if it has been impossible until the collision was inevitable." Hence, before the rules there was an obligation by maritime law to show a light or signal to vessels approaching from the stern when the night was so dark that vessels could only be seen at short distances; that this obligation is not taken away but rather enforced by the regulations; that the present case was most clearly one where a light or signal was necessary, the night being very dark, and the master admitting he would have shown it if he had seen the Earl Spencer; that he ought to have kept a look-out astern, so as to have seen the Earl Spencer sooner, and show a light in time; that the neglect to show the light or signal prevents the plaintiffs from recovering, as there would have been no collision if it had been shown.

Milward, Q.C. and E. C. Clarkson, for the respondents. It is the duty of a following ship to keep out of the way of a ship ahead, and it is so prescribed by the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, article 15; but there is no duty imposed upon the leading ship save that of keeping her course. [Sir R. P. COLLIER-Is there no duty on the part of the leading ship to keep a look-out astern.] There is a duty to look out ahead, but not astern. [Sir MONTAGUE SMITH.-It must be the duty of some one on board a leading ship in a fairway and crowded place to look round now and then, although she may not be bound to have the same vigilant look-out astern as ahead.] If the steamer had been going at a moderate pace there would have been time to have signalled when she was seen, so as to have prevented a collision. In The Anglo-Indian (ante, p. 1), the duty to show a light astern under some circumstances is laid down, and that is binding, but in the present case, if the steamer had come up at a proper pace, the schooner would have had time to give, and might have given, some signal, but it was impossible to do so in consequence of her excessive speed and the shortness of the time. There is, however, no law requiring a leading ship to have on board a signal to be shown astern. [Sir MONTAGUE SMITH.-But you must take all prudent measures, and would it not be a prudent thing to have some such light or signal?] We were clearly not bound to carry a riding light ready for exhibition. We had no opportunity of getting a light ready. We were entitled to assume that they would see us in due time, and that they would come at a pace which would enable them to take proper measures to avoid us. It was not our province to be supplied with extraordinary means of making our position known. If it had been required that sailing vessel should carry such signals or lights, the sailing rules would have so provided. [Sir MONTAGUE SMITH.-It is said that lights or signals are to be used in special circumstances in article 20] That does not contemplate that sailing ships are to carry another light ready to supplement the ordinary fixed lights. It is expressly provided by the sailing rules, article 2, that no lights other than those prescribed in the specific articles named therein shall be carried. [Sir MONTAGUE SMITH-Would you contend that if a vessel approaching you at a moderate rate of speed were unable to see you, and you knew it, and you were necessarily in a place of danger, you were not bound to take some precaution to make her aware of your position? There must be some duty to look astern.] We were bound to do that

[PRIV. Co.

which any ordinary seamen taking ordinary care would do, but I submit that it was impossible to do anything under the circumstances; they came upon us too rapidly. [Sir R. P. COLLIER.-You could do nothing when you actually saw the steamer, but the master says if he had looked round he could have seen the steamer a long distance, and would have shown a light. Why did he not do so?] The real cause of the collision was, not the failure to give a signal on the part of the Merlin but the excessive speed of the Earl Spencer; but for that they would have had ample time to have avoided us; if they had been going slower when they sighted us, they could have ascertained which way we were going, and then would have had time to shift their helm so as to clear us. If extra signals or lights are encouraged, there will be great confusion and danger ensuing therefrom. The only duty as to look out astern is, that a leading ship must keep such a reasonable lookout as will enable her to give warning to ships approaching at a proper speed.

Aspinall, in reply.-Even supposing the speed of the Earl Spencer was excessive, that would only make her half to blame; if a signal of her position had been given by the Merlin at an earlier period, the Earl Spencer, in spite of her speed, could and would have avoided the collision. When entering a channel where they are likely to be followed, ships are bound to keep some look-out so as to prevent ships coming into them astern by giving a signal, and some one on board ought to look astern sufficiently often to enable him to take precaution in reasonable time.

