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ἀνήδυστος (Phoc. 5); αὐθέκαστος (De Adul. et Am. 14). We find, further, Aristotle (Ethic. Eudem. vii. 5) contrasting the avoτnpós with the evτpáTEλos, which last word he uses in a good sense.

At the same time it will be observed that in none of the epithets with which we have thus found avoτηpós associated, is there that deep moral perversity which lies in those with which oλnpós is linked; and, moreover, it is met not seldom in more honorable company; thus it is joined with oppov continually (Plutarch, Conj. Præc. 7, 29; Quæst. Gr. 40); while the Stoics were wont to affirm all good men to be austere (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 1. 64, 117): καὶ αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, μήτε παρ ̓ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν πроodéɣeolaι: cf. Plutarch, Præc. Conj. 27. In Latin, austerus' is predominantly an epithet of honor (Döderlein, Lat. Synon. vol. iii. p. 232); the 'austerus' is one earnest and severe, opposed to all levity; needing, it may very well be, to watch against harshness, rigour, or moroseness, into which his character might easily degenerate—(' non austeritas ejus tristis, non dissoluta sit comitas,' Quintilian, ii. 2. 5)—but as yet not charged with these.

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We may distinguish, then, between σkλnpós and αὐστηρός as follows: σκληρός, applied to any, conveys always a reproach and a severe one, indicates

In Plutarch this word is used in an ill sense, as selfwilled, 'eigensinnig;' being one of the many, in all languages, which, beginning with a good sense (Aristotle, Ethic. Nic. iv. 7), ended with a bad.

a character harsh, inhuman, and (in the earlier use of the word) uncivil; avoτnpós, on the contrary, does not always convey a reproach at all, any more than the Germanstreng,' which is very different from hart;' and even where it does, yet one of comparatively a milder and less opprobrious description.

§ xv.—εἰκών, ὁμοίωσις, ὁμοίωμα.

THERE is a double theological interest attending the distinction between eirov and the two words which are here brought into comparison with it; the first belonging to the Arian controversy, and turning on the fitness or unfitness of the words before us to set forth the relation of the Son to the Father; while the other is an interest that, seeming at first sight remote from any controversy, has yet contrived to insinuate itself into more than one, namely, whether there be a distinction, and if so what it is, between the image (eikwv) of God, in which, and the likeness (óμolwois) of God, after which man at the first is declared to have been created (Gen. i. 26).

And first, for the distinction drawn between the words during the course of the long Arian debate. It is evident that εἰκών (from ἔοικα) and ὁμοίωμα might often be used as equivalent, and in many positions it would be indifferent whether of the two were employed. Thus they are convertibly used by Plato (Phædr. 250 b), óμowμaтa and

Eikóves alike, to set forth the earthly patterns and resemblances of the archetypal things in the heavens. When, however, the Church found it necessary to raise up bulwarks against Arian error and Arian equivocation, it drew a strong distinction between these words, one not arbitrary, but having essential difference for its ground. Elkov (= 'imago,' 'imitago") always supposes a prototype, that which it not merely resembles, but from which it is drawn. It is the German Abbild,' which invariably presumes a 'Vorbild;' Gregory Nazianzene (Orat. 36): αὕτη γὰρ εἰκόνος φύσις, μίμημα εἶναι τοῦ ἀρχετύπου. (Petavius, De Trin. vi. 5, 6.) Thus, the monarch's head on the coin is eikov (Matt. xxii. 20); the reflection of the sun in the water is its elkov (Plato, Phædo, 99 d); the statue in stone or other material is elkov (Rev. xiii. 14); the child is eμvxos eixóv of his parents. But in the ὁμοίωμα οι ὁμοίωσις, while there is resemblance, it by no means follows that it has been gotten in this way, that it is derived: it may be accidental, as one egg is like another, as there may exist a resemblance between two men who are not in any way akin to one another. Thus, as Augustine in an instructive passage brings out (Quæst. lxxxiii. 74), the 'imago' (= eirov) includes and involves the 'similitudo,' but the 'similitudo (ópoiwois) does not involve the 'imago.' The reason will at once be manifest why cikóv-is applied to the Son, as representing his relation to the Father (1 Cor. xi. 7; Col. i. 15; cf. Wisd. vii. 26); while among all the words of the family

of ὅμοιος, not merely none are so employed in the Scripture, but they have all been expressly forbidden and condemned by the Church; that is, so soon as ever it has had reason to suspect foul play, and that they are not used in good faith. Thus Hilary, addressing an Arian, says, “I may use them, to exclude Sabellian error; but I will not suffer you to do so, whose intention is altogether different" (Con. Constant. Imp. 17—21),

Εἰκών, when employed of the Son, like χαρακ Týp and aπavyaoμa (Heb. i. 3), with which theologically it is nearly related, is indeed inadequate, but, at the same time, it is true as far as it goes; and in human language, employed for the setting forth of truths which transcend human thought, we must be content with approximative assertions, seeking for the complement of their inadequacy, that which shall redress their insufficiency, from some other quarter. Each has its weak side, which must be supported by strength derived from elsewhere. Eikáv is not without its weakness; for what image is of equal worth and dignity with the prototype from which it is imaged? But it has also its strong side; it at any rate expresses derivation; while ὁμοιότης, ὁμοίωσις, or any other words of this family, expressing mere similarity, if they did not actually imply, might yet suggest, and if they suggested, would seem to justify, error, and that with no compensating advantage. Exactly the same considerations were at work here, which, in respect of the verbs yevvâv and KTIČE, did in this same controversy cause the

Church to allow the one, and to condemn the other.

The second interest in the discrimination of these words lies in the question which has often been discussed, whether in that great fiat announcing man's original constitution,, "Let us make man in our image (eikov, LXX., Dy Heb.), after our likeness” (ópoíwois, LXX., ♫ Heb.), anything different was intended by the second than by the first, or whether the second is merely to be regarded as consequent upon the first, "in our image" and therefore "after our likeness." Both are claimed for man in the N. T.: the cirkóv, 1 Cor. xi. 7; the oμoiwois, Jam. iii. 9.

Many of the early Fathers, as also of the Schoolmen, maintained that there was a real distinction. Thus, the Alexandrians taught that the cikov was something in which men were created, being common to all, and continuing to man after the fall as before (Gen. ix. 6), while the oμoíwors was something toward which man was created, that he might strive after and attain it; Origen (De Prin. iii. 6): Imaginis dignitatem in primâ conditione percepit, similitudinis vero perfectio in consummatione servata est;' cf. in Joan. tom. xx. 20. It can hardly be doubted that the Platonist studies and predilections of the Christian theologians of Alexandria had some influence upon them here, and on this distinction which they drew. It is well known that Plato presented the oμocovoar τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (Theat. 176 α) as the