people abandoned him, he had to fall, like an idol of wax, melted in the heat of adversity. May we not forget a lesson so terrible, learned at the cost of indescribable sufferings. The introduction to this manuscript of Mabini's on the revolution is in the form of a "Manifesto" to the Filipinos, which is chiefly interesting on autobiographical grounds.1 For Americans, however, it is of especial interest to note the reasons which Mabini assigns for reaching the conclusion that the Filipinos have, by a great majority, willed that the war should stop. Among other things, Mabini seems desirous of asserting that he had been more conservative than radical; at least he asserts that he was one of those who in 1896 thought agitation and work along educative lines better than a campaign of revolt. Looking back, then, upon the whole period of Filipino agitation, and particularly to that phase which began with the formation of the "Liga Filipina" among the educated reformers in 1892 and ended with the Katipunan revolt in 1896, Mabini would stamp himself as one preferring to be enrolled under Rizal's banner rather than that of the revolutionists. In this "manifesto" we have the theorist speculating on theory and practice, saying: "If truth is found in the harmony between reason and experience, so in the harmony between theory and practice is virtue found." "Virtue" has a broader scope of meaning in Spanish than in English, to be sure, but Mabini himself could scarcely have explained just what he meant by this sentence, one of a sort favorite with him. His definition of what religion meant to him is also of interest, especially in connection with his "True Decalogue" of 1898, which has been mentioned above. We may smile at the dominant note of egotism, the occasional touch of childishness, its author's want of experience, and the lack of a saving grace of humor; but this testament of a young-old man on the brink of the grave is too pathetically serious to be dismissed thus, even merely as an individual human document. Viewed as an expression of Filipino racial sentiment, of a nascent patriotism, the still tenacious assertion of a dawning national consciousness, it touches too intimately upon the underlying bases of a grave problem of state now confronting us of America to permit of its going unheeded into the archives of unread documents. Mabini was not a neurotic, errant Filipino genius, though he occasionally appeared in that light; he was the true spokesman of the "Young Filipino Party", the best of whose aims we must hope to see the Filipinos. as a people rise into ability and disposition to carry out. The involved sentences of the original text have been translated It was printed in El Comercio, Manila, July 29 and 30, 1903. very literally, not to run into difficulties of another sort than that of extracting logical meanings from some of them. The document follows: MANIFESTO. Although from May, 1899, till the following November, when I was captured by the American forces, not only did I not occupy any official position, but I also lived at a distance from the Filipino government; nevertheless, having been treated as one of the defenders of the cause of the people, I believe it part of my duty to give account to my compatriots of my efforts, now that I believe it proper to consider them at an end. From my capture until my deportation to Guam, I had the honor to confer in great detail with Generals MacArthur and J. F. Bell over the termination of the war and the pacification of the islands. A summary relation of the general results of these conferences will give an idea of my procedure.' The said generals began by expressing to me their keen desire that I should aid in the pacification of the islands, since by this means alone would the Filipinos come to attain their own well-being. To which I replied that I ardently wished the same thing, and asked them to point out the manner in which they would appreciate my co-operation. They then told me that they would have confidence in me and would accept my services only after I should have recognized unconditionally American sovereignty in the Philippines, especially if I would then aid them in the establishment of a government which they thought the most efficacious for the happiness of the Filipino people. I again replied that, in so far as I should do what they demanded of me, in the state of mind in which my fellow-countrymen then were, the latter would at once withdraw the confidence which they had in me, and, my influence among the Filipinos being lost, I should be of no use for the purposes of pacification nor for any other useful purpose.' 1 On May 5, 1900, General Arthur MacArthur succeeded General Otis as commanding general and military governor in the Philippines, and soon after General James Franklin Bell was called in from the command of the district including Pangasinan province to serve as provost-marshal-general of Manila. After the proclamation of amnesty in June, 1900, many efforts were made, especially by Bell, who often visited Mabini in person, to secure the influence of the latter in behalf of peace. Mabini also had an interview with the newly arrived Taft Commission. Mabini was at this time given quite complete freedom of movement and wrote for the Filipino press when he chose. He would not, however, commit himself to acceptance of American sovereignty. His reasons, outlined below, were given at greater length in the correspondence he had with General Bell, which was published in the Filipino press. 