The judgment of the court was delivered by Sir ROBERT P. COLLIER.-The material circumstances of this case are as follows:

The Merlin, a small coasting schooner of 65 tons, with four hands on board, was bound on a voyage from Carmarthen to Liverpool with a cargo of tin plate, but owing to a strong gale setting in from the S.S.W. she beat up for and entered Holyhead Harbour, and at the time of the collision, which was in the night or towards the morning of the 17th Oct., there being a strong wind and also a drizzling rain, she was going about two and a half knots an hour. The Earl Spencer is a steamer, carrying passengers and cargo, plying between Greenore and Holyhead, and was coming into Holyhead at the same time, taking very much the same course as the Merlin, According to her own showing the steamer entered the harbour of Holyhead at a speed of eleven knots an hour, and at about a cable's length or somewhat more she saw the Merlin in front of her. It appears that the captain came to the conclusion that the Merlin was anchored, although the Merlin showed no light; acting upon that view he put the helm of the Earl Spencer to the starboard, and the result was that in a short time he ran into the port quarter of the Merlin, and the Merlin was subsequently sank. The court below has held that the Earl Spencer was alone to blame for this collision, owing to the excessive speed at which she entered the harbour. Their Lordships have no doubt that the finding of the court is right so far as the Earl Spencer is held to be to blame. Their Lordships entirely agree that she entered the harbour with a reprehensible and they may add a reckless speed, considering the time of the night, the state of the weather, and that a number of vessels were in

the habit of anchoring very near to the path which she took.

It appears to their Lordships also that she is to blame for executing a wrong manoeuvre. Seeing no light on board the Merlin, and seeing the Merlin in the usual route of the steamers, which would not be the usual anchoring ground, though not far from it, it appears to their Lordships that the captain was not justified in assuming that the Merlin was at anchor, and that he took a wrong manoeuvre in starboarding his helm, whereas if he had attended to the advice of the mate in time, which was to port the helm, the collision would have been avoided.

The question remains whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the Merlin. The captain of the Merlin certainly says that he was at the helm, and that if he had looked round he probably could have seen the steamer some considerable distance off, and if so that he should have waived a light or adopted some mode of attracting her attention.

On the whole, however, their Lordships see no reason to dissent from the finding of the court below, that the Merlin was not guilty of contributory negligence such as would fix her with a portion of the blame of this collision. Their Lordships do not at all depart from the rule which they laid down in a recent case, The Anglo-Indian (ubi sup.). They are far from saying that it is never the duty of a vessel ahead to look behind. There may, undoubtedly, be circumstances of an exceptional character which may throw upon the vessel ahead the duty of looking behind, and, further, of giving some signal, by the way of a light or otherwise, to a vessel behind approaching her under circumstances under which there is reason to suppose that the after vessel does not see the vessel in front, and when there is danger of a collision. But in this case, although no doubt the night was a dark, and to a certain extent a stormy one, it appears to their Lordships that the Merlin could have been seen at a sufficient distance by the steamer for the collision to have been avoided if the steamer had gone at a proper speed (which, according to their Lordships' view, would be somewhere about one half or possibly less than half of the speed at which she was going). That being so, the captain of the Merlin might reasonably have supposed that steamers coming in his wake would (as their primâ facie duty at all events was) keep out of his way, and their Lordships are not able to say that he was guilty of negligence contributing to the accident, simply because a lookout behind was not kept, and no signal was given to the approaching vessel.

For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment of the court below is right, and they would humbly advise her Majesty that it be affirmed, and that this appeal be dismissed with

COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Reported by H. LEIGH and CYRIL DODD, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

Jan. 20 and Feb. 12, 1875. LOCKHART v. FALK.

[Ex.

Ship and shipping-Charter-party-DemurrageLien and exemption clause-Detention at port of loading-Action for by shipowner-Construction of charter-party.

