that, finally, every colonial régime which does not understand how to adjust itself to the always growing needs of the colonies and their constantly easier and closer communication with civilized peoples fosters the separation of the colonies at the same time with the political corruption and the decadence of the metropolis. If we add to these counsels of reason and teachings of history the pride of a people which knows its own power and greatness and believes that it has the practical understanding of life, we may assert that at present there exists not a single reason to justify confidence on our part, and yet we ought to forget past grievances and sacrifice them in behalf of reconciliation and fraternal union between Americans and Filipinos. Not only has the United States assured us that this union is the surest guaranty of our happiness, but it has by force compelled us to this belief, making itself arbiter of our fate. So be it, then; but in the meantime let us strive that our intelligence and our soul may be worthy of all that is ennobling and honorable in life, waiting till time shall lift the veil of the future to show us the true path of progress and happiness for us.

Fearing that my sickness has been the principal cause of the inefficacy of my labors and incapacitates me for the tasks demanded by the solution of the great problems of the present situation, I return to the obscurity whence, thrust forth by circumstances, I emerged, in order to hide my shame and grief, not for having committed any improper act, but for not having been able to render better service. I am not, indeed, the one called upon to say whether I have done well or ill, have labored intelligently or under error; nevertheless, I do not conclude without saying that I possess no other balm to assuage the bitterness of a painful life except the satisfaction produced by the conviction of not having committed any error voluntarily. May I be able to say the same at the hour of my death!



Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis,

1904. Edited by HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D., Director of Congresses. Volume II. History of Politics and Economics, History of Law, History of Religion. (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company. 1906. Pp. ix, 661.)

This second of the eight volumes which are to give us the remarkable series of papers read year before last by the scholars of the Old World and the New at the St. Louis Exposition covers three of the six “ Departments " which made up what was known as the “ Division" of

Historical Science". Doubtless the three remaining Departments of that Division-History of Language, History of Literature, and History of Art—will furnish the content of another volume.

At this late date it would be idle as well as invidious to question or to discuss the Congress's classification of human knowledge or its choice of the scholars who should represent the divisions thus created. Nor could it serve a useful purpose to recapitulate within the brief limits of a review the authors and the titles of the three dozen able addresses which compose the present volume. As everybody will remember, each Department, after listening with its fellow Departments to the opening paper of the Chairman of the Division, and after hearing two addresses of its own—one on the fundamental methods and conceptions of its branch of science, the other on its progress during the past centurywas then to dissolve itself into “ Sections ", each of which should likewise listen to two papers, the first dealing with the relations of its subtopic to neighboring fields, the second with its own present problems. Loyally carried out in the main, though with often a happy excursion and now and then a frank departure, the project in its literary incarnation lies now before us. What can be said of the result as a whole ?

Already in his opening address Chairman Woodrow Wilson strikes a key-note. With admirable tact taking as his theme “The Variety and Unity of History”, he finds place and mission for each of the great lines of study into which the Congress has divided “Historical Science”; but it is only to insist with a warmer emphasis on the essential oneness of the historian's field. The subject of History is not politics or economics or law or religion or literature or art or language. It is not all these combined. It is that of which these are but a few of the myriad changing phases. “All history has society as its subject matter" (p. 8)—its theme is human life. From these opening thoughts of President Wilson to the final papers in the closing group—to Professor Har

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nack's underscored assertion (p. 622) that “ The history of the church is part and parcel of universal history, and can be understood only in connection with it ”, and Professor Reville's jubilant affirmation (p. 645) that " The water-tight bulkhead which separated the so-called 'profane' from the so-called 'sacred' studies has been removed" and that

the progress of our general historical knowledge makes us recognize ever better that the history of Christianity ... is intimately bound with the economical, moral, social, and religious history of the surrounding world”—this conviction of the oneness of History is the most recurrent note. As the programme of the Congress knows “science", but not “sciences ", so its historians will have no divided history.

Most striking is this in that first body of speakers whom the logic of the programme has grouped under the rubric of “ Political History". Their neighbors, however they protest their freedom, devote themselves to the field prescribed them; the political historians not only protest, they rebel. Not one of them restricts himself to the history of politics or seems to suppose himself expected to do so. Few of them even put political history foremost. One or two expressly remand it to the background. The apostasy is the more significant because it is clearly so unconscious. Who shall say that it is to be regretted ?

All the groups, and not alone the opening speakers in each, are much concerned with questions of historical method. Yet, strange to say, that fundamental problem as to the logic of the historian's processes which is just now so exercising historians and logicians alike receives hardly a mention. Even Professor Colby's sparkling paper on “Historical Synthesis ", though it touches it in passing, scarcely grasps its full import. Professor Lamprecht, whose own tenets are so hazarded, is of course not oblivious; but his attention is here mainly given to the positive exposition of his “socio-psychologic ” theory—a theory of which, it is to be feared, he will find almost as little echo in the papers of his colleagues. Doubtless courtesy to such a guest contributed to this silence. Doubtless, too, many, like Professor Colby, “doubt whether academic utterances as to what history is or should be, help us very far forward” (p. 166). The unstudied implications of these thoughtful papers are, when they skirt the topics in dispute, of all the greater weight. Among the questions more largely ventilated is that as to the right of history to be an art as well as a science-or, as Professor Robinson, who makes this the chief topic of his paper on “ The Conception and Methods of History ", prefers to phrase it, the “relations between history and literature". Another old friend whose face peers out from many a paper is the issue, in its older form, between the narrator and the historical philosopher.

