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provide it was a problem. Considering that Springfield was in the midst of a somewhat discontented population, Knox was afraid that a small guard might challenge attack rather than avert it. A large guard would involve large expense; and where was the money to be found? From this dilemma he sought escape by shifting the responsibility upon the government of the state. He wrote to Governor Bowdoin on September 16, setting forth his uneasiness about the Continental stores, and requesting such protection for them as the governor might think needful. The federal authorities, he took pains to explain, had refrained from setting a guard because they were confident of the fidelity of Massachusetts, and unwilling even to seem to call that fidelity in question. Moreover, it would have been expensive.1

Governor Bowdoin promptly handed the responsibility back to Knox. The Secretary at War, he replied, knew better than he how strong a guard was required. He had therefore issued orders to General Shepard to raise whatever number of the Hampshire militia Knox might request. The latter, meantime, had returned to New York and had submitted the report of September 20. On receiving the governor's letter, he again addressed Congress, on September 28, asking whether Shepard should be ordered to raise a guard at once, or be left to act upon his own judgment. The latter course was the one which, under the circumstances, he recommended. The best solution of all, he said, would of course be to send to Springfield a body of four or five hundred federal troops. He refrained, however, for financial reasons, from pressing such action upon Congress. In reply Congress passed on September 29 its first vote with reference to the Shays Rebellion. The Secretary at War was directed to proceed to Springfield and there take such measures as he should judge necessary for the protection of the arsenal. Armed thus with complete authority from both Congress and the government of Massachusetts, Knox started at once for Springfield. Before he reached that place, however, the first crisis had already arrived and passed.

Tuesday, September 26, had been set for the opening of a term of the Supreme Court at Springfield. For reasons stated above the insurgents decided to intervene. General Shepard, however, not only ordered out the militia, but also issued a call for volunteers. In

1Ibid., 551-553 (Knox to Bowdoin, September 16, 1786); 567-571 (Report of Knox to Congress, September 28, 1786).

2 Ibid., 559 (Bowdoin to Knox, September 19, 1786); 567–571 (Report of Knox to Congress, September 28, 1786); 575 (Knox to the President of Congress, September 29, 1786); Secret Journals of Congress, I. (Domestic Affairs), 266–267.

response, eight or nine hundred men, including many of the leading citizens of the county, assembled to protect the court and guard the arsenal. They were so inadequately armed, however, that Shepard, though he had no permission from Knox, felt obliged to demand the key of the magazine, and take a field-piece and four hundred smallarms to supply his men. On the morning of the twenty-sixth the justices arrived. The insurgents were not far behind. Under the protection of Shepard's men the court was formally opened, but the justices seem to have been thoroughly frightened and transacted hardly any business. The insurgents, led by Daniel Shays, certainly made a threatening appearance. They marched past the court-house in military order with loaded pieces. They demanded that no indictments should be returned against their leaders, that judgments. in civil cases should be suspended, and that the militia should disband. They even talked of attacking the troops and seizing the arsenal. One suspects, however, that all this was largely bravado, for, though the mob outnumbered General Shepard's force, they were so poorly armed that they would certainly have been worsted in a contest. Fortunately, by a curious device the danger of a collision was averted. At a conference between the insurgent leaders and the militia officers it was agreed that both parties should disband, and on Thursday afternoon this arrangement was faithfully carried out. On the same day the justices concluded their insignificant proceedings, adjourned sine die, and thankfully took their departure alive and safe. Quiet supervened, but three results were apparent the session of the court had been a failure; the insurgents were elated by their success; the United States arsenal remained as defenceless as before.1

When Knox reached Springfield, probably on the following Monday, he was greatly impressed with the gravity of the situation. He was convinced that the prestige of the state government was severely shaken, and that the insurgents were planning a complete political and social revolution. As to the arsenal he was in greater perplexity than ever. He was sure that the insurgents would before long attempt its capture, but General Shepard's bargain with them stood in the way of raising a guard large enough to be of any

1 On these occurrences at Springfield see note 2, p. 42; also Papers of the Old Congress, No. 150, I. 579-580 (Shepard to Knox, Springfield, September 29, 1786); 583-584 (Knox to the President of Congress, Hartford, October 1, 1786); 587-590 (Knox to the President of Congress, Springfield, October 3, 1786).

2 Knox MSS., New England Historic Genealogical Society, Boston, XIX. 23 (Knox to John Jay, Springfield, October 3, 1786); Papers of the Old Congress, No. 150, II. 67-71 (Report of Knox to the President of Congress, October 18,

service. Since nothing could be done at Springfield, Knox decided to appeal once more to Governor Bowdoin, and accordingly set out for Boston. Just what he wished the governor to do, he would probably have found it difficult to say. His reports show that he hoped to see at Springfield a strong body of militia recruited by the state government at state expense; but where this force was to be raised, and how it was to be brought to Springfield before the insurgents should have sacked the arsenal, his writings fail to explain.

