6

introduced, and in which he now lives and moves; the restitution of the Divine image; and in all this, so far from being passive, he must be a fellowworker with God. That was regeneratio,' this is ' renovatio.' They must not be separated, but neither may they be confounded. What infinite confusions, conflicts, scandals, obscurations of God's truth on this side and on that, have arisen from the one course as from the other!

§ xix.—αἰσχύνη, αἰδώς.

THERE was a time when the Greek language possessed only the word aidas: which then occupied the two regions of meaning afterwards divided between it and αἰσχύνη. Αἰδώς had at that time the same duplicity of meaning as is latent in the Latin 'pudor,' in our own 'shame.' Thus in Homer aloxúvn never occurs, while sometimes, as Il. v. 787, αἰδώς is used on occasions when αἰσχύνη would, in later Greek, have necessarily been employed; elsewhere Homer employs aides in that sense which, at a later period, it vindicated as exclusively its own. And even Thucydides (i. 84), in a difficult and doubtful passage where both words occur, is by many considered to have employed them as equipollent and convertible. Generally,

1

Gerhard (Loc. Theoll. xxi. 7. 113): Renovatio, licet a regeneratione proprie et specialiter acceptâ distinguatur, individuo tamen et perpetuo nexu cum eâ est conjuncta.'

however, in the Attic period of the language, the words were not accounted synonymous. Ammonius formally distinguishes them in a philological, as the Stoics did in an ethical, interest; and almost every passage in which either word occurs is an evidence of the real difference existing between them. Yet the distinction has not always been seized with a perfect success.

Thus it has been sometimes said that aidos is the shame which hinders one from doing a dishonorable thing; aloyúvn is the disgrace, outward or inward, which follows on having done it (Luke xiv. 9). This distinction, while it has its truth, is yet not an exhaustive one; and if we were thereupon to assume that aioxúvn was thus only retrospective, the consequence of things unworthily done, it would be an erroneous one:1 for it would be abundantly easy to show that aioxúvn is continually used to express that feeling which leads to shun what is unworthy out of a prospective anticipation of dishonor. Thus one definition (Plat. Def. 416) makes it þóßos èπì πрoodokią ȧdožías : and Aristotle includes the future in his comprehensive definition (Rhet. ii. 6): ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη, λύπη τις καὶ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων, ἢ γεγονότων, ἢ μελ

'There is the same onesidedness, though exactly on the other side, in Cicero's definition of 'pudor,' which he makes merely prospective: 'Pudor, metus rerum turpium, et ingenua quædam timiditas, dedecus fugiens, laudemque consectans ;' but Ovid writes,

Irruit, et nostrum vulgat clamore pudorem.

XóvTOV. In this sense as 'fuga dedecoris' it is used Ecclus. iv. 21; by Plato, Gorg. 492 a; by Xenophon, Anab. iii. 1. 10. In this last passage, which runs thus, φοβούμενοι δὲ τὸν ὁδὸν καὶ ἄκοντες ὅμως οἱ πολλοὶ δι' αἰσχύνην καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ Κύρου συνηκολούθησαν, Xenophon implies that while he and others, for more reasons than one, disapproved the going forward with Cyrus to assail his brother's throne, they yet were now ashamed to draw back.

This much of truth the distinction drawn above possesses, that aidos (= 'verecundia,' which is defined by Cicero, Rep. v. 4: 'quædam vituperationis non injustæ timor') is the nobler word, and implies the nobler motive: in it is implied an innate moral repugnance to the doing of the dishonorable act, which moral repugnance scarcely or at all exists in the aioxúvn. Insure the man restrained only by aloxúvn against the outward disgrace which he fears may accompany or follow his act, and he will refrain from it no longer. It is only, as Aristotle teaches, περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία : its seat, therefore, as he goes on to show, is not properly in the moral sense of him that entertains it, in his consciousness of a right which has been, or would be, violated by his act, but only in his apprehension of other persons who are, or might be, privy to its violation. Let this apprehension be removed, and the aioxúvn ceases; while aidós finds its motive in its own moral being, and not in any other; it implies reverence for the good as good, and not merely as that to which honor and reputation are attached. Thus it is often connected

with evλáßeia (Heb. xii. 28), the reverence before God, before his majesty, his holiness, which will induce a carefulness not to offend, the German 'Scheu;' so Plutarch, Cas. 14; Conj. Præc. 47; Philo, Leg. ad Cai. 44; often also with Séos, as Plato, Euth. 126 c; with evкоσμía, Xenophon, Cyr. viii. 1. 33; with evτağía and кoσμióτηs, Plutarch, Cas. 4; with σeμróτns, Conj. Præc. 26. To sum up all, we may say that aids would always restrain a good man from an unworthy act, while aloxúvn would sometimes restrain a bad one.

§ xx. αἰδώς, σωφροσύνη.

THESE words occur together at 1 Tim. ii. 9; the only other places where owppoσúvn occurs between Acts xxvi. 25; and 1 Tim. ii. 15, where αἰδώς and σωφροσύνη are urged by the Apostle as together constituting the truest adornment of a Christian woman. If the distinction drawn in § 19 be correct, in that case the following, which Xenophon (Cyr. viii. 1. 31) ascribes to Cyrus, between the words now under consideration, can hardly be allowed to stand: διῄρει δὲ αἰδῶ καὶ σωφροσύνην τῇδε, ὡς τοὺς μὲν αἰδουμένους τὰ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ αἰσχρὰ φεύγοντας, τοὺς δὲ σώφρο νας καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ. On neither side is it successful, for as on the one hand the aidós does not shun merely open and manifest basenesses, however the aioxúvn may do this, so, on the other side, the point of the owopooúvn is altogether

different from that here made, which, though true, is yet a mere accident of it. The old etymologies οι σωφροσύνη, that it is so called as σώζουσα τὴν φρόνησιν (Aristotle, Ethic. Nic. vi. 5), or σωτηρία τῆς φρονήσεως (Plato, Crat. 411 e; cf. Philo, De Fort. 3), have about the same value which the greater number of the ancient etymologies possess. But Chrysostom rightly: σωφροσύνη λέγεται ἀπὸ τοῦ σώας τὰς φρένας ἔχειν. The opposite of ἀκολασία (Thucydides, iii. 37), of ἀκρασία (Xenophon, Mem. iv. 5), it is properly the state of an entire command over our passions and desires, so that they receive no further allowance than that which the law and right reason admit and approve (Tit. ii. 12). Thus Plato (Symp. 196 c) : εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν: and in the Charmides he has dedicated a whole dialogue to the investigation of the exact force of the word. Aristotle (Rhet. i. 9) : ἀρετὴ δι ̓ ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει: cf. Plutarch, De Curios. 14; De Virt. Mor. 2; and Gryll. 6: ἡ μὲν οὖν σωφροσύνη βραχύτης τις ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τάξις, ἀναιροῦσα μὲν τὰς ἐπεισάκτ τους καὶ περιττὰς, καιρῷ δὲ καὶ μετριότητι κοστ μοῦσα τὰς ἀναγκαίας: and Diogenes Laertius, iii. 57. 91. It is often joined to κοσμιότης (Aristophanes, Plut. 563, 564). No single Latin word exactly represents it; Cicero, as he avows himself (Tusc. iii. 5; cf. v. 14), renders it now by 'temperantia,' now by 'moderatio,' now by modestia.' Σωφροσύνη was a virtue which assumed more marked prominence in heathen ethics than it does

'