By a charter-party between the plaintiff and the defendant, a vessel of the plaintiff was to proceed to W. and there load a cargo 66 in the customary manner," and forthwith proceed to R. and deliver the same.. "The cargo to be discharged in ten working days (weather permitting), commencing from the day after the ship has got into her proper discharging berth. Demurrage at 21. per 100 tons register per day. The ship to have an absolute lien on cargo for freight and demurrage, the charterer's liability to any clauses in this charter ceasing when he has delivered the cargo alongside the ship." It was proved that at W. the customary rate of loading was twenty tons a day.

In an action by the shipowner against the charterer for damages for undue detention of the vessel at the port of loading, the judge of the County Court held that the claim was not for demurrage, and gave judgment for the plaintiff for 441. 28. 8d, being damages for detention for sixteen days at the rate of 21. 158. 2d. per day. And on appeal therefrom, it was

Held, by the Court of Exchequer (Cleasby, Pollock, and Amphlett, BB.), dismissing the appeal, that the decision of the County Court judge was right, and that the demurrage and lien and exemption clauses in the charter-party were applicable to the port of discharge only, and did not apply to the shipowner's claim for damages arising from delay on the part of the charterer at the port of loading.

Bannister v. Breslauer (16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 418; 36 L. J. 195, C. P.; L. Rep. 2 C. P. 497), and Francesco v. Massey (L. Rp. 8 Ex. 101; ante, vol. 2, p. 594, n.), discussed and distinguished. (a)

(a) Since the above decision the Exchequer Chamber, in Kish v. Cory (ante, vol. 2, p. 593), have decided somewhat differently. In that case a charter-party between a shipowner and a charterer provided that the cargo was to be loaded in thirteen working days, and was to be discharged at not less than thirty-five tons per working day from the time of the ship being ready; that there should be ten days on demurrage for all like days above the said days, to be paid at the rate, &c.; and that the charterer's liability should cease when the ship was loaded, the captain or owner having a lien on cargo for freight and demurrage. An action was brought by the shipowner against the charterers for four day's demurrage at the port of loading beyond the thirteen clear working days allowed by the charter party, and it was held that the demurrage days related to the port of loading as well as the port of discharge, and that the charterer's liability for all such demurrage ceased when the ship was loaded. The distinction between that case and the present is that in the present there were no definitely named number of days for loading, consequently no days to which the term demurrage, as strictly applied, could refer at the port of loading; whereas in Kish v. Cory there was a definite number of loading days, and therefore, in accordance with the decisions, the demurrage clause was held to apply to both port of loading and discharge. It is to be regretted, however, that the meaning of the word "demurrage "should be so restricted. In the ordinary commercial sense it means

The date given in the bill of lading is not conclusive evidence that the cargo was shipped before that date.

THIS was an appeal from the decision of the judge of the County Court of Yorkshire, and the following are the material facts of the special case stated by the judge for the opinion of the Court of Exchequer.

The plaintiff in the action entered a plaint for 50l. and the following were the particulars annexed to the summons: "The plaintiff sues the defendant for that on the 16th March 1874, it was mutually agreed between Jno. Corran, the master of the plaintiff's vessel, the Zoe, of 138 tons, as agent for the plaintiff and the defendant, that the plaintiff's said vessel should go with all convenient speed to Western Point, and there load, from the defendant or his factors, a full and complete cargo of rock salt, in the customary manner (certain damages and accidents excepted), and demurrage was to be 21. per 100 tons register per day. And the plaintiff's vessel proceeded to Weston Point, and did all that was necessary to have the defendant's part of the charter fulfilled; but the defendant did not load the said vessel in the customary manner, but detained her twentynine days beyond the usual time, namely, from the 2nd to the 20th April last, both inclusive; and the claim for detention amounts to 521. 88. 2d., and the plaintiff abandons the excess over 50l., and sues for 50l. only."