On reaching Boston, Knox laid the matter before the governor, and the governor invited to confer with the Secretary and himself a number of his most confidential advisers. Among those present was Rufus King, at that time a member of Congress for Massachusetts. At this meeting was developed the plan, which has always been ascribed to a committee of Congress, that the call for troops should originate with the national government. The first question discussed was whether the federal munitions should be protected at Springfield or removed. Every one present preferred the former course. To remove the stores would require as many men as to guard them, and the insurgents would think that they had frightened. both the state and national governments. But how could the insurgents be kept quiet while the state was collecting its forces? The mere knowledge that the arsenal was to be protected might provoke an instant attack. To meet this difficulty the suggestion was made, and unanimously approved, that Congress, without referring to the insurrection, should request the state to furnish a quota of federal troops. It was hoped that in response to this call a force could be assembled without stirring up the insurgents. Having once secured

1 The exact composition of this council is not certain. Knox described it in his letter of October 8 to the President of Congress as "Those gentlemen connected in the affairs of Government, with whom he consulted confidentially, on this occasion" (Papers of the Old Congress, No. 150, II. 17-19). In the report of October 18 it is stated that "The gentlemen with whom he advised on my communications, were of the most respectable character in the state for their political knowledge" (ibid., 67-71). Probably it was a gathering in which the three departments of the state government were all represented. Several such conferences had previously been held on the question of using troops to protect the courts. On September 7, for example, the governor had consulted the council, the justices of the Supreme Court, the attorney general, and such members of both houses of the General Court as were in Boston (Massachusetts Archives, CXC. 242-245).

The date of the meeting, also, is not exactly known. Since Knox, however, was in Springfield on October 3, and on the eighth wrote an account of the conference to the President of Congress, it was probably not earlier than the fifth nor later than the seventh of the month. There is, of course, no mention of the meeting in the files or minutes of the governor's council, for it could not be regarded as a meeting of that body.

these troops, the federal government might use them to protect its property.1

It is impossible to say who originated this device. It is known, however, that King talked with Gerry on this visit to Massachusetts about the probability of an Indian war. A few days later he took an active part in pushing the requisition for troops through Congress. A plausible conjecture-though no more than a conjecturewould be that the artifice was his.2 From whatever source it came, the plan must have strongly appealed to Knox. It seemed to promise complete success to his mission. As has been said, what he most desired was a guard of federal troops at Springfield. It will be seen, moreover, that, for reasons quite apart from the rebellion in Massachusetts, he wished such troops to be raised.

It remained to secure the help of Congress in the stratagem which had been devised. This was a somewhat delicate undertaking. Governor Bowdoin could hardly venture a request to Congress without permission from the General Court; but to breathe the project to the General Court would both betray the secret and defeat the plan. That assembly was not yet ready for decisive action against the insurgents by the state government, much less for federal intervention. The only way, therefore, was to leave the matter informally to the management of the Secretary at War and the Massachusetts delegates in Congress. Knox and King accordingly returned to New York. On the way the former made such arrangements as he could-in which he admitted that he had little faithfor the temporary safety of the arsenal. He directed General Shepard to watch the situation closely, and to call out the militia, if he should see signs of trouble. He also wrote to several Revolutionary officers, urging them to volunteer their services, if help should be required at Springfield. Finally, he arranged with Governor Huntington, of Connecticut, that, in case of need, twelve or fifteen hundred of the Connecticut militia should march to Shepard's assistance.3

On October 18 Congress received from Knox a full report upon the situation in Massachusetts. He spared no emphasis in depicting the dangerous tendencies which he ascribed to the rebellion. He declared that "great numbers of people in Massachusetts and the neighbouring states . . . avow the principle of annihilating all debts 1 Knox to Congress, October 3, 8, and 18 (Papers of the Old Congress, No. 150, I. 587-590; II. 17-19, 67–71).

2

King to Gerry, October 19, 1786, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,

I. 191-192.

3 Knox's report of October 18; also letters to several officers (Knox MSS., XIX. 20, 22, 26, 27).

public and private. . . . It is my firm conviction," he added, "unless the present commotions are checked with a strong hand, that an armed tyranny may be established on the ruins of the present constitution." Nothing, he continued, short of a guard of five hundred men would suffice to protect the arsenal at Springfield. He therefore recommended that the force of seven hundred men then in the service of the United States 1 should be increased to fifteen hundred. The new recruits would guard the arsenal during the coming winter, and, "if they should not be requisite for the same purpose the next spring, they might be marched to the frontier, or disbanded as Congress should think most proper."

1

The report was committed to Messrs. Pettit, Lee, Pinckney, Henry, and Smith. On October 20 this committee presented a report and accompanying resolutions, all of which Congress unanimously approved. These votes provided for an increase in the army of thirteen hundred and forty non-commissioned officers and privates. The total non-commissioned force would then be two thousand and forty strong. Furthermore, nearly all the new recruits were to come from New England, and scarcely less than half from Massachusetts. Of infantry and artillery Rhode Island was to furnish one hundred and twenty men, Connecticut one hundred and eighty, New Hampshire two hundred and sixty, and Massachusetts six hundred and sixty. Outside of New England only Virginia and Maryland were called upon—each to supply a cavalry troop of sixty men. It was further voted that all possible haste should be urged upon the governments of these states; that the governors should be asked to assemble the legislatures, if they were not in session, in order that the quota might be promptly granted. Means for the support and payment of the troops should be devised and reported to Congress by the Board of Treasury.2

Now it would seem obvious that this action of Congress was due to the recent statements of Knox about the insurrection. On the contrary, nothing of the sort can be gathered from the committee's report. That document made no reference whatever to the crisis in Massachusetts. It did give, however, a highly colored account of impending danger from the western Indians. Papers had come in

'Knox to Bowdoin, October 22, 1786 (ibid., 29). Cf. Journals of Congress, April 1, 7, and 12, 1785.

2 Journals of Congress, XI. 186-188 (edition of 1801).

The resolution further provided that the recruits were to serve for three years, unless sooner disbanded. The Secretary at War was to call upon the governments of the states in which the troops were to be raised for such commissioned officers as their respective quotas required. Subject to order from the War Office, the Board of Treasury was to contract for clothing and rations.

AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XI. - 4.

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