in Christian; not because more value was attached to it there than with us; but partly because it was there one of a much smaller company of virtues, each of which therefore would singly attract more attention; but also in part because for as many as are led by the Spirit," this condition of selfcommand is taken up and transformed into a condition yet higher still, in which a man does not command himself, which is well, but, which is far better still, is commanded by God.

In the passage already referred to (1 Tim. ii. 9), where it and aidés occur together, we shall best distinguish them thus, and the distinction will be capable of further application;-if aidós is that 'shamefastness," or pudency, which shrinks from

It is a pity that 'shamefast' and 'shamefastness,' by which last word our translators rendered owppoσúvn here, should have been corrupted in modern use to 'shamefaced' and 'shamefacedness.' The words are properly of the same formation as steadfast,' 'steadfastness,' 'soothfast,' 'soothfastness,' and those good old English words, now lost to us, 'rootfast,' and 'rootfastness.' As by 'rootfast' our fathers understood that which was firm and fast by its root, so by 'shamefast' in like manner, that which was established and made fast by (an honorable) shame. To change this into 'shamefaced' is to allow all the meaning and force of the word to run to the surface, to leave us ethically a far inferior word. It is very inexcusable that all modern reprints of the Authorized Version should have given in to this corruption. So long as merely the spelling of a word is concerned, this may very well be allowed to fall in with modern use; we do not want them to print 'sonne' or 'marveile,' when every body now spells 'son' and 'marvel.' But when the true form, indeed the life, of a word is affected by the alterations which it has undergone, then I cannot but consider that subsequent

overpassing the limits of womanly reserve and modesty, as well as from the dishonor which would justly attach thereto, owopooúvn is that habitual inner self-government, with its constant rein on all the passions and desires, which would hinder the temptation to this from arising, or at all events from arising in such strength as should overbear the checks and barriers which aidos opposed to it.

§ xxi.—σύρω, ἑλκύω.

THESE words differ, and with differences not

theologically unimportant. We best represent these their differences in English when we render σύρειν, ' to drag, ἑλκύειν, to draw. In σύρειν, as in our 'drag,' there lies always the notion of force, as when Plutarch (De Lib. Ed. 8) speaks of the headlong course of a river, πάντα σύρων καὶ πάντα παραφέρων: and it will follow, that where persons, and not merely things, are in question, σúpew will involve the notion of violence (Acts viii. 3; xiv. 19; xvii. 6). But in exvev this notion of force or violence does not of necessity lie. That, indeed, such is often implied in it, is plain enough (Acts xvi. 19; xxi. 30; Jam. ii. 6; and cf. Il. xi. 258; xxiv. 52, 417; Aristophanes, Equit. 710; Euripides, Troad. 70: Aiàs εiλKE

editors were bound to adhere to the first edition of 1611, which should have been considered authoritative and exemplary for all that followed. ̧

G

Kaσávdpav Bíą); but not always (thus Plato, Pol. vi. 494 ε: ἐὰν ἕλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν), any more than in our 'draw,' which we use of a mental and moral attraction, or in the Latin 'traho,' as witness the language of the poet, Trahit sua quemque voluptas.'

Only by keeping in mind the difference which thus there is between ἑλκύειν and σύρειν, can we vindicate from erroneous interpretation two doctrinally important passages in the Gospel of St. John. The first is xii. 32: “I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men [πávτas ÉλKÚσw] unto me." But how does a crucified, and thus an exalted, Saviour draw all men unto Him? Not by force, for the will is incapable of force, but by the divine attractions of his love. Again He declares (vi. 44) : "No man can come to Me, except the Father which hath sent Me draw him" (Éλkúoŋ avtóv). Now as many as feel bound to deny any 'gratia irresistibilis,' which turns man into a mere machine, and by which, willing or unwilling, he is dragged to God, must at once allow, must indeed assert, that this eλkúon can mean no more than the potent allurements, the allective force of love, the attracting of men by the Father to the Son; compare Jer. xxxi. 3, "With loving-kindness have I drawn thee" (eïλкvoά σe), and Cant. i. 3, 4. Did we find σúpe on either of these occasions (not that I conceive this would have been possible), the assertors of a 'gratia irresistibilis" might then

1 The excellent words of Augustine on this last passage, himself sometimes adduced as an upholder of this, may be

urge the declarations of our Lord as leaving no room for any other meaning but theirs; but not as they now stand.

In agreement with this which has been said, in éλKÚELV is much more predominantly the sense of a drawing to a certain point, in σúpew merely of dragging after one; thus Lucian (De Merc. Cond. 3), likening a man to a fish already hooked and dragged through the water, describes him as σvpóμevov kaì πρὸς ἀνάγκην ἀγόμενον. Not seldom there will lie in σúpe the notion of this dragging being upon the ground, inasmuch as that will trail upon the ground (cf. σύρμα, σύρδην) which is forcibly dragged along with no will of its own; as for example, a dead body (Philo, In Flac. 21). A comparison of the uses of the two words at John xxi. 6, 8, 11, will be found entirely to bear out the distinction which has been here traced. In the first and last of these verses éλrúev is used; for in both a drawing of the net to a certain point is expressed; by the disciples to themselves in the

here quoted (In Ev. Joh. Tract. xxvi. 4): 'Nemo venit ad me, nisi quem Pater adtraxerit. Noli te cogitare invitum trahi; trahitur animus et amore. Nec timere debemus ne ab hominibus qui verba perpendunt, et a rebus maxime divinis intelligendis longe remoti sunt, in hoc Scripturarum sanctarun evangelico verbo forsitan reprehendamur, et dicatur nobis, Quomodo voluntate credo, si trahor? Ego dico: Parum est voluntate, etiam voluptate traheris. Porro si poetæ dicere licuit, Trahit sua quemque voluptas; non necessitas, sed voluptas; non obligatio, sed delectatio; quanto fortius nos dicere debemus, trahi hominem ad Christum, qui delectatur veritate, delectatur beatitudine, delectatur justitiâ, delectatur sempiternâ vitâ, quod totum Christus est ?'

ship, by Peter to himself upon the shore. But at ver, 8 ἑλκύειν is exchanged for σύρειν ; for nothing is there intended but the dragging of the net which had been fastened to the ship, after it through the water. Our Version, it will be seen, has maintained the distinction; so too the German of De Wette, by aid of ziehen' (= éλkúew), and ‘nach(schleppen' (= σúpev), but neither the Vulgate, nor Beza, which both have forms oftraho' throughout.

§ xxii. —ὁλόκληρος, τέλειος.

THESE words occur together, though their order is reversed, at Jam. i. 4,-" perfect and entire;" óλókληpos only once besides (1 Thess. v. 23); óλokληpía also, used however not in an ethical but a physical sense, once (Acts iii. 16; cf. Isa. i. 6). Oxópos signifies first, as is implied in the words which compose it, that which retains all allotted to it at the first, being thus whole and entire in all its parts, with nothing wanting that was necessary for its completeness. Thus unhewn stones, inasmuch as they have lost nothing in the process of shaping and polishing, are óλókλŋpoɩ (Deut. xxvii. 6; 1 Macc. iv. 47); so too perfect weeks are ἑβδομάδες ὁλόκληροι (Deut. xvi. 9); and a man ἐν ὁλοκλήρῳ δέρματι, is ‘in a whole skin' (Lucian, Philops. 8). At the next step in the word's use we find it employed to express that integrity of body, with nothing redundant, nothing