When the cause came on for hearing, an objection was taken to the jurisdiction, and the learned judge decided that he had no jurisdiction and dismissed the suit. The judge's notes, on which the appeal was heard, were as follows: Mr. R. objects that it is not a suit of wages, that it 8 more in the nature of a partnership. Mr. H. referred to 36 & 37 Vict. c. 85, s. 8. Agreement put in not exe. cuted as provided by that section. I hold, on Mr. R.'s objection, that this is not a suit for wages, or within the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty at all, it is not within the jurisdiction of the County Court as a wages suit. I suggested that Mr. H. should ascertain whether the Court of Admiralty ever entertained a suit under such an agreement as a wages suit, and, if he found it had, he might apply to me again. M'Clymont, for the plaintiff, on the 30th Jan. obtained a rule nisi to set aside this decision, and on 5th Feb. 1878 the rule came on for argu ment. M'Clymont for the appellant.-There is jurisdiction for a judge of a County Court having Admiralty jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this description: sect. 3 County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71). The agreement is a contract of wages. This species of agreement is specially countenanced by sect. 8 of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 85). [Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-Is the agreement in writing?] Yes, but we have failed to obtain it; the original is in the possession of the defendant, and he has not given it up, though he has had notice to do so. But even if it was not executed in accordance with the statute, it is nevertheless a binding agreement for the payment of a share of the profits of the fishing adventure as wages. [Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-The learned judge does not say he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit if it was a wages suit, but that under the circumstances it was not a wages suit, and that therefore he had no jurisdiction.] This method of payment of wages in the fishing trade has been recognised as a portion of the general maritime law long anterior to the Merchant Shipping Acts: (The Frederick, 5 Ch. Rob. 8.) It is sufficient. if I show that this is, speaking generally, a wages suit. I am not bound to show that each item of the claim comes under that definition. That is a matter for the consideration of the County Court. Clarkson-I admit that an agreement to take a share of the profits of a fishing adventure is an agreement in the nature of a contract of wages, and that the County Court judge has jurisdiction in such a case; but the case is not confined to that; there is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal. It has heen held that this court has jurisdiction to entertain such a claim, but that is a consequence of its original jurisdiction: ADM. The Great Eastern, L. Rep, 1 A. & E. 384; 17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 228; The Northumbria. (a) But the Admiralty jurisdiction of the County Courts is the creature of the statute, and therefore limited by the statute; and there is nothing in sect. 3, sub-sect. 2 of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71) to give such jurisdiction as this, in a case of damages for wrongful dismissal. The other item of the claim is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the County Court. This court has never exercised a jurisdiction to estimate damages in an action of detinue. M'Clymont in reply.-Our claim for wrongful dismissal is a claim for wages under the contract, which we have not been allowed to complete, and therefore is a claim properly included in a claim for wages. As to the last item of the claim, the Court of Admiralty has exercised jurisdiction in cases of personal injury (The Ruckers, 4 Ch. Rob. 73); and in a recent case the petition alleges the wrongful detention of clothes and other chattels of the plaintiff's on board the ship (The Roebuck, 2 Asp. Mar. L. C. 387; 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 274). That pleading was not objected to, and the court made a general decree which shows that such a claim may be made in a Court of Admiralty. [Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-Supposing that the High Court of Admiralty had such a jurisdiction, how do you show it to be conferred on the County Court?] Sect. 2 sub-sect. 1, of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Amendment Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 51) gives a County Court jurisdiction over any claim in tort in respect of any goods carried in any ship," but I do not consider it necessary to press that part of the claim. That it Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-I give no decision as to whether the court can entertain a claim for the wrongful detention of chattels, but I shall remit this case to the judge of the court below, with an intimation that the County Court has jurisdiction over the main portion of this claim. is a question of wages, on the authorities cited, there can be no doubt. It appears to me a matter of regret that the learned judge was not properly informed of the cases by those who argued the matter before him. I remit to him to re-try the case. The appellants are entitled to have their costs below and of the appeal. Solicitors for plaintiff, Belfrage and Middleton, agents for Holmes and Brewis. Solicitors for defendants, Tuffnell and Southgate, agents for Dixon. Feb. 22, 23, and 25, 1878. Collision-Dragging-Duty of pilot-River Mersey (a) The Northumbria was an action brought in 1876 by a master mariner to recover the balance of his wages and disbursements, and damages for wrongful dismissal. The plaintiff was engaged for a voyage from England to South American ports and back, which would have lasted about six months. The action was in rem. The plaintiff was discharged about a fortnight after the engage ment, and when the vessel put back into a port of dis tress. The defence was drunkenness. The Court found for the plaintiff that he had not been guilty of drunkenness, and gave him damages for the wrongful dismissal to the amount of the wages he would have earned if he had completed his voyage.