together with a number of small guns, to prevent the landing on the Quebec side of the river, of the army of Wolfe, which had just been reunited in camp at Levis. His particular orders were to strictly follow all Wolfe's movements, by ascending the river when he went up, and descending as he did the same: in short, to be an army of observation, with only the St. Lawrence between him and the English forces. Day and night he had faithfully carried out these instructions. By their continnal passing and repassing up and down the river, the English ships above the town, having on board a number of troops, kept De Bougainville and his forces, who were determined not to lose sight of them, constantly upon the march, until they were quite worn out with fatigue and restless vigil. One of Brigadier Townshend's letters describes these movements as having been purposely made " to amuse the enemy." In conjunction with these movements on the part of the ships, there were also frequent marchings and counter-marchings of the English troops on the south shore. The army of observation on the day previous to the British landing, was chiefly stationed at Cap Rouge and along the shore from the Cap Rouge River to prevent Wolfe's forces from landing there, which was then thought to be their design. The mouth of the Cap Rouge river, about eight miles above the city, which seemed to offer special facilities for the landing of a hostile force, was protected by floating batteries. One of the French accounts of the English movements on the afternoon and evening of the 12th of September, shows that Wolfe's tactics, including the hasty embarkation of his troops from the south shore, and the

departure of his ships up stream, conveyed the desired impression that he was about to attempt a descent of his army at Pointe-aux-Trembles, whither Bougainville, with the greater part of his command hastened later on to intercept him. It was no fault of the gallant French commander, charged with this duty, that he failed to observe the departure of the English troops for their destined landing place at the Foulon. Admiral Holmes, who was in command of the ships, kept them moored as near as possible to the south shore, and the barges into which the men were lowered from them, were concealed on the south side of the vessels. The night was so dark, that when the boats floated noiselessly down, away from the ships, on the falling tide, they could not be observed from the French lines posted along the north shore. The stars shone brightly enough, but there was no moon light, and the rustle of a strong south-west breeze, conveyed no sound of the movement on the water to the watchers of De Bougainville's command.

(1)

As soon as the troops in the flat bottomed boats had got well under way, a number of the ships of Admiral Holme's division, moved slowly up the river, eagerly followed by de Bougainville, and in due time reached Pointe aux Trembles. (2) Even if de Bougainville had been aware

(1) "Admiral Holmes was accounted a very good seaman, and ins"tructed in his profession Lord Hood, famous for his naval achieve"ments. Admiral Holme died at Jamaica in 1761.”

From the Memoirs of an officer.

(2) A movement made at the same time and for the purpose of deception, by Admiral Holmes, with the ships under his command up the river, attracted the attention of the French sentinels, and the impor"tant flotilla passed unobserved by them."

of the fact that some of the open boats had drifted from the English ships towards the Foulon, it would still have been his duty to have followed the larger vessels of the fleet in their westward course, () because he had been particularly warned to keep a strict watch over the movements of the vessels.

It was not until nine o'clock on the morning of the 13th of September, that the courrier met Bougainville who was returning from Pointe aux Trembles, and gave him the tidings that the British had landed at the Foulon.

Bougainville immediately set forth to join the main body of the army.

The fate of Quebec had been decided, however, before it was possible for him to reach the battle-field.

(1)" He (Montcalm) detached M. de Bougainville, with five companies of grenadiers, two hundred and thirty cavalry, a body of Canadian "volunteers and Militia; in the whole, fifteen hundred men, to follow "us and watch our motions. This stupid man proceeded along the west"ern bank of the river but not being aware of our retrograde movement "on the night of the 12th-13th, he found himself on the day of the "battle, so far from the field on which it was fought that his services "were lost to the French army for that time and campaign." "Memoirs of an Officer of Wolfe's army."

(See also Journal of Foligné & British Magazine, 1760.)

CHAPTER VIII.

THE

IN THE FRENCH CAMP

HE firing of the French artillery in the four gun battery at Samos and the noise of the small arms were distinctly heard in the camp at Beauport; the south-west wind and the quiet of the early morning hour having favoured the conveyance of the sound. General Montcalm, who had never for a moment imagined the possibility of such a ruse as that by means of which Wolfe had been able to effect a landing in spite of the faithful execution of the orders to De Bougainville, was much disconcerted at the reports of the guns at Samos. Instead of conveying to him the intelligence of the stirring events which were then transpiring, they seemed to notify him of the seizure, by the English, of the boats bringing from Three Rivers or Montreal, the necessary provisions of which his army stood so much in need. De Bougainville had informed him that the boats would be sent down that night, and knowing the number of British ships in the river, both above and below the town, Montcalm was violently agitated all night long, and repeated more than once to Chevalier Johnstone that he trembled lest they should be taken, as he had only two days' means of subsistence for the army.