would fain limit, for instance, the πpâos of the N. T. to such a sense as the word, when employed by the best classical writers, would have borne, will deprive themselves and those who accept their interpretation, of very much of the deeper meaning in Scripture;' on which subject, and with reference to this very word, there are some excellent observations by F. Spanheim, Dubia Evangelica, vol. iii. p. 398. The Scriptural πρaóτηs is not in a man's outward behaviour only; nor yet in his relations to his fellow-men; as little in his mere natural disposition. Rather is it an inwrought grace of the soul; and the exercises of it are first and chiefly towards God (Matt. xi. 29; Jam. i. 21). It is that temper of spirit in which we accept his dealings with us without disputing or resisting; and it is closely linked with the ταπεινοφροσύνη, and follows directly upon it (Eph. iv. 2; Col. iii. 12), because it is only the humble heart which is also the meek; and which, as such, does not fight against God, and more or less struggle and contend with Him.

This meekness however, which is first a meekness in respect of God, is also such in the face of men, even of evil men, out of the thought that these, with the insults and injuries which they

They will do this, even though they stop short of lengths to which Fritzsche, a very learned modern expositor of the Romans, has reached; who on Rom. i. 7, writes: 'Deinde considerandum est formulâ χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη in N. Τ. nihil aliud dici nisi quod Græci illo suo χαίρειν s. εὖ πράττειν enuntiare consueverint, h. e. ut aliquis fortunatus sit, sive, ut cum Horatio loquar, Ep. i. 8.1, ut gaudeat et bene rem gerat!'

may inflict, are permitted and employed by Him for the chastening and purifying of his people. This was the root of David's Tπρаóτηs, when on occasion of his flight from Absalom Shimei cursed and flung stones at him-the thought, namely, that the Lord had bidden him (2 Sam. xvi. 11), that it was just for him to suffer these things, however unjust it might be for the other to inflict them; and out of like convictions all true Christian Tраóтηs must spring. He that is meek indeed will know himself a sinner among sinners; or, if there was One who could not know Himself such, yet bearing a sinner's doom; and this will teach him to endure meekly the provocations with which they may provoke him, not to withdraw himself from the burdens which their sin may impose upon him. (Gal. vi. 1; 2 Tim. ii. 25; Tit. iii. 2).

The Tрaóτns then, if it is to be more than mere gentleness of manner, if it is to be the Christian grace of meekness of spirit, must rest on deeper foundations than its own, on those namely which the TаTEоoρоσúvn has laid for it, and it can only continue, while it continues to rest on these. It is a grace in advance of ταπεινοφροσύνη, not as being more precious than it, but as presupposing it, and as being unable to exist without it.

§ xliii.—πραότης, ἐπιείκεια.

Ταπεινοφροσύνη and ἐπιείκεια are in their meanings too far apart to be fit objects of synonymous

discrimination; but πрaóτηs, which stands between, holds on to them both. Its points of contact with the former have just been considered; and for this purpose its own exact force was sought to be seized. Without going over this ground anew, we may now consider its relation to the latter. Of éπieĺkela it is not too much to say, that the mere existence of such a word is itself a signal evidence of the high development of ethics among the Greeks.' Derived from eľko, čoɩka, 'cedo,' it means properly that yieldingness which recognises the impossibility which cleaves to formal law, of anticipating and providing for all those cases that will emerge and present themselves to it for its decision; which, with this, recognises the danger that ever waits upon legal rights, lest they should be pushed into moral wrongs, lest the 'summum jus' should in practice prove the 'summa injuria;' which, therefore, urges not its own rights to the uttermost, but going back in part or in the whole from these, rectifies and redresses the injustices of justice. It is in this way more truly just than strict justice.

1 No Latin word exactly and adequately renders it; 'clementia' sets forth one side of it, æquitas' another, and perhaps modestia' (by which the Vulgate translates it, 2 Cor. x. 1) a third; but the word is wanting which should set forth all these excellences reconciled in a single and a higher one.

2 This aspect of mieikeia must never be lost sight of. Seneca (De Clem. ii. 7) well brings it out: 'Nihil ex his facit, tanquam justo minus fecerit, sed tanquam id quod constituit, justissimum sit;' and Aquinas: Diminutiva est pœnarum, secundum rationem rectam ; quando scilicet oportet, et in quibus oportet.'

N

would have been; δίκαιον, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος Sukalov, as Aristotle expresses it (Ethic. Nic. v. 10. 6); being indeed, again to use his words, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου: and he sets the ἀκριβοδίκαιος, the man who stands up for the utmost tittle of his rights, over against the Tieks. Plato defines it (Def. 412b), Sikaiwv δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων ἐλάττωσις.

The archetype and pattern of this grace is to be found in God. All his goings back from the strictness of his rights as against men; all his allowing of their imperfect righteousness, and giving of a value to that which, rigidly estimated, would have none; all his refusals to exact extreme penalties (Wisd. xii. 18; 2 Macc. x. 4; Ps. lxxxv. 5: ὅτι σύ, Κύριε, χρηστὸς καὶ ἐπιεικὴς καὶ πολυéλeos: cf. Plutarch, Coriol. 24; Peric. 39; Cæs. 57); all his remembering whereof we are made, and measuring his dealings with us thereby; we may contemplate as éπieίKELα upon his part; as it demands the same, one toward another, upon ours. The greatly forgiven servant in the parable (Matt. xviii. 23) had known the èπɩeikeia of his lord and king; the same therefore was justly expected from him. The word is often joined with piλav@ρwπía

1 Daniel, a considerable poet, but a far greater thinker, has in a poem addressed to Lord Chancellor Egerton a very noble passage, which may be regarded as an expansion of these words; indeed it would not be too much to say that the whole poem is written in honor of emieikeia or equity,' as being

"the soul of law,

The life of justice, and the spirit of right."

(Polybius, v. 10. 1; Philo, De Vit. Mos. i. 36; 2 Macc. ix. 27); with μakpolvμía (Clemens Romanus, 1 Ep. 13); and often with pаórηS: thus, besides the passage in the N. T. (2 Cor. x. 1), by Plutarch, Pericl. 39; Cæs. 57; cf. Pyrrh. 23; De Prof. Virt. 9.

The distinction between these two, Estius, on 2 Cor. x. 1, seizes in part, although he does not exhaust it, saying: Mansuetudo [paórns] magis ad animum, èπieĺkeιa vero magis ad exteriorem conversationem pertinet;' cf. Bengel: 'πраóτηS virtus magis absoluta, èπieikeia magis refertur ad alios.' Aquinas too has a fine and subtle discussion on the relations of likeness and difference between the graces which these words severally denote (Summ. Theol. 2a 3e, qu. 157): Utrum Clementia et Mansuetudo sint penitus idem.' Among other marks of difference he especially urges these two; the first that in éπieikeia there is always the condescension of a superior to an inferior, while in πρаóτηs nothing of the kind is necessarily implied: 'Clementia est lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem; mansuetudo non solum est superioris ad inferiorem, sed cujuslibet ad quemlibet ;' and the second, that which has been already brought forward, that the one grace is more passive, the other more active, or at least that the seat of the paórηs is in the inner spirit, while the eπieixeca must needs embody itself in outward acts: Differunt ab invicem in quantum clementia est moderativa exterioris punitionis, mansuetudo proprie diminuit passionem iræ.'