-ED. 128, 138-Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104), 88. 353, 362-Costs. Where a vessel under the charge of a pilot is at anchor and drags, it is the duty of the pilot to inform himself of the condition of affairs, before taking steps to avoid damage arising from it, and not to wait till someone reports it to him. Where a vessel coming from sea into the river Mersey with a pilot on board is prevented from docking, in consequence of the violence of the wind, or want of water, and anchors, but is to be docked as soon as circumstances permit, the employment of a pilot is, under the Mersey Docks Acts Consolidation Act, compulsory. The Admiralty Division will adhere to the practice of the High Court of Admiralty as to costs in cases of compulsory pilotage. THIS was an action brought by the owners of the Dutch barque Twee Zusters against the American ship Princeton, to recover for the damages sustained by the former vessel in two collisions which happened between the vessels whilst at anchor in the river Mersey on the 25th Jan. 1878. The Princeton counter-claimed for the damage sustained by her in the same collision. The Twee Zusters was a barque of 375 tons register, and had put into Liverpool as a port of refuge. In consequence of the badness of the weather on her arrival she had been unable to get a pilot, and had come in, and to anchor, without one. The Princeton was a ship of 1349 tons register, laden with a cargo of cotton, and had come into harbour in charge of a pilot, who, at the time of the collision, was still on board. When the vessels were anchored in the first instance each gave the other a clear berth. At 4 a.m., shortly after which time the first collision happened, the tide was ebb, running about 23 knots, and the wind blowing a gale from about N.N.W. against the tide. The Twee Zusters had two anchors down with 45 fathoms of chain on one, and 69 fathoms on the other. The Princeton had one anchor down with 70 fathoms of chain. Both vessels were riding to the tide with their heads up the river. Under these circumstances each vessel alleged the other to have dragged, in consequence of which the collision happened. The jibboom and port cathead of the Twee Zusters coming into contact with the starboard mizen chains of the Princeton. Before the collision the Twee Zusters had paid out cable and ported her helm. After the collision the Twee Zusters dropped clear to the northward of the Princeton. On the following flood tide the vessels swung clear of one another, but on the succeeding ebb, about 6 p.m., they again came into collision, in much the same positions as before, and remained in collision for a considerable time, doing considerable damage; and ultimately the Twee Zusters parted from her anchors. The Princeton slipped her cable before going into dock, and when her anchor was weighed it was found to be foul, the cable being round the stock. The pilot of the Princeton proved that he was engaged to take the vessel from sea into dock, and that she would have gone into dock as soon as the weather permitted. Each vessel alleged the want of a proper look. out on board the other, and an insufficiency of ground tackle, and negligence. The Princeton [ADM. raised in addition the defence of compulsory pilotage. It was proved that the pilot of the Princeton had been paid the proper pilotage rate from sea to the docks, and also the sum of 108., being at the rate of 58. per diem for two days during which the Princeton lay in the river. Butt, Q.C. (with him Myburgh) for plaintiffs, owners of the Twee Zusters.-It was negligence on the part of the Princeton to lie at single anchor in such weather. It is proved that the anchor was foul when weighed, and therefore it must have been foul before the cable was slipped; therefore it would not hold so well as if clear, consequently the Princeton dragged and occasioned the collision. She was also out of the control of her helm; had she been properly under control she could have avoided the collisior. The question of compulsory pilotage does not arise. She had no proper lookout; had she had a proper look-out she would have been seen to have been approaching the Twee Zusters, and the fact would have been reported. It was not reported, and that has been held to be contributory negligence on the part of the crew. Milward, Q.C. (with him Clarkson).-We never dragged at all, and therefore our anchor was sufficient to hold us. When weighed the chain was only under the stock, and that would make no difference in the holding power of the anchor, even if it was in that condition at the time of the collision. Myburgh in reply. Feb. 25.-Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-This is a case of collision between two vessels at anchor in the river Mersey, either to the northward of Egremont Ferry or abreast of the Bramley Moore Dock. The vessels which came into collision were the Twee Zusters, a Dutch vessel of 375 tons register, and heavily laden, and which had come to anchor in a proper berth to the westward of mid-river on the 23rd Jan. in this year, and had, before the collision, dropped both her anchors the starboard one with forty-five fathoms of chain and the port one with sixty fathoms. The other vessel was the Princeton, an American ship of no less than 1349 tons register, laden with a cargo of cotton. She had come to anchor in a proper berth abreast of the Bramley Moore Dock, with her starboard anchor and seventy fathoms of chain. The Twee Zusters had anchored twenty-four hours before the Princeton. It is admitted, and also proved by the evidence, that in coming to anchor the Princeton did not give the Twee Zusters a foul berth, there being a cable's length distance between them; but, nevertheless, two collisions took place. It is also admitted that, whichever is responsible for the first collision is responsible also for the second, because the fouling of the berth which caused the first collision was the cause of the second also. In the first the jibboom of the Twee Zusters came into contact with the starboard side of the Princeton, and on the evidence it is plain that the collision must have been occasioned by one of the two vessels dragging her anchor on the tide, the wind at the time blowing in an opposite direction to the tide. The question which the court has discussed with the Elder Brethren of the Trinity House is, which of the two vessels dragged? After a careful consideration of the evidence, which is contradictory, we think that, on the whole, it establishes that the Twee Zusters remained at her anchor, and the Princeton drove upon her. We are clearly of opinion that the pilot in charge ought to have let go the second anchor, as that was a precaution which the state of the weather imperatively demanded. We think that the collision was caused by the dragging of the anchor of the Princeton, to prevent which proper measures, such as setting her staysail, were not taken. I pronounce the Princeton alone to blame. Butt, Q.C. then contended that the pilot was not responsible for the collision. There ought to have been a proper look-out, and there was not, or if there was a look-out he neglected his duty; he ought to have given notice to the pilot or person in charge of the ship when the vessels were approaching one another; he must either have seen that they were approaching and neglected to report it, or he did not see it and ought to have done so. It was also negligence on the part of the ship's officers to leave her in an unmanageable condition. Milward, Q.C. was not called on. Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-The Trinity Masters are of opinion, and I entirely agree with them, that the pilot himself ought to have seen the state of affairs. I therefore decree that the pilot alone is to blame for this collision. The question whether under the circumstances the employment of the pilot on board the Princeton was such as to exempt the owners from liability was then argued. The statutes and sections on which the arguments were based were the following: The Liverpool Pilot Act (5 Geo. 4, c. lxxiii.). Sect. 32. Every pilot so to be licensed as aforesaid, who shall pilot or conduct any ship or vessel into the said port of Liverpool, is hereby required to take care (if need be) to cause such ship or vessel to be properly moored at anchor in the river Mersey, and afterwards to conduct such ship or vessel into one of the wet docks within the said port, without being paid any other rate or price than is hereby directed to be taken for the piloting or conducting such ship or vessel into the said port of Liverpool; but in case such attendance shall be required during such ship or vessel being at anchor in the river Mersey and before she is docked, five shillings per day shall be paid, provided, &c. Sect. 34. If the owner, master, or commander of any ship or vessel shall require the attendance of a pilot, licensed as aforesaid, on board any ship or vessel during her riding at anchor, or being at Hoylake, or in the river Mersey, such pilot shall attend such ship or vessel, and be paid for every day he shall so attend five shillings and no more: provided always, that in case such pilot shall not be employed the whole day, but be dismissed in less time than a day, such pilot shall be paid five shillings for his attendance: provided also that the pilot, so to be licensed as aforesaid, who shall have the charge of any ship or vessel, shall be paid for every day of his attendance whilst in the river, except the day of going to sea with such ships or vessels as shall be outward bound, and the day of returning from sea and the day of docking for such as shall be inward bound. The Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104). Sect. 353. Subject to any alteration to be made by any pilotage authority in pursuance of the power hereinbefore in that behalf given, the employment of pilots sball continue to be compulsory in all districts in which the same was by law compulsory immediately before the time when this Act comes into operation, and all exemptions from compulsory pilotage then existing within such districts shall also continue in force, &c. Sect. 362. An unqualified pilot may, within the pilotage district, without subjecting himself or his employer to any penalty, take charge of a ship as pilot under the following circumstances (that is to say).. For the purpose of changing the moorings of any ship in port, or of taking her into or out of any dock, in cases where [ADM. such act can be done by an unqualified pilot without infringing the regulations of the port, or any orders which the harbour master is legally empowered to give. Sect. 388. No owner or master of any ship shall be answerable to any person whatever for any loss or damage occasioned by the fault or incapacity of any qualified