But perhaps the most gratifying quality of the volume as a whole is the sane and generous spirit with which even questions so hotly mooted as these are lifted out of the mire of altercation. It is, for example, precisely Professor Adams, who most keenly points out the besetting faults of the sociologist and the economist in their dealings with history, who is most earnest in appeal to them for help, declaring (p. 137) that " without the work of the economic historian and the sociologist, the task of completing our scientific knowledge of medieval history” seems to him almost impossible.

To discuss the individual qualities of a series of studies so rich in variety and in personality is here impossible. There is in them little that suggests perfunctory work. All are suggestive, many are brilliant, a few seem notable contributions to knowledge or to thought. The briefer papers contributed to the sessions by those not officially speakers are here printed in abstract only. A somewhat unexpected but wellmade and useful appendix to the several groups is a select bibliography of the literature of each subject.


Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship. By J. G. FRAZER.

(New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan and Company. 1905. Pp. xi, 309.)

Since the simultaneous appearance in 1861 of Maine's Ancient Law and Bachofen's Mutterrecht each year's research has revealed more and more clearly the relative culture-value of institutional history. Indeed, it is scarcely too much to say that the history of institutions is pure Kulturgeschichte. It is the essential element in sound sociological and anthropological investigation. The fact is gradually becoming familiar that all institutions are the slow resultant of human experience, the residuum of social struggle. As Frazer remarks (p. 3), even the great institutions of our civilized society, such as marriage, private property, and the worship of a god,“ have their roots in savagery, and have been handed down to us ... through countless generations, assuming new outward forms in the process of transmission, but remaining in their inmost core substantially unchanged". In particular the study of primitive magic promises to become a rich field for the discovery of institutional beginnings. Already this field has been partially explored by several English writers whose works show decided originality. Spencer and Gillen's detailed investigation of the sexual customs and other social conditions of the Native Tribes of Central Australia (1899) has been supplemented (1904) by their account of the Northern Tribes of the same region. In his Mystic Rose (1902) Crawley sought the origins of matrimonial institutions in the various usages arising in sexual taboo; while in 1900 Frazer's Golden Bough, an epoch-making study of magic and religion, reached the second edition.

The present work deals with the “sacred character and magical functions of kings in early society". It consists mainly of “fresh examples or illustrations of principles” (p. 2) already stated in the Golden Bough; and in substance it will appear in the third edition of that book now in press. The text is composed of nine lectures delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge, during 1905; and it is a very clear and entertaining discussion of a difficult subject, but supported in the numerous foot-notes by a full bibliographical apparatus. The author finds that the primitive kingship is a development of the office and functions of the sorcerer or magician. As a starting-point for his discussion, he takes a particular, case of the sacred kingship," the priesthood of Diana at Nemi, which combined the regal with the sacred character; for the priest bore the title of Rex Nemorensis or King of the Wood, and his office was called a kingdom” (p. 9). In the first chapter evidence is adduced to prove " that the worship of Diana in her sacred grove at Nemi was of great importance and immemorial antiquity; ... that associated with her was a water-nymph Egeria, who discharged one of Diana's own functions by succouring women in travail, and who was popularly supposed to have mated with an old Roman king in the sacred grove; further, that Diana of the Wood herself had a male companion, Virbius by name [identical with the Greek hero Hippolytus), who was to her what Adonis was to Venus, or Attis to Cybele; and, lastly, that this mythical Virbius was represented in historical times by a line of priests known as the Kings of the Wood, who regularly perished by the swords of their successors [always runaway slaves), and whose lives were in a manner bound up with a certain tree in the grove, because, so long as that tree was uninjured, they were safe from attack (pp. 26-27). In the sequel, each element in the facts thus established is acutely interpreted in the light of the comparative history of sacred kingships, and in that of the correlated general principles of magic.

However, before considering the genesis of the kingship, the theory and practice of magic are expounded in the second, third, and fourth chapters. Here the author has made a distinct advance upon the results won by earlier investigators. In his view, magic rests upon two fundamental principles of thought: "first, that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and, second, that things which have once been in contact continue to act on each other even after the contact has been severed. The former principle may be called the Law of Similarity, the latter the Law of Contact or Contagion” (pp. 37-38). From the law of similarity "the magician infers that he can produce any effect he desires merely by imitating it"; from the law of contact “he concludes that whatever he does to a material object will affect equally the person with whom the object was once in contact, whether it formed part of his body or not” (p. 38). "Sympathetic magic” thus has two branches: “homeopathic magic” and “contagious magic". These are illustrated by a wealth of examples. Especially helpful is the division of the system of sympathetic magic into “positive precepts” and “negative precepts”. The positive precepts are charms: the negative precepts are taboos. The whole doctrine of taboo, in fact, would seem to be only a special application of sympathetic magic, with its two great laws of similarity and contact” (p. 52). Thus, if magic be distinguished as theoretical magic or pseudo-science, and practical magic or pseudo-art; then sorcery will represent the positive and taboo the negative side of the pseudo-art.

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