforesaid. Verification. To this plea, the plaintiff demurred specially, assigning the following causes: That it was not alleged in, nor did it appear from, the plea, that the said business, matters, and things therein mentioned were done by the plaintiff as an attorney or solicitor in or relating to the suing, prosecuting, defending, or carrying on of any action or suit, or other proceeding or proceedings, in any Court whatsoever; that, although the first count related, not only to the work and labour, care, diligence, journeys, and attendances of the plaintiff, done, performed, and bestowed by the plaintiff as an attorney and solicitor, but also to work and labour, care, diligence, journeys, and attendances done, performed, and bestowed by the plaintiff otherwise than as an attorney or solicitor, the said plea was pleaded generally as to the sum of 631. 8s. 6d., parcel of the sum of money in the said first count mentioned, without any limitation of the said fourth plea to such of the said work and labour, care, diligence, journeys, and attendances in the said first count mentioned, as were done, performed, and bestowed by the plaintiff as an attorney and solicitor, and not otherwise; and that, although the first count included causes of action for *money lent by the plaintiff to the defendant, and for money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff, as to which causes of action the plea could be no answer, the said plea was pleaded generally as to the said sum of 631. 8s. 6d., parcel &c., without excepting or excluding from the application of the said fourth plea such lastmentioned causes of action, &c. (1) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, referred to in a preceding plea. Joinder in demurrer. Talfourd, Serjt., in support of the demurrer : The main objection to the plea, is, that it does not show that the work and labour was done by the plaintiff as attorney or solicitor in the conduct of any proceeding at law or in equity: it merely alleges that the debt as to which the plea is pleaded, consists of fees, rewards, and disbursements alleged to be due to the plaintiff for and in respect of business done by him as an attorney and solicitor for the defendant, after the passing of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, and that, at the time the said business was so done, the plaintiff was uncertificated. The defence is founded upon the 27th section of the statute. This question has already been before the Court of Exchequer in a case of Richards v. Lord Suffield (1), where it was held that the 26th *section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73 only disables an uncertificated attorney from suing for fees, rewards, or disbursements for any business, matter, or thing done by him as an attorney or solicitor in some suit or proceeding in one of the Courts mentioned in the Act, and not for business done which had no reference to such suits or proceedings. It is impossible to distinguish that case from the present. A party may be the attorney of another, without being an officer of any Court. J. Brown, contrà, prayed leave to amend; which was granted, upon the usual terms. Rule accordingly. GREENE v. REECE. [91] [92] WORTHINGTON v. WARRINGTON (2). (8 C. B. 134-142; S. C. 18 L. J. C. P. 350.) A. entered into possession of premises under an agreement with B., under which he was to hold them as tenant for two years, at the yearly rent of 501., with liberty to him to make, at his own expense, such alterations and additions to the premises as he might think proper, the same being improvements, and A. to have the option of purchasing the premises, at any time during the two years, for 6007., "it being understood between the parties that B. was possessed of the premises for his own life and the life of C., and of the survivor of them." It being, however, discovered that B. had not the precise interest mentioned in the agreement, A. brought assumpsit to (1) 76 R. R. 702 (2 Ex. 616). (2) See Engel v. Fitch (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 314, 37 L. J. Q. B. 145, in Ex. Ch. (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B, 659, 38 L. J. Q. B. 304; Bain v. Fothergill (1874), 1849. June 21 [134] |