2 Mabini omits one, perhaps the chief, reason why he and others held off from acceptance of the offers for conciliation made by the McKinley administration both through the military authorities at Manila and through the Civil Commission; this was the hope of such an outcome of the presidential election of November, 1900, as would secure the recognition of Filipino independence and The generals mentioned saw nothing in my reply but a pretext for continuing in a state which they characterized as one of systematic opposition to the plans of the Americans, declaring to me on this account that they were convinced that my intransigent attitude and that of Señor Aguinaldo were the only obstacles to the wished-for peace, and, as they were determined to secure it, for the welfare of the Filipinos themselves, they might find themselves compelled to remove such obstacles by deporting the intransigents. I stated that, in my judgment, the revolution had been produced not by mere personal ambitions, but by the unsatisfied aspirations of the people; that I was fully convinced that, should Señor Aguinaldo and I work in open disagreement with public opinion, we should become men without prestige and finally incapable of preventing new leaders, sooner or later, taking up the fight to continue it; that true peace was to be brought about only by the confidence which the Americans might learn how to inspire in the Filipinos, and a proceeding as arbitrary as violent was never going to inspire such confidence; that the experience acquired during Spanish domination shows that deportation serves only to arouse hatred and hostile feelings, because it is cruel and unjust to impose the double punishment of imprisonment and banishment for an indefinite period upon persons the charges against whom have not been proved in legal form. And I concluded by saying that, far from opposing the plans of the Americans, I had tried to show sincerely the real sentiments of the Filipinos in general and of the revolutionists in particular, to prevent ignorance on these points developing a policy mistaken and prejudicial to the cause of peace; and that I thought to preserve my prestige at every cost, moved alone by the desire of being useful not only to the Filipinos but also to the Americans. The latter might be mistaken in their estimates, it might be that, in spite of my deportation, and of the capture or surrender of Aguinaldo, minds (las ideas) would not be pacified; in such case the aid of the Filipinos who had not lost the confidence of the revolutionists would be indispensable for the realization of peace, and for this purpose I wished to hold myself in reserve, in lack of others who were better, or at least to aid and serve these latter. Studying now the subsequent events, I do not find any evidence that the deportation to Guam contributed in any way to the capture of Aguinaldo and Lukban or to the surrender of Malvar and other Filipino leaders. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that this mistake had not a little influence in prolonging the war and in causing more shedding of blood. Diplomacy having been despised as a weapon of the weak, the war necessarily ended only when the revolutionists ceased to possess means to continue it.' The ordinary and natural course of also, they believed at the time, the immediate recognition of the late Filipino government itself. 1 Here again Mabini is not quite candid, or at any rate he omits to state fully the circumstances leading to the quite general laying down of arms in early things is not that the weak should conquer the strong. (We fought under the conviction that our duty and dignity demanded of us the sacrifice of defending, while we could, our liberties, because without them social equality between the dominant caste and the native class would be practically an impossibility, and so we should not succeed in establishing perfect justice between us; but we knew that it would not be long before we should exhaust our scanty resources and that our defeat was inevitable.) War became, then, unjustifiable from the moment when the immense majority of the people preferred to submit to the conqueror and many of the revolutionists themselves passed to his ranks, because, not being able to enjoy their natural liberties while the American forces prevented it, and not having the resources for removing this obstacle, they deemed it prudent to yield and to have hope in the promises made in the name of the people of the United States. The surrender of the last opposing bands was followed by a proclamation of amnesty, and on August 24, 1902, the deportees in Guam were told that they might return to their country, provided they should swear to recognize and accept voluntarily the supreme authority of the United States in the Philippines and to maintain sincere fidelity and obedience to the same, without mental reservation or thought of evading this obligation. In order to quiet scruples of conscience, since