The cause was heard on the 21st July 1874, when the following appeared to be the facts: The plaintiff is the owner of a vessel called the Zoe, and the defendant is a salt merchant. On the 16th March 1874, Juo. Corran, the master of the Zoe as agent for the plaintiff, and the defendant, entered into a charterparty, of which the following is a copy:

It is this day mutually agreed between Jno. Corran, master of the good ship or vessel called the Zoe now in Runcorn, and H. E. Falk, that the ship shall with all convenient speed, proceed to Weston Point and load from the said H. E. Falk, or his factors, a full and complete cargo of rock salt, in the customary manner, say about 250 tons. . . and being so loaded, shall therewith proceed to Riga Bridge and there deliver the same. Freight, at the rate of 10s. 3d. (say ten shillings and three pence) and five guineas gratuity, per delivered ton of 20cwt. being paid by the receivers of the cargo, on the delivery of the same, in cash, at the current rate of three months' London exchange. The cargo to be discharged in ten working days (weather permitting), commencing from the day after the ship has got into her proper discharging berth. Demurrage at £2 per 100 tons register per day. Penalty for non-performance of this agreement, amount of freight. The ship to be addressed to the charterers' agents and brokers at the ports of discharge, paying the usual addressed commission of the port (the act of God," &c., excepted). The ship to have an absolute lien on cargo for freight and demurrage; the charterer's liability to any clauses in this charter any detention of a ship in port of loading or discharge and whether any number of days have been named for loading or not; and a charter-party is essentially a commercial document, drawn by commercial men, who may be presumed to intend the meaning which a word ordinarily conveys to their minds. It is to be hoped that the decision in Kish v. Cory will lead to a more liberal interpretation of the word, and that it will be held that whenever a lien is given for freight and demurrage, and the charter-party exempts the charterer from liability when the cargo is loaded, the exemption extends to any detention at the port of loading. The charterer inserting these clauses is usually only an agent, and the master has ample security against the principal by means of his lien.-ED.

[Ex.

ceasing when he has delivered the cargo alongside the ship. Vessel to clear with charterer at Runcorn. Liverpool, this 16th of March 1874. (Signed) JOHN_CORRAN,

Per proc H. E. FALK, THOS. LANCASTER,

The vessel proceeded to Weston Point on the 20th March, and on the 21st March notice was given to the defendant that the vessel was ready to load cargo. The captain called repeatedly afterwards at the defendant's office, and from time to time was promised that the cargo should be sent alongside, but none was, in fact, sent until the 11th April, and between that date and the 20th April, the defendant loaded on board the Zoe part of the cargoes of several lighters, and sent the rest of such cargoes to other vessels which he was loading in the same dock. On the 18th April the balance to complete the cargo was alongside the ship, but it had to be lifted on shore and weighed before it was loaded on board the Zoe, and the loading was not completed until the 20th April.

The ship sailed on the 20th at 10 a.m. There was no evidence of any demand for demurrage or detention before such sailing, or until after all the cargo was delivered alongside. Bills of lading were signed by Jno. Corran the master, dated the 18th April; but, at the hearing, he deposed that he did not sign them until the 20th April. The bill of lading (a copy of which was here set out in the case), was made "unto order or to order of assigns, he or they paying freight for the said goods, and all other conditions as per charter party." "It was proved by the plaintiff that the usual despatch of the port was twenty tons per working day for loading, and it was contended on his behalf that at that rate the loading should have been completed on the 4th April, and he claimed damages for sixteen days' detention of the ship from that day until the 20th April.

It was submitted on the part of the defendant that as no evidence had been given of a claim for demurrage or detention at the port of loading having been made until after all the cargɔ had been delivered alongside, and till after the vessel had sailed, the liability of the defendant under the charter-party had ceased, that the demurrage, for which the captain had an absolute lien on the cargo, included such detention or delay in loading as had occurred in the present case; that the plaintiff was bound by the date of the bill of lading; and that at all events the amount must be reduced to the sum of 51. 10s. 4d. Judgment was given for the plaintiff for 44l. 28. 8d., the amount which the learned County Court judge thought the plaintiff was entitled to recover, viz., for sixteen days at 21. 158. 2d. a day. The learned judge was of opinion that the word "demurrage in the foregoing clause of the charter-party did not apply to detention prior to delivery of the cargo at the port of loading, and that the plaintiff's claim for such detention was not affected by the said clause.