pilot acting in charge of such ship within any district where the employment of such pilot is compulsory by law. The Mersey Dock Acts Consolidation Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.) s. 6, repeals (inter alia) the sections of the Liverpool Pilot Act set out above. Sect. 123 enacts a penalty of 201. for unlicensed persons piloting vessels in or out of the port of Liverpool. Sect. 128. The pilot in charge of any inward-bound vessel shall cause the same (if need be) to be properly moored at anchor in the river Mersey, and shall pilot the same into some one of the wet docks within the port of Liverpool, whether belonging to the board or not, without making any additional charge for so doing, unless his attendance shall be required on board such vessel while at anchor in the river Mersey and before going into dock, in which case he shall be entitled to receive five shillings per day for such attendance. Sect. 129 enacts a penalty of 51. on masters of inward-bound vessels omitting to fly a signal for a pilot on coming within the pilot stations, and not giving reasonable assistance to a pilot to come on board. Section 130 enacts that masters of vessels other than coasting vessels in ballast or under 100 tons burthen refusing to accept the services of a pilot when offered shall pay full pilotage rates to such pilot. Sect. 133 gives power to the board to fix pilotage rates for inward-bound vessels within certain limits. Sect. 138. If the master of any vessel shall require the attendance of a pilot on board any vessel during her riding at anchor, or being at Hoylake or in the river Mersey, the pilot so employed shall be paid for every day or portion of a day he shall so attend the sum of five shillings, and no more, provided that the pilot who shall have the charge of any vessel shall be paid for every day of his attendance whilst in the river; but no such charge shall be made for the day on which such vessel, being outward bound, shall leave the river Mersey to commence her voyage, or being inward bound, shall enter the river Mersey. Sect. 139. In case the master of any vessel being outward bound. . . . shall proceed to sea and shall refuse to take on board or to employ a pilot, he shall pay to the pilot who shall first offer himself to pilot the same, the full pilotage rate that would have been payable for such vessel if the pilot had actually piloted the same into or out, as the case may be, of the said port of Liverpool, together with all expenses incurred in recovering the same. Bye-laws for the licensing and government of the pilots under the jurisdiction of the Liverpool Pilotage Committee approved by Order in Council June 24th 1856. 5. Duties of individual pilots.-Every pilot on his arrival from sea, either in charge of a vessel or otherwise, shall give notice thereof to the master of the boat to which he belongs as soon as possible, and shall not leave his vessel until she is safely anchored in the river, nor then leave her without a written permission from the commander, or on being relieved by a pilot of equal class by order of one of the masters of the boat, &c. Butt QC. and Myburgh for plaintiffs, owners of the Twee Zusters.-Pilotage is not in this case com pulsory. Admitting it to be so in the Mersey generally, that is that, with certain exceptions not affecting this case, vessels inward bound into the port of Liverpool are bound to employ a licensed pilot, the compulsion only lasts till they are moored, and revives when they are moving from their moorings into dock. The Mersey Docks Consolidation Act, (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.), s. 6, repeals the previous Pilotage Act, but as that Act (5 Geo. 4, c. lxxiii.) was in force when the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104) was passed, the exemptions from compulsory pilotage whilst a vessel is lying in the river, contained in sects. 32 and 34 of the former Act are preserved by sect. 353 of the latter Act, and there is nothing since to limit them. Sect. 128 of the Mersey Docks Consolidation Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.) is almost identical with the section of the former Pilot Act referred to, and by it the duty of the pilot is defined to be, "to cause the vessel to be properly moored at anchor in the river Mersey." The pilot here had fulfilled that duty; then comes an employment voluntary on the part of the master of the ship, but which the pilot is bound to accept, and for which he receives 5s. a day, which the pilot has done; the fact of the payment being made shows that the employment was within the voluntary portion of the clause; if the service were one continuous compulsory service from sea to dock, the ordinary rate of payment for that service would alone have been made, no matter how long it took to perform. The Annapolis (Lush. 295, 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 417; 1 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 69) is uot in point; the pilotage was compulsory there because the vessel was again en route from her anchorage to the dock, for which service the pilotage is compulsory; besides there the antecedent delay in the river had been necessary; no such necessity is shown here. Sect. 128 of the Mersey Docks Consolidation Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 92) shows that pilotage is compulsory in the first and last stages of coming from sea to dock, but not in the second; if there could be any doubt about the meaning of the statute, it is put an end to by a former decision of the court (The Woburn Castle 3 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 240; 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 