it did not seem to me reasonable nor proper to give my word without first assuring myself whether I ought or ought not to do it, I asked that they bring me as a prisoner to this capital [Manila], in accordance with the proclamation, which stated that the oath might be taken before any authority in the Philippine archipelago. The governor of Guam promised to communicate my request to the proper authorities, but after saying that he probably would not learn the decision for some months. Nevertheless, I preferred to wait, and on February 9, 1903, the officer of the prison handed me a letter from the governor, notifying me that I was free to go anywhere, except to the Philippines, whither I could not return without taking the oath of obedience and fidelity. I asked time to consider, for it was not so easy for me to decide as at first it seemed. In the first place, I believe like any other man in certain truths which, after the fashion of a guide or rule, direct my conscience in judging my acts, constituting my religion. That religion 1901. "Diplomacy" and conciliation were employed, particularly by means of the Federal Party, a Filipino peace-organization, and by means of the conciliatory measures for the inauguration of civil government in towns and provinces and the laws of the Civil Commission regarding civil service reform, education, etc. These accompanied a more rigorous military campaign, which undoubtedly played its part; but to ascribe the ensuing peace in a majority of provinces entirely to military sternness and the exhaustion of the people would be very wide of the truth. Mabini does not mention the revolutionary leaders, many of them of more authority and prestige than either Lukban or Malvar, who surrendered both prior to and soon after the capture of Aguinaldo, itself merely a spectacular incident in the general movement toward peace at the time. AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XI.—56. teaches me that all authority over the people resides in the people themselves, by the provisions of natural law. Hence it was that, before the idea of the oath recognizing and pledging fidelity to the authority of the United States, I should imagine myself invoking God to sanction an act contrary to the law or order which He Himself set up at the moment of establishing His plan of the world. My conscience told me it was a blasphemy to ask God to aid in a thing which He Himself disapproves. Moreover, if the free expression of thought is one of the privileges of every citizen in the Philippines, would it be legal to require of me to renounce my beliefs from the moment when I promise to lead a peaceful and honorable life? If the practice observed in all civilized nations extends the said liberty to all doctrines that do not promote the disturbance of the social order and the corruption of customs, could an oath be considered valid that was imposed by the executive power against the spirit of American institutions and the right interpretation of the laws governing in the Philippines? Having taken the oath of unconditional fidelity, would it be lawful for me, without being false to the fidelity sworn, afterward to advocate the lessening of that authority, asking for the people the self-government publicly promised to be conferred upon the Filipinos when they shall be fit? If every obligation contrary to natural law is essentially null, is it not more practicable and helpful to try to find some other procedure that will reconcile the respect due to the law and the fulfilment of the proper duties of every state with the liberty of conscience and the promises of the government, in order that the Filipinos may not become accustomed to looking upon perjury as lawful? If at all events the government must use force to punish those who disobey it, is not requiring the oath of a simple citizen. the same as confessing that it has not a right to rule without his consent? It is true that he who attempts to govern only with theory must fail, because the science of government is essentially practical; but it is true also that every practice contrary to theory, or rather to reason and truth, is properly an abuse, that is to say a corrupt practice, since it corrupts society. The success of him who governs always results from practice (la práctica) adjusted to the natural and unchangeable order of things and to the special necessities of the locality, which success is obtained by the aid of theoretical knowledge and of experience. It is not, then, theory, but practice confused by evil passions or ignorance, which is the origin of all governmental failures. If the government of the United States has been able to conduct the Union along the road of prosperity and greatness,' it is because its practices have not 1 Here Mabini's conception of government as a thing proceeding from above again exhibits itself. Social reform, in his conception, was a matter of governmental decrees; practical rulership depended entirely upon the rulers. The notion that the United States has given the world the great example of a successful republic, not because of a clever scheme of government and able rulers, but because of the spirit and temper of the people themselves, is something that had never dawned upon him. |