The grounds of appeal were: first, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover against the defendant anything in respect of demurrage, or damages in the nature of demurrage, or on the particulars of his claim as filed in this action; secondly, that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover any sum, the damages awarded were excessive, the evidence proving that the whole cargo was delivered alongside the ship before or not later

than the 18th April; thirdly, that the plaintiff did not, at any time before action make any demand for demurrage or for anything comprised within his particulars.

at

Gully for the defendant (appellant).-Substantially the plaintiff's claim is for "demurrage the port of loading, and the word applies to any damage arising from undue detention or delay, and must be so construed on the present occasion. Demurrage and detention differ in this, that in the one case there is a fixed number of days, and in the other the days are not fixed; but that is not material here because the days can be ascertained precisely by reference to the number of days in which the vessel could be loaded "in the customary" manner at the particular port. The plaintiff's claim is for the stipulated demurrage amount of 21. 158. 2d. a day, and for that he had a lien on the cargo, and cannot maintain this action, all liability on the charterer's part having ceased upon the cargo being delivered alongside. In Francesco v. Massey (ante, vol. 2, p. 594, n.; L. Rep. 8 Ex. 101; 42 L. J. 75, Ex.) the last case in which the question of demurrage was discussed, it was decided that the protection to the charterer afforded by a clause similar to that in the present charter was coextensive with the lien given by the charter-party, and that it extended to demurrage at the port both of loading and discharge, and that the ship having been loaded, no action lay against the charterer for demurrage accruing during the loading. [CLEASBY, B. referred to Gray v. Carr (ante, vol. 1. p. 305; L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 522; 40 L. J. 257, Q. B.) to the same effect as Francesco v. Massey, and the cases of Christoffersen v. Hansen (ante, vol. 1, p. 305; 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 547; L. Rep. 7 Q. B. 509; and Bannister v. Breslauer (16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 418; 36 L. J. 195, C. P.; L. Rep. 2, C. P. 497)]. The result of all the cases would appear to be that where a lien is given and a certain number of days for demurrage fixed by the charter-party, the lien is applicable only to those fixed days, and not to any detention beyond the fixed period. Here the delay in loading gives rise to the lien; and as the loading was to be in the "customary manner," the custom of the port showed that a certain time was allowed for loading. Whether, therefore, the charterparty itself specifically fixed the precise time, or the time could be made certain by construing the words of the instrument with reference to the facts of the case, the result was precisely the same. The parties intended to make provision for demurrage at both ends, the loading and the discharge, and the clause applies to both accordingly. The words "lien for demurrage" in this charter mean the demurrage therein mentioned at 21. 158. 2d. a day, or they mean nothing. That is the plaintiff's claim, and for that the verdict was given. But if this claim is for "demurrage" it is barred by the last clause in the charter-party when the loading was completed. (He contended also that the bill of lading was an estoppel to the claim of damages for delay beyond the 18th April.)

R. G. Williams, Q. C. (with him was E. T. Wheeler) for the plaintiff (respondent).—If no time is fixed after which demurrage begins, then no claim for demurrage arises. It is not necessary, however, to make it strictly demurrage that the time should be fixed. The defendant here has contended that the clause providing for the loading being accom

66

[Ex.

plished "in the customary way" is equivalent to a precise number of days being specifically fixed, but those words had no reference to time at all. They relate merely to the manner of loading, as, e.g., by lighters or from the wharf, &c. For that there is conclusive and express authority. Thus, in Lawson v. Burness, in this court (1 H. & C. 396), Pollock, C.B. said (at p. 400), "It appears to me that the words 'customary manner mean the mode of loading, whether from a lighter or from a wharf." And in Tapscott and others v. Balfour and others, in the Common Pleas (ante, vol. 1, p. 501; 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 710; 42 L. J. 16, C. P.; L. Rep. 8 C. P, 46), Bovi!l, C.J. approved of that construction of those words, and thought that the words directing the loading of a vessel in the "usual and customary manner" applied not to the time, but to the place or mode in which the loading was to be performed. The rate of "27. per 100 tons per day," and the 'ten days" limited by this charter, have relation to a demurrage claim, whereas the plaintiff's claim is for not loading within reasonable time, as to which the charter fixes no rate or number of days at all, and so the exemption from liability clause is not applicable. In Maude and Pollock on Shipping, 3rd edit. p. 305, "demurrage" is well defined as the "sum which is fixed by the contract of carriage as a remuneration to the shipowner for the detention of the ship beyond the number of days allowed for loading or unloading." Such a clause as the last clause in this charterparty relates primâ facie, to future and not to past liabilities: (See Pedersen v. Lotinga, 28 L. T. Rep. 267; Christoffersen v. Hansen (ubi sup.) No doubt in Oglesby v. Yglesias (E. B. & E. 930; 27 L. J. 356, QB.), and Mildam v. Perry (3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 736; 3 E. & E. 495; 30 L. J. 90, Q.B.), it was held to apply to past and already accrued liabilities; but that was because the express words of the instrument rendered such a construction necessary; but that will not be in the absence of express words, or such as raise a clear inference to that effect. The case of Francesco v. Massey (ubi sup.) is clearly distinguishable. There was there a time fixed for both loading and discharging, and demurrage was given at both ports. [CLEASBY, B.

In Bannister v. Breslauer (ubi sup.) a provision for the ceasing of the charterer's liability on the shipment of the cargo was held no answer to an action for delay in loading] No time was fixed in that case for loading or unloading, nor was there a demurrage clause, and if the clause did not apply to detention there was nothing to which "demurrage" could apply. And, moreover, that case had doubts thrown upon it in Gray v. Carr (ubi sup.) The present charter fixed the time for discharging, but is silent as to that for loading, and the lien and exemption clause must be limited to after claims at the port of discharge, and cannot be applied to the present claim for damages already incurred at the port of loading.

Gully, in reply, referred to and distinguished the cases cited on the other side.

Cur. adv. vult. Feb. 13.-The judgment of the court (Cleasby, Pollock and Amphlett, BB.) was now delivered, as follows, by

CLEASBY, B. The question in this case is whether the charterer is liable for detention at the port of loading by not loading in the customary manner? There is also a question of amount

depending upon the number of days during which the vessel was detained.

We think that the detention must be taken up to the time when the cargo was loaded, and that the date of the bill of lading is not conclusive.

There is a clause in the charter-party giving the shipowner a lien for freight and demurrage, and providing that the charterer's liability shall cease upon the cargo being delivered alongside the ship. The question really becomes whether what may be called the "lien and exemption" clause which, no doubt, applies to demurrage, properly so called, applies also upon the language of this charter, to a clause for undue detention at the port of loading. A similar question has frequently arisen before, and we should not think of departing from what has been already decided; but it must always be borne in mind that if the language be not the same, the decision may not be applicable. There is no case exactly the same as the present

case.

The word "demurrage," no doubt, properly signifies the agreed additional payment (generally per day) for an allowed detention beyond a period either specified in, or to be collected from the instrument; but it also has a popular and more general meaning of compensation for undue detention time; and from the whole of each charter-party containing the clause in question, we must collect what is the proper meaning to be assigned to it.

When the charter-party contains no clause allowing demurrage at a specified rate at all, it has been held that the word " demurrage," in the exemption clause, applies to detention, and that the charterer is discharged as soon as a cargo is on board. This was the case of Bannister v. Breslauer (ubi sup.). That decision is certainly not applicable to the present case, because we have in this charter-party a demurrage clause, though not a precise one. In the present case the charter provides that the ship shall be discharged in ten working days, and afterwards has these words: Demurrage at 21. per 100 tons register per day."

It has also been decided that where there is a time specified for loading, and also a time for unloading, fixed by its being at the rate of so many tons a day, and afterwards a demurrage clause for a fixed number of days, at one agreed price per day, then in that case the exemption clause applies to demurrage whether at the port of loading or of discharge; but it was thought clear that it did not apply to detention beyond the ten days and demurrage days at the port of loading. This was the case of Francesco v. Massey (ubi sup.). The effect of that decision is that, where there is a clause for demurrage at a specified rate for a certain number of days, and, a number of days being allowed for loading, there can be demurrage in the proper sense at the port of loading, the exemption clause applies to demurrage there. And if we could read the provisions for loading in the present case, as fixing a particular time for doing so, the decision would apply at all events, to the period, although not specified, to which the demurrage clause might be considered to apply. But we do not think that we can read the words, that the vessel shall load a cargo "in the customary manner," as equivalent to a provision that she shall load in a certain number of days, or at a certain rate per day, for the purpose of applying the word "demurrage

[ADM.

| to a detention beyond that period; those words do not admit, in our opinion, of an addition that she may remain, if she does not load "in the customary manner," for a number of days on demurrage.

The conclusion at which we arrive is, that, in the present case, the word "demurrage" in the lien and exemption clause must be confined to demurrage days after the ten working days allowed for discharge, and must not be extended to improper detention at the port of loading. The decision of the court below was therefore right, and this appeal must be dismissed.

Judgment for the plaintiff (respondent). Attorneys for the plaintiff (respondent), Prior, Bigg, Church, and Co., agents for J. B. Wilson, Liverpool.

Attorney for the defendant (appellant), H. G. Field, agent for Thos. Etty, Liverpool.

COURT OF ADMIRALTY. Reported by J. P. ASPINALL, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

May 4 and 11, 1875. THE NILE.

Salvage-Apportionment-Government transportOwners-Senior naval officer-Transport officer -Right to reward.

A ship chartered to Government as a transport under a charter-party in the ordinary form used by the Government for chartering ships in time of war, is not demised to the Government in a way which deprives her owners of the right to salvage reward for services rendered by her under the directions of the Queen's naval officers commanding at the place where she is stationed. The senior naval officer on a station sending out of harbour a transport with her own crew and a number of men from one of her Majesty's ships, for the purpose of rendering assistance to and towing into harbour a ship in distress, is entitled to share in the sum awarded for the service, and the naval officer (being also a transport officer of the station) who commands the men from H.M.'s ship, is to be considered so far in charge of the whole expedition that he is entitled to reward in that capacity.

THIS was an application to the High Court of Admiralty to apportion between salvors a sum of 10001. recovered in two consolidated causes instituted in that court by them for salvage services rendered to the steamship Nile. The two causes were instituted, the one on behalf of owners, master, and crew of the steamship Finisterre, and the other on behalf of the commander, officers, and crew of H.M.S. Simoom. The owners of the Nile appeared, and filed an answer to the plaintiffs' petition, by which they pleaded a tender of the sum of 1000l., and this amount having been duly tendered, was accepted by the plaintiffs.

The facts, as stated by the plaintiffs in their petition in the consolidated causes, were follows:

as

1. The Finisterre is a screw steamer of 551 tons register, with engines of 90-horse power nominal, working up to about 400-horse power, and is of the value of about 18,000l. H.M.S. Simoom is an iron steamship of 1980 tons register, and carries a complement of 172 officers and men. The Nile is a screw steamer of about 725 tons register, and was, at the time of the occurrence hereinafter mentioned, bound for Demerara with a general cargo.