621). Sect. 138 of the Mersey Dock Consolidation Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.) shows the period within which the voluntary service lasts, and the collision happened whilst the Princeton was within that period. The judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of The City of Cambridge (L. Rep. 5 P. C. 451; 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 439) supports this view, as it only shows that where a vessel outward bound is hindered by the weather from at once proceeding to sea, the employment of the pilot remains compulsory during her unavoidable detention, as it is the intention to proceed as soon as possible; and in that case he is entitled to extra remuneration under a different section of the Act (sect. 139 Mersey Docks Consolidation Act 1858). But it does not apply to ships inward bound which might remain for a month before proceeding into dock, or never go there at all. [Sir R. PHILLIMORE -It would extend the exemption of shipowners from liability to a very great extent indeed, if they are not to be liable at all whilst a pilot is in board their vessel lying at anchor in the river, no matter how long.] That could not be the intention of the Legislature, and the tendency of the courts has been to interpret the statutes relieving the shipowner of liability strictly. The pilot was not bound to stay on board unless required to do so by the master, and therefore he was not compulsorily employed. Milward, Q.C. and Clarkson.-The case of [ADM. keeping a pilot on board for a month at 5s. a day is totally distinct from this case. Here the pilot was engaged to take the ship from sea into dock, and he was bound to complete the service; he could not dock when he came in, as the water was too low, but he was to dock the next tide; then he was prevented by the violence of the weather, but there was a continuing intention to dock as soon as possible; under these circumstances he could not leave the ship, and it was not necessary for the captain to require him to remain on board. The fact of receiving 58. a day for the two days he was detained in the river by the weather does not matter; if he received it and was not entitled to it that cannot alter the law, but in this case he was entitled to it, though employed compulsorily. The City of Cambridge (ubi sup.) is directly in point; it shows that where the intention to proceed continues the pilotage is compulsory. The Woburn Abbey (ubi sup.) was the case of a ship lying in the river without any intention of proceeding into dock immediately. This ship was really navigating, her anchoring was a step in her journey to dock, and she was doing so in a district in which pilotage was compulsory by law, and she had taken on board a pilot on compulsion of law, and therefore her owners are exempt from liability for the result of his negligence: General Steam Navigation Company v. British_and Myburgh in reply.-There are three stages recognised in the case of vessels coming from sea into dock, and rightly, for when they enter the river they cannot tell what dock they are to go to, or whether they are to dock at all: they may be ordered to another port of discharge. Whilst they are moving either on their way to anchor or on their way to dock, the pilotage is compulsory; whilst stationary in the river, it is voluntary. The case of an outward-bound ship is different; there, when she leaves the dock, she is to go to sea at once, there is no doubt as to her destination. The wording of sects. 128 and 139 of the Mersey Docks Consolidation Act 1858 distinctly recognises the difference between inward and outward bound vessels. The City of Cambridge (ubi sup.) was an outward bound vessel, and therefore cannot govern the case of an inward-bound ship. Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-I must take as admitted facts to which the law is to be applied the following: That the pilot was taken on board with an engagement to pilot the Princeton to her mooringplace, and subsequently to her dock, and that, in the discharge of that engagement, he had moored her for the night meaning to take her into dock on the next day; that the next morning the weather was such as, in his judgment, rendered it unsafe to proceed into dock; that he so advised the captain, and that in consequence the vessel did not go into dock; on that day the collision happened. The question arises whether, having regard to sects. 128, 138 of the Mersey Dock Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.) and to the general provisions as to pilotage contained in that Act, and to sects. 353 and 362 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104) the vessel remained under the charge of a compulsory pilot during the interval between the mooring and docking. It is not necessary that I should do more than refer to The Annapolis (ubi sup.), The Woburn Abbey (ubi sup.), and The City of Cambridge (ubi sup.) in support of the view I take. Looking to the principle to be extracted from those cases, and giving a reasonable interpretation to the sections of the Acts of Parliament, I am of opinion that the Princeton was still under the management of a compulsory pilot, who was taken on board by compulsion of law. To hold otherwise would be a harsh construction of the statute. The ship was at the time of the collision, in itinere, making her progress towards the dock, aud there was no discontinuance of the engagement of the pilot, or substitution of a voluntary for a compulsory service. The circumstances show that the vessel was compelled to remain where she was by a vis major. If she could have gone into dock sooner, I am not prepared to say that I should consider her entitled to the immunity towhich she is under the existing circumstances entitled. I confine this construction of the law to the particular facts of this case, and I think that the pilot taken on board by compulsion of law was still in charge of the vessel at the time of the collision. With regard to the receipt of 5s. per diem, that has been disposed of by one of the cases to which I have referred, The City of Cambridge (ubi sup.), and the reception of it does not affect the construction I put upon the Act. I pronounce that the vessel was under the charge of a pilot, taken on board by compulsion of law, at the time the collision happened. Milward,Q.C. then applied for costs.-Admitting that it was the practice of the High Court of Admiralty not to allow costs in a case where a defendant raised other defences in addition to that of compulsory pilotage and succeeded only on the ground of compulsory pilotage, that is not the practice of the High Court of Justice, in which in all cases, including the present (see General Steam Navigation Company v. London and Edinburgh Shipping Company, ante p. 454; 36 L. T. Rep. N. S. 743; 2 Ex. Div. 467), a successful defendant gets his costs, and this division will follow the practice of the other divisions. Butt, Q.C. was not called on. Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-I see no reason for altering the well-established practice of this court as to costs in cases of compulsory pilotage, and I shall, in accordance with that practice, make no order as to costs. Suit dismissed, but without costs. Solicitors for plaintiffs, owners of the Twee Zusters, Bateson and Co. Solicitors for defendants, owners of the Princeton, Duncan, Hill, and Dickenson. Tuesday, Feb. 26, 1878. THE FALCON. Appeal from County Court-Amount under 501.— Sect. 31 County Court Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71). A plaintiff claiming an amount not exceeding 501. in an Admiralty cause in a County Court, is precluded from appealing from the decision of the court by sect. 31 of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71). The Doctor Van Thunnen Tellow (20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 960; 3 Mar. L. C. (O. S.) 244; and The [ADM. Elizabeth (L. Rep. 3 A. & E. 33; 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 729), commented on and explained. THIS was an appeal from the City of London Court in its Admiralty jurisdiction. The plaintiffs, owners of the dumb barge Bromley, instituted a suit in that court against the Falcon, a steam vessel belonging to the General Steam Navigation Company, for damages sustained by the Bromley in a collision between that vessel and the Falcon in the River Thames on the 9th Sept. 1877. The plaintiffs claimed in the suit the sum of 301. The cause was heard in the City of London Court on the 5th Feb. 1878, when the learned judge of that court, Mr. Commissioner Kerr, dismissed it with costs. On the 12th Feb. 1878, Safford, for the plaintiff, moved ex parte to set aside the judgment, and obtained a rule nisi. On the 26th Feb. 1878 the rule came on for argument. The argument turned on the question whether sect. 31 of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 gave any appeal to a plaintiff who had claimed less than 501. The following is the section in question : No appeal shall be allowed unless the amount decreed or ordered to be due exceeds the sum of 501. E. C. Clarkson and C. Hall, for the respondents, owners of the Falcon.-The court has no power to entertain the appeal. The action is only entered in 301.; and therefore by sect. 31 of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71) there is no appeal. The Act is express that there is no appeal in such a case by defendants, and therefore by implication there is none for the plaintiffs. The Doctor Van Thunnen Tellow (20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 960; 3 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 244) is not in point. That case only decided that the section in question did not apply to a case where the plaintiff recovered nothing; but it does not appear that the suit in that case was instituted for less than 501. Had it been so there could have been no appeal, as the plaintiffs could never have recovered more than 501. The true interpretation of the section is that no appeal should be allowed where the amount recovered or sought to be recovered, is less than 501. That the section does apply to appeals by the plaintiffs is shown by The Elizabeth (L. Rep. 3 A. & E. 33; 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 729; 3 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 325). It is contrary to equity that an appeal should be denied to a defendant and allowed to a plaintiff. The whole spirit and purport of the County Court Admiralty Jurisdiction Act was to give a cheap remedy in these small cases, and the object of the Acts would be defeated if in such a case a plaintiff has a right of appeal. Where the words of a statute are am biguous, as in this case, the courts will interpret them according to the intention of the Legislature. E. Clark and Safford for appellant.-This case is decided by The Doctor Van Thunnen Tellow (ubi sup.) and The Elizabeth (ubi sup.) The first of those cases shows that the 31st section of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 does not apply to plaintiffs, and does not in any way limit the right of appeal which a plaintiff has in all cases. In the latter case there were cross-causes, and that in which the defendant was plaintiff was dismissed; and though he would have no appeal quá defendant, he had a right of appeal quá plaintiff in his crosscause. Some